


Force and Accommodation in World Politics



Stanley E. Spangler

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE JUN 1991		2. REPORT TYPE N/A		3. DATES COVERED -	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Force and Accommodation in World Politics				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Stanley E. Spangler				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Air Univ, Maxwell AFB, AL				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS United States - Foreign relations - Soviet Union; Soviet Union - Foreign relations - United States; United States - Foreign relations - 1945 - ; Soviet Union - Foreign relations - 1945 - ;Pacific settlement of international disputes					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT SAR	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 383	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			



Force and Accommodation in World Politics

by

**Stanley E. Spangler
Senior Research Fellow
Airpower Research Institute**

*Air University Press
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-5532*

August 1991

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Spangler, Stanley E.

Force and accommodation in world politics/by Stanley E. Spangler.

p. cm.

"June 1991."

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. United States—Foreign relations—Soviet Union. 2. Soviet Union—Foreign relations—United States. 3. United States—Foreign relations—1945- . 4. Soviet Union—Foreign relations—1945- . 5. Pacific settlement of international disputes. I. Title.

E183.8.S65S627 1991

327.73047—dc20

91-17932

CIP

DISCLAIMER

This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environment in the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the United States government.

This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and is cleared for public release.

For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents
US Government Printing Office
Washington, DC 20402

*To My
Mother and Father
John Harold and Winifred Spangler*

Contents

<i>Chapter</i>	<i>Page</i>
DISCLAIMER	ii
FOREWORD	vii
ABOUT THE AUTHOR	ix
PREFACE	xi
INTRODUCTION	xiii
Notes	xx

Part 1

Factors Inhibiting Accommodative Diplomacy since World War II

1	Bargaining with Threats and Incentives: The Nature of Positive Diplomacy	3
2	Kennan, Containment, and Carrots	23
3	Historical Analogies, the Containment Paradigm, and the Role of Inducements	47
4	Other Impediments to Conciliation: Rhetoric, Politics, and Personality	67
5	Global Change and Superpower Cooperation	101

Part 2

Case Studies

6	Quemoy Crisis of 1958	143
7	Berlin Crisis of 1958–59	193
8	Berlin Crisis of 1961	221
9	Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam War	251

Part 3

Summary


10	Sticks, Carrots, and Positive Diplomacy: A Review	293
11	Some Final Thoughts on Force and Accommodation	337
	INDEX	349

Foreword

As we near the beginning of a new century the international system and relations between nations are undergoing far-reaching and fundamental changes. While many conservative observers object to assertions that the cold war is over, there can be little doubt that the conflictual relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union has changed enormously in the past few years. While no one can predict what form the relationship will take in years ahead, nor what will eventually come out of the Gorbachev revolution in the USSR, it now seems obvious that things are unlikely to return to the glacial and highly threatening bilateral confrontation of the four decades that followed World War II.


All these changes do not mean that conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union is a thing of the past. It certainly does not mean that military force will become a virtual nonplayer in the relations between nations. What it does mean, at least in the judgment of the author of this study, is that a host of factors—political, economic, social, and environmental—have combined in this nuclear age to make many of the past practices of the superpowers irrelevant, counterproductive, or both. As a result, both the superpowers, as well as many other nations, are currently fumbling about, seeking some new system under which their foreign relations can be more profitably conducted.

Dr Spangler develops a model or conceptual approach to foreign policy that he calls “positive diplomacy,” which is to him a preferable method of integrating force and diplomacy in this very complicated and increasingly dangerous world. Although he makes no claim that this approach is scientific or exact, it is his considered judgment that the world would be a far safer and more pleasant place if policymakers handled their international relations with this or a similar policy-making framework in mind.



DENNIS M. DREW, Col, USAF
Director
Airpower Research Institute

About the Author



Stanley E. Spangler

Stanley E. Spangler is a Secretary of the Navy senior fellow and professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. He has also served as a senior research fellow at the Air University Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (AUCADRE), Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama; as special assistant to the dean and international program adviser at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University; as executive director of the World Affairs Council of Boston; as director of the Office of Public and International Affairs at the University of North Carolina; as an associate regional director for the Foreign Policy Association; and as a program officer for the Asia Foundation.

He is a past president of the National Council of World Affairs Organizations; a member of the Editorial Advisory Committee of the Foreign Policy Association; and a former commissioner on the US National Commission for the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

A graduate of the University of Montana, Dr Spangler received his master's degree in political science from Columbia University and his doctorate from the University of North Carolina. He is currently working on two other books on US foreign policy; one on the changing nature of deterrence and the other on the Sino-American rapprochement.

Preface

With economic pressures, demographic changes, and the acknowledged futility of nuclear war steadily eroding the perceived utility of traditional military force, nations are looking with new favor on many of the conciliatory tools that were used so effectively during the classical diplomacy of the nineteenth century (negotiation, bargaining, the use of inducements)—in short, a diplomacy emphasizing cooperation and accommodation. Mikhail Gorbachev, in spite of his enormous domestic difficulties, has clearly recognized the value of such an approach and has managed to score impressive public relations victories and thereby vastly improve the Soviet Union's image around the world.


Force will still be an important player in international politics, especially at lower levels of conflict. An important objective for the United States, then, should be to overcome its traditional inhibitions about conciliatory approaches (especially strong since World War II) and to integrate a new and imaginative accommodative diplomacy with a force structure that is sensible, low profile, but fully sufficient to handle our security needs. We must recognize that it is no longer possible for nations to ensure their own security by superior military force alone; this only increases the level of insecurity for all. Therefore, while the world moves slowly toward some new security arrangement—eventually perhaps some form of world government—it behooves both superpowers to emphasize a cooperative style of diplomacy.

The major purpose of this book is to point out that for a variety of reasons, conciliatory approaches—accommodative measures—have too often been avoided by the United States and, if used, have too often been undervalued in comparison to military force. To point this up, we have developed a very rough model or conceptual approach to integrating force and diplomacy—in short, a diplomacy emphasizing cooperation and accommodation—in our relations with other nations. Although we make no claim that this approach is a perfect one, we believe that there can be no real safety

for any nations until policymakers handle their international relations within this or a similar framework.

Many people deserve thanks for assistance on this book, though none of them bear any responsibility for its defects. Foremost among those who have contributed is Hugh Richardson, my chief editor and a key member of the Air University Press staff. Hugh spent many hours helping me to clarify my thoughts and making my syntax more readable, and I am most grateful to him for his fine work. His colleagues at AU Press, Tom Mackin and John Jordan, also read certain sections and made some useful suggestions. Several other people read various parts of the book and made helpful suggestions, including Maj Earl Tilford, Jr., USAF, Retired, and Lt Col Ted Reule, USAF, Retired. Students in my course at the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, also made helpful comments on a number of ideas incorporated in the book. I am also particularly grateful to the production staff of Air University Press, headed by Dorothy McCluskie, for all their assistance in typing and technical editing, plus the many other chores that went into developing several drafts of the book.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge the very important contribution of my wife, Addie, whose love and support (and occasional barbed remark about completing it) were instrumental in seeing me through to the end.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Stanley E. Spangler". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the printed name.

STANLEY E. SPANGLER
Senior Research Fellow
Airpower Research Institute

Introduction

Whether to be firm and tough toward an adversary, in order to deter him, but at the risk of provoking his anger or fear and heightened conflict, or to conciliate him in the hope of reducing sources of conflict, but at the risk of strengthening him and causing him to miscalculate one's own resolve, is a perennial and central dilemma of international relations.

—Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing
Conflict among Nations

Essentially this is a book dealing with the management of international conflict through the use of bargaining, specifically bargaining with coercion and conciliation—in short, the use of both “sticks” and “carrots” to achieve political objectives. Clearly the subject—the use of force and accommodation to achieve political ends—is a topic that has been analyzed over the years by a host of observers, ranging from Niccolò Machiavelli to John F. Kennedy. Whether called “deterrence,” “coercive diplomacy,” “armed diplomacy,” “gunboat diplomacy,” or whatever, we are interested in how limited force is employed, along with accommodative measures, to influence an adversary and convince him to follow a desired course of action without engaging in a continuing contest of violence.¹ Note that the primary goal is to *influence or persuade* the adversary to adopt a course of action satisfactory to you; defeating him militarily is *not* the objective.

Force has, of course, long been used as a bargaining tool in international relations. For the most part, however, it has been used, as one might expect, as a threat or “stick” with relatively little attention given to the use of the “carrot”—promises, incentives, inducements, and other accommodative steps. In short, there has been a heavy emphasis on threats and a substantial neglect of promises.

For that reason, this is not intended to be simply another study of the mechanics of deterrence, coercive diplomacy, or conflict bargaining. An impressive amount of excellent work has already

been done on these subjects, and the reader will find an abundance of useful resources.² The broad purpose of this work is to address a fundamental problem that over the years has afflicted both civilian and military policymakers in the United States—a lack of understanding regarding the use of force as a tool in international bargaining, *especially a lack of understanding concerning the techniques and value of using accommodative measures in conjunction with force*. This lack of understanding regarding the utility of such steps has resulted in a damaging psychological and philosophical reluctance to take them.

In some important respects, what we are talking about here is a better understanding and appreciation of the classical diplomacy and international relations of the nineteenth century. For nearly a century following the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Europe enjoyed a period of peace that was relatively free of major conflicts. A key reason for this, as we have already observed, was that many statesmen and military leaders of the period, while accepting that some forms of conflict were quite inevitable, also recognized it was possible to control and contain such conflict. Further, the statesmen and soldiers of classical diplomacy understood that adversaries can be influenced by a host of nonmilitary threats and promises, including such steps as withdrawing from negotiations, breaking diplomatic relations, terminating commercial agreements, establishing embargoes, and conducting psychological warfare. Along with this, they understood better than we the use of force for political purposes—that is, the employment of armed force in a demonstrative fashion, *combined with certain kinds of carrots*, such as inducements, compromises, concessions. In short, they approached the difficult task of avoiding major conflict by recognizing that force and threats are not enough. They must be combined and blended with other instruments (nonviolent threats, incentives, concessions) in a coordinated and complementary fashion like the instruments in a good symphony orchestra.³

Though constantly aware and protective of their own country's objectives, nineteenth-century statesmen such as Lord Castlereagh, Prince von Metternich, Lord Palmerston, and Otto von Bismarck were pragmatic political leaders who recognized that their own interests would be more likely achieved in a

relatively conflict-free environment in which a variety of means were used to keep the interests of each in constant balance with those of others. Little driven by ideological considerations, these leaders looked on conflict management as a skill in which one could take great pride; sticks and carrots, threats and promises could be orchestrated in such a way as to keep the system in balance, at least sufficiently to avoid great conflicts between the major powers.⁴

Perhaps most significant from the standpoint of this study, they recognized that the use of conciliatory measures and inducements is not necessarily a sign of weakness but rather a potentially valuable instrument in the control of conflict. As the great writer on the diplomacy of the eighteenth century Francois de Callieres aptly put it:

Every Christian prince must take as his chief maxim not to employ arms to support or vindicate his rights until he has employed and exhausted the way of reason and persuasion. *It is to his interest also to add to reason and persuasion the influence of benefits conferred, which indeed is one of the surest ways to make his own power secure, and to increase it* [emphasis added].⁵

This study has two *broad* purposes: (1) to try to understand the reasons American military and civilian leaders since World War II have too often been reluctant to use accommodative steps such as inducements and other forms of conciliation to manage conflict; and (2) to determine, insofar as possible, what factors seem to be most important in making the use of an accommodative strategy effective. In this latter connection we will look at several case studies, three of them in considerable detail and several others in briefer fashion. While we will also be looking at the role of force, our major emphasis will be on conciliatory steps as part of an overall strategy of managing conflict in crisis situations.

A few words about methodology. Part 1 of this study analyzes how and why the inducement/accommodation factor—the carrot—has played only a secondary role in American foreign policy to the detriment of our overall international position. Here we want to look at those factors that have too often inhibited American statesmen from using conciliation and accommodation effectively, if at all. To accomplish this, we will examine those

particular historical, social, cultural, and psychological variables that appear most responsible for this phenomenon. Among other things we will look at the influence of factors from World War II, postwar strategies such as containment, the importance of personalities, domestic politics, and so on.

Part 2 contains case studies that help achieve our second broad objective of determining what things seem to be necessary to make an accommodative strategy effective in crisis situations, particularly tense situations involving the superpowers* either directly or indirectly. This is a more difficult task since in crisis situations both sides normally use a mixture of coercion and accommodation with the former usually taking precedence over the latter, especially in the early stages. The fact that the two strategies are mixed makes it difficult to assess the relative effectiveness of each.

To at least partially overcome this difficulty, we are especially interested in cases where sticks and carrots have been used effectively, particularly cases where the accommodative element has played a major role, one that presumably could be as important as, or perhaps even more important than, the role played by force. Further, our special interest is in cases where the force employed has been used in such a restrained and circumspect manner that force becomes *itself* a means of communicating *a desire for accommodation, a desire that can be communicated without fear of demonstrating weakness*.

There are not many historical cases that fill this bill, at least not in the ideal sense we are discussing here. We are talking about an approach to crisis situations that emphasizes conciliation and accommodation *over* force but which recognizes that force will likely be a “player” in crises and therefore must be carefully managed to promote settlement of disputes rather than to provoke conflict.

Essentially we are looking for a method for managing conflict that emphasizes the positive elements in the situation as opposed

*Many observers no longer refer to the Soviet Union as a superpower because of its faltering economy and internal instability. However, it remains a superpower militarily and we shall continue to use that term throughout this study.

to the negative elements, an approach that focuses on the common interests between the parties rather than the conflicting interests. This ideal approach, which for obvious reasons cannot be precisely defined, uses positive inducements and incentives as part of a systematic overall strategy (including force) designed to achieve an early and mutually satisfactory settlement of the conflict.

We will hereafter refer to this idealized approach or model for crisis management as *positive diplomacy*, although this is not a very satisfactory term for a variety of reasons. Throughout this study we will use this idealized strategy as a model against which to compare several actual historical cases. None of these cases will be perfect examples of this ideal approach (which we will describe in greater detail in chapter 1), but several of them approach it in many respects. Positive diplomacy—as we define it—has certain definite characteristics, and we will discuss those cases we feel most closely approximate it. We will also discuss a few that represent failure, that is, cases in which the appropriate use of positive diplomacy might have brought success instead of disaster.

We will give detailed attention in part 2 to two crisis situations from the Eisenhower administration—the Quemoy crisis of 1958 and the Berlin crisis that broke out that same year. We will also analyze the Berlin crisis of 1961, which took place during the Kennedy administration. These are the only cases we will study in sufficient detail to qualify as possible case studies. In chapter 9 we will look briefly at two other cases, one that demonstrates the successful application of certain features of positive diplomacy (Cuba) and one that represents a failure (Vietnam).

Our reasons for studying in detail the two crises from the Eisenhower administration are quite straightforward. The principal reason is that, in our judgment, both cases represent excellent examples of how to use sticks and carrots to defuse a crisis. Moreover, we think the role of conciliatory steps in both cases was of greater importance than is usually acknowledged, and force was used in a restrained mode that communicated a desire to reach an accommodation. In addition, both represent instances in which key American policymakers—especially the president and secretary of state—were able to objectively consider the opponent's vital interests and to a remarkable degree empathize

with his legitimate security problems, all within a crisis context. Thus, in many respects the two cases illustrate important aspects of positive diplomacy working positively.

There are other reasons for concentrating on these cases. First, though they have been analyzed quite extensively, they have not been studied as thoroughly as some other crises—for example, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. This is particularly true insofar as the role of inducements and conciliation are concerned. Second, both cases took place during the peak of the cold war at a time when crises were occurring with considerable frequency.

Third, the two cases offer an excellent view of the importance of personality in diplomatic negotiations. There was the president, who had a military background, great experience in international politics, a pragmatic cast of mind, and an inclination to leave details to others. Working with him was a strong-willed secretary of state (John Foster Dulles) who was skilled in the tactics of diplomacy, who was driven by a world view that was very much influenced by religious concepts of “good” and “evil,” and who thrived on the day-to-day details of his work. Although both men greatly respected each other, they had some sharp differences, especially in their attitude toward negotiations and the need to defuse the cold war. Finally, the two cases represent in many respects two different types of bargaining situations, one of symmetrical bargaining power (Berlin) and one of asymmetrical bargaining power (Quemoy). We think the latter case developed into more of a case of symmetrical bargaining power as the crisis developed, but more about that later. In any event, the two situations make for interesting comparison from the standpoint of relative bargaining power.

A third case, the Berlin crisis of 1961, represents other aspects of the use (or nonuse) of positive diplomacy. This crisis, which occurred during the administration of another president, offers valuable comparisons with the other cases, especially in regard to the use of military force.

We recognize the limitations inherent in an approach using essentially only three cases. However, time and space constraints make this necessary. Moreover, since our primary objective is to illustrate what positive diplomacy is, what it can accomplish, and

what its limitations are, we think these cases—buttressed by somewhat less detailed looks at two other cases (Cuba and Vietnam)—will serve that purpose.

The rationale for using crises as a focus for research and analysis is well established, but it is probably worthwhile to note again that international crises represent on a smaller and concentrated scale the longer-term relations between nations. As Glenn Snyder has phrased it:

An international crisis is international politics in microcosm. That is to say, a crisis tends to highlight or force to the surface a wide range of factors and processes which are central to international politics in general. Such elements as power configurations, interests, values, risks, perceptions, degrees of resolve, bargaining, and decision-making lie at the core of international politics; in a crisis they tend to leap out at the observer, to be combined and related in a revealing way, and to be sharply focused on a single, well-defined issue.⁶

This study is not an attempt to build theory except in the most modest sense of the word. It is my intention and my hope that the substance of the book be straightforward enough for the average layman, ungrounded in the intricacies of international-relations theory, to absorb with profit and some degree of pleasure. That is one reason for avoiding long and often painful discussions of theoretical approaches and research designs. If new approaches to conflict are to move from esoteric discussions in the classroom to policy relevance and application in practice, we need fewer abstruse, jargon-laden articles and books that are virtually incomprehensible to laymen and even to knowledgeable policymakers with superior educations and consequently are of little interest to them. Changing long-held beliefs and behavioral patterns is difficult enough if the suggested “change” is reasonably understandable; if it is not, the task becomes virtually an impossible one. Unless we achieve greater success in educating the public concerning the need to develop new approaches to conflict, it will be impossible to build the type of consensus necessary to support policy innovation and experimentation in this field.

This book will employ a straightforward historical-descriptive approach. To the modest extent that we employ a conceptual

framework, it will be what Alexander George and Richard Smoke have called the “focused comparison” method—that is, looking at a number of historical cases from the perspective of the same variables to account for similarities and differences in the outcomes of these cases.⁷ We will discuss this conceptual framework in more detail at the beginning of the second section.

Before turning to specific cases, we need to first take a general look at the role of bargaining in international political life; changes in the present international system that may affect bargaining with force (and particularly the use of accommodative measures); the nature of deterrence and coercive diplomacy in crisis situations; and the definition of what we have chosen to call *positive diplomacy*. In the first chapter, we will address these tasks and will begin an analysis of the topic that is the major focus of the first section of the book—the factors that have inhibited the use of conciliation and accommodation since World War II.

Notes

1. This definition owes a debt to definitions used by Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William R. Simons in *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), 18; and in *Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* by Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978), 12.

2. For example, see Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); George, Hall, and Simons; Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977).

3. For interesting observations concerning the applicability of classical diplomacy to our times, see Paul Gordon Lauren, “Theories of Bargaining with Threats of Force: Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy,” in *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy*, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New York: Free Press, 1979), 183; and Paul Gordon Lauren, “Ultimata and Coercive Diplomacy,” *International Studies Quarterly* 16, no. 2 (June 1972): 144–48.

4. For an interesting account of this, particularly Prince von Metternich’s philosophy and policies, see Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973).

5. Francois de Callieres, *On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes*, trans. A. F. Whyte (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963), 7.
6. Glenn Snyder, "Crisis Bargaining," in *International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research*, ed. George F. Hermann (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1972), 127.
7. George and Smoke, 95–97.

Part 1

Factors Inhibiting Accommodative Diplomacy since World War II

Chapter 1

Bargaining with Threats and Incentives: The Nature of Positive Diplomacy

Using threats of force as a bargaining tool to secure political objectives is as old as the history of human conflict. We can see its use from the time powerful Athens threatened Melos in 400 B.C. to the recent use of American planes and warships to deter an aggressive Iraq in the Persian Gulf. Across that span of 24 centuries many masters of the use of force for bargaining purposes have practiced their “craft” on the world stage—Charlemagne, Genghis Khan, Metternich, Palmerston, Otto von Bismarck, Adolf Hitler, and Joseph Stalin to name a few. A substantial number of American presidents from William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt to Lyndon B. Johnson and Ronald Reagan have attempted to use force coercively for bargaining purposes—with varying degrees of success, it might be added.¹

The lure of military diplomacy—the threatened or actual use of limited force to secure political objectives—is substantial. Its highly successful use by John F. Kennedy in the Cuban missile crisis was a classic of its kind, a significant foreign policy triumph for the young American president and a defeat from which Nikita Khrushchev never fully recovered. In Vietnam, on the other hand, our attempt to use coercive diplomacy (the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign of 1965–66) to force the North Vietnamese to cease their support of the Vietcong was a conspicuous failure.² Why were the outcomes in these two situations so different? We will attempt to answer that question as we examine those cases and others in part 2 of this study.

As stated in the introduction, the primary objective of this work is to examine how and why the United States and the Soviet Union for many years neglected one important element of bargaining—

the inducement/accommodation factor—in their conflictual relationship, with unfortunate results for both superpowers and for the world. This has changed considerably since Mikhail Gorbachev emerged on the world stage, but it is still important to try to understand the neglect of conciliatory approaches during the greater part of the postwar period. Related to this objective—in fact part and parcel of it—is a somewhat broader objective: to look at the nature of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union in the postwar period and to analyze how that adversarial relationship has been affected overall by the neglect of the inducement/accommodation factor. What factors long conditioned the US-Soviet relationship to emphasize conflicting interests and obscured elements of common interest? Since opponents obviously can be influenced by promises as well as threats, by carrots as well as sticks, why was the latter heavily favored by both sides to the detriment of the overall relationship? As noted, this has changed in the Gorbachev era, but there is always a danger that it may recur should relations between the nations experience a setback. Preventing a recurrence of the old pattern requires an understanding of the dynamics that drove foreign policy during the cold war years. What can be done to correct this imbalance?

The Framework and Hypotheses of the Study

As observed in the introduction, we have chosen to examine these questions within the framework of crisis situations that have featured military diplomacy (deterrence and/or coercive diplomacy) because (1) these situations best demonstrate, in a limited time frame, the difficulties and the pluses in using the inducement/accommodation factor; (2) because, as we have already noted, international crises highlight in microcosm the relations between nations over the long run; and (3) because they promise to be a continuing feature of the international system. They bring out, in a much sharper focus than routine times, the complex interactions that form the core of international politics.³

The primary hypothesis of this study is that positive inducements (the carrot approach) have been ignored, underused, or misused in many crisis situations by the United States and the Soviet Union with consequent negative effects or outcomes, particularly over the long run.

A second and closely related hypothesis is that positive inducements, when properly used, have not only contributed to the settlement of international crisis situations between the superpowers (and between one superpower and client-states of the other) but have also tended to promote settlements that have proven to be more stable over the long run. Unfortunately, these positive and productive uses of inducements have occurred rather infrequently. Two important cases of this kind were the Quemoy crisis of 1958 and the Berlin crisis that same year. We will look at these cases in some detail.

A third hypothesis is that the concentration on the use of threats and military force in international bargaining (and the neglect of accommodative measures) by the United States in much of the postwar period was due in no small measure to factors other than the actual Soviet threat—that is, causal factors that emerged from the peculiar conditions of American history, culture, and politics, particularly in the period since World War II. This is not to say the Soviets have never posed a serious threat to American interests. Obviously they did so at various times, for example, during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.⁴ However, other factors unrelated to the so-called Soviet threat were instrumental in making American statesmen reluctant to use conciliation and accommodation as bargaining tools. We will look at these factors in the first part of this study.

A fourth hypothesis is that American military leaders, because of a fixation on “victory” and “winning wars,” have too often viewed conflict as a zero-sum game in which a gain for one side results in a corresponding loss by the other and thus have frequently failed to provide the kind of astute politico-military advice a crisis situation requires. While there are notable exceptions, too often the training of these military leaders does not

permit the innovative and flexible approach to managing conflict that the modern world demands. Rather than thinking in terms of a variety of conflict management tools and techniques (of which military force applied coercively is only one), too many military leaders continue to focus on conflict as a contest to be “won” rather than an international malady that requires flexible and imaginative management. Too often military leaders are instrumental in encouraging civilian policymakers to force conflicts into the procrustean bed of an overt contest of arms when other nonviolent measures have not yet been exhausted.⁵

In fairness to the military, it should also be pointed out that the profession of arms has turned out some outstanding leaders who possessed excellent political sense and who were instrumental in restraining other civilian and military leaders from ill-considered belligerent acts. Dwight D. Eisenhower and Gen Matthew B. Ridgway are two excellent examples. In recent history there have been a number of instances in which the senior US military leadership has exercised a restraining influence on civilian officials eager to use the military instrument or ready to take what they consider a “tough” stand on some issue. Continued observance of the unratified Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) II treaty comes to mind. A number of leading civilian policymakers favored discontinuing adherence to the terms of that treaty while the Joint Chiefs of Staff favored continued US observance.⁶ It is too early to predict to what extent this may indicate a trend among senior military leaders (faced with prohibitively expensive arms requirements and hard-to-combat forms of low-intensity conflict). More likely it indicates a hardheaded assessment of relative military capabilities with and without the treaty, as well as a recognition of the limitations of force in the modern world.

A fifth hypothesis is that the current international system, due to a variety of reasons, is undergoing changes that have already significantly altered the nature of international conflict and, given a minimum of statesmanship, will alter the nature and scope of international cooperation as well. We will consider these

developments at some length later; suffice it to say at this point that we believe these changes will continue to transform the methods as well as the philosophy of international conflict. They will positively reinforce a trend toward a greater emphasis on the use of what we choose to call *positive diplomacy*—that is, a greater reliance on positive inducements and incentives and less dependence on threats.

Factors Favoring Inducements over Threats

What are these changes that will increase the value of positive inducements and further decrease the utility of threats and force, thereby enhancing the cooperative aspects of international relationships, particularly between the superpowers? In our opinion, they include but are not limited to the following:

1. Fundamental changes in the nature of conflict have already taken place as a result of nuclear weapons and other sophisticated military technology. Full-scale major war has largely been replaced by limited war and low-intensity conflict. Terrorism, insurgencies, revolutions, and other forms of conflict at the lower end of the conflict spectrum have to a considerable extent become substitutes for wars.⁷ Because of the necessity of preventing these so-called low-intensity types of conflict from escalating to nuclear conflict, the two superpowers have been forced into cooperative behavior of various kinds.⁸ As these forms of warfare (especially terrorism) become increasingly major global problems, the cooperative aspects of the superpower relationship should increase. This has been evident in the war with Iraq, which, although a major conflict in terms of personnel involved, is still a regional war that is limited geographically and has thus far been limited to conventional weapons. This, of course, may change.

2. There has been ever-increasing global political, economic, and military multipolarity. As progressively stronger regional power centers develop, especially in Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia, the superpowers will feel an increasing inability to

control global politico-military stability. The concern over possible use of nuclear weapons by new regional powers—the People's Republic of China (PRC), India, Pakistan, Israel, Iraq, and Brazil, for example—will contribute to greater cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union.⁹ The development of the PRC into a real international power in every sense in the early part of the twenty-first century will be especially significant in this respect.

3. The explosive growth in all forms of technology, especially information and space technology, has made strategic nuclear and conventional military competition between the superpowers increasingly expensive and pointless since neither side has been able to gain a decisive edge. Combined with serious domestic problems in their homelands (including major frustrations and protests over the level of arms expenditures) and increasing low-intensity conflict globally, both the United States and the Soviet Union have, out of necessity, been forced to seek a cooperative relationship that will reduce the huge outlays on strategic and conventional armaments.¹⁰ There is, of course, much evidence of this already in the arms control treaties concluded since Gorbachev came to power and in proposed treaties yet to be completed.

4. Major domestic problems in both the United States and the Soviet Union will continue to accelerate the tendency toward greater cooperation, though there will be periodic setbacks. Extremely critical problems with the economy, minorities, and dissident national groups plague the Soviet Union, while the United States experiences serious economic difficulties as a result of burgeoning automation, a rapidly changing economy, severe foreign competition, an awesome deficit problem, and the severe strain in meeting its international commitments. The drug problem, already a major issue in the United States, is a growing area of concern in the USSR.

5. Important generational leadership changes taking place in the Soviet Union and to a lesser extent in the United States will accelerate the tendency toward greater cooperative efforts between

the two countries. As the World War II generation of leadership passes entirely from the scene in both nations, the area of common interests will be perceived as greater, a tendency already evident in the leadership of Gorbachev.

6. Significant demographic and religious developments worldwide will tend to increase cooperation between the two superpowers. For example, the rapid growth in urban populations (to crisis proportions in many cases) will force the United States and the Soviet Union to join forces to combat this spreading problem. The increasing power and influence of Islam (and its greater cohesion globally) will come to represent an ever more serious threat to both US and Soviet vital interests. As Islam's power grows, it will become less dependent on the superpowers and will increasingly act in an independent and frequently antagonistic fashion toward both the United States and the Soviet Union. This is obviously already occurring in the Middle East. Although such states as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan can be expected to remain reasonably moderate, more radical nations such as Syria, Iraq, and Iran are likely to continue to pose a threat to both the Soviet Union and the United States under the banner of Islam.

7. Environmental issues—as for example the so-called greenhouse effect—will result in worldwide problems so serious that only joint efforts by the major powers can prevent a catastrophic deterioration in global living conditions.

We will be discussing these factors in more detail throughout this book; suffice for now to say that these are some of the developments the author feels will take place between now and the early years of the next century. Moreover, they are developments we feel will tend to bring the two superpowers into a more cooperative relationship by broadening the range of common interests between them. In particular, the ever-increasing complexity of conflict, the difficulty of coping with the lower end of the violence spectrum, and the crushing financial burden of coping with the upper end—the strategic nuclear and space conflict arenas—will increasingly lead the superpowers to seek new ways

of resolving conflict. One of these ways, and a most important one, will be a new approach to accommodation and conciliation—the use of incentives and inducements, the carrots of international life. In short, there will be a new respect for and an appreciation of what we call positive diplomacy. As we will see, this new approach will resemble the classical diplomacy of the nineteenth century in at least some respects.

The Continuing Role of Force

It would be unrealistic, indeed naive in the extreme, to expect this development to eliminate the use of force. Threats will continue to play a significant and often determining role in international life well into the next century. We see this vividly illustrated in the current struggle with a regional predator—Iraq. However, at least insofar as the relationship between the two superpowers is concerned, the use of threats and force to attain political objectives will steadily decline and various forms of accommodation, both tactical and strategic in nature, will play an increasingly prominent role. This is already apparent in Soviet-American relations, and despite periodic temporary setbacks, this trend should continue.

Another aspect of this development, one that is most important for the purposes of this study, is that the increasing emphasis on accommodation and the use of inducements will not be limited to traditional diplomacy but will also take place within the context of military diplomacy (this includes both deterrence and coercive diplomacy). Indeed, it is our judgment that the development will be very apparent in military diplomacy with significant results for other aspects of international intercourse. The use of force to achieve political objectives—military diplomacy—will be much in evidence for many years, but in our opinion, it will be steadily changing in character, at least between the superpowers. One of the chief reasons for this change will be the mounting frustration

and concern of both superpowers over various forms of low-intensity conflict, particularly international terrorism.

The Problem of Terrorism

Today the United States is the power most affected by the complicated problem of terrorism, including both state-sponsored and individual terrorist acts. Because of the great difficulties involved in pinpointing those responsible for acts of terrorism, the selection of a means of response that is effective and “appropriate to the crime” is enormously difficult. In April 1986 American warplanes responded to purported terrorist acts by Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi by attacking a selected list of targets in Libya. Force was used coercively in a demonstrative fashion to persuade Colonel Qadhafi that terrorism is an unprofitable business. To the extent that any inducement was present in connection with the action, it was simply the concomitant incentive that for ceasing terrorist acts Colonel Qadhafi would be rewarded by no further US attacks on his nation. Was such an incentive enough to cause Qadhafi to cease sponsoring terrorist acts? Or was the use of military force in a coercive fashion more likely to reinforce Qadhafi’s will to resist, thus increasing the likelihood of additional terrorist acts?

Our experience in using sticks *and* carrots in policy toward unstable leaders of small nations (such as Qadhafi’s Libya) is very limited and thus far not very conclusive.¹¹ With all the returns not yet in, there are indications that our resort to force against Libya may be a case where a military solution produced some positive results in the war against terrorism. On the other hand, the long-range results may be less satisfactory. It is still too early to tell.

However, despite the fact it is a bit premature to assess its long-term significance, the Libyan action does point up some important questions relevant to this study. For example, is the use of armed force—in this case a quick surprise strike intended to

persuade the adversary to adopt a certain course of action—appropriate when dealing with a shadowy, amorphous, elusive field of conflict like terrorism? Was the demonstrative use of force employed too early, before all other options had been explored? Is it realistic to assume that terrorism will be curtailed by the US action or is terrorism more likely to increase as a result? Did the action do anything to address the root causes of terrorism or did it simply attack the symptoms? Would any form of incentive or inducement (other than the promise to cease attacks if terrorist acts ceased) have been appropriate and useful in dealing with an erratic and unstable leader like Qadhafi?

These are questions requiring much additional study. If nothing else, however, the Libyan case illustrates graphically that the United States has not developed a coherent, balanced politico-military policy for dealing with terrorism or terrorism-sponsoring states like Libya. In short, we have not developed an array of political and diplomatic weapons that can be effectively applied against an actor who transgresses against the system, as was the case during the period of classical diplomacy in the nineteenth century. We have used the stick perhaps effectively against the Libyan leader with little or no attention to incentives or inducements. Such measures may indeed be inappropriate when dealing with terrorists. Still, it seems possible that the orchestrated use of sticks *and* carrots might also be effective on occasion in dealing with the shadowy and less gentlemanly figures of our time, at least when such terrorists are state sponsored. Perhaps not, but we should certainly have the array of “tools” that permits us to try.

The Need to Go beyond Threats

While terrorism and low-intensity conflict are critical concerns and the questions we have raised here are vital ones, these are areas largely outside the scope of this study. As noted earlier, our primary area of interest is the superpower relationship—how

positive diplomacy can be employed more effectively to improve that relationship.

Clearly there are now and will continue to be a variety of obstacles inhibiting the growth of positive diplomacy. As pointed out by numerous writers, conciliatory diplomatic approaches to adversaries fell into disrepute in the 1930s and 1940s when inducements failed with Hitler and later Stalin. *Appeasement*, once an honorable term in nineteenth-century diplomacy for adjusting conflicting interests, became an odious term signifying weakness, lack of will and integrity, or even cowardice.¹² American policymakers from Harry S. Truman to Ronald Reagan and George Bush, as well as many Soviet leaders, have bent over backward to avoid association with anything that might smack of appeasement. The inevitable result, of course, has been a reluctance to use inducements, a tendency to rely too heavily on threats, and an exaggerated compulsion by leaders to prove their resolve and toughness.¹³ It is true that during the Gorbachev years, American policymakers have been more forthcoming with inducements and concessions than was true earlier. To no small extent, however, this development came about only *after* Gorbachev had made an astounding number of important Soviet concessions.

Other obstacles have hindered the development of what Alexander George and Richard Smoke call "inducement theory" in their excellent book, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*. They argue that deterrence theory must be supplemented by inducement theory as part of a broader international influence theory, a concept wholly supported by this author.¹⁴ For a variety of reasons this has not occurred to any great extent, either in theory or in practice. One of the most important reasons is the fact that we adopted the policy of containment and applied it globally in ways unintended by its original author (George Frost Kennan), structured it in a form that tended to encourage military responses, misapplied it geographically, and—perhaps worst of all—failed to adequately develop other types of responses to our adversaries.¹⁵

The Influence of the Containment Doctrine

For reasons to be discussed later, we became enamored with the word *containment* and the doctrine for the sake of the doctrine; it became a policy for all seasons, a foreign policy conceptual framework to handle *all* contingencies. It appeared capable of handling nearly all tasks provided those tasks came in the form of what we *perceived* as challenges to our interests or those of our allies around the world. Containment developed in the four decades after World War II into a policy typified by rigidity, inflexibility, and an inherent inability to develop new approaches—a basically defensive, reactive, stereotyped reaction that allowed little room for innovation. Though it came in different types of wrapping depending on the administration in power at the time—NSC-68 of the Truman period, the Eisenhower-Dulles “New Look,” the flexible response of John F. Kennedy—it failed to provide the scope to accommodate approaches that were positive rather than negative, offensive rather than defensive, proactive rather than reactive.

In a later chapter we will consider the results of containment in greater detail. In the interest of objectivity, however, we should point out here that the results of the containment policy have certainly not all been negative. As noted by George and Smoke, the policy undoubtedly served a useful purpose in the years immediately after the end of the war, with Europe weak and in shambles and with a power vacuum stretching from the Elbe to the English Channel.¹⁶ Nevertheless, it seems clear that containment, as it was interpreted and applied by successive American administrations, gradually led to a rigidity and uniformity of application to situations where it was often inapplicable, Vietnam being the prime example. This effectively discouraged innovative approaches from being developed, especially those leading to strategies similar to what we are calling *positive diplomacy*.

There are, however, many factors besides our somewhat shortsighted fascination with containment that have been obstacles to the development of inducement theory and positive diplomacy.

Indeed, our fascination with containment is in no small part a result of other human behavioral characteristics and traits, some peculiarly American, others more universal in nature.

Some Necessary Definitions

Before attempting an analysis of these other factors that have inhibited the development of positive diplomacy, we must make clear what we mean by certain terms—*military diplomacy*, *coercive diplomacy*, *deterrence*, and, of course, *positive diplomacy*. Too often these terms have been used very loosely, and as a result they have different meanings for different people. It is therefore desirable to briefly define the terms, particularly as they relate to the inducement/accommodation factor.

Military force can be used as a *political* instrument or as a *martial* instrument. When used as a martial instrument, its purpose is to attain such concrete objectives as destroying a target, securing territory, or physically defeating an opponent. Here the objective is fundamentally military in nature. When used as a political instrument, its objective is not to destroy the opponent or physically restrain him but rather to influence his actions, to persuade him to adopt a desired course of action, to affect his motivation or will. This brings us to the concept of *military diplomacy*, a term we employ occasionally throughout this book. Though defined differently by various authors, we will use it as an overarching term that includes both deterrence and coercive diplomacy.¹⁷ Essentially it means the use of force as a political instrument, aimed at influencing or persuading other actors to refrain from taking an action they might otherwise take or to stop or undo an action they have already taken. If our aim is to persuade or influence other actors to refrain from taking an action *they have not yet taken*, we are engaging in deterrence; if we are trying to persuade them to *stop* or *undo* an action, we are involved in coercive diplomacy.

Thomas C. Schelling has pointed out other significant differences between deterrence and coercive diplomacy or, as he calls it, “compellence.”¹⁸ The distinctions are important, but for purposes of this book—to analyze the role of the inducement/accommodation factor in deterrence and coercive diplomacy—it is sufficient to note that deterrence is basically defensive in character and that coercive diplomacy can be either defensive or offensive.* As Schelling observes, deterrence involves “setting the stage by announcement, by rigging the trip-wire, by incurring the obligation—and waiting.”¹⁹ This puts the ball in the other’s court; the next move is up to the opponent. Coercive diplomacy, on the other hand, involves compelling an opponent to stop something, or to undo something, and therefore requires the compelling side to initiate action to take the first step. Thus, deterrence is essentially defensive while compellence is more offensive.²⁰

As noted by Schelling, “The power to hurt is bargaining power.”²¹ And ever since the advent of military air power made it possible to hurt or even defeat the enemy before his military forces were destroyed, it has been possible to separate the threat to hurt him from the threat to actually destroy his military capability.²² This threat has been magnified enormously, of course, by the development of nuclear weapons. One can now hurt the opponent tremendously in a variety of ways (such as attacking his cities, industries, etc.) without ever touching his armed forces. The awesome destructive capability of nuclear weapons and the ability to separate the threat of using these weapons from their actual use greatly enhanced the value of bargaining with threats of force. As a result, the 1950s and 1960s saw the emergence of a vast body of so-called strategic theory and strategic studies literature that featured theories of deterrence and coercive diplomacy—blueprints for using force to persuade an opponent to alter his

*It should be noted that coercive diplomacy can be defensive in nature under certain circumstances and deterrence can have offensive aspects (as in active or dynamic deterrence). The various strategies—deterrence and coercive diplomacy, defense and offense—often merge and become indistinguishable once a conflict begins. See Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 78-86.

course of action without resorting to war. Unfortunately, because of the emphasis in both deterrence and coercive diplomacy on the threat or punishment aspect, little attention was given to another element of most bargaining situations, the interests in common that might be present. Consequently, incentives and inducements received little attention despite the fact that numerous studies show elements of both conflict and cooperation present in every bargaining situation. There must be at least some element of cooperation present before bargaining can begin.

Positive Diplomacy

We now have working definitions for deterrence and coercive diplomacy. Before moving on to a consideration of the variables that have inhibited greater use of the inducement/accommodation factor, thus preventing a more rapid development of positive diplomacy, we need to attempt a more rigorous definition of that term.

In this study, the term *positive diplomacy* means the psychological readiness as well as the strategy to approach conflict situations from a positive rather than a negative perspective. As we have just indicated, most conflicts are bargaining situations where elements of both conflict and cooperation are present. The conflicting interests precipitate a clash, but the common interests present motivate each side to bargain. This common interest may be nothing more than a shared desire to avoid the awesome destruction of nuclear war, but that is obviously not an inconsequential interest. Moreover, it provides a base from which other common interests may be discovered and developed.

Unfortunately, because of fascination with various techniques or means of utilizing force coercively, the threats (negative actions) have received far more attention than incentives or inducements (positive actions). Thus, the negative element has dominated most conflict situations between the superpowers in the postwar period, with any inducements generally an uncoordinated,

unsystematic afterthought. As we have observed, there have been dramatic changes in this process in the recent past; but threats have been far more dominant than conciliatory actions during most of the postwar era.²³

Positive diplomacy, on the other hand, reverses that perspective. Positive incentives and inducements based on a careful analysis of common interests present in the situation are utilized as part of a systematic, coordinated strategy and play a major role in the conflict situation. They are normally used earlier and play an equal (or in some cases even a dominant) role compared to negative sanctions (threats). In short, whereas much postwar US strategy in crisis situations has emphasized the negative—with some notable exceptions that we will be discussing later—positive diplomacy, as we define it, emphasizes the common interests present in the situation.

However, threats and the potential use of force are not absent in this equation, and the opponent should be left with no doubt in his mind that we have the potential to hurt him if necessary. Nonetheless, the threat profile is lower and the cooperative profile higher. Force, if employed, is used with restraint and as a means of communicating with the adversary. If the strategy is correctly applied, the psychological atmosphere becomes more positive; rather than a zero-sum conflict situation where a gain for one side means a loss for the other, the objective is seen as one of emphasizing common interests in the situation and de-emphasizing conflicting interests until a mutually agreeable solution is reached. This requires each side to avoid the temptation to manipulate the other side by threats of superior force, forcing the opponent to capitulate—humiliated, frustrated, and already planning how to gain the upper hand in the next encounter.

Positive diplomacy seeks to change the proportion of threat and inducement so that the latter is seen by the opponent as an element of at least equal weight with the threat. The opponent's image of us must be positive—that is, he must have the impression that we have not only carefully assessed our interests but also *his* interests and that we are addressing the situation with a basically

conciliatory approach that recognizes the legitimate interests of both parties. Francois de Callieres noted that “the great secret of negotiation is to bring out prominently the common advantage to both parties” and warned that any bargain that does not satisfy this condition “is apt to contain the seeds of its own dissolution.”²⁴

Positive Diplomacy Not a New Concept

At this point, readers may be saying to themselves, “Well and good, but the approach seems more than a little naive and impractical and probably nothing very new—only another version of the carrot-and-stick approach with a little more emphasis on the carrot.” We reserve comments about whether the approach is naive and about the degree of its practicality for later sections of this book. However, we will comment briefly at this stage on the question of “newness.”

We make no claim that this approach is new in the usual sense of that word. Similar approaches have been proposed before and there are a great variety of peaceful or conciliatory schemes that one can point to, some of which have been tried in the real world and some of which remain nothing but theoretical constructs.²⁵ Many of these have features similar to what we have been calling positive diplomacy. Therefore, in no sense do we claim our version of positive diplomacy is new or original in conception. Practically every conceivable peaceful/conciliatory approach has been proposed in one form or another, and it would be presumptuous to claim *any* approach is entirely new. If anything, this plan differs from other approaches emphasizing the carrot and stick (such as the “conciliatory firmness” described by Philip Williams)²⁶ largely in timing and relative emphasis given the carrot. While we feel these differences are important, they do not qualify the approach as new or original, and we make no such claim.* However, the

*Although coercive diplomacy and positive diplomacy have some features that are similar, there are distinct differences primarily in the different emphasis given the carrot and the stick. We will discuss these differences in a later chapter.

attendant measures that accompany the approach and that create the psychological environment necessary for success have not often been used in the postwar world. In that sense—that is, meaning something which has been infrequently used in the real world—one can perhaps say the approach has an element of newness about it.

We recognize the term *positive diplomacy* is not an entirely satisfactory term. First of all, it implies we are dealing primarily (if not exclusively) with diplomatic efforts and indicates nothing about elements of force that may be involved. Second, although the approach can be applied in either crisis or noncrisis situations, in this book we are recommending it in the context of crisis situations. Therefore, it might be more accurate to refer to it as “positive crisis diplomacy.” However, until such time as we are able to find a term that more accurately describes the approach, we will use the shortened term *positive diplomacy*. The reader will be aware that this is a strategy that has different variations, that can be applied in either crisis or noncrisis situations, and that may or may not involve force, depending on the context of the situation. In this book we will be applying it to cases where force was involved to a greater or lesser degree.

Let us say one final word about definitions. We will frequently use the terms that describe conciliatory behavior—*negotiations*, *accommodation*, *inducements*, and *conciliation*—in a broad and inexact sense. We will not worry about using the terms absolutely precisely unless using them in their broader and less exact sense does disservice to our meaning.

Now that our objectives, methodology, and definitions are reasonably clear and we have made the necessary qualifications and disclaimers, we are ready to move on to a consideration of the specific factors that have inhibited the development of positive diplomacy—those things that have caused international bargaining with force to concentrate heavily on the conflict aspects of the superpower relationship to the neglect of the cooperative aspects. To introduce this complicated subject, we must begin with a general discussion of the postwar world and the role of

containment. And this brings us to a detailed consideration of the role of a man who in one sense has been very influential in American foreign policy but who in another sense failed to exercise the influence he would have liked—George Frost Kennan.

Notes

1. For an interesting study on bargaining with force, including short case studies, see Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977).

2. For an excellent study on coercive diplomacy that includes these two cases, see Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William R. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971).

3. See Philip M. Williams, *Crisis Management* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1976), 10–15, for a good discussion of the utility of international crises as an analytical tool.

4. The literature on the Cuban missile crisis is very extensive, but two good accounts that deal capably with the carrot aspects are the study above by George, Hall, and Simons; and Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).

5. For a good discussion of this, see Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1973), 478–96.

6. A majority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (three out of five) favored continuing our observance of the treaty. Their judgment was based on “military considerations.” The chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Gen John Vessey, made no recommendation. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle were in favor of abandoning our commitment to the treaty. See Leo Sartori, “Will SALT II Survive?” *International Security*, Winter 1985–1986, 169.

7. Stanley Hoffman, *Gulliver's Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1968), 31.

8. George and Smoke, 47.

9. See Dimitri K. Simes, “Soviet Policy toward the United States,” in *The Making of America's Soviet Policy*, ed. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 305–6.

10. John Steinbruner, “Arms Control: Crisis or Compromise,” *Foreign Affairs* 63, no. 5 (Summer 1985): 1049.

11. For a good discussion of our tendency to apply a "military grid" to complex political situations, see Hoffman, 156–57.
12. Michael Nacht, "On Memories, Interests, and Foreign Policy: The Case of Vietnam," in *National Security and International Stability*, ed. Bernard Brodie, Michael Intriligator and Roman Kolkowicz (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, Inc., 1983), 362.
13. Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 266–70.
14. George and Smoke, 604–10.
15. For a good discussion of this, see Michael McGwire, "Deterrence: The Problem—Not the Solution," *SAIS Review* 5, no. 2 (Summer–Fall 1985): 105–24.
16. George and Smoke, 4.
17. For detailed definitions of "deterrence" and "coercive diplomacy," see Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 172–203.
18. Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), 69–78.
19. *Ibid.*, 71.
20. *Ibid.*, 79.
21. *Ibid.*, 2.
22. Paul Gordon Lauren, "Theories of Bargaining with Threats of Force: Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy," in *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy*, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New York: Free Press, 1979), 185.
23. *Ibid.*, 189–99.
24. Francois de Callieres, *On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes*, trans. A. F. Whyte (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963), 110.
25. For a survey of various conciliatory approaches to conflict, see Richard W. Fogg, "Dealing with Conflict: A Repertoire of Creative, Peaceful Approaches," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 29, no. 2 (June 1985): 330–58.
26. Williams, 170–71.

Chapter 2

Kennan, Containment, and Carrots

The nation which indulges toward another an habitual hatred or an habitual fondness is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and interest.

—George Washington

As we observed in the last chapter, one major reason inducements were not more widely used in the pre-Gorbachev relationship between the superpowers lies in the nature of the containment policy and its handmaiden, deterrence theory. Before discussing specific cases in which inducements, either by their presence or absence, played a key role in deterrence and coercive diplomacy, we must examine the ways in which the concepts of containment and deterrence helped condition the adversarial relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The Neglect of Inducements

George Washington's observation that nations should avoid "habitual hatred" and "habitual fondness" toward other nations is obviously applicable to the US-Soviet relationship and, in a somewhat different way, the relationship between the United States and China. For purposes of this study we are primarily interested in US-Soviet relations, but at various points we will touch on the use of inducements in the Sino-American rapprochement of 1969–72. Now, however, we turn to the struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States that began shortly after the end of World War II.

Even though it is quite true that there were and are real and serious differences between the two nations, there is little question that the circumstances surrounding the origins of the conflict and the methods by which the United States chose to oppose what we considered Soviet aggressiveness contributed to making the cold war both prolonged and highly inflexible in nature. What might have been a conflict over differing postwar objectives lasting a number of years became a monumental worldwide struggle lasting decades. From the standpoint of this book, the key element is the fact that the “operating rules” of the approach adopted by the United States—containment (and its instrument, deterrence)—by its nature tended to rule out any extensive use of inducements (positive diplomacy).

And here we come to some vital questions we hope to address. Is there evidence that other kinds of approaches might have proved more productive? Were other types of approaches even possible in the postwar world?

In later chapters we will be looking at a number of crisis situations between the Soviet Union and the United States in which bargaining with force (the use of deterrence and coercive diplomacy) played a role. In some of these situations the bargaining included inducements and incentives, that is, conciliatory steps recognizing the presence of common interests. In others such steps were either not included or were inappropriate. Since it is obvious that general attitudes on the part of both the Soviet Union and the United States regarding conciliatory measures (whether formal negotiations, informal bargaining, specific inducements, or whatever) would affect the way the two countries used (or failed to use) inducements in crisis situations, we need to know how these general attitudes developed and how they were affected by the containment policy. Because this is primarily a book about US policy, we will be mainly concerned with American attitudes (though the reader is cautioned to continually bear in mind that Soviet attitudes about conciliatory steps obviously also affected each situation).

The Cold War

During World War II Americans temporarily overcame their visceral distrust of the Soviet Union and joined hands with Stalin to defeat what appeared to be an even greater evil. But within little more than a year after Hitler's defeat, the friction that would soon grow into a full-fledged cold war was already evident between the two countries. By 1947 it was clear that the two powers Alexis de Tocqueville had described as "each [being] summoned by a secret design of providence to hold in his hands, some day, the destinies of half the world"¹ were on a collision course. By 1948, only three years after the end of World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union were locked in a bitter ideological/political struggle that except for brief respites continued for nearly four decades.

It is not our purpose in this book to examine in detail the origins of the cold war nor to attempt to assess blame. That subject has been covered at great length by a host of revisionist and orthodox historians.² Our primary objective in this chapter is to consider the constricting influence of what Michael Nacht has called the "containment paradigm"³ and its corollary, deterrence theory, on American foreign policy, forcing the policy into an essentially defensive and reactive mode that has tended to stifle innovative approaches like positive diplomacy.

Containment and Deterrence

Before considering the negative aspects of containment and deterrence, we should point out once again that those concepts have also produced some very positive results and were probably essential in the years immediately following World War II. George Kennan, the "father of containment," saw the chaos and disillusionment in postwar Western Europe as an open invitation to the Soviets to expand their influence, which was powered by historical Russian insecurities and the internal dynamics of Soviet society.⁴ With a major power vacuum in Western Europe and the

prostrate societies of that region struggling to reestablish viable political identities, some form of struggle like the cold war was probably inevitable. The policy of containment and its corollary, deterrence, did at least set reasonably firm lines and helped bring some order and clarity to a chaotic political situation. In that sense, they were probably a positive element in the early cold war years, from 1947 to 1953.

The most ardent supporters of containment and deterrence will, of course, deny that these concepts had any negative effects. On the contrary, they will maintain they have kept the peace for over 40 years and prevented a war between the superpowers, a war that surely would have occurred otherwise. Many will argue that containment was responsible for the recent breakup of the Soviet empire. Again, these are not points we intend to debate since it is impossible to prove them one way or the other. A war might have ensued had there been no containment policy or deterrence strategy, but it is also possible there would have been no major conflict had other more positive policies been followed. The very existence of nuclear weapons made a substantial degree of mutual deterrence an objective fact. Combined with more positive approaches to the problems posed by Soviet insecurities and potential expansionist tendencies, a more conciliatory approach might also have kept the peace while producing a more congenial political atmosphere. There is simply no way to prove what would have happened. Likewise, a strong argument can be made that the breakup was due as much to inherent defects within the Communist system as it was to the effects of our containment policy.

The fact is, of course, that containment was the policy adopted and deterrence became the instrument of that policy. Unfortunately, the combination, as developed in practice over the years, served to severely limit American options in the "real world" to largely negative objectives and carried with it mind-sets that, among other things, viewed negotiation and compromise as weakness. The resulting atmosphere was hardly an auspicious one for the use of inducements or the conduct of productive negotiations.

To understand how containment as a policy and deterrence as an instrument of that policy have helped to inhibit the development of a more positive diplomacy, we need to examine how containment was initially conceived by George Kennan and how it became transmuted in the years that followed. By understanding what Kennan hoped to achieve over time and comparing these ideas with what was actually put into practice, we can begin to comprehend some of the dynamics involved in setting an international stage that was essentially inhospitable to negotiations, bargaining, inducements—in short, to compromise.

Why the Emphasis on Threats?

Was this negative outlook on what we earlier described as positive diplomacy the product of unresolved conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union? Or was it simply the result of policy-making by a group of shortsighted, narrow-minded leaders who were motivated primarily by self-serving political considerations? The answer in each case, at least in our judgment, is no—though clearly there is room for debate among reasonable people on both questions. Certainly there were difficult conflicts of interest to resolve after the war and obviously some of the policy makers involved on both the Soviet and American sides could hardly be called statesmen of great vision or statesmen of the first order. Nonetheless, the available evidence indicates that many of the major disputes between the Soviet Union and the United States could have been approached in a more objective and productive fashion. At the same time, it also indicates that, by and large, the major actors in American foreign policy decision making were dedicated and conscientious statesmen who would never consciously or deliberately do anything harmful to their country's best interests.

What, then, were the factors that caused American statesmen to follow the path of containment and deterrence, a basically defensive and reactive policy that left little room for negotiation and compromise? What things affected policymakers and

hardened an already existing distrust of negotiations and conciliation? What things were responsible for the development of a negative mind-set about bargaining and compromise that in later years would be reflected in the failure, far too often, to use inducements as part of a coherent and well-balanced strategy of positive diplomacy? To find answers to these questions, we must take a detailed look at the international environment that followed World War II and particularly at the role played by George Kennan and his theory of containment.

Kennan's View of the Soviets

In early 1946 George Kennan was acting chief of our diplomatic mission in Moscow, filling in for Amb Averell Harriman who was about to complete his tour there. Kennan's famous "long telegram," sent from our embassy to the State Department in February 1946, was the first major exposition of Kennan's thinking on US-Soviet relations and probably the most significant analysis of that relationship that had been made up to that time. Essentially Kennan said that our methods of dealing with the Soviets, both during and after the war, were premised on false assumptions about Soviet leadership and society. In his view, excessive and largely unproductive efforts had gone into analyzing how our actions influenced Soviet actions and how we might devise a policy that would secure Soviet cooperation. Kennan's basic thesis was that the apparent Soviet aggressiveness and hostility to the West was fueled by certain internal dynamics of Soviet society and that these were not controllable by the United States or its allies; hence our actions, regardless of their nature or intent, had little influence on Soviet actions. The characteristics of the Soviet system—its extreme secrecy, the prevalence of conspirational plotting, the basic insecurity and paranoia—all made it necessary for that country to create external enemies to gain internal legitimacy, or at least a semblance of it. "The party line," said Kennan, "is not based on any objective analysis of the situation beyond Russia's borders. . . . It arises mainly from basic

inner-Russian necessities which existed before [the] recent war and exist today.”⁵

Kennan did not see the Soviets as determined to achieve world domination or as planning a military attack on the West. Rather, he saw the challenge as largely psychological and political rather than military in nature. He believed the weakened condition of the Western European states following the war presented the Soviets with a golden opportunity for political penetration using indigenous Communist parties. These, he felt, were in an ideal position to exploit the political and psychological instability in countries situated within the Soviet sphere of influence.⁶ Kennan did not think we could depend on Soviet ideology as a reliable guide to Soviet behavior; rather, he saw Marxism-Leninism being used more as a justification for action already taken than as any kind of guide to future action.⁷ With this view of the Soviets, one that held certain perceptions of the threat but one that was optimistic that the threat could be managed by judicious policies, Kennan wrote his famous “Mr. X” article in *Foreign Affairs* in 1947 in which he proposed the approach that was to become basic American policy, in one form or another, for the better part of four decades.

Containment as Seen by Kennan and Others

Thousands of pages have been devoted to discussions of Kennan’s containment policy, both to the views he actually expressed as well as those points some scholars feel he intended to make. As John Gaddis has pointed out, “There has developed a kind of cottage industry among cold war scholars, devoted to elucidating what Kennan really meant to say.”⁸ Fortunately, we have a wealth of material from Kennan written over the years since 1947, much of it his more recent evaluations of American policy, including containment.

For our purposes here, however, we are interested primarily in those aspects of the policy that have influenced (inhibited) the use of inducements and negotiations in dealing with the Soviets.

Fortunately, it is quite clear how Kennan felt in this area. It is equally evident that his overall concept of containment was progressively transformed by others from what he had originally intended, especially during the period from 1950 until the beginnings of détente following the Cuban missile crisis.*

One of the modifications of his conception of containment (as it had been developed by 1948) that Kennan most objected to was in the area of inducements and negotiations. As originally conceived by Kennan, containment was designed to thwart aggressive Soviet moves through a "long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies."⁹ With a worldview that saw the need to reestablish a viable global political and military balance, particularly in Europe, he believed containment could slow the growth of Soviet influence while competing centers of power developed. In his "Mr. X" article, Kennan saw this policy as featuring what John Gaddis has called a "perimeter-defense" concept—that is, responding to all Soviet aggressive moves with counterforce in any menaced part of the world. As Kennan put it:

Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world is something that can be constrained by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy.¹⁰

By late 1947, however, Kennan had moved to a more discriminating policy featuring "strong-point defense," or what Gaddis has called "asymmetrical response."¹¹ In essence, Kennan proposed that the United States meet the Soviet challenge in those situations where vital American interests were at stake and at the times and places where American capabilities made a successful outcome possible. And since Kennan saw the challenge from the Soviets as more political and psychological in nature than military, he proposed that our responses be balanced ones featuring

*It should also be noted that Kennan's own ideas about containment changed a great deal over the years.

psychological, political, and economic measures. Military measures were not excluded and indeed were to be one of the instruments available to implement containment; however, since Kennan did not see the threat as primarily a military one, he emphasized the importance of nonmilitary measures, especially economic steps.¹²

In addition to the objectives of reestablishing a viable balance of power and halting Soviet encroachments with strong-point defense, Kennan's version of containment by 1948 featured two other important aims. One aim was to inhibit the global projection of Soviet power by encouraging fragmentation in the international Communist movement. The second aim was to encourage a fundamental change in the Soviet concept of international relations, moving it away from its paranoid obsession with imagined external threats and replacing it with a feeling of increased security that would in turn permit a greater degree of Soviet tolerance of diversity in the world.¹³ In essence, Kennan argued that *his* containment approach would not only prevent the Soviets from attaining unacceptable foreign policy objectives but would, in addition, eventually create significant changes in the internal dynamics of Soviet society. As time passed and these changes accumulated, Soviet imperialist-expansionist inclinations would recede.

This latter objective, the goal of inducing a change in the Soviet concept of international relations, holds significance for our study. While Kennan clearly recognized the importance of the negative aspects of containment—the psychological, political, economic, and military measures necessary to make the Soviets aware that their aggressive moves would be opposed—he was equally sensitive to the necessity of providing inducements, or rewards, for acceptable behavior. In short, Kennan saw the problem as one of “behavior modification” that involved the use of a combination of deterrents and inducements to gradually encourage the Soviets to change their behavior to a mode acceptable to the United States and the international community. He did not visualize such changes as coming about through either war or appeasement but rather through the patient application of what he called “counter-

force” (later identified more accurately as *counter-pressure*)—that is, the judicious use of various forms of deterrent measures to resist Soviet aggressive moves combined with positive measures (inducements and incentives) to reward “good” behavior.¹⁴ It was the wise and patient employment of the stick and carrot scenario that was to be closely followed by the Nixon/Kissinger team more than two decades later. As Kennan put it in 1947:

The shape of Soviet power is like that of a tree which has been bent in infancy and twisted into a certain pattern. It can be caused to grow back into another form; but not by a sudden or violent application of force. This effect can be produced only by the exertion of steady pressure over a period of years in the right direction.¹⁵

Kennan, who by now was director of the policy planning staff in the State Department, was increasingly finding his views at odds with other policymakers in the Truman administration. As the cold war grew in intensity, the architect of containment saw the intent of his plan increasingly distorted by the harsh realities of the growing superpower struggle. From Kennan’s perspective, it was essential to resist Soviet aggressive moves with firmness, but it was also equally essential to reward them for accommodative behavior. This idea that a carefully developed combination of sticks and carrots (deterrents and inducements) could modify Soviet behavior in desired directions was expressed again in National Security Council (NSC) document 20/1, a 1948 Kennan-directed study of policy toward the Soviet Union. Kennan said that if “situations can be created in which it is clearly not to the advantage of their power to emphasize the elements of conflict in their relations with the outside world, then their actions, and even the tenor of their propaganda to their own people, can be modified.”¹⁶

As time passed it became more evident that many influential policymakers in the Truman administration, though still paying lip service to many of Kennan’s ideas, were in practice implementing policies that were bound to conflict with those ideas. As the tension between the Soviets and the United States increased from 1948 to

1950, the administration took a number of actions that Kennan felt narrowed the possibilities for constructive negotiations between the two nations. These actions included the decisions to build the hydrogen bomb, to maintain American troops in Japan after the formal occupation was over, to create an independent West German state, and to form the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).¹⁷ Kennan believed that these steps would simply reinforce historic Soviet feelings of insecurity and hence virtually foreclose the possibility of conducting positive diplomacy, constructive negotiations based on an awareness and sensitivity to each other's interests.¹⁸ However, Truman and his chief advisers, though generally in accord with Kennan on some aspects of containment, parted company with him on his idea that Soviet behavior could be modified over time and that the Soviet concept of international relations could be changed through a judicious use of not only deterrents but also "positive" responses to conciliatory Soviet behavior. By this time, Truman and his key people were no longer buying Kennan's argument that the Soviets were unlikely to make war and that consequently our policy should be flexible and receptive to the idea that mutually beneficial negotiations might be possible.¹⁹

Thus, by late 1949 Kennan's influence within Washington's policy-making circles had begun to slip noticeably. The founder of containment was increasingly appalled by the administration's fixation on a military response to the Soviet problem. As Kennan was to say in later years in responding to the question as to whether containment has been a failure:

If a policy of containment could be said in later years to have failed . . . the failure consisted in the fact that our own government, finding it difficult to understand a political threat as such and to deal with it in other than military terms. . . failed to take advantage of the opportunities for useful political discussion when, in later years, such opportunities began to open up.²⁰

It was apparent to Kennan by early 1950 that the Truman administration—with its decisions on West Germany, NATO, Japan, and the hydrogen bomb—interpreted the Soviet challenge

in a substantially different manner than did Kennan himself. A particularly worrisome development to the originator of containment was the fact that the administration increasingly was basing policy decisions on estimates of Soviet *capabilities* as opposed to *intentions*, a practice Kennan found ill-advised and potentially disastrous. The outbreak of the Korean War in the summer of 1950 accelerated this tendency; as Kennan observed, it “stimulated the already existing preference of the military planners for drawing their conclusions only from the assessed *capabilities* of the adversary, dismissing his *intentions*, which could only be safely assumed to be hostile.”²¹

Many of Kennan’s associates in the State Department and particularly in the military found the idea of assessing intentions a “mushy” concept that did not lend itself easily to any kind of proof. Being able to quantify the resources of the Soviet military in neat graphs and charts was far easier and more reassuring than attempting to divine through some combination of intuition and guesswork what the Soviets were thinking and planning. As Kennan was to say later in his *Memoirs*:

All this tended to heighten the militarization of thinking about the cold war generally, and to press us into attitudes where any discriminate estimate of Soviet intentions was unwelcome and unacceptable. In addition, it encouraged the military planners in another tendency against which I had fought long and bitterly but generally in vain: the tendency, namely, to view Soviet intentions as something existing quite independently of our own behavior. It was difficult to persuade these men what people in Moscow decided to do might be a reaction to what we had done.²²

In the spring of 1950, President Truman ordered a thoroughgoing review of national security policy. Headed up by the new director of the policy planning staff, Paul Nitze, the study was eventually to emerge as NSC-68, a document that was to drastically alter Kennan’s concept of containment and heavily influence American foreign policy for years. During the drafting of the document, Secretary of State Dean Acheson made it plain to Kennan and his fellow Soviet expert, Charles (“Chip”) Bohlen, that the vagueness and uncertainties involved in trying to assess or

rate Soviet intentions held little appeal for him. It was, in Acheson's view, an irrelevant exercise. In his mind, capabilities were what counted most, Moscow's capabilities for aggression, regardless of what its intentions might be.²³

Though the language in places paid lip service to some of his views, NSC-68 basically represented a radical departure from Kennan's concept of containment. Shaken by the fall of China and Soviet acquisition of the atomic bomb earlier than anticipated, and facing increasing stress by the US military on Soviet capabilities (in no small part stimulated by growing interservice competition for funds), the Truman administration produced in NSC-68 a national strategy that essentially called for an across-the-board US response to Soviet advances regardless of where they occurred. Rather than the response advocated by Kennan, one that differentiated between vital and marginal interests and advocated a strong-point defense, NSC-68 proposed meeting Soviet aggression *wherever* encountered—in short, perimeter defense. Moreover, unlike Kennan's approach, the new strategy did not propose an evaluation of American national interests based on an objective assessment of the intrinsic and inherent importance of those interests; on the contrary, it proposed that US interests should be defined in terms of the Soviet threat. If an interest, regardless of its original merit, became threatened by the Soviet Union, it ipso facto became a vital interest.

As John Gaddis has pointed out, the effect of this approach was to make it possible for the Soviets to exercise control over US interests, in a sense defining what those interests would be by exerting pressure at various places in the world. If interests were to be defined by threats, then clearly the country posing the threat had a greatly heightened ability to control the world "chessboard."²⁴

Moreover, following a tendency that had become evident earlier in US government circles, NSC-68 concentrated on Soviet capabilities rather than intentions. In July 1950, following the North Korean attack on South Korea (an event that seemed to confirm the alarm expressed in NSC-68 and that helped speed its adoption by the president), Kennan wrote:

Plainly the [US] government has moved into an area where there is a reluctance to recognize the finer distinctions of the psychology of our adversaries, for the reason that movement in this sphere of speculation is all too undependable, too relative, and too subtle to be comfortable or tolerable to people who feel themselves confronted with the grim responsibility of recommending decisions which may mean war or peace. In such times, it is safer and easier to cease the attempt to analyze the probabilities involved in your enemy's mental processes or to calculate his weaknesses. It seemed safer to give him the benefit of every doubt in matters of strength and to credit him indiscriminately with *all* aggressive designs, even when some of them are mutually contradictory.²⁵

While Kennan deplored the North Korean attack on the south, he saw Soviet approval of the attack as, at least partly, a response to our behavior—the earlier withdrawal of our forces from South Korea, Dean Acheson's National Press Club speech in January 1950 in which he indicated South Korea was not included in our defensive perimeter, our decision to conclude a separate peace treaty with Japan (which excluded the Soviets), and our decision to retain US military personnel and bases in Japan indefinitely. As Kennan stated:

For some reason this connection—the idea that in doing things disagreeable to our interests the Russians might be reacting to features of our own behavior—was one to which the mind of official Washington would always be strangely resistant. Our adversaries, in the ingrained American way of looking at things, had always to be demonic, monstrous, incalculable, and inscrutable. It was unthinkable that we, by admitting that they sometimes reacted to what we did, should confess to a share in the responsibility for their behavior.²⁶

With the onset of the Korean War, the adoption by the Truman administration of NSC-68, and a very evident decline in his influence, Kennan prepared to leave government service by late summer of 1950. Much of what he saw troubled him greatly, and as he put it: “All through the summer I had the feeling that the situation was slipping away not only from the control but from the influence of people like myself. I talked about this several times with Chip Bohlen who I believed shared this impression.”²⁷

It clearly spoke volumes about the atmosphere of the times that two of the country's leading experts on the Soviet Union, in a period of extremely critical relations between the two nations, felt that they had little or no control or influence over events! A third Soviet expert, Llewellyn Thompson (along with Kennan and Bohlen, probably one of the three most knowledgeable men on the Soviet Union in the government) also often found himself differing with high-level policymakers in the State Department and Defense Department. While these Soviet "experts" generally felt Soviet interventions had to be carefully analyzed and our approach to them should be a balanced one emphasizing elements other than military force (including receptivity to negotiations), many if not most key government officials were convinced the Soviets understood and would respond only to "the language of military power." The outbreak of the Korean War, of course, further reduced the relative influence of the three Sovietologists, for to all appearances Stalin had taken an action they had predicted he was unlikely to take.²⁸

Although the invasion of South Korea further hardened attitudes toward the Soviet Union within the Truman administration and prompted massive new defense expenditures, the stress on a military response was not new. In the spring of 1950 before the Korean outbreak, NSC-68 had called for a greatly increased emphasis on military capabilities as it described the necessity of frustrating the "Kremlin design."²⁹ Several years before that, in the summer of 1946, as the cold war was in its very early stages, White House counsel Clark Clifford collected the views of various high-level officials on US-Soviet relations, including the secretaries of state, war and Navy, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Summarizing their views in a memorandum to President Truman, Clifford wrote:

The language of military power is the only language which disciples of power politics understand. The United States must use that language in order that Soviet leaders will realize that our government is determined to uphold the interests of its citizens and the rights of small nations. *Compromise and concessions are considered, by the Soviets, to be*

evidence of weakness and they are encouraged by our "retreats" to make new and greater demands [emphasis added].

The main deterrent to Soviet attack on the United States, or to attack on areas of the world which are vital to our security, will be the military power of this country. . . . In order to maintain our strength at a level which will be effective in restraining the Soviet Union, the United States must be prepared to wage atomic and biological warfare. . . .

In conclusion, as long as the Soviet government adheres to its present policy, the United States should maintain military forces powerful enough to restrain the Soviet Union and to confine Soviet influence to its present area.³⁰

Thus, as early as 1946, even before the major precipitating events of the cold war, there were strong indications that top Washington policymakers viewed inducements and negotiations as inappropriate for the situation, indeed as counterproductive in that they might encourage the Soviets to make new and greater demands. By 1949 this view (or variations of it) permeated the Truman administration. The following year this outlook was codified in NSC-68: the Soviets were seen as implacable adversaries, US power was perceived as declining (with Soviet acquisition of the atomic bomb and the loss of China), negotiations were viewed as counterproductive exercises, and military strength was considered the key element in the US response. The rhetoric of NSC-68—emphasizing such terms as the *free and slave world*, the *Kremlin design*, and *opportunities for the Kremlin to do its evil work*—was highly alarmist and clearly designed to produce apprehension and anti-Soviet sentiment among the American public. Secretary of State Acheson essentially admitted NSC-68 tended toward “exaggerations,” but he defended this as necessary under the circumstances.³¹

But it was in the area of negotiations that NSC-68 presented perhaps its most fascinating if rather disingenuous face. Though the document mentioned negotiations repeatedly and even talked about their desirability under appropriate circumstances, it clearly viewed them largely as a tactical ploy to be used primarily to gain the time necessary to build “situations of strength,” which in NSC-68 terms meant *military strength*. As the document put it,

“Negotiation is not a possible separate course of action but rather a means of giving support for a program of building strength, of recording progress in the cold war, and of facilitating further progress while helping to minimize the risks of war.”³²

Thus, while George Kennan saw diplomacy and negotiations as means of presenting those inducements (carrots) that might help modify Soviet behavior if used in a well-orchestrated program employing both deterrents and incentives, NSC-68 essentially rejected diplomacy and negotiations as a means of accomplishing this objective. In the view of NSC-68, negotiations were of little real value until the Soviet system experienced fundamental changes in its nature. And this would not happen until US and Western strength was built up. As NSC-68 stated, “Nevertheless, concurrently with a decision and a start on building up the strength of the free world, it may be desirable to pursue this tactic (negotiations) both to gain public support for the program and to minimize the immediate risk of war.”³³

Readers will recall that a vital part of Kennan’s version of containment called for the blocking of Soviet power at key points, thereby forcing the Soviets to reconsider their international strategy. Meanwhile, the passage of time would hopefully bring about internal changes in the Communist giant that would in turn promote a change in the way the Soviet Union viewed the world. Thus, deterrents of various kinds—political, psychological, economic, and in some cases military—would halt Soviet expansion while various kinds of inducements would help steer their energies in desired directions. NSC-68 viewed the situation much differently, placing far more emphasis on sticks than it did on carrots.³⁴

Thus, with the outbreak of the Korean War and the final adoption of NSC-68, a new and substantially altered version of Kennan’s containment policy had been put in place by the latter part of 1950. The basic ingredients of the new approach would dominate American foreign and defense policy for years to come. Even when occasional combinations of innovative leaders and favorable world developments combined to produce new approaches (as in the era of *détente*), the pattern set by NSC-68

and the events of 1947–50 acted as an unforgiving boundary, an outer limit beyond which new attempts to moderate the US-Soviet conflict found it extraordinarily difficult to proceed.

For our purposes we must now review some of the “conceptual strands,” the basic ingredients that were instrumental in producing NSC-68 and making its essential philosophy a dominant element in American foreign policy. While obviously there have been many changes in US policy, especially since Gorbachev came to power, the fact remains that many of the basic factors that produced NSC-68 still linger in the psyches of a formidable number of policymakers even today. Any substantial setback in US-Soviet relations is likely to bring them to the surface.

Why is this historical background important to our study of deterrence and coercive diplomacy in the postwar period? The attitudes and philosophy about the American-Soviet relationship that became entrenched in American governmental circles during the immediate postwar years were the result of a variety of special and rather unique factors that were associated with World War II—its origins, its results, and its aftermath—along with some significant traditional American historical concerns, cultural characteristics, and domestic political problems that exerted an influence. Blended together in an uneasy and volatile mix, these attitudes were imposed on an international system that had been drastically altered as a result of political changes emerging from the war and of such technological advances as jet aircraft and nuclear weapons. The attempt to impose a rigid, black-and-white, highly structured policy framework (containment) on a rapidly changing, highly complex international system was bound to result in serious problems for the United States, as, of course, it did in Vietnam and elsewhere. But because of these American attitudes (as well as Soviet attitudes and responses) and the new realities of the postwar international system, certain foreign policy instruments assumed new importance. Prominent among these, of course, were deterrence and coercive diplomacy.

Although George Kennan’s version of containment recognized that the world was far more complicated than it had been before the war and that America’s power to control that world had definite

limits, the US governmental version that emerged in the 1947–53 period was far more ambitious and at the time much less flexible. Both approaches, of course, contained elements of deterrence and coercive diplomacy because the changed international system and new constraints on full-scale war made these necessary. But whereas Kennan's approach emphasized traditional diplomacy and a mixture of deterrents and inducements, the approach that actually emerged from the Truman and Eisenhower years tended to downgrade traditional diplomacy, inducements, bargaining, and compromises (though this had begun to change to some extent by the last years of Eisenhower's administration). However, the emphasis was on sticks rather than carrots. Rather than following the old and honored concept of avoiding war by using the instruments of diplomacy and negotiation, American policy after 1950, despite some notable exceptions that we will consider later, was substantially based on the concept of preventing war by the threat of force. Though it is generally acknowledged that the utility of force has declined in recent years and negotiations appear to be in an "up" phase, the fact remains that threats (direct or implied), based on military force, remain an important element in American foreign policy.

We have reviewed George Kennan's concept of containment and the US government's reaction to that concept at considerable length because it illustrates in rich historical detail two contrasting approaches to US-Soviet relations. It also provides a convenient and highly relevant background for the primary subject of this book—the substantially different ways in which carrots and sticks, as instruments of policy, have been viewed and used at different times and by different administrations.

On the one hand, we have a man (perhaps as knowledgeable about the Soviet Union in the immediate postwar years as any living American) who started out alarmed by what he saw as "Russian expansive tendencies."³⁵ In a few short years, however, that man had substantially modified his views to the point where, though the policy he favored embodied definite mechanisms to resist Soviet pressures, nonetheless emphasized nonmilitary means. Traditional diplomacy, political, psychological, and

economic measures, negotiation, and inducements—all these took precedence over force in Kennan's mind.

On the other hand, the US government followed a diametrically opposite course. Under Franklin D. Roosevelt, and later under Truman until 1947, the American government had approached the Soviets with the attitude that negotiations and agreements were possible, that even though both countries recognized the great differences between the systems, it was still possible to get along. Within a few years, the American government had discarded these more conciliatory views and by 1947 was beginning to adopt a much "harder line" that emphasized deterrence of the Soviets through the threat of force. Kennan, meanwhile, had taken a considerably different tack.

As stated earlier, this is not intended to be a history of the cold war, so we will not attempt to trace all the American and Soviet actions that led first to friction and then to outright conflict. In particular we will not attempt to consider in any detail those well-known attitudes and actions of the Kremlin that contributed to the conflict—the extreme sensitivity and extraordinary secretiveness, the rampant feelings of insecurity and paranoid suspiciousness, the aggressive and often brutal moves as in Poland and Czechoslovakia, the sometimes incredibly poor judgment as in Berlin and Korea, and so on. These are generally well known to the reader and do not require detailed elaboration here. We mention them briefly only to make it plain that this is not a "revisionist" account of the cold war, nor does the author intend it to be unjustifiably critical of American policy. The Soviet Union's actions were in many ways responsible for the development of American policy, and greater openness and sensitivity on the Soviet side would have done much to prevent the conflict from developing as it did.

Having made these qualifications, however, and hopefully having alerted the reader to the fact that we are well aware that the origination of the cold war was a two-way affair, we return to the dynamics that drove American policy, for that is what this study is about. Many of these dynamics, a considerable number of which influence US policy to this day, have very little or nothing to do

with Soviet actions per se. We will concentrate on those that relate to the core of our study—American attitudes toward threats and force, negotiation and compromise, diplomacy and military power, peace and war, appeasement and resolve, and sticks and carrots. These attitudes still influence American policy and the instruments of that policy, including deterrence and coercive diplomacy.

It may be useful at this stage to once again remind the reader of the basic assumptions of this study. The first is that sticks and carrots, appropriately mixed and administered, have frequently proved to be effective instruments in deterrence and coercive diplomacy. A further assumption is that inducements (the carrot part of the equation) have been neglected and that greater attention to this element can produce more effective diplomacy. A third and related assumption is that in a number of international crisis situations the use of force has received more credit for a solution to the crisis than it in fact deserved, while conciliatory/accommodative measures have received less credit than they deserved. A fourth assumption is that the inducement factor has been underused and misused for a variety of rather special reasons (actually because of a number of specific attitudes), many of them unrelated to any Soviet action. Lastly, a basic assumption is that an understanding of the reasons for these attitudes can lead to an improvement in the use of inducements and thus more effective diplomacy—a much more positive diplomacy.

Before we discuss the factors that have produced these attitudes and the influence they have had on US policy, we need to consider briefly the changes that took place in the international system following World War II. It was on this decisively altered stage that American policy would be played out.

Notes

1. Quoted in Kenneth W. Thompson, *Cold War Theories*, vol. 1, *World Polarization, 1943–1953* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981), 25.

2. See, for example, John L. Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972);

William A. Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, rev. 2d ed. (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1972).

3. Michael Nacht, "On Memories, Interests, and Foreign Policy: The Case of Vietnam," in *National Security and International Stability*, ed. Bernard Brodie, Michael D. Intriligator, and Roman Kolkowicz (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, Inc., 1983), 357.

4. John L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 20.

5. George F. Kennan to State Department, 22 February 1946, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), 6:696–709 (hereafter cited as *FRUS*).

6. *Ibid.*

7. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 34.

8. *Ibid.*, 26.

9. George F. Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," in *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950*, ed. George F. Kennan (New York: Mentor Books, 1951), 113.

10. *Ibid.*

11. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 61.

12. George F. Kennan, *Memoirs*, vol. 2, 1925–1950 (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967), 410.

13. *Ibid.*, 365.

14. *Ibid.*, 303, 358–59.

15. Quoted in Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 49.

16. Thomas H. Etzold and John L. Gaddis, eds., *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945–1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), 187.

17. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 71.

18. Kennan, *Memoirs*, 2:419, 446–47.

19. *Ibid.*, 497.

20. *Ibid.*, 365.

21. *Ibid.*, 497.

22. *Ibid.*

23. Paul Y. Hammond, "NSC-68: Prologue to Rearmament," in *Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets*, ed. Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 267–378.

24. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 98.

25. Kennan, *Memoirs*, 2:499.

26. *Ibid.*, 498.

27. *Ibid.*, 499.

28. Ernest R. May, "The Cold War," in *The Making of America's Soviet Policy*, ed. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 225–26.
29. *FRUS*, 1:291.
30. Etzold and Gaddis, 66–70.
31. Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (New York: W. W. Marten and Co., Inc., 1969), 375.
32. *FRUS*, 1950, 1:276.
33. *Ibid.*, 274.
34. *Ibid.*, 276.
35. Kennan, *American Diplomacy*, 533–34.

Chapter 3

Historical Analogies, the Containment Paradigm, and the Role of Inducements

Most of the major international political changes that took place following World War II are well known and require no more than a brief mention here. Obviously three of the most significant changes were the United States and the Soviet Union emerging as the most powerful actors on the world stage; the former leading nations of Europe (Germany, France, and Great Britain), exhausted by the war, being reduced to middle-level powers; and the vast colonial empires of the European powers undergoing great changes as a result of the war and being largely broken up, often through revolutionary violence. As a result, a host of new and untried nations were born.

Conflict Constraints and New National Goals

In addition to these changes, other critical alterations were occurring in the international system. Chief among these were changes in the use of force as a result of technological advances, particularly nuclear weapons. The possession of these weapons by both superpowers after 1949 made it necessary to alter the “rules of the game” insofar as force was concerned. The new constraints on conflict imposed by weapons of mass destruction made it essential for the superpowers to change not only their means but also their ends—their goals and objectives. Thus, as Stanley Hoffman of Harvard University has pointed out, the old “possession goals” such as conquering territory and acquiring treasure gave way to “milieu goals”—more general kinds of objectives aimed at “influencing conditions beyond national

boundaries.” An example of the latter was the attempt by the United States to create conditions in other countries to favor democracy over authoritarianism and free enterprise over communism.¹ The limitations on the use of force made pursuit of “possession goals” an exceedingly hazardous business for the superpowers, a fact that increased the pursuit of milieu goals. The pursuit of such goals was much safer, and it was much easier to rationalize failure if a nation’s efforts fell short of achieving the milieu goals.

At the same time that milieu goals have become more common than possession goals, the limitations on the use of force have helped produce what Hoffman has called “internalized world politics”—that is, “the migration of force from, say, conquest to subversion and the mutation of war into a legitimate adjunct of revolution.”² With full-scale war (particularly between the superpowers) a mutually avoided area of violence, internal violence such as revolutions has become increasingly important—a “safety valve,” so to speak, for the frustrations imposed by the limitations on traditional warfare.

Thus, where traditional warfare had been an instrument of change in the international system, the postwar nuclear world—locked into a system of constraints on violence—had to find other means of bringing about change. Two means of producing change that thus developed were internal societal violence (such as subversion and revolutions) and international crises, or confrontations—those situations of great tension between the superpowers (or their clients) that took the place of traditional wars.³ Among these, of course, were such crises as the confrontations over Berlin, the Korean War, the Cuban missile crisis, the Vietnam War, and others. It is in these confrontations—the instances in which deterrence and coercive diplomacy played major roles—that we are particularly interested.

Our intention in the following chapters is to look at a number of these crises in an effort to determine (a) the effectiveness of the use of sticks (force) and carrots (inducements) in particular situations; (b) the mixture of sticks and carrots that seemed to be

most effective and why; (c) the kinds of situations that seemed to be most favorable for the use of sticks, for the use of carrots, and for a mixture of both; (d) the constraints that were placed on the use of inducements and why; (e) how civilian and military leaders differed in their attitudes about the use of sticks and carrots in specific crisis situations; and (f) variables other than carrots and sticks that were important in these situations. As we indicated in the introduction, we will spend the most time on two crises during the Eisenhower administration because we think they are good examples of positive diplomacy. We will examine several other crises as well, albeit in briefer fashion.

The Containment Paradigm and Pressures for Change

In the previous chapter we reviewed in considerable detail the policy of containment as it was originated by George Kennan and as it was developed in actual practice by the US government between 1947 and 1953. Before moving to an examination of specific crises between the superpowers, we need to first take a closer look at those attitudes about the American-Soviet relationship that were prevalent in American government circles in these early cold war years. Our objective is to determine, if we can, what factors produced these attitudes. Aside from Soviet actions, what elements peculiar to American society, American history, and American policymakers (civilian and military) helped bring these attitudes to the fore and make them an intimate part of American policy? Why did deterrence, emphasizing threats of force, assume the importance it did? Why was the use of military force stressed while accommodative steps—negotiations, inducements, and compromises—were more often than not ignored? What was the role played by military policymakers in the development of these attitudes as compared to civilian policymakers? Why was the policy conceived and advocated by George Kennan largely bypassed and the philosophy and guidelines of NSC-68 largely followed?

As we look at instances of deterrence and coercive diplomacy in crisis situations, we will see a variety of influences at work in the development of American policy. Probably strongest among these influences have been the attitudes and philosophy that produced NSC-68 and the Truman/Acheson-Eisenhower/Dulles version of containment—what Michael Nacht has called the “containment paradigm.” As Nacht has pointed out, while that paradigm has undergone alterations especially since the Vietnam War, it has not been replaced, though there is considerable evidence in the Gorbachev era that it may be in the process of being substantially modified.

Referring to Thomas Kuhn’s study of the development of paradigms (“an existing set of rules of how to think about problems, a collection of shared assumptions, and a common belief in the location of the discipline’s frontiers”), Nacht observes that once a paradigm such as containment has been well established, it is extraordinarily difficult to replace. For the most part, widely accepted paradigms are “adjusted, refined, and extended,” but they are only infrequently replaced and then only if there is overwhelming evidence that the existing paradigm is badly flawed.⁴ Since the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the cold war as we have known it appears to be over. With a fragmented, problem-ridden Soviet Union struggling to overcome a host of internal crises, the old containment paradigm would appear in most ways to be no longer applicable, since the Soviets after all seem far less threatening. Academicians and policymakers have been struggling mightily in recent months to come up with some new conceptual approach to replace the containment paradigm but thus far have not been notably successful. Hence while we are now in a transitional period and containment has been bypassed in many respects, it still has many adherents, especially among those who predict that Gorbachev will fail and the Soviet Union will return to a more conservative and aggressive stance.

In this period of rapid and exciting change, it is hard to predict what form containment will take or whether it will disappear

entirely. It has not as yet, though it has been modified substantially. But over the years since 1947, it has proved extraordinarily resilient. Whether the world events of 1989–90 will produce a new paradigm to guide American foreign policy remains to be seen.

Despite the great strength of the containment/deterrence paradigm, there obviously have been other influences at work. Among these are changes in the international system itself, a number of which we have discussed. Included here are the breathtaking technological advances, the superpower “standoff” resulting in great caution in the use of force and development of so-called rules of the game, the tendency toward increasing political multipolarity, the extensive fragmentation and outright collapse of states in what was formerly thought of as the “Communist monolith,” and so on. Thus, we have certain strong pressures that push against the solidity and tenacity of the containment paradigm, but, for the most part, these pressures have resulted in modifications of the paradigm, not its replacement. As Nacht argues, the Kennedy years saw a number of new theoretical developments in the use of force—theories of limited war, coercive diplomacy, and counterinsurgency—but these represented *adjustments* in the paradigm, not fundamental changes.⁵ Likewise, developments in the Gorbachev era have greatly modified the containment paradigm, but it is still an operative principle in US foreign policy, albeit fairly low profile at the moment.

A number of the crises between the superpowers discussed in later chapters illustrate in microcosm the struggle between the containment paradigm and countervailing forces that have pushed against the paradigm, often in vain but occasionally with some success, as in the era of *détente*. In examining these situations in which the United States has employed deterrence, coercive diplomacy, or a combination of both, we will look at the relative mixture of coercion and inducements, and perhaps in the process we will be able to see more clearly the dynamics of the interactions between the containment paradigm and the forces that seek to change it. And hopefully we will be able to discern in the dynamics of these particular situations that certain approaches were more

effective than others and hence can be useful in helping chart future policy, not just in crisis situations but in the broader stream of US-Soviet relations. Before doing that, however, we need to examine in some detail those attitudes and mind-sets that made the Truman/Acheson-Eisenhower/Dulles version of containment and deterrence a dominant force in American foreign policy and that relegated the Kennan-type approaches to the “back burner” except for brief periods after the Cuban missile crisis, during a portion of the Nixon/Kissinger years, and, of course, during the Gorbachev era.

We have already observed that a variety of factors (over and above the effects of Soviet actions) appears to have been instrumental in the development of the particular containment paradigm the United States essentially followed for over four decades. These include factors that appear to be intimately related to the peculiar conditions of international conflict in the twentieth century, especially the conditions surrounding World War II; factors that seem to be the product of particular traits or attitudes in the American character developed in the course of our special and in many ways unique national history; and factors that apparently are primarily the result of the dynamics of a volatile, pluralistic political system operating in a society of great cultural heterogeneity. Time will not permit the discussion that each of these merits, but a brief survey of each factor should prove useful in an attempt to perceive and understand the constraints and limitations that too often have made US policy lack flexibility and imagination.

The Influence of Historical Analogies

Certainly a major factor influencing US foreign policy has been the so-called Munich syndrome. It is difficult to overstress the significance of this factor. The tendency of American policy-makers to refer to historical analogies as a basis for their policy

decisions, particularly the events of the 1930s, is a behavioral pattern of great significance for American foreign policy.⁶

Virtually every postwar American president has been influenced by parallels drawn from the 1930s when Great Britain and France failed to react soon enough and strongly enough to halt Hitler. Their appeasement of Hitler—*appeasement* was an honorable term in diplomatic parlance in the previous century—led to the tragedy of World War II, or so the theory went. Had Allied statesmen stood firm in the face of Nazi aggression, particularly when Hitler was still relatively weak, the war could likely have been avoided. In the minds of many such postwar American statesmen as Harry Truman, Dean Acheson, Dwight Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles, John F. Kennedy, Dean Rusk, Lyndon Johnson, Ronald Reagan, George Bush, and others, Nazi and Japanese aggression of the thirties and forties left an indelible impression. These men had matured in those years and the international events of the period had been burned into their thought processes. In the words of Dean Acheson's biographer, the "image of Hitler seared itself on the eyes of all who fought him."⁷

The Influence of Soviet Actions

Obviously, other factors also accounted for the anti-Soviet stance that American statesmen began to assume as early as 1946. Some of these factors included various aggressive-appearing Soviet actions (as in Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria) and the strongly anti-Soviet dispatches sent in by US foreign service personnel stationed in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe at this time. But as Ernest May of Harvard University has pointed out, American diplomats who had observed Soviet behavior in these areas over a period of time were concerned that many civilian policymakers in the United States had been influenced by the conciliatory-idealistic thinking of Franklin D. Roosevelt and as a

result had become excessively naive about the Soviets.* George Kennan was originally of this school of thinking, as reflected in his "long telegram" of 1946. To counteract this tendency, the foreign service officers sent in reports that focused on Soviet actions that appeared malign and aggressive and that ignored those Soviet actions in other countries (as in Czechoslovakia, Finland, and Hungary) that appeared to contradict the thesis that the Soviets were intent on using whatever means might be necessary to establish Communist regimes everywhere. In these latter countries, the Soviets had tolerated non-Communist regimes and despite having the power to change them, had made no attempt to impose Communist administrations until after the announcement of the Truman Doctrine in 1947. May states that

it seems clear now that many of the diplomats indulged in overstatement, probably in order to counteract the excessive trustfulness and optimism which they had earlier observed among politicians. Some of them used black and white to portray issues that might have been sketched more faithfully in grays.⁸

May also states that elsewhere the Truman administration "ascribed to Soviet machinations developments which might with equal plausibility have been explained in other ways" (for example, in Iran, Greece, and Yugoslavia).⁹ The evidence regarding Soviet actions and intentions was thus mixed and subject to different interpretations depending on one's point of view. However, despite a picture that tended to be gray rather than black and white, Truman and the men around him moved increasingly toward a policy that lacked the ability to make discriminating judgments on a case-by-case basis. By late 1946, following tension-producing situations with the Soviets over their failure to withdraw troops from northern Iran and over what appeared to be a Soviet attempt to intimidate Turkey over the Dardanelles, the American government's position hardened rapidly into the

*A number of other leading American scholars, not usually considered in the "revisionist school," have also pointed this out.

containment paradigm. Daniel Yergin of Harvard University described this hardening process in his book *Shattered Peace*:

Notwithstanding, the Turkish episode did lead to the expression of the anticommunist consensus among American policymakers. The image of the Soviet Union had, we might say, "closed." The official American view of Russia was no longer ambiguous. Excluded now were assessments keyed to the nature of a particular problem or suggesting that the Russians were confused or crudely reactive. Interpretations and assessments from this point on derived from the axiomatic construct that the Soviet Union was not a Great Power operating within the international system but rather a world revolutionary state bent on overturning that system. These axioms and the doctrine of national security coalesced to create a permanent crisis mentality among the Americans. Here, operating for the first time, was an interpretative framework that would govern American policy well into the 1970s.¹⁰

The Need for a "Blanket" Policy

Although Yergin's finding that the US position had hardened so completely by the time of the Turkish incident may be open to question, there is little doubt that his basic conclusion is essentially accurate. In the four years from 1946 to 1950, American policymakers came to view the "Soviet problem" as one to be handled not on a case-by-case basis, considering the merits of each case in its own unique context, but rather as a problem requiring a uniform approach, a blanket policy for all situations. It was far easier and much more convenient to construct a policy that made simple and straightforward assumptions about Soviet behavior in *all* circumstances than to attempt judgments about Soviet actions and motivations in individual cases, especially in a highly complex international environment.

Just as it appeared easier to base policy on Soviet capabilities rather than intentions, it appeared simpler to consistently apply a known conceptual framework or formula that explained Soviet actions in terms of unchanging postulates. Among these basic postulates, of course, were the assumptions that the Soviet Union was a radical and revolutionary world power, expansionist in its

foreign policy, bent on world domination, and little troubled by the means that might be required to reach this goal. Against such a power, the only effective course of action would be firmness, strong wills, and the courage to oppose its aggression wherever it occurred, even by war if necessary.¹¹ Against such a foe, diplomacy was largely ineffectual, negotiations useful only as a tactical device, and compromise a sign of weakness. With this group of constants, one could construct a policy framework and apply it to *all* situations involving the Soviets. Utilizing George Kennan's early contributions, modified over time by others into the type of containment exemplified by NSC-68, this kind of framework was constructed between 1946 and 1950.

The Continuing Attraction of Historical Analogies

Possibly as early as the latter part of 1946, and certainly by mid-1947, the US government had thus identified the Soviet Union as a threat to the United States and, because of its postulated relentless drive for world conquest, a threat to the world as a whole. However, as Ernest May has pointed out, it was not just that the Soviets had been identified as a problem that presented certain threatening aspects; rather, they represented an implacable and dangerous threat that had to be resisted by the United States, by war *if necessary*.¹² While the postwar actions of the Soviets in 1946–47 could legitimately be construed as a cause for concern, the degree of alarm on the part of the US government cannot be adequately explained by an objective consideration of these actions alone. As we noted earlier, many other interpretations of Soviet actions were possible and reasonable. In May's view:

[The American government] could have seen the developments reported by the diplomats as at most cause for public expressions of regret. In the preceding decade, American officials had so viewed Fascist or Nazi take-overs in Spain, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. Why did members of the Truman administration react differently? The most plausible answer is that they came to see the events described by their diplomats as analogous to the events of the 1930s.¹³

As Stanley Hoffman has observed, this kind of analogical thinking is dangerous because it “singles out, in the two complex events being compared, features that are common to both, and suggests that since they were essential in the first case they must be decisive in the second.”¹⁴

Perhaps the most quoted example of a major statesman using a historical analogy is President Truman’s reference to the history of the 1930s when he learned of the North Korean invasion of South Korea:

In my generation, this was not the first occasion when the strong had attacked the weak. I recalled some earlier instances: Manchuria, Ethiopia, Austria. I remembered how each time that the democracies failed to act it had encouraged the aggressors to keep going ahead. Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier. I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed to fall Communist leaders would be emboldened to override nations closer to our own shores. If the Communists were permitted to force their way into the Republic of Korea without opposition from the free world, no small nation would have the courage to resist threats and aggression by stronger Communist neighbors. If this was allowed to go unchallenged it would mean a third world war, just as similar incidents had brought on the second world war.¹⁵

Few statements illustrate so well the various characteristics of analogical thinking and its flaws. Time will not permit a full analysis of the pitfalls usually involved in this type of reasoning but the key ones bear mentioning.

The Pitfalls in Analogical Reasoning

Probably the chief danger in reasoning by reference to a historical analogy is the tendency to seize on those elements in the past situation that are similar to elements in the current situation, meanwhile ignoring those things that are dissimilar. Here the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance is present—the tendency to reinforce one’s predispositions or “belief systems” by being selectively attentive to information that reinforces long-held

attitudes and that does not create the need for painful readjustments in thinking. In the critical situation in which President Truman found himself in the Korean case, he seized on those similarities from the 1930s that supported his mental predispositions: armed aggression across a border, a “totalitarian” state against a “democracy,” the Western democracies being in a position to oppose the aggression providing they had the will, and so on. In the process, he ignored important dissimilarities: the fact that Korea was an artificially divided nation on the Asian mainland with close historical and geographical ties to China and the Soviet Union; the fact that announced American policy had excluded Korea from the US “defense perimeter”; and the fact that the continuing and apparently permanent presence of US bases and forces in Japan, regardless of how defensive in nature from the US perspective, created security concerns in China and the Soviet Union (two countries excessively paranoid about their security in the best of circumstances).

Explicit in the Truman statement, of course, are the principles that aggression must be met by force, that *firm* action by the democracies can halt such aggression if undertaken in time, and that failure to resist aggression will result in the loss of other small nations (later to be termed the *domino theory*) and very likely the beginning of a third world war. But implicit in the statement are other “lessons” drawn from Truman’s long-held belief system that included, of course, the events of the 1930s funneled through the perceptual filter of his own life experiences. Among these were the strongly held beliefs that one should appear strong, demonstrate firmness and resolve, make decisions boldly and without undue hesitation, and above all avoid any appearance of weakness or vacillation.¹⁶

None of this should be taken to mean that Truman’s basic decision to defend South Korea was wrong. On the contrary, the decision to oppose the naked North Korean aggression was a courageous and widely admired action, and nearly four decades of hindsight has not proved Truman’s initial decision to be in error. What is in question, however, are the historical grounds that

Truman and his advisers selected as the basis for their decision to intervene in Korea and, more importantly, for subsequent actions. By selecting the history of the 1930s, they ignored as we have noted, a host of dissimilarities between that era and the Korean crisis. While this did not mean the fundamental decision to defend South Korea was wrong (it was not), it did lead American policymakers to apply the same analogy to later developments in the Korean situation when in fact it was not appropriate. This is perhaps best illustrated by the blind hubris that led Gen Douglas MacArthur to lead his troops up to the sensitive Communist Chinese border, despite numerous warnings from Peking, with the leadership in Washington unable to recognize that the situation was no longer analogous to the 1930s, if in fact it ever had been.

Whether in Korea or elsewhere, once Truman had become convinced of Soviet duplicity in the early postwar years and had seized on the 1930s as an analogue, efforts to seek compromise through bargaining and conciliatory steps were generally regarded as naive and counterproductive. Such efforts had been tried by England, France, and the United States in the 1930s, and the result had been a tragic worldwide war—no matter that the antagonist now was different, the issues different, the time different, and the circumstances different (especially considering the new and ominous presence of nuclear weapons). The fact remained, at least in the thinking of Truman and those around him, that certain “principles” could be derived from history, especially from the history of the 1930s, a period they had all lived through. Unfortunately, as Ernest May observed:

Members of the Truman administration appear to have thought about the issues before them in a frame of reference made up in part of historical analogies, parallels, and presumed trends and . . . the history employed for this purpose was narrowly selected and subjected to no deliberate scrutiny or analysis.¹⁷

Clearly this “historical analogical thinking” had an extraordinary emotional hold on American policymakers in the 1940s and 1950s and to a considerable degree that hold has continued to this day. One result, of course, was to relegate bargaining,

negotiations, and inducements—key instruments in the diplomacy of the nineteenth century—to a relatively secondary position behind the policy of deterrence through the threat of force. To be sure, diplomacy and negotiations and bargaining still took place, but for the most part the primary emphasis was on deterrence, building “situations of strength,” “negotiating from positions of strength,” “keeping one’s powder dry,” and so on.¹⁸ Bargaining, negotiations, and the use of inducements were available tools, but they did not play a primary role, not in the sense of being earnestly utilized by policymakers to pursue what we have described as positive diplomacy. The main role in American policy continued to be played by containment and deterrence.

The Selection of Analogies by Policymakers

The momentous events of the late 1930s were almost always selected as offering the most relevant lessons for the present, though later historical parallels were also frequently referred to, including “the loss of China” (1949) and the Korean War (1950–53). The Vietnam War would also become a much-used historical analogy nearly three decades later. All of this confirmed the points made by Robert Jervis that policymakers tend to be drawn toward analogies that are dramatic, especially recent major wars in which the policymaker has participated or at least has lived through.¹⁹ For example, John Foster Dulles, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and John F. Kennedy were all men conscious of history and especially of the conflicts they had lived through, though as we shall see later, the latter two were far more objective in the selections made and the lessons drawn. It was Secretary of State Dean Rusk and President Lyndon B. Johnson, however, who over and over again drew from the history of the 1930s and 1940s every conceivable historical parallel to support American intervention in Vietnam. As Rusk said, “Once again we hear expressed the views which cost the men of my generation a terrible

price in World War II. We are told that Southeast Asia is too far away—but so were Manchuria and Ethiopia.”²⁰

He was echoed by his boss, President Johnson, who said, “Surrender in Vietnam [would not] bring peace, because we learned from Hitler at Munich that success only feeds the appetite of aggression.”²¹ In 1970 after leaving the White House, he said to author Doris Kearns:

Yet everything I knew about history told me that if I got out of Vietnam and let Ho Chi Minh run through the streets of Saigon, then I'd be doing exactly what Chamberlain did in World War II. I'd be giving a big fat reward to aggression. . . . You see, I deeply believe we *are* quarantining aggressors over there just like the smallpox. Just like FDR and Hitler, just like Wilson and the kaiser. *You've simply got to see this thing in historical perspective* [emphasis added]. What I learned as a boy in my teens and in college about World War I was that it was our lack of strength and failure to show stamina that got us into that war. I was taught that the kaiser never would have made his moves if he hadn't been able to count Uncle Sam out because he believed we'd never come in. Then I was taught in Congress and in committees and by FDR that we in Congress were constantly telegraphing the wrong messages to Hitler and the Japanese [that we] were letting Hitler know he could move without worrying about Uncle Sam.²²

One could go on at great length with similar quotations from other American presidents, but the point has been made. As we observed earlier, it is difficult to overstress the importance of this policy-making by historical analogy, particularly regarding the events surrounding World War II. As Doris Kearns states in her biography of Lyndon Johnson:

Thus, when Johnson took the presidential oath, behind him was a century of American involvement and concern with Asia, three Pacific wars, two decades of cold war accompanied by the feared possibility of a nuclear apocalypse, and a widely held belief—almost a dogma—that the arena of confrontation was shifting to the “third world.”

But perhaps most significant of all was the fact that an entire generation, many of its members now come to leadership, viewed these views and other conditions of the postwar period from the perspective of their experience of World War II—that shattering transformation of historical conditions which created an America, not only powerful but supreme, faced with the alternative of accepting international responsibilities or abandoning the map of Europe to the intentions—whatever they were—of that only other significant power, the Soviet Union. Those felt responsibilities, emerging more from circumstances than from choice—and the ensuing confrontation, known as the cold war—were given their distinctive form by the lessons of the war that had just ended—or by what was then almost universally accepted as an accurate analysis of how the war had begun and why the forces of darkness had achieved so much, and had come so perilously close to a decisive conquest.²³

It is tempting to spend several chapters, or indeed an entire book, analyzing the many facets of this fascinating subject, but there is a considerable body of literature already available on the topic.²⁴ It is sufficient for our purposes to stress once again that historical analogical thinking has been of great significance in the making of American foreign policy, especially in the area of US-Soviet relations. Major wars and revolutions are magnetically attractive as historical analogies and their influences on those who have participated in them, or at least grew to maturity during that time, are often deep and profound.²⁵

The Development of “Formula Thinking”

As already noted, the use of historical analogies is often flawed for a number of reasons, the most important being that the historical comparison is usually narrowly based, confined to *one* historical episode or situation (often a recent one); similarities to the current situation are stressed but dissimilarities are more often than not ignored; and details of causation are often ignored (or not fully understood) with the result that the outcomes seized on for comparative purposes tend to be used in a superficial and overgeneralized fashion. Perhaps worst of all, as Stanley Hoffman

has observed, analogical thinking in this fashion results in “an inability to see new events for what they are, a tendency to reduce them to something reassuringly familiar.”²⁶

It is this tendency of analogical thinking to reduce situations to “something reassuringly familiar” that is of special significance for our study of deterrence and coercive diplomacy and the role of inducements. What Hoffman calls “formulism”—that is, relying on such set formulas and dogmas as containment, deterrence, and counterinsurgency to cope with any and all situations—results from reasoning in analogies. The question in the policymaker’s mind then becomes, What dogma or formula or analogy can I apply to this situation to give me policy guidance? Clearly the solution should actually be one that starts with the unique elements of each situation, attempts to determine details of causation, and only then turns to a carefully selected and representative sample of historical cases that may provide insights for current policy.

The Containment Formula

From our perspective—that is, trying to understand how and why inducements have been underused, misused, and ignored—it is imperative that we understand (1) the attitudes of American policymakers toward negotiations, inducements, and compromise that have existed since shortly after the end of World War II and (2) the reasons why these attitudes developed as they did. To accomplish this we have sketched in considerable detail the evolution of the containment policy and the often mechanical application of that policy, using historical analogy, to situations to which it did not apply.

Containment was mechanically applied through analogy to very different situations. Despite vastly different countries, regions, and circumstances, it was applied to both the Soviet Union in Europe and to China in Asia. And as Stanley Hoffman observes, Americans could with equal conviction (and a nearly total disregard of very great differences) see this policy as equally

applicable to Nazi Germany had the Western powers had the foresight and courage to apply it.

It is apparent that the containment paradigm (despite its beneficial features in the early cold war years) was a policy essentially antithetic to negotiations, inducements, compromises—in short, to positive diplomacy. First of all, as the word *containment* indicates, the key element is the drawing of a line to contain something, to hold something in. Rather than images of positive human interaction, the term summons up pictures that are essentially negative and defensive—a group of embattled defenders holding back a determined foe.

But most of all, the concept of containment as applied through analogy to the events of the 1930s conjured up vivid images of strength and weakness, demands and compromises, firmness and vacillation. Hitler had been strong, did not compromise, and looked with disdain on those who did. Neville Chamberlain had attempted to compromise, to appease, and had been proven weak. The moral was obvious: authoritarian regimes, whether Nazi or Soviet, regarded diplomacy as merely a tactical device, a delaying tactic to gain time to achieve their real objectives. Therefore, one could not in seriousness negotiate with such people; the only language they really understood was strength, particularly the strength of superior armed force.

The lessons were therefore clear whether dealing with the Nazis in the 1930s, the Soviets in the late 1940s, the North Koreans in the 1950s, or the North Vietnamese in the 1960s: one must demonstrate firmness and resolve; rely principally on superior armed strength; negotiate primarily for purposes of tactical advantage; avoid any concessions or compromises that might indicate weakness; and clearly and credibly convey to the opponent one's willingness and ability to resist his advances, by war if necessary. With the questionable logic of a physician applying one prescription to a number of different illnesses, containment and its corollary, deterrence, were applied to a variety of situations with little attention paid to fundamental differences.

One result, of course, was that negotiation, compromise, and inducements—given the fundamental tenets on which containment was postulated—were often accorded short shrift.

The primary purpose of this chapter has been to make clear the very considerable effect the use of historical analogies and “formula thinking” have had on American foreign policy. Thinking in terms of the events of the 1930s and applying containment and deterrence theory to virtually all situations (regardless of their context) tended to place a premium on sticks and firmness and, as we have just noted, accorded carrots and flexibility and bargaining a limited role. There were, however, a number of other factors that also contributed to this result, and we must now take a look at these.

Notes

1. Stanley Hoffman, *Gulliver's Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1968), 58–62.

2. *Ibid.*, 59.

3. Glenn H. Snyder, “Crisis Bargaining,” in *International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research*, ed. George F. Hermann (New York: Free Press, 1972), 220.

4. Michael Nacht, “On Memories, Interests, and Foreign Policy: The Case of Vietnam,” in *National Security and International Stability*, ed. Bernard Brodie, Michael D. Intriligator, and Roman Kolkowicz (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, Inc., 1983), 364.

5. *Ibid.*, 365–66.

6. See Ernest R. May, *Lessons of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 49–50.

7. Gaddis Smith, *Dean Acheson*, ed. Robert H. Terrell (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1972), 424.

8. May, 30–31.

9. *Ibid.*, 45.

10. Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: Origins of the Cold War and National Security* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1977), 235.

11. “United States Security Policy: Estimates of Threats to the National Security,” *Foreign Relations of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950), 1:254–55.

12. May, 31.

13. Ibid., 31–32.
14. Hoffman, 135.
15. Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, vol. 2, *Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1956), 332–33.
16. May, 75.
17. Ibid., 51.
18. For a good discussion of this, see Coral Bell, *Negotiation from Strength: A Study in the Politics of Power* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963).
19. Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 139–71.
20. Ibid., 221.
21. Ibid., 223.
22. Doris Kearns, *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream* (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1976), 252, 329.
23. Ibid., 254–55.
24. For example, see May, *Lessons of the Past*; Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*; and Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making and System Structure in International Crises* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977).
25. Jervis, 239–70.
26. Hoffman, 137.

Chapter 4

Other Impediments to Conciliation: Rhetoric, Politics, and Personality

A nation's foreign policy is the result of many complex variables. It is extraordinarily difficult to assign a weight to each in terms of their relative importance. Fortunately, our task in this book is somewhat less complicated since we are interested in one particular aspect of policy: why bargaining with the use of force in much of the post-World War II period largely neglected the use of inducements. While the problem is still a difficult one, we can with some confidence pinpoint a number of factors that played a major role in the tendency in American policy to focus on the stick and neglect the carrot.

We have already dealt with three of these factors: (1) the development of containment, which for various reasons featured a hard-line approach that downplayed negotiations and inducements; (2) the tendency to develop and apply "formulas" such as containment to situations where they were often inapplicable; and (3) the tendency to use historical analogical thinking without adequately analyzing the applicability of the historical referent to the current situation. Obviously the three are related and each has affected the others in various ways.

As we saw in the last chapter, the weight of the past has played (and will continue to play) a major role in policy formulation. However, there are a number of other factors, some related to the use of historical analogies and some not, that have had an adverse effect on the development and use of conciliatory steps between the superpowers. Conciliatory approaches—whether we call them negotiations, bargaining, accommodation, compromise, or positive diplomacy—have suffered as a result of these factors.

The Rhetoric Trap

Prominent among these factors is what might appropriately be called *the tyranny of rhetoric* or the *word trap*, a reference to the often amazing facility of policymakers to imprison themselves (and the policies of their countries) by making repeated simplistic, moralistic, and frequently disingenuous public statements that severely restrict the flexibility with which policy can be addressed. This is a particular brand of rhetoric that is usually characterized by appeals to emotion, frequent references to so-called relevant historical analogies, emphasis on lofty principles, overly simplified objectives, and discussion of issues in black-and-white terms. It is also noteworthy for its redundancy.

Vietnam is a classic example of this kind of rhetoric in action. The Johnson administration, led by the president and his secretaries of state and defense and supported by a host of lesser officials, literally (if unintentionally) wove a tight web around American policy, confining and restricting it and making innovation and new policy directions difficult if not impossible.¹ The central question for our purpose here is not the usual one of whether or not our presence in Vietnam was warranted and our armed intervention justified. Our point is simply that the rhetoric employed by the Johnson administration—the overblown, unbending, interminable rhetoric emphasizing the ironclad American commitment to the unstable and unreliable government of South Vietnam—painted the United States government into a corner from which it found it extraordinarily difficult to escape.² Space will not permit even a fairly representative sampling of the many statements of this kind from the Vietnam era, but perhaps one statement by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara in August 1965 will illustrate the point:

It is clear that a Communist success in South Vietnam would be taken as proof that the Chinese Communists' position is correct and they will have made a giant step forward in their efforts to seize control of the world Communist movement.

Furthermore, such a success would greatly increase the prestige of Communist China among the non-aligned nations and strengthen the position of their followers everywhere. In that event we would then have to be prepared to cope with the same kind of aggression in other parts of the world wherever the existing governments are weak and the social structures fragmented. If Communist armed aggression is not stopped in Vietnam, as it was in Korea, the confidence of small nations in America's pledge of support will be weakened and many of them, in widely separated areas of the world, will feel unsafe.

Thus, the stakes in South Vietnam are far greater than the loss of one small country to communism. Its loss would be a most serious setback to the cause of freedom and would greatly complicate the task of preventing the further spread of militant Asian communism. And, if that spread is not halted, our strategic position in the world will be weakened and our national security directly endangered.³

We have already considered the use of historical analogies at considerable length in the preceding chapter, so it is unnecessary to repeat that discussion here except to note that policy-making by analogy (taking the "lesson" from one situation and applying it to another) obviously leads to a substantial amount of generalization. In fact, one of the great attractions of using historical analogies is that it is relatively easy to generalize from one situation to another. However, the process usually greatly oversimplifies the two situations and obscures real differences. In the above statement by Robert McNamara (a secretary of defense of great ability and integrity who was himself caught in the "word trap" but who later realized it and reversed course), we can see the many elements of this kind of generalizing and accompanying rhetoric. They include the prediction of dire consequences if one fails to stand firm against aggression; the comparison to an earlier historical event that has some similarities but many dissimilarities (Korea and Vietnam); the appeal to fears that the result of displaying any form of weakness may result in far-reaching consequences of disastrous proportions; and the implicit expression throughout the statement that one must meet and defeat aggression before addressing the basic core issues that created the conflict in the first place.

Rhetoric, Slogans, and Vietnam

The problems in Vietnam caused by the inflexible but politically profitable cold war-style rhetoric were well stated by Pulitzer prize-winning historian Barbara Tuchman in *The March of Folly*:

Having invented Indochina as the main target of a coordinated Communist aggression, and having in every policy advice and public pronouncement repeated the operating assumption that its preservation from Communism was vital to American security, the United States was lodged in the trap of its own propaganda. *The exaggerated rhetoric of the cold war had bewitched its formulators* [emphasis added]. The administration believed, or had convinced itself under Dulles' guidance, that to stop the advance of the Communist octopus into Southeast Asia was imperative.⁴

As we noted earlier, this type of confining rhetoric tends to be characterized by the frequent use of slogans and formulas—for example, “containment,” “domino theory,” or “wars of national liberation.” Generalized and often questionable theories are frequently cited in such rhetoric; for example: “If we appease the opponent now we shall have to fight a much larger war against him later,” “Arms races lead inevitably to war,” “Communists can’t be trusted to honor arms agreements,” “Compromises are interpreted by aggressors as signs of weakness,” “One should always negotiate from a position of strength,” and so on.⁵

There are obviously elements of truth in such statements—sometimes. The problem, of course, is that the slogan or statement is too often applied as a formula to fit *every* situation, without adequate regard to the special circumstances of each case. As the slogans are repeated over and over and become ever more familiar to the public, the administration using them becomes increasingly “locked in” by its own rhetoric. As Alexander George and Richard Smoke have pointed out, sometimes policymakers take a theoretical generalization and combine it with a misleading historical analogy to form a working theory, as was the case with the “domino theory” as applied to Southeast Asia.⁶ This kind of

generalizing with slogans, applied to policy, can have particularly unfortunate results.

Vietnam illustrates how historical analogies (in this case the history of the 1930s and the loss of China in 1949) are often applied with little or no attention to dissimilarities between the cases being compared; how a slogan or formula—containment—can be applied arbitrarily and inappropriately to situations it does not fit; and how policymakers frequently use faulty generalizations, often reflected in dramatic rhetoric, to develop policy. Since this rhetoric is more often than not directed at a domestic political audience, it is not uncommon for policymakers to get locked into an unwise policy by repeating the rhetoric so incessantly that even they become convinced of its validity. It frequently takes some especially traumatic event such as the North Vietnamese Tet offensive of 1968 to jar policymakers back to a more realistic assessment of the situation.⁷

As George and Smoke observe, the tendency of policymakers “to employ their own dangerously oversimplified generalizations” reflects the need they feel “for assistance in diagnosis and in contingent prediction.” Since they have received only limited assistance in policy-relevant theory (policy science) from the international relations academic community, and since they “are usually unwilling . . . to cope with their problems in a wholly nonabstract, atheoretical, *sui generis*, ad hoc manner,” there is a tendency to revert to the use of overly simplistic generalizations and dangerously imprecise, overblown rhetoric.⁸ Nowhere was this tendency more tragically evident than in the case of Vietnam. In addition to the three factors discussed above, the Vietnamese case illustrates two other things: the self-fulfilling prophecy in action and the inhibition among policymakers against real negotiations and other conciliatory responses, as evidenced in the tone of the rhetoric used and the historical analogies selected.

Rhetoric and the Self-fulfilling Prophecy

The self-fulfilling prophecy resulted from policymakers defining the Vietnam situation as a case of clear-cut North Vietnamese aggression against the South (rather than a revolutionary/nationalistic struggle for power)—aggression promoted by an imperialistic and expansionist China (also not fully in accord with reality). This cast the struggle in terms that led us to take the steps that in fact helped bring about the situation we feared.

As to the point concerning inhibitions against real negotiations, Vietnam illustrates vividly how the historical analogies selected (and the rhetoric used to describe the lessons learned) nearly always emphasized such qualities as toughness, strength, no retreat, holding firm, resolve, resisting aggression, and so on. Qualities that characterized much of nineteenth-century diplomacy—flexibility, conciliation, compensation, communication, compromise, and inducements—were largely ignored, underused, or misused. True, policymakers frequently talked about the desirability of negotiations, but they did so for the most part in a framework that was unrealistic considering the nature of the opponent and his objectives.

Sources of Misperception

Today, one reading overblown statements like the previously mentioned quote of Secretary of Defense McNamara on Vietnam in 1965 cannot help but be struck by the gap between his perceptions of future developments and the reality of today. Twenty-odd years after this statement was made, a statement that plainly earmarked the People's Republic of China (PRC) as not only an enemy but the driving force behind "militant Asian communism," the United States enjoys a relatively cooperative relationship with China that has now existed in one form or another for more than two decades. The relationship, originally based

largely on a mutual concern about the Soviet Union, has suffered something of a setback as a result of the Tienanmen Square massacre in the summer of 1989. Still, the relationship is basically cooperative, and it is clearly in our best interest to make every effort to keep it that way.⁹ Because of geopolitical realities, Sino-American relations are likely to remain basically cooperative if not warm.

Despite some ominous setbacks in the relationship between China and the United States recently, also granting that circumstances in 1965 were much different than they are today, and admitting that hindsight is considerably easier than foresight, the misreading of the actual situation evident in the McNamara statement is egregious indeed. And this is not by any means an isolated statement; the Vietnam period saw a raft of similar statements. Nor was it made by a man who was inept, dishonest, or both. On the contrary, it was made by a man of great competence and integrity, one of the finest public servants America has produced in this century.

How, then, are we to interpret such misperceptions by men with the ability, decency, and integrity of Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, and others? In the case of Vietnam, there was already substantial evidence of a serious rift between the Chinese and the Soviets, centuries-old evidence of hostility between the Chinese and Vietnamese, and no real evidence that the Chinese Communists were militarily expansionist. How was it possible for highly capable men to ignore such facts and to engage in the kind of simplistic rhetoric present in the McNamara quotation?

Finding an answer to this question is not a simple task, but we will make an attempt. The answer appears to lie to a considerable extent in those factors we have already discussed, plus two we have not yet mentioned. The use (or misuse) of historical analogies and the fascination with the "containment paradigm" have been explored rather thoroughly. We have alluded to the needs of policymakers for guidance and the influence of the negotiating-from-strength syndrome. These factors will be examined in more detail momentarily. Two additional factors we have yet to discuss

but which play major roles are personality traits of decision makers and domestic politics.

The Policymakers' Need for Guidance

As we noted earlier, policymakers not surprisingly feel a strong need for assistance in diagnosis and prediction as they face foreign policy problems. When they fail to receive any assistance in terms of theory or a model to follow, there is a strong tendency to use highly simplified generalizations and inflated rhetoric.¹⁰ The generalizations, as we have already seen, are usually based on historical analogies that since World War II have been most often drawn from "the lessons of the 1930s" or the so-called Munich syndrome.¹¹ The postwar policymakers who de-emphasize inducements and other forms of conciliation tend to use generalizations and slogans based on the "lessons" of the 1930s because the conciliatory approaches of that interwar period obviously did not work very well.¹² This type of historical analogue has been popular because it is based on a period of conflict in which the policymakers were maturing and impressionable. And its emphasis on such qualities and slogans as *resolve, firmness, negotiating from strength, and no appeasement* fits in admirably with domestic political requirements that senior policymakers demonstrate impeccable anti-Communist credentials.¹³

Once having selected the analogy and applied it along with the formula of containment as the prescriptive remedy to the situation in question, the policymaker is no longer in the uncomfortable position of being forced to consider the case on its own unique merits.¹⁴ No longer is the policymaker required to look at the situation in an ad hoc, sui generis fashion, with all the possible interpretations and shades of gray such an approach entails. Instead, he or she has a "lesson" from history to serve as a guide and a formula that has been tried and proven and that (perhaps even more importantly) is politically viable at home. Thus, in the

aforementioned statement by Robert McNamara, he could point to the Korean War as a guide to making sense of the extraordinarily complex Vietnam situation, despite the vast differences between the two conflicts. While there may be some nagging doubts about how well the selected framework really fits his problem, it is infinitely superior to having no framework with which to work.¹⁵ Moreover, if the nagging doubts continue, as frequently they will with the more capable policymakers, there is a remedy in rhetoric: simply repeat the argument frequently and with conviction and eventually the doubts will go away (or at least diminish sufficiently to proceed with the preferred course of action). This has the additional important advantage of educating the public to see the wisdom of the policy, hopefully thereby building a consensus to support it (something that did not occur in the case of Vietnam, especially after 1968).

This presentation is oversimplified, of course, but it illustrates some important points. It seems axiomatic that policymakers too frequently reach decisions about policy on the basis of what is convenient and comfortable, what reduces anxiety (cognitive dissonance), and what is politically "safe." To be sure, most policymakers probably would not admit or even be aware that these less-than-noble motivations played any part in decisions to adopt particular policies. If a Soviet or American policymaker were told that he or she adopted a policy based on the Brezhnev Doctrine or the containment formula because doing so made it unnecessary to cope with the anxieties and uncertainties associated with examining each case *sui generis*, both would probably vehemently deny it. And if each had reiterated the policy often enough, forcefully enough, and with at least a reasonably satisfactory reception, the odds are that each would really believe what he or she was saying.

Objectives of this Study Revisited

We should remind the reader at this point how all of this relates to the central subject of this book—the use of conciliatory measures in the management of conflict and how both coercion and accommodation can be used to achieve political objectives.

Later chapters look at a number of case studies—crisis situations facing American foreign policy—to assess the role of both sticks and carrots with special emphasis on the latter. The reader will recall that one of the basic hypotheses of this study is that the less than effective use of carrots (inducements) has had consequent negative effects on US foreign policy. To this point, we have been attempting to determine what factors have generally inhibited the use of inducements and other forms of conciliatory steps. It is obvious that the attitudes of American policymakers toward conciliation in general have influenced their reactions as they have considered the use of inducements in crisis situations. The way policymakers view negotiations and bargaining clearly affects their perspective as they approach any type of conciliation in a conflict situation. Thus, it is vitally important that we fully understand what factors have exerted an influence on American policymakers insofar as their attitudes about conciliation are concerned.

Thus far we have seen how the containment policy developed after World War II downplayed the value of negotiations and conciliatory procedures, even though its original author, George F. Kennan, had not meant this to be the case. We have observed how the history of the 1930s, the Munich syndrome, has been a rich source of historical analogies for postwar American policymakers—analogies that hold any form of appeasement in contempt and by inference cause suspicions of any conciliatory procedures. We have noted the lack of adequate prescriptive theory in policy science and have observed that policymakers, anxious to find a framework of some kind on which to base policy (and resistant to handling crisis on a *sui generis* basis), have resorted to

simplistic generalizations, slogans, and dramatic rhetoric in developing policy.

We hope some of the instrumental factors that inhibited negotiation and accommodation between the United States and the Soviet Union in the postwar period are now beginning to come into focus for the reader. We will be returning to these points as well as others throughout the book. For now, however, we can only hope that the reader has a better understanding of how the postwar containment/deterrence policy of the United States developed and how this policy—by its very nature—proved unreceptive to conciliatory approaches.

The Two World Wars and “Negotiation from Strength”

We have already observed that during the interwar period (1919–39) there was great fear of precipitating another crisis similar to that of 1914 by being obdurate and unwilling to discuss problems and to compromise. This was a natural reaction to the bloody disaster of World War I, a conflict that many felt could have been avoided had the key statesmen involved not been encumbered by inflexible national policies that inhibited essential bargaining and necessary compromises. The result, of course, was a swing to another extreme—that of excessive reluctance to take any precipitous action against an aggressor (even one as blatant as Hitler) and a refusal to recognize that, given the nature of the Nazi regime, more than good intentions and a willingness to negotiate would be necessary.¹⁶

World War II saw the pendulum swing in the other direction. The new war was seen as being caused not by excessive firmness or lack of willingness to negotiate but rather by weakness, by appeasement, and by too great a readiness to compromise. Thus, at war's end the prevailing beliefs were that crises must be met with firmness, that armed strength must be available and called on early if an adversary is threatening, that too much willingness to

compromise may be interpreted by a potential enemy as a sign of weakness, and that negotiations should be carried on only from a position of strength.¹⁷

During the interwar period, issues had tended to be considered on the merits of each individual case, but postwar demands by one side or the other, whether Soviet or American, often tended to be resisted simply because the other side had raised the issue.¹⁸ This was more often than not the conscious or unconscious reaction of statesmen who desired to establish a reputation for firmness and to avoid any kind of association with the by now discredited term of *appeasement*.¹⁹

The result, as we have noted a number of times, was the adoption of policies and strategies (i.e., containment and deterrence) that were characterized more by negative elements (threats of force) than by positive elements (diplomatic accommodation). In 1967, Evan Luard pointed out that "a willingness to demonstrate strength at the first sign of disagreement is the logical corollary of an international strategy based on deterrence."²⁰ Michael McGwire of the Brookings Institution stated in 1985 that "U.S. policies are now based on the idea of deterring or preventing war by the threat of force, rather than the time-honored principle of averting or avoiding war through negotiation and diplomacy."²¹ Crises must be met with fast and firm reactions, and impressive military strength must be readily available for demonstrative purposes. Nothing that can be interpreted as weakness is permissible; consequently, any type of conciliation or accommodation must be approached with great caution.

Up until the Gorbachev era, all of this made any significant accommodation between the superpowers unlikely and certainly inhibited negotiations. Coral Bell points out that the United States attempted to follow a policy of "negotiation from strength" in the postwar period partly because it had an appeal for both liberal/pacifist types and hard-liners, the former emphasizing negotiation, the latter emphasizing strength. Each could find something in the phrase that appealed to his or her prejudices and preconceptions.²² The trouble, of course, is that deterrence and "negotiating from

strength” are in many ways not compatible, since the former emphasizes *reaction* to a threat while the latter emphasizes *initiatives*. Deterrence as practiced by the United States is essentially a *defensive* military strategy while “negotiating from strength” is a political/diplomatic approach (based on military strength) and involves *initiating* action. Whereas deterrence is essentially an effort to support the status quo, negotiating from strength is revisionist—that is, it seeks through diplomatic leverage (based on greater military capabilities) a change in the status quo. Thus, as Bell observes, there are some important differences between the two.²³

Parity or Superiority?

Regardless of this incompatibility, however, the US strategy of “negotiating from strength” has been a major strand in US policy since at least 1950, when Dean Acheson began to stress the theme in a series of speeches.²⁴ The term has been a popular one for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is the fact, as we have just noted, that it appeals to people on both sides of the political spectrum. Moreover, it is ambiguous in other important ways. Does it refer to parity or superiority? Does it mean negotiating from a position of equality with the adversary or only when one has superior strength? As Bell observes, there is considerable evidence in the postwar years that the phrase was used in the sense of expecting to gain an advantage before negotiating.²⁵ Though Bell’s study deals only with the 10-year period from 1950 to 1960, it seems probable (although unprovable) that this expectation governed American policy throughout most of the postwar era.

The conclusion of Bell’s study (written in 1963) was that the policy of negotiating from strength was essentially a failure and “came to nothing because the compounded pluralism of decision-making in an alliance of democracies vitiated the effort at strength, and the chosen concept of strength ruled out the one promising issue for negotiation” (disarmament).²⁶ Though Bell’s

study was written nearly three decades ago, its basic conclusions have remained valid in many respects. One of the more significant facts is that even in the period of clear American military supremacy over the Soviets (1947–53), negotiating from strength was a policy objective, something down the road to work toward, something to be attained before one engaged in serious negotiations. As Bell phrased it in talking about the 1950–60 period, “The idea of negotiation from strength has had, at least in the period under review, the true mirage-like quality of some of the most effective political myths: shimmering promisingly, always a little farther off, across a stony waste of effort, keeping its distance at each apparent advance.”²⁷

Soviet Actions as Conciliation Inhibitors

The reader will perhaps by now appreciate the many complex factors that have tended to inhibit negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, many of them unrelated to the actual state of relations between the two countries. In addition to the real differences as represented in confrontation and disputes over specific issues, we have seen that other factors have played major roles—for example, the lingering influence of history, the deficiencies of policy science, and the psychological needs of policymakers. All these were important in developing within the American government an attitude toward negotiations and accommodation with the Soviet Union that was essentially suspicious and wary of conciliatory procedures, including the use of inducements in crisis situations (though this has improved since the Gorbachev era began).

It is perhaps useful to point out once again that we are concerned here with those things on the American side, over and above actual Soviet actions, that may have contributed to this attitude. It is obvious that certain Soviet actions and policies in the postwar era have been of such a nature as to constitute real concerns about Soviet intentions and hence justifiable American reserve about the

value of conciliatory procedures. In this category would fall, for example, such Soviet actions as the brutal suppression of uprisings in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, the ill-conceived effort to introduce missiles into Cuba, and the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. Though Soviet apologists have frequently argued that even these actions should be interpreted as nothing more than defensive reactions to Western policies, the fact remains that Soviet leaders could not reasonably have expected to carry out such military moves without producing distrust and a consequent reluctance to negotiate on the part of the United States and its allies. Quite obviously, Soviet leaders were aware of these probable negative effects but chose to proceed in any case, apparently placing a higher value on the local vital interests involved than any consideration of long-range relationships with the Western powers.

Thus, there were in fact Soviet actions that by any objective standard could be expected to produce distrust of negotiations on the part of the United States during certain periods of the cold war. However, these alone do not account for the extraordinary caution and reserve with which the United States has approached the use of conciliatory procedures as a means of managing conflict. A number of important factors other than Soviet actions played a major role as we have already seen. We have not yet discussed one which is extremely important but very difficult to treat—the personality traits of decision makers.

The Role of Personality

We need not preface the discussion of the personality factor with a general discussion of the pro and con arguments concerning the relative impact of individuals on history. There is clearly a great deal of disagreement on this subject, and it seems unnecessary to spend time discussing the question on these pages. Suffice to say that the author is in the camp of those who believe that strong personalities, given appropriate circumstances, do exert enormous

influence on the direction of history. And though other factors obviously also play important roles, the impact of personality should not be underrated. One need only look at the impact in the twentieth century of leaders such as Lenin, Hitler, Churchill, Stalin, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Eisenhower, Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh, Gorbachev, and—most recent and dramatic—Iraq's Saddam Hussein.

Beyond such major world personalities are those who might be called *second-echelon leaders*, those who for one reason or another have had tremendous historical influence even though they did not necessarily hold the top leadership positions in their country. In this category are individuals like Col Edward M. House, Harry Hopkins, George C. Marshall, Dean Acheson, Chou En-lai, Gen Vo Nguyen Giap, and Robert McNamara. Of this group of second-echelon leaders, at least among Americans, probably none have been more influential in this century than John Foster Dulles, President Eisenhower's secretary of state. His influence and the impact of his personality and policies on American foreign relations, especially vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, have been extraordinary. For that reason, we have chosen Dulles as a figure who well represents the impact of personality on the core subject of this book—the use of inducements and other conciliatory procedures as a conflict management technique.

We should first understand, however, that although the impact of Dulles's personality on US foreign policy was great, President Eisenhower in the final analysis had firm control of American policy. He allowed Dulles substantial leeway in conducting diplomacy, but he nonetheless kept a "weather eye" on the substance of that diplomacy and made the major decisions. In the following chapters we will see how Eisenhower managed to control policy and how remarkably skillful he was at it, despite intense pressures. In fact, Eisenhower's personality, though low in profile, was as much or more a major factor than Dulles's, at least insofar as major decisions were concerned.

However, for purposes of the subject we are discussing—the impact of personality on policy—Dulles provides an extremely

interesting example. He did have a definite influence on Eisenhower in some respects, though fortunately not in the most critical areas. Still, had Dulles been more forthcoming on the subject of negotiations, Eisenhower probably would have done even more in this field. As it was, it was his personality that provided the impetus toward negotiations the majority of the time with Dulles usually skeptical and holding back. Yet, in all fairness to Dulles, we should add that in the final year of his life he appeared to be more flexible, more receptive to negotiations. Perhaps this was due to Eisenhower's influence, or perhaps it was simply an indication that Dulles was a good tactician. In any case, he represents an excellent example of the influence of personality on foreign policy, and we shall view him from that perspective.

The Black-and-White World of John Foster Dulles

Even though "negotiating from strength" was a refrain John Foster Dulles would often play, it was Dean Acheson, President Truman's secretary of state, who first became associated with the policy through a series of speeches made in 1950. As we have already seen, the "loss" of China in 1949 and Soviet acquisition of atomic weapons the same year had the effect of greatly increasing the sense of threat felt by American policymakers. This sense of being threatened was understandably greatly increased by the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950.

However, the antecedents of this policy were evident as early as 1947, when then Secretary of State George Marshall decided that the United States should break off the Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow because of concern that we were attempting to negotiate from a position of military weakness. There is even some evidence that it was State Department strategy in the years from 1947 to 1950 that negotiations with the Soviets should be avoided.²⁸

Regardless of when the policy began, it soon became clear in the Eisenhower years that Secretary of State Dulles had, in Seyom Brown's words, "inherited the Acheson attitude that there were in fact no significant negotiable issues between the Soviets and us."²⁹ This attitude was, in part, the result of the widely shared belief that cold war developments were favoring the Soviets, that the global balance of power was shifting heavily in their favor, and that only an increase in Western strength could bring about a situation in which negotiations might be fruitful. But it reflected much more than this, particularly in the case of Dulles. In Stanley Hoffman's words:

The United States' long insistence on "negotiating from strength," the belief that agreements actually reached with our foes will probably be either deceptive or worthless reflect more than Cold War realities: they correspond to a conviction *that there really is no negotiable middle ground except insofar as requirements of survival are concerned* [emphasis added].³⁰

This approach to negotiations was, of course, epitomized in the person of John Foster Dulles, who visualized the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union in Manichaean terms—good against evil, the forces of light against the forces of darkness, godless communism pitted against the Judeo-Christian heritage of the West, and so on. As a prominent Presbyterian layman, Dulles's view of world politics was essentially a theological/spiritual one in which international conduct was the result of a titanic struggle between opposing "faiths"—atheism against spiritualism, communism versus Christianity. As Dulles saw it, political success comes to individuals and states through the exercise of "moral power" (psychological power with a spiritual foundation). Christianity provides a guide for "proper" action, and individual policymakers and nations can best realize their political and spiritual potentials by following the teachings of the Christian faith.³¹

In short, Dulles's concept was that politics and religion were from one cloth, each intimately affecting the other. Thus, one could not reasonably be expected to approach negotiations with the

Soviets with any sense of confidence or enthusiasm; after all, how could one be expected to seriously negotiate with adversaries who had no spiritual basis for their policies and who, based on the writings of such men as Lenin and Stalin, could be expected to lie and cheat and use negotiations as nothing more than a cynical ploy to achieve their objectives?³²

In actual fact, the Eisenhower administration proved more willing to pursue negotiations with the Soviet Union and Communist China than had the Truman administration. However, this was largely due to the personality and inclinations of President Eisenhower and owed little to Dulles, who generally continued to view negotiations with distrust.³³ His negative approach, and the fact that Eisenhower allowed him to actually conduct most negotiations, had the effect of limiting both the quantity and quality of the overall negotiating effort, especially in the earlier years of the administration.

Dulles and Cognitive Dissonance

Ole R. Holsti's well-known study of Dulles's attitudes toward the Soviet Union demonstrated that Eisenhower's chief deputy for foreign affairs had a remarkable ability to handle "cognitive dissonance," that is, any information he received that did not accord with his belief system about the Soviet Union. As Holsti observed, "The Soviet Union represented the antithesis of the values which were at the core of his belief system."³⁴ To handle information that contradicted his beliefs, Dulles simply rationalized and reprocessed the discrepant material and made it accord with his long-held convictions. For example, Dulles interpreted Soviet conciliatory gestures or indications of lessened hostility as evidence of weakness and failure in Soviet foreign policy rather than as evidence of a desire to bargain and reach mutually satisfactory agreements.³⁵ Thus, as Robert Jervis has observed, Dulles constructed an "image of the enemy" based on an "inherent bad faith model," a political image "which can

provide an explanation for almost any possible behavior the other may engage in. Hostility needs no special explanation, and conciliatory action can be seen as an attempt to lull the perceiver into lowering his guard.”³⁶ Hence, regardless of what the Soviets did with inducements or conciliatory gestures, Dulles’s model or “image of the enemy” made it mandatory that he reprocess any new information to fit the “inherent bad faith” concept. Having long ago defined the Soviets as an implacable enemy, he constructed a belief system strong enough to ensure that nothing the Soviets did could seriously disturb the image he had so painstakingly created. This was far simpler and less painful than rearranging his long-held beliefs about religion, the state, and the nature of man to make them accommodate discrepant information.

As Holsti observes, all this does not mean that Dulles’s views regarding the Soviet Union were entirely inaccurate. During the Eisenhower years the Soviet Union *was* a challenge and did represent, in some ways, a potential threat to the United States. Some of Dulles’s perceptions were based on concrete Soviet actions that in fact did support his nearly totally negative belief system. However, many other judgments made by Dulles about Soviet actions and behavior were clearly not justified by any objective circumstances or facts. These judgments were apparently the result of personal factors, including a moralistic and theological conceptual approach to international politics that would tolerate nothing that failed to fit within its rigid framework.³⁷

The American Conception of International Bargaining

In the case of Dulles, however, resistance to negotiations and to using inducements went beyond simple distrust of Soviet motives and intentions, though this was clearly a major factor. As Adam Ulam has pointed out with regard to the Eisenhower administration, “Even the pattern of wartime ‘summitry’ disintegrated *because of the inherent American inability to conceive of*

international politics as bargaining . . . the president approached the whole business of sitting down with the Russians with diffidence; his secretary of state, with distaste" (emphasis added).³⁸

So, supplementing Dulles's rigid belief system as an impediment to negotiations was the traditional, long-held American distrust of international bargaining, a distrust well illustrated in the once widely used expression, "The United States never lost a war or won a conference." While Americans can and do easily conceive of domestic politics as a process of bargaining, compromise, and mutual adjustment, they have much greater difficulty viewing international politics in the same light. Different standards apply in international life, and the management of conflict through bargaining and accommodation is a difficult concept for Americans to accept. A persistence in viewing international conflict as something to be "won" or "lost" (rather than adjusted) seems to be a characteristic Americans are reluctant to shed, though there have been significant changes in this attitude in the Gorbachev era. Certainly this was true of John Foster Dulles. If one sees the world as divided between good and evil, compromises tend to be employed as merely a temporary tactic or ploy, for surely one cannot compromise with the devil!³⁹

The Need for an External Threat

In the case of Dulles, another factor was involved that influenced his attitude toward negotiations, compromises, or any other conciliatory procedures. Stated simply, Dulles felt that only a sense of being externally threatened by an enemy could produce the necessary feeling of alarm and determination in the American and European publics that would permit the building of adequate Western military power. He therefore felt it desirable to maintain a certain level of tension between the Soviet Union and the United States, and since negotiations (if successful) would tend to lower that tension level, Dulles viewed them with little enthusiasm. As he explained it to a State Department colleague:

If there's no evident menace from the Soviet bloc, our will to maintain unity and strength may weaken. It's a fact, unfortunate though it be, that in promoting our programs in Congress we have to make evident the international Communist menace. Otherwise such programs as the mutual security one would be decimated.

The same situation would probably prevail among our allies [as a result of a *détente*]. They might feel that the danger was over and therefore they did not need to continue to spend large sums for defense.⁴⁰

Essentially, then, Dulles feared that negotiations could lead to *détente*, and *détente*—by relaxing tensions—could lead to a lessening of Western strength, not only military strength but moral strength as well. Therefore, one had to be cautious about negotiations and to view them more as a tactical ploy than as an effective instrument of diplomacy. As we noted earlier, the fact that the Eisenhower administration showed any flexibility on negotiations was due largely to the president, who had a much superior ability to view overall strategy and ultimate ends than did Dulles, essentially a tactical thinker.⁴¹

John Foster Dulles was not the only American statesman to effectively “screen out” competing information that contradicted his belief system. He was not the only American statesman to use what was essentially an inherent bad faith model. Nor was he the only American statesman to look on negotiations with skepticism and distrust. However, he was probably the most important statesman of the postwar period to possess a combination of all these qualities, and there can be no doubt that his influence was enormous.⁴²

Why has the shadow of John Foster Dulles been so important and long lasting? Why some three decades after his death is Dulles's influence still an important factor in shaping our attitudes about negotiations with the Soviet Union? Why does his legacy have so much bearing on the main subject of this study—the use of inducements as a tool in the management of conflict?

Dulles, of course, came to a seat of power in a critical period, a time when our attitudes about the Soviet Union and the cold war were being formed—“cast in concrete,” as it were. True, the cold

war had begun several years earlier and important strands of American policy toward the Soviet Union had been woven in the years from 1946 to 1952. Still, it was during the Eisenhower years (1952–60) that the boundaries and “rules” of the cold war were firmly set in place. Had Dulles—the man at the helm of American foreign policy at that time—been less rigid, less prone to see the world in black and white, less positive about the evil intentions of our major adversary, and more receptive to the idea that conflict in the twentieth century must be managed through bargaining and negotiation, the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States might have been friendlier as the decade of the sixties dawned. However, as long as Dulles continued to funnel his perceptions through an inherent bad faith model, rapid progress in this area was stymied. What progress was made in laying the groundwork for negotiations as a legitimate means of conducting relations with the Soviet Union was due largely to President Eisenhower, as we shall see later.

The Inherent Bad Faith Model

Ole Holsti stated the problem represented by Dulles’s closed belief system:

To the extent that each side undeviatingly interprets new information, even conciliatory gestures, in a manner calculated to preserve the original image of the adversary, they are caught up in a closed system with little prospect of changing the relations between them. If decreasing hostility is assumed to arise from weakness and frustration and if the other party is defined as inherently evil, there is little cause to reciprocate. Rather, there is every reason to press further, believing that added pressure will at least insure the continued good conduct of the adversary and perhaps even cause the enemy collapse. As a result, perceptions of low hostility are self-liquidating, and perceptions of high hostility are self-fulfilling. The former, being associated with weakness and failure, do not invite reciprocation; the latter, assumed to derive from strength and success, are likely to result in reactions which will increase rather than decrease tensions.⁴³

It should be pointed out, of course, that Soviet leaders have also often acted on the basis of an inherent bad faith model, interpreting all American actions within their narrow concept of “monopoly capitalism.”⁴⁴ Quite clearly, the fact that both sides are frequently operating with inherent bad faith models makes it more understandable why the use of inducements and other forms of conciliation has not been very effective in the postwar period. It is encouraging to note that neither Mikhail Gorbachev nor George Bush appears to be following such a model.

Although it is rarely possible to determine with certainty what factors caused a policymaker to act in a certain manner, we have observed in the case of Dulles that his adoption of the inherent bad faith image of the enemy, in large measure a result of his religious convictions, was a major causative factor. He states it simplistically in his 1950 book, *War or Peace*: “Soviet communism starts with an atheistic Godless premise. Everything else flows from that premise.”⁴⁵ And he said in a *Life* magazine article in 1952:

There is a moral or natural law not made by man which determines right or wrong and only those who conform to it will escape disaster. This law has been trampled by the Soviet rulers, and for that violation they can and should be made to pay.⁴⁶

Thus, Dulles’s world view was a fusion of religion and politics into one conceptual framework that had little tolerance for compromise. If the Soviets violated moral law consistently, as Dulles believed they did, then they should be punished. In Dulles’s mind, this could be accomplished by applying pressures of various kinds—economic pressures, politico-military alliances and pacts around the periphery of the USSR, and “public diplomacy” campaigns designed to identify the “good guys” and the “bad guys.” If the Soviets made conciliatory gestures, Dulles quickly attributed them to the effectiveness of these Western pressures. For example, when the Soviets gave indications of a desire to improve relations between the two countries following Stalin’s death in

1953, he told colleagues working on a conciliatory Eisenhower speech:

There's some real danger of our just seeming to fall in with these Soviet overtures. It's obvious that what they are doing is because of outside [Western] pressures, and I don't know anything better we can do than keep up these pressures.⁴⁷

Reflected in this statement is a fundamental point of this study—that an attitude of suspicion and disbelief more often than not has been the response to any conciliatory gestures from the other side in the superpower struggle, regardless of the objective circumstances (though this has improved somewhat since the Gorbachev era began). However, it should be pointed out that the emphasis on pressures (sticks) and the suspicion of conciliatory gestures (carrots) was not new with Dulles and the Eisenhower administration, for, as we have seen, it had become evident within the Truman administration by 1950. Nonetheless, Dulles's psychological peculiarities and his theological approach to world politics intensified this reaction. It became an art form under Eisenhower's foreign policy guru, and because of his unique influence and long tenure in office, Dulles left an indelible imprint in this area not only on the foreign policy establishment but on the American public as a whole. Like their globe-girdling, alliance-building Calvinistic secretary of state, the American people came to regard any Soviet conciliatory overtures with suspicion, as a Trojan horse of some kind.⁴⁸ If one interpreted conciliatory overtures either as deception or an indication of weakness and believed that the appropriate response should be additional pressure on the adversary, prospects for any form of accommodation were obviously greatly lessened. This shortsighted attitude was not a Dulles legacy alone, but he certainly was a major cause of its pervasiveness. Unfortunately, even in this era of improved US-Soviet relations, this attitude has far from vanished.

The Influence of Domestic Politics

We have repeatedly mentioned the importance of domestic American politics in determining US policy toward the Soviet Union, but up to now we have not discussed the subject in any detail. Nor do we intend to devote much attention to it in this book, not because the subject is unimportant—it obviously is. Rather, our decision to accord it minimal attention is based on the fact that the subject has been very well covered by other authors, for example, in *The Making of America's Soviet Policy*, edited by Joseph S. Nye, Jr.⁴⁹

The political structure of our democratic system greatly affects the way our relationship with the Soviet Union is conducted. Unfortunately, the effect is predominately negative. As stated by Nye:

In the area of foreign policy, the Constitution establishes the open "invitation to struggle" for control by the executive and legislative branches. . . . This struggle is complicated by the federal and relatively geographically dispersed nature of the political elite; the weakness and poor discipline of the national political parties; the strength and legitimacy of economic, ideological, and ethnic pressure groups; the depth and frequency of political turnover in the executive branch after elections; and the almost constitutionally entrenched role of the press as a virtual fourth branch of government.⁵⁰

All these features of our democratic system, plus others, make the conduct of foreign policy very complicated. The conduct of policy toward the Soviet Union is made especially difficult because of the lack of continuity and consistency. And because of political factors—the requirement of policymakers to meet the often conflicting needs of competing groups in a pluralistic society—policy is often reduced to the lowest common denominator. Too often in the past this has meant exaggerating the Soviet "threat" as the easiest method of forming a consensus on which to base policy. Plainly because of historical and cultural factors, it has been simpler and quicker to arouse the American public by painting the threat in lurid colors than to educate them about the

subtleties and sophisticated nature of a more cooperative approach such as the *détente* of the Nixon/Kissinger years. Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles both freely admitted their use of the Soviet threat as a means of gaining congressional and public support.⁵¹ They have not been alone. One study during the cold war years speculated that our erratic and often overly suspicious attitude toward the Soviet Union was based as much on the need to relieve “internal tensions” by creating an external threat as it was on the real problems between the two countries.⁵²

In any event, domestic political factors have clearly played a major role in inhibiting negotiations, inducements, and other conciliatory steps by the United States in its relationship with the USSR. This is an obvious fact, but the reasons for it and an analysis of the problem have received much less attention in the past than has the relationship between the two superpowers. Fortunately, as we have already observed, recent studies are beginning to plug this gap and provide valuable insights in this area.

Summary

We hope we have brought to the reader some understanding of the many complex variables that served for many years to inhibit the conciliatory side of the US-Soviet relationship—the generally skeptical attitude toward negotiations, the chary use of inducements, the reluctance to balance threats with incentives, and the heavy reliance on the stick as opposed to the carrot. We have analyzed the role of a number of factors that were instrumental in inhibiting conciliatory steps—the influence of historical factors; the tendency to substitute rhetoric, slogans, and formulas for thoughtful policy; the powerful and pervasive influence of domestic politics; the inherent negative structural aspects of such paradigms as containment and its instrumentality, deterrence; and the personality traits of key policymakers. We do not contend that this exhausts the list of causative factors, but it does at least indicate the complexity of the problem.

We have quoted two authors in this chapter, Adam Ulam and Stanley Hoffman, whose statements perhaps most closely catch the essence of the problem of reluctance on the part of American statesmen to use inducements and other conciliatory procedures in bargaining. Ulam said, in speaking of the not very successful Big Four Geneva Conference of 1955:

The Geneva meeting, then, could not be, as Churchill had wished, a conference in the style of those of the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe, where the Great Powers stated their interests and ambitions and then, through a process of bargaining, adjusted their differences and established an international equilibrium to last until the next great crisis. Even the pattern of wartime "summitry" disintegrated because of the inherent American inability to conceive of *international* politics as bargaining.⁵³

And as Stanley Hoffman phrased it in *Gulliver's Troubles*:

Lastly, we raise a barrier between us and other countries by our very acts. Consider our approach to negotiation with foes. On the one hand, American diplomats resist engaging our foes in active negotiation, since this is not the ordinary way to deal with conflicts of ends and our principles might be corrupted. . . . On the other hand, Americans do attempt to convert their adversaries to harmony: either with a global offer to "reason together" . . . or with pragmatic attempts at "fractionating" conflicts and issues.⁵⁴

Thus, in the overall mosaic formed by the many factors that inhibited accommodative steps between the United States and the Soviet Union, two primary factors stand out on the American side. The first factor has been our inability to conceive of international politics as a bargaining process that must ordinarily be settled not by total victories or total defeats but rather by various forms of compromise. The second factor has been our tendency to view adversaries as *total* enemies with whom one cannot seriously negotiate because the great differences in our politico-cultural systems and our fundamental beliefs make it impossible (in our opinion) to reach honest and reliable agreements.

These factors are a result of the many variables we have discussed thus far—our own history and geography; the recent

history of Europe and Asia; the influence of such strong personalities as Harry Truman, Douglas MacArthur, John Foster Dulles, and Lyndon B. Johnson, to name but a few; the persistence of once useful paradigms that time renders inappropriate, such as containment; the periodic confusion of means and ends and the tendency to allow fixation on particular means to become ends in themselves; the vagaries of domestic politics; the deficiencies of “policy science”; the psychological needs of policymakers; and so on. The reader will now appreciate that one cannot point to two or three neatly drawn variables and say *these* are what account for our reluctance to use conciliatory steps in bargaining in general and especially in bargaining with force. The picture is far more complicated than that. And even though much of this has changed with the warming of US-Soviet relations, it is important to keep this history in mind.

To see how these many variables have played a role in the way conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union has been managed in the postwar era and particularly what part has been played by conciliatory/accommodative steps (both positive and negative), we are now nearly ready to turn to the case studies. The reader will recall that we feel an analysis of several crises between the United States and the Soviet Union will yield valuable insights into the role of conciliatory steps in the conflictual relationships between the two countries. As we observed in the introduction, international crises represent on a smaller and concentrated scale the long-term relations between nations. As Glenn Snyder phrased it:

An international crisis . . . tends to highlight or force to the surface a wide range of factors and processes which are central to international politics in general. In a crisis they tend to leap out at the observer.⁵⁵

It may be too much to hope that significant “truths” about the use of inducements and other conciliatory steps in crisis bargaining situations will “leap out” at the reader. However, we do think an examination of several Soviet-American crises will illustrate a number of things about the use of carrots—among other things the

fact that they have been underused and also often poorly used. But more important, such examinations demonstrate that when properly employed under appropriate circumstances and with perceptive timing, carrots have been remarkably effective in lowering tension levels. We hope the case studies will also illustrate what kinds of conditions seem to favor the use of conciliatory procedures and what kinds do not.

Before we look at specific cases, however, it will be useful to speculate a bit about the nature of conflict as well as the overall nature of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union in the remaining years of this century. What forces may affect that relationship in the years ahead? How will those forces change the relationship? What is the role of "positive diplomacy"? In the following chapter we take a general look at these questions before turning to specific cases.

Notes

1. See, for example, Barbara W. Tuchman, *The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1984), 264–65; Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1973), 152–54.

2. Adam B. Ulam, *The Rivals: America and Russia Since World War II* (New York: Viking Press, 1971), 346–47.

3. Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, 4 August 1965, in Senate, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1966: Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations*, 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965, 763–64, reprinted in *Why Vietnam?* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1965), 19.

4. Tuchman, 258–59.

5. Alexander George and Richard Smoke point out that such hypothetical generalizations have often "been applied simplistically" by American policymakers "to short-term U.S. policy problems within the last few decades." Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 626.

6. Ibid.

7. Clark Clifford, McNamara's successor in 1968 as secretary of defense and formerly a "hawk" on Vietnam, was shaken in his beliefs by the indifference of our "allies" in Asia to the war in Vietnam when he toured these countries in the

summer of 1967. The Tet offensive in January 1968 shook his beliefs even more. Tuchman, 350–52.

8. George and Smoke, 627.

9. John Fincher, “Zhao’s Fall, China’s Loss,” *Foreign Policy* 76 (Fall 1989): 25.

10. George and Smoke, 626–27.

11. Kenneth W. Thompson, *Cold War Theories*, vol. 1, *World Polarizations, 1943–1953* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981), 121.

12. Evan Luard, “Conciliation and Deterrence,” *World Politics* 19, no. 2 (January 1967): 169–71.

13. Tuchman, 259.

14. As Evan Luard has pointed out, problems between nations in the interwar period were considered more on the merits of each individual case than has been true of the post-World War II period, when formulas like “containment,” “wars of national liberation,” and the “domino theory” have served to blur the merits of individual cases. Luard, 179–80.

15. Alexander George and Richard Smoke point out that ordinarily it is not possible to consider short-term policy problems in a truly *sui generis* fashion and also that sophisticated decision makers often go beyond the simple models made up of analogies and generalizations in an effort to “extend and enrich” the model to make it fit the current situation better. While this is true in certain cases, it is not clear how many decision makers are sophisticated enough to do this nor the extent to which they have done so. It is clear that many important decision makers have not gone far beyond the “simple model” and have in fact based policies on analogies and generalizations without an in-depth analysis of the situation they are dealing with. As pointed out by Ernest May, Harry Truman in Korea and Lyndon Johnson in Vietnam represent this tendency to not go very far beyond the simple generalization approach. George and Smoke, 621–30; Ernest R. May, *Lessons of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 115–21.

16. *Ibid.*, 173.

17. *Ibid.*

18. *Ibid.*

19. For a good discussion of appeasement and its role in the interwar and postwar periods, see John W. Herz, “The Relevancy and Irrelevancy of Appeasement,” *Social Research* 31, no. 3 (Autumn 1964): 296–320.

20. Luard, 173.

21. Michael McGwire, “Deterrence: The Problem—Not the Solution,” *SAIS Review* 5, no. 2 (Summer–Fall 1985): 115–16.

22. Coral Bell, *Negotiation from Strength: A Study in the Politics of Power* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), 234–35.

23. *Ibid.*, 226.

24. *Ibid.*, 5–7.

25. Ibid., 19.
26. Ibid., 239.
27. Ibid., 5.
28. Ibid., 20.
29. Seyom Brown, *The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Reagan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 91.
30. Stanley Hoffman, *Gulliver's Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1968), 198.
31. Ole R. Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy: Dulles and Russia," in *Enemies in Politics*, ed. David J. Finlay, Ole R. Holsti, and Richard R. Fagen (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1967), 38–39.
32. Brown, 92.
33. John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 159–63.
34. Holsti, 42.
35. Ibid., 63–69.
36. Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 310–15.
37. Holsti, 93–94.
38. Ulam, 233.
39. For a good account of John Foster Dulles's religious and political views, see Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973).
40. Quoted by Andrew Berding, *Dulles on Diplomacy* (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., Inc., 1965), 24.
41. See Bell, 235; Brown, 91–93; Gaddis, 159–60.
42. Holsti, 89–91.
43. Ibid., 95.
44. Ibid., 94.
45. John Foster Dulles, *War or Peace* (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1950), 8.
46. John Foster Dulles, "A Policy of Boldness," *Life* 32 (19 May 1952): 154.
47. Emmet John Hughes, *Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years* (New York: Atheneum, 1963), 109.
48. For an interesting discussion of how American internal problems may have affected our attitudes toward the Soviets, see Robert Dallek, *The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs* (New York: Mentor Books, 1983).
49. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., ed., *The Making of America's Soviet Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984).
50. Ibid., 3.

51. Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969), 374; Andrew Berding, *Dulles on Diplomacy* (Princeton: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., Inc., 1968), 24.

52. Dallek, xvi–xviii.

53. Ulam, 232–33.

54. Hoffman, 198.

55. Glenn Snyder, “Crisis Bargaining,” in *International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research*, ed. George F. Hermann (New York: Free Press, 1972), 217.

Chapter 5

Global Change and Superpower Cooperation

We have reviewed those things that have contributed to our neglect of the accommodative/inducement approach in our international dealings since World War II. We have considered a number of variables that have contributed to this neglect. We can easily see that many factors have been at work to block and frustrate a more extensive use of accommodative approaches. From shortly after World War II until very recently, US policy has tended to be wary and suspicious of accommodation—the use of inducements and incentives in bargaining—especially in our relations with the Soviet Union. Our policy has relied largely on threats (deterrence), and we have used accommodative approaches sparingly and sometimes inappropriately. Though in the past we have often talked about negotiation and accommodation, too frequently we adopted these approaches as a means of gaining an advantage, not as a method for reaching genuine and mutually satisfactory agreements. There have been some notable exceptions to this, especially in the Gorbachev era, but generally the statement holds true for much of the post–World War II period. The fact that the Soviets have been guilty of the same thing does not negate the basic thesis that we have generally looked with a skeptical eye at the kinds of accommodative bargaining that took place in the nineteenth century and have instead largely been guided by the philosophy that has inspired many familiar aphorisms: “The United States never lost a war or won a conference,” “You can’t bargain with the devil,” and “Speak softly but carry a big stick.” In short, while Americans have never in principle ruled out negotiations with the Soviets (and have at certain times entered them with considerable enthusiasm), they have looked on them with substantial skepticism insofar as potential results are

concerned and have approached them too frequently with the idea of winning a contest rather than effecting a compromise.¹ This attitude has been changing, of course, with spectacular changes taking place in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. However, elements of the old attitude remain and, as a result, American policymakers generally have lagged behind Gorbachev in taking the initiative on accommodative approaches. The Soviet president was indisputably the leader in making the concessions that broke the ice of the cold war. For this he deserves great credit, despite his internal difficulties.

The Changing Patterns of Conflict

Clearly there is little that one can criticize about being cautious and prepared. It is admirable to be firm when the occasion demands it. It is necessary to be realistic and recognize that not all people (or nations) are nice and that some of them may wish you many things other than good fortune. The most basic kind of common sense dictates that a nation must be prepared to defend itself and to use force if required. The war with Iraq in the Persian Gulf is a vivid and costly illustration of the fact that the world is still a dangerous place. The wise nation will be prepared to deal with conflict from a variety of sources. However, having recognized the dangers still present, we nonetheless should recognize that conflict has changed enormously since World War II ended over 45 years ago and that those changes have profound implications, not all of them yet fully recognized or understood. During the nuclear age, there have been a substantial number of so-called limited wars and an impressive number of international crises, but the world has remained free of large-scale conflict *between the major powers* for more than four decades, a period twice as long as the interval between World Wars I and II. While scholars argue about the relative role of nuclear weapons in achieving this uneasy peace, there can be little doubt that their awesome destructive power has

been the principal factor influencing the superpowers to approach conflict with extreme caution.

With recent developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, it is also now clear that the Soviet leaders are hardly in a position to consider any kind of war, if indeed they had ever considered such a step (which seems highly improbable). The United States also has serious internal problems to consider. But even putting aside these important developments, it is a central assumption of this study that the great powers have simply become too strong militarily to profitably wage all-out war and that it is therefore almost a certainty that this type of conflict will not take place. In Henry Kissinger's words, "The American people must be made aware that with the end of our atomic monopoly, all-out war has ceased to be an instrument of policy, except as a last resort."² Thus, despite earlier forecasts of doom from a remarkably diverse group of observers (including military men, scientists, and members of nuclear freeze organizations), intentional all-out war between the superpowers now seems extremely unlikely. As Kissinger put it in his landmark book *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*:

It is often argued that since limited wars offer no inherent guarantee against their expansion, they may gradually merge into all-out war. On purely logical grounds, the argument is unassailable. But it assumes that the major protagonists will be looking for an excuse to expand the war whereas in reality both sides will probably grasp at every excuse, however illogical, to keep a thermonuclear holocaust from occurring. [That], in fact, [is] what happened in the Korean war, at a time when the weapons technology was much less horrendous. We refused to retaliate against the Manchurian air bases from which enemy planes were attacking our forces. And the Chinese made no effort to interfere with our aircraft-carriers, or with our bases in Japan, or even to launch an attack against our only two big supply ports, Pusan and Inchon.

These limitations were not brought about by logic or agreement but by a mutual reluctance to expand the conflict. It is clear that war cannot be limited unless both sides wish to keep it limited. The argument in favor of the possibility of limited war is that both sides have a common and overwhelming interest in preventing it from spreading. The fear that an

all-out thermonuclear war might lead to the disintegration of the social structure offers an opportunity to set limits to both war and diplomacy.³

The basic thesis of Kissinger's book, of course, was that it is possible to keep both conventional and nuclear wars limited in the nuclear age. Kissinger did foresee that the superpowers would go to great lengths to keep conflict limited, but he did not then appreciate just how far they would go. The decades since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 have demonstrated the enormous lengths they will go to in order to prevent any armed conflict directly between themselves. Even conflicts involving third-party clients have been handled with great circumspection. Only once, during the Cuban crisis, did the two sides come close to a direct military confrontation, and even then it was avoided because both sides exercised extreme caution. This latter incident, because of its frightening implications, served to increase the caution exercised by both sides in potential encounters involving force.

The Possibility of War by Accident

Many observers argue that while the restraint and caution displayed by both sides have so far kept the use of force under control, this may no longer necessarily apply because of the tremendous advances in weapons technology—that is, the sophistication and complexity of weapon systems have reached the point where it is conceivable that humans may no longer be able to control them fully under certain circumstances. In short, we may have all-out war by accident or miscalculation. Some writers, for example, contend (with considerable persuasiveness) that an accidental war may occur, one in which intense energy bursts—electromagnetic pulse (EMP)—will knock out all communications between the superpowers.⁴ Should this disruption of communications include the hot lines, nuclear risk-reduction centers, and the other instruments designed to defuse the crisis, things would indeed have come to a sorry pass. However, like most worst-case scenarios of this type, this exposition focuses on technical and

military capabilities and largely ignores motivations and intentions.

Yes, should relations between the United States and the Soviet Union deteriorate badly, an accidental war is possible, and it is also conceivable that all communications could be destroyed, thereby making it impossible to bring the destruction to a halt. However, the chances of such an accident occurring, especially one that disrupted communications so completely as to make it impossible to defuse the crisis in the early stages, is exceedingly remote. The argument takes full account of what is technologically possible but does not give adequate weight to the human element—in this case, the tremendous motivation on the part of policymakers on both sides to prevent an accidental occurrence from escalating to global chaos and possible extinction of the human species.

Moreover, we should remember that even though it is true that the rapid advances in weapons technology since the end of World War II pose real dangers, thus far mankind has been able to develop political controls adequate to avoid the use of nuclear weapons. Although it is true that the increases in weapon sophistication and destructive capacity have been breathtaking and that political controls have lagged behind, there are indications that the lag is not as great as some believe. For example, as improved hot lines, nuclear risk-reduction centers, mutual inspection systems, and various other confidence-building means of defusing crises between the superpowers increasingly become a reality, the chance of a major war caused by accident or miscalculation is greatly reduced. We and the Soviets have made great progress in developing these conflict-preventing devices in the past few years.

Some will argue, of course, that this is an overly sanguine view, but in the opinion of this author it is not. The public and the policymakers in both the United States and the Soviet Union have been conditioned over 40 years to regard nuclear war as unthinkable. It seems likely that just as the mutual fear engendered over those years by weapons developments produced political controls adequate to prevent all-out war, the fear on both sides of the latest destructive technology will also produce new means to

manage conflict. To a large extent, this has already occurred as witnessed by US-Soviet arms control agreements of the past few years.

New Approaches in Bargaining with Force

Thus, we can consider a full-scale, all-out war between the superpowers as extremely unlikely, even should the relatively warm relations at the present time deteriorate. This argument assumes, of course, that both the White House and the Kremlin are occupied by rational leaders and not madmen. But even those leaders of questionable sanity are far more likely to act with circumspection in a world of nuclear weapons than in a nonnuclear environment. Probably even Hitler would have sought to achieve his goals by means other than all-out war had he been faced with nuclear weapons. Likewise, there is some evidence as of this writing that even someone as unpredictable as Saddam Hussein, though undeterred by conventional war, has considerable respect for nuclear weapons.

Simply put, the nature of war has changed so profoundly that the major powers no longer view it with the same sense of challenge, potential utility, and romanticism that they once did. After all, it was only eight decades ago, in the period immediately before World War I, that the major actors on the world stage not only regarded "armed conflict as a perfectly legitimate means of settling disputes between sovereign states, but also everywhere there was a positive readiness—even a longing—for what Yeats called the 'red-dimmed tide.'"⁵ This is far from the case today. There is every indication that the leading nations of the world no longer view war as having much utility, and certainly this is especially true of all-out war. Balancing probable costs against possible benefits, the leading powers see little to gain in becoming involved in unlimited conflict. As Martin L. van Creveld observes, all-out wars, to the extent they are fought at all, are waged by second- or third-rate nations in relatively remote areas of the

world.⁶ On occasion, a second-rate power such as Iraq may become involved in a conflict with a major power like the United States. However, because of US reluctance to use its ultimate weapon, and the opponent's awareness of this fact, such conflicts will probably remain relatively limited. Elsewhere war has become limited in all its dimensions—scope, objectives, time, and the types of weaponry used. More so than in any earlier age, war in its modern forms has truly become what Carl von Clausewitz maintained it was many years ago—"a continuation of policy by other means."

Since 1945 almost every war has been waged with strict limitations that seek to restrain the conflict and to maximize political gains within those limitations. As van Creveld phrases it, "The most important problem now is to fine-tune military power to bring it in harmony with political possibilities, to employ just enough of the former while remaining safely inside the bounds of the latter."⁷ During the four decades since World War II, we have steadily moved in the direction of an increasingly sophisticated management of traditional conflict between the superpowers. True, this cap on traditional all-out war has resulted in an increase in other types of conflict such as crises, terrorism, and various types of so-called low-intensity conflicts and the limited wars between second- and third-rate powers referred to earlier.*

We are thus in an era in which conflict is generally seen as something similar to disease—undesirable but inevitable, dangerous but to a considerable extent controllable. Since 1945 a raft of strategies and techniques to manage conflict have been developed and dignified in impressive theoretical models and studies—deterrence theory, coercive diplomacy, crisis management, and so on. These have reflected mankind's recognition that conflict must remain limited and controlled if the human race is to survive on this planet. Beyond that, however, they also reflect the fact that while the major world actors view unlimited conflict as lacking utility, they continue to regard the controlled use of

*Such wars as the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq may not be limited from the standpoint of the participants but are normally localized.

military force as a potentially useful instrument to achieve political objectives. Thus, we have what amounts to a desire on the part of the policymakers of major powers to use force for political ends but within strict and mutually observed ground rules that prevent any escalation to full-scale conflict. Bargaining with threats of force by either superpower is permissible so long as certain rules of the game are observed.⁸ An impressive array of techniques has been developed to make it possible to successfully manage conflict within these boundaries. These have been used successfully on some occasions and at other times with a distinct lack of success. Fortunately, there have been no failures in situations involving *direct* superpower confrontations, which have, of course, been relatively infrequent since 1945.

It seems probable that limited conflict will be the “name of the game” for some time. Numerous studies have documented the development of the rules of the game between the superpowers, and it appears likely that these rules will continue to develop and be observed despite occasional lapses and differences in interpretation.⁹ Foremost among these rules, of course, are strictures against any actions that might lead to nuclear war.

New Prospects for Superpower Cooperation

The rapid and stunning collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the revolutionary developments in the Soviet Union itself have seemingly brought an end to the cold war. The new relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union despite some periodic setbacks, is (as of this writing in February 1991) far warmer than it has been for the past 45 years. However, with developments in the Soviet Union and its empire still very much in a state of flux and with outcomes still uncertain, it is hazardous to speculate about the future of Soviet-American relations.

There are, however, at least three predictions we can make with a reasonable degree of certainty: (1) that both the United States

and the USSR will remain military superpowers for some time despite substantial reductions in their current force structures; (2) both nations will continue to be active in international politics around the globe; and (3) despite a growing rapprochement, the two nations will experience periodic conflicts of interest, at times quite severe.

Thus, despite the startling developments in the Soviet empire, one can make a good case that well into the next century we are likely to be faced with a situation in which the superpowers periodically fence with each other, usually indirectly through third-party clients. Many competent observers even believe that Gorbachev's "new thinking" and reforms in the Soviet system will not bring about any permanent détente between the two nations and that we will therefore likely see a pattern similar to that of the past four decades—continuing conflict between the superpowers at a relatively moderate level, with occasional periods of deep crisis, alleviated by occasional periods of better than normal relations.

While the author believes the United States and the Soviet Union will continue to have conflicts of interest (as all great powers do from time to time), the level of conflict will be less intense and the forces propelling the two nations toward a more cooperative relationship will continue to grow stronger. This fact of international life will be due not only to the breakdown of the Communist empire but also to other international developments that have already taken place or will take place soon.

Among these are the worldwide increase in terrorism and other forms of low-intensity conflict; the increasing multipolarity in the world, and especially the growth of significant regional military power centers; the technology explosion and the increasingly expensive arms race and space race in which neither side is likely to gain a decisive edge; growing environmental problems; serious domestic economic and social problems in the Soviet Union and the United States; changes in leadership attitudes and philosophy due to generational leadership changes in both countries; and highly significant changes in world demographics and develop-

ments within the religious field, particularly the continuing growth of Islam.

As we noted in chapter 1, all these developments will have the effect of pushing the two superpowers into a more cooperative relationship. To a substantial extent we have already seen this happen. Faced with serious domestic economic problems, the United States and the Soviet Union are finding that the arms race and space race are becoming prohibitively expensive. Consequently, as evidenced in already negotiated and projected arms agreements, there are strong pressures to slow (if not eliminate) these competitions. The growth of new regional military power centers with nuclear capabilities (such as Israel, Pakistan, India, the People's Republic of China [PRC], and later perhaps Japan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Brazil) will greatly complicate the controlled bipolar competition that has gone on between the superpowers. In short, the Soviet Union and the United States will find it essential to work together more closely to keep the nuclear (and chemical) genie in the bottle when additional actors (some of them highly unstable) begin to exercise their newfound power. This pressure toward greater cooperation between the superpowers will be increased by the ever-present threat that radical terrorist groups may acquire nuclear and chemical warfare capabilities.

An overly optimistic view? Perhaps. Still, there is substantial historical evidence that countries that have been highly antagonistic over long periods of time often become much more cooperative when faced with a mutual threat. One can obviously cite a host of examples but a few in modern times will suffice: England, Russia, Prussia, and Austria combining forces against the threat of Napoléon; England and the United States allying themselves with the Soviet Union against Hitler; post-World War II Germany and France combining against the Soviet Union; and the People's Republic of China, feeling threatened by the Soviets, moving from near total enmity to a rapprochement with the United States. While one can argue that the nature of the threats facing this country and the Soviet Union are considerably different than the threats in the above examples, we do not think this invalidates

the argument. Although the threats that face the superpowers today—mutually felt threats—are perhaps not so immediate and are long range in nature, they are nonetheless real and dangerous and at least in some cases promise to become more so. Moreover, they are recognized by the superpowers as threats, either actual or potential, and both countries are increasingly aware that it will take more than tired old cold war strategies to manage them successfully. Most of all, they have in common the thing that has prevented any armed conflict between them for more than 40 years—a very strong mutual interest in avoiding a nuclear holocaust. So far, this interest has been sufficient to overcome the threats posed by rapidly advancing technology, including first the atomic bomb, then the hydrogen bomb, intercontinental ballistic missiles, multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles, cruise missiles, antisatellite weapons, and so on. It seems probable that this will continue to be the case, but we make this statement with certain qualifications, to which we now turn.

Problems in Superpower Cooperation

We have discussed a number of global forces we feel are moving the world toward two highly desirable goals. The first of these is an environment in which the actual threat of all-out nuclear war between the superpowers is extremely remote as a result of mutual fear that weapons technology may outrun political controls and bring on, perhaps accidentally, a worldwide calamity. The very recognition that weapon capability on earth and in space is approaching a state in which there may no longer be adequate response time to prevent catastrophe (should anything go wrong) will, in our opinion, stimulate the development of even more effective political restraints. We can see this process in evidence already, with the Soviets in particular going to previously unheard of lengths to achieve various kinds of political controls over nuclear developments.¹⁰ The second and related development, as a direct outgrowth of this mutual fear plus the effects of the other

mutually felt threats discussed earlier, is pressure on both superpowers for greater cooperation. Like a reluctant bride and bridegroom being dragged kicking and screaming to the altar, the United States and the Soviet Union are heading for a marriage of sorts, pushed there by forces to a large extent beyond their control.

There are, however, qualifications to this rosy picture. Although a number of important forces are pushing the superpowers toward greater accommodation and cooperation, many problems will remain, particularly in the near term. Differences over arms control issues, regional conflicts, human rights, and competition in the third world will remain important areas of conflict between the two powers for some time. The last, in particular, will remain an impediment to increased cooperation because of the ability of the developing client-states to pull the superpowers into conflict, often against their will. Despite democratic developments in the Soviet Union, the two nations will probably continue to occasionally disagree about political issues involving third-world countries.

Because of the increasingly formidable military capabilities of such potential middle-level powers as Israel, Iraq, and Brazil, and countries already in that category, like Pakistan, India, and China, and the capacity of the small developing nations to draw them into regional and local conflicts, the situation becomes far more volatile. On one hand, the growth of increased regional military capabilities by these middle-level powers is, as we noted earlier, a threat to world stability and should be a force pushing the superpowers toward greater cooperation as we have seen in the Persian Gulf crisis. The superpowers clearly do not want to see disputes between other powers destabilizing things to the point where they bring Americans and Soviets into direct conflict, nor do they want to see them brandishing newly acquired nuclear arsenals. On the other hand, the small developing states—particularly those in areas relatively close to the borders of the superpowers (Cuba, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, the two Koreas, etc.)—present special problems because (1) they fall within the respective security zones of the superpowers; (2) in most cases, the United States and the Soviet Union have long-standing

commitments to these nations; and (3) these small countries have the capacity to involve nearby, militarily potent middle-level powers in regional disputes.

The countries of the Middle East present an especially critical problem. Nations such as Israel, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq will continue their conflicts with one another and will continue to try to involve the United States, the Soviet Union, and various other middle-level powers. If Israel manages to solve its major economic problems, its highly successful arms trade, exceptional military prowess, and potential nuclear capabilities will increase Israel's worldwide political influence significantly.¹¹ If Iraq is defeated in the current Gulf conflict as seems likely, Syria and Iran may move to fill the power vacuum. In any case, the two superpowers will likely find it increasingly difficult to control these nations as they experiment with this newfound leverage. On the positive side, however, the great volatility of the area creates a great incentive for both superpowers to cooperate to control events.

Mixed Prospects for Stability

Thus, the growth of regional military power centers (much stronger than those existing today) will force the United States and the Soviet Union into a closer relationship, an informal working arrangement that will allow them to control the international security environment and prevent strong regional powers from engaging in conflicts that could lead to full-scale, worldwide nuclear war. At the same time, the small developing nations are likely to play off new middle-level power centers against one another (and against the superpowers) to further their own ambitions. As it is today, this may be an insurgent group within the developing country on some occasions, whereas at other times it may be the government itself. The results of this situation are likely to be (1) potentially more serious international crises than at present because of the additional volatility and imbalances created by the new regional military power centers; (2) greater

opportunities for conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union (and also chances of conflict between the regional powers and the superpowers) because of the increased frequency of crisis situations; and (3) movement in the direction of a more cooperative superpower relationship to keep clients under control because the two superpowers perceive that any situation involving nuclear confrontation is potentially extremely dangerous and may bring them into direct conflict. It is one thing to promote the interests of client-states when only conventional conflict is a possible result but quite another thing when nuclear war may be the ultimate outcome. As they have for the past four decades, the United States and the Soviet Union will make every effort to avoid situations that hold the potential for nuclear catastrophe.¹² Both powers recognize that the growing independence of the regional nuclear-armed powers, combined with an increased number of crises and spectacular advances in weapons technology, greatly escalates the risk of just such a clash between them. Therefore, both will recognize that it is in their best interest to cooperate to defuse these situations before they get out of hand. Along this line there has already been encouraging progress by the two nations in resolving regional conflicts.

The world over the next two decades would thus seem likely to have the following characteristics: (1) a continuing nuclear standoff between the superpowers, with the threat of all-out nuclear war between them considered an extremely remote possibility—so remote as to be almost (but not quite) impossible; (2) a somewhat more unstable international situation marked by an increased number of crises as a result of the growth of regional military power centers and ever-greater advances in military technology; (3) a continuing incidence of low-intensity conflicts (local insurgencies, rebellions, and revolutions) and various forms of terrorism; (4) a declining incidence of actual conflicts between the two superpowers as they find that closer cooperation is necessary to meet the threats posed by conflicts between middle-level powers or by complicated situations resulting from

insurgencies or revolutions in smaller developing nations; and (5) concentration by the superpowers on pressing domestic problems.

Should this scenario prove to be reasonably accurate, a number of interesting possibilities emerge. For example, as concern by the Soviets and the Americans over the increase in international instability created by new regional military power centers, unbridled military technology, and domestic economic problems continues to stimulate greater cooperation between them, it is reasonable to assume that they will attempt to eliminate marginally important crisis points that have the greatest potential for trouble. Among these would be points of conflict between them that are outside their respective security zones. For example, the Soviet Union will be far less likely to regard countries like Nicaragua and Cuba as vital concerns, while the United States will be less likely to look at a nation like Afghanistan as being of vital interest to this nation. The overall result is thus likely to be, over the longer term, a significant decrease in third-world competition between the superpowers as each realizes that acquiring third-world "bargaining chips" for leverage against one another is not as important as the new threats that confront both of them. This already appears to be happening. Thus, though the opportunities for conflicts between the Soviets and the United States will likely increase for reasons we have already mentioned, both nations will demonstrate a growing maturity in handling them.

Superpower Cooperative Initiatives

Despite the fact that there seem to be strong forces tending to push the superpowers in the direction of greater cooperation and accommodation in the years ahead, this will not happen without some help from the superpowers themselves. That is to say, the superpowers must adopt approaches in their day-to-day relations that support and supplement the trend toward greater accommodation, or else that trend might be halted and reversed. It is probable that limited force will continue to be used as a bargaining tool in

certain situations between the superpowers, but usually this will be done through client-states and proxy forces. Thus deterrence, coercive diplomacy, and crisis management techniques are likely to be much in evidence in the years immediately ahead, though their form may be altered somewhat from what we have been familiar with during the cold war.

However, though the United States and Soviet Union will continue to experience conflicts of interest in the coming years, the forces pushing them in the direction of greater cooperation will be gradually changing the nature and the tenor of these disagreements. The two countries increasingly will seek areas in which they can effectively cooperate to meet the problems that threaten them both. At the same time, they will maintain the general accommodation that they have established in order to better handle their own peculiar problems.

Thus, just as the Sino-American rapprochement of 1969–72 could take place because certain conditions favored it (Chinese fear of the Soviet Union and American disenchantment with the war in Vietnam),¹³ a US-Soviet rapprochement is also taking place. Despite some setbacks, this rapprochement is well along. If Gorbachev is able to handle his internal problems and the Soviet Union does not drift into social chaos, the two nations should continue to enjoy a relationship that is far more cooperative than it has been in more than 40 years.

In spite of the powerful forces favoring a Sino-American rapprochement, it would likely have been delayed for many years had it not been for the highly skillful accommodative signaling and bargaining techniques employed by Nixon, Kissinger, Mao, and Chou En-lai. There was an understanding on both sides that various world forces favored a substantial improvement in relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States, but each side also recognized that because of more than two decades of conflict, this opportunity might be lost (or at least long delayed) unless each side took progressive steps to gradually dissipate the hostility that permeated the relationship.¹⁴ This was accomplished in a process similar to the conceptual scheme developed by

Professor Charles E. Osgood of the University of Illinois known as graduated reciprocation in tension-reduction (GRIT).¹⁵ Essentially, this scheme proposes that tensions between the superpowers can be reduced and mutual trust increased if one power initiates a program of progressive conciliatory steps designed to increase the opponent's sense of security. Such steps, however, are designed so as not to compromise the basic security of the initiator. In theory at least, these steps (small at first but gradually increasing in significance) will sooner or later produce a conciliatory response from the adversary, and a tension-reducing process will be set in motion.

It has been reported that John F. Kennedy was familiar with Osgood's GRIT scheme and followed it in the period immediately after the Cuban missile episode as he and Khrushchev, shaken by the crisis, attempted to establish improved relations. On both sides there was evidence of conciliatory steps as the two countries attempted to reduce tension.¹⁶

It seems clear that even though there may be strong forces favoring a rapprochement between two hostile powers (as in the case of China and the United States), the rapprochement process may never get under way unless it is given impetus by the two governments involved—that is to say, these governments must take deliberate conciliatory steps that will initiate the process. These steps represent, at least in part, the kind of positive diplomacy we referred to at the beginning of this book. The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty represents such a step. Many of Gorbachev's other initiatives (in the past two years especially) and some of the United States' also fall in this category.

Forces Opposing Rapprochement

Between now and the turn of the century, the Soviet Union and the United States will continue to move closer together. How fast and how completely this occurs obviously depends on the strength of those forces opposing a rapprochement. Needless to say, there

are a substantial number of such forces and they are strong. To mention just a few, there are many conservative organizations, military-industrial interests, and ethnic groups within the United States that vigorously oppose and will continue to oppose any far-reaching accommodation between the two countries. Clearly there are also many similar vested interests within the Soviet Union that do not see a close relationship between the superpowers as being in their best interest.

Because of the strength of these forces, as well as the very real conflicts of interest that exist between the two nations, a real rapprochement will take place relatively slowly and with considerable grudging resistance. Only by developing a pattern that incorporates steps of positive diplomacy (carrots) to accompany the usual propaganda and coercive measures (sticks) will we be able to gradually develop an interaction process that eventually leads to the goal we seek—a genuine and lasting accommodation between the superpowers. Thus, we must attempt to change the patterns of the past (which have tended to emphasize military force, threats, and coercion with only a small element of genuine conciliation) to patterns that emphasize conciliatory steps based on a mutual and sincere effort to recognize the legitimate interests of both parties.¹⁷ The elements of firmness (the stick) used in a particular situation must be appropriate to the context of that situation and limited to only the amount required to help inspire a favorable solution.

Opportunities for the “Carrot”

As we have observed, the number of crises on the international scene will probably tend to increase as regional military powers develop. For a number of years there will continue to be clashes of interests between the superpowers, usually indirect and often involving one of the increasingly assertive regional powers. More often than not, these clashes will involve deterrence or coercive diplomacy—that is, one or both powers will try to prevent the other

from doing something it has not yet done (deterrence), or to persuade the other to stop doing something or to undo something it has already done (coercive diplomacy).¹⁸ The interaction may increasingly involve attempts by the superpowers to use deterrence or coercive diplomacy against a regional power rather than against each other. In some cases this may be a cooperative effort, as in the Persian Gulf, while in others it may be independent action.

In any event, there lies within these situations the opportunity to begin establishing a pattern of interaction between the superpowers that emphasizes the carrot as opposed to the stick. As this process develops, the two powers will begin to *expect* the carrot to be emphasized over the stick in a manner similar to Osgood's GRIT scheme. To a considerable extent this has already happened in the Gorbachev era. If these conciliatory steps become the rule rather than the exception, the two powers may incorporate this approach and make it a part of the rules of the game—a set of mutually observed tenets that govern the Soviet-American relationship. If those rules eventually incorporate a large element of positive diplomacy, then the rapprochement between the two powers will be accelerated and more permanent. Cooperation in the Persian Gulf crisis has hopefully established a valuable precedent.

Is this projected scenario naive and overly optimistic? Is it practical? Or are the forces that divide the two nations and that have long hindered any lasting superpower accommodation so formidable as to make an effort along these lines little more than "pie in the sky," an impractical and meaningless dream?

Clearly one cannot answer such questions with any certainty. The results of such an effort will not be known until it has been given a fair try. We do know that in every conflict situation there are elements of conflict as well as elements of commonality. By giving more emphasis to the latter and less to the former, we at least have a reasonable basis for expecting that the conflict level will be lowered.

As John Gaddis points out in a recent article, the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union has taken on a

“new maturity”—that is, “an increasing commitment on the part of both great nations involved to a ‘game’ played by the rules.” Integral to this maturity (or stability) is the ability of each superpower to recognize certain things about the other and the effects of their interactions on one another. As Gaddis puts it:

What stability does require is a sense of caution, maturity, and responsibility on both sides. It requires the ability to distinguish posturing—something in which all political leaders indulge—from provocation, which is something else again. It requires recognition of the fact that competition is a normal rather than an abnormal state of affairs in relations between nations much as it is in relations between major corporations, but that this need not preclude the identification of certain common—or corporate, or universal—interests as well. It requires, above all, a sense of the relative rather than the absolute nature of security: that one’s own security depends not only upon the measures one takes in one’s own defense, but also upon the extent to which these create a sense of insecurity in the mind of one’s adversary.¹⁹

The Case for Mutual Security

In short, we cannot reasonably expect to have a stable world until nations are mature enough to recognize that consistently creating insecurity in our opponents is not likely to produce stability. This means we must recognize that our opponent has what he considers legitimate interests, too, and that he will not respond positively as long as he feels those interests are being ignored or threatened beyond a certain point. He cannot and will not respond favorably if the military measures we take create great insecurity—a sense of being threatened in his basic core values—that is, his fundamental national security. Only if we give evidence that we are taking his legitimate national aspirations, sense of security, and international reputation into account is he likely to react in a manner we consider productive. It is promising that Mikhail Gorbachev has stressed this idea of mutual security repeatedly, stating, “There can be no genuine security unless it is equal for all and comprehensive.”²⁰

This is not to say that what we are recommending in *positive diplomacy* is a policy of weakness and appeasement (in the worst sense of that much-abused word). On the contrary, we firmly believe that each power must retain a credible deterrent force adequate to convince the opponent that it has the strength to inflict unacceptable damage should the opponent's behavior violate certain norms. However, what we *are* suggesting is that in dealing with conflict situations between ourselves and the Soviet Union we must try to convince the Soviets (1) that we recognize the Soviet Union has certain legitimate interests; (2) that we consider these interests and our own are negotiable; (3) that we much prefer to solve crises by recognizing that we have certain interests in common and that these must be stressed over the conflictual issues; (4) that we recognize that each of us has a stake in seeing that the other emerges from the crises in a reasonably positive way; and (5) that while force is indeed available for use, we regard it as something to be used as a last resort.

Clearly this approach is much less likely to work against an irrational opponent. If someone is determined to have a war, as Hitler probably was, he will likely find a way to have a war. There seem to be some reasons for believing Saddam Hussein saw benefits in going to war, though evidence of this is still inconclusive. However, in the nuclear age, with potential penalties much greater than they were in the prenuclear era, nuclear-armed states facing similarly armed opponents are far more likely to weigh the consequences and seek other ways out of the confrontation.

Factors Affecting Positive Diplomacy

What evidence is there that this kind of diplomacy we have described works? What historical cases, if any, demonstrate that the timely and appropriate use of accommodative steps not only tends to bring about a reasonable solution to the crises but also promotes better relations over the long run? Under what conditions

is positive diplomacy most likely to be effective? Can those conditions be created and if so, how? Is there now solid evidence that in our relations with the Soviet Union we are more likely to be effective with this type of approach than one that emphasizes threats?

Not surprisingly, there are a considerable number of factors that appear to be relevant in determining the extent of accommodative bargaining in a crisis situation and the role of what we have termed *positive diplomacy*. These include such variables as the overall structure of the crisis situation; whether the interests of the disputing parties are marginal or vital interests; the relative resolve of the disputants; the personalities and belief systems of key decision makers; the dynamics of the bargaining process itself, including successful or faulty communication; and the relative military capabilities of each party in the dispute. These are not necessarily presented in their relative order of importance, for clearly they are all important and closely interconnected. Nor do these necessarily represent all the relevant variables that determine whether and how accommodative bargaining and positive diplomacy are utilized. In our opinion, however, they are very likely the most important ones. Let us now look at each of these factors in more detail, breaking them down into the most relevant component parts.

Structure of the Situation

The overall bargaining context of the situation plays a unique role in determining the strategy adopted to meet the crisis, including the extent to which accommodation is a part of that strategy. There are many aspects of the situation that must be considered: the overall international situation, events in other areas that may impact on the crisis, the relationship between the superpowers and between each of them and their client-states (if client-states are involved), the domestic political situation's impact on foreign policy, domestic and international public opinion, and the geographical factors favoring one side or the other. The

following questions serve as a guide in determining the overall structure of the bargaining situation.

- The international political environment. (What other international events or developments impact on this crisis?)
- The relationship between the superpowers. (Are relations cold or relatively warm? Is it a period when one or both superpowers have strong motives for moving toward or away from détente?)
- The relationship between the superpowers and their client-states. (Is the overall relationship sound or are there factors in this particular crisis that create friction between the superpower and client?)
- The domestic political situation. (Is there some gain to be made domestically by either party to the dispute by being conciliatory or by being aggressive?)
- Public opinion. (What is its status internationally and domestically?)
- Geographical factors. (Is one party favored over the other by the location of the crisis situation?)

Vital Interests and Resolve of the Parties

If one party in a crisis views its interests as more important than those of its opponent (and is able to convince the latter that this is indeed true), that party is usually able to establish “resolve dominance.” The party with resolve dominance—or asymmetrical motivation—has convinced the other that its interests in the situation are greater and that it is prepared to accept more risks in protecting those interests than is the opponent.

The establishment of resolve dominance gives a country more flexibility in the use of accommodation and coercion by eliminating the nation’s concern over being labeled weak if it offers concessions, while at the same time diminishing its concern about the use of coercive actions. However, in cases of asymmetrical bargaining power where one party is considerably

stronger than the other, the interests involved are not reliable predictors of the extent to which accommodation will be used.

Vital interests may more accurately predict the extent to which an accommodative strategy is used when we are dealing with symmetrical bargaining situations. In these situations, neither party is able to establish clear resolve dominance over the other because neither is convinced it has more at stake than the other. In such situations, as Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing observe, there is relative equality in bargaining power—at least it is perceived that way—and there is a tendency on both sides to accord some degree of legitimacy to each other's claims.²¹

In situations in which neither side feels it has a decisive advantage, there is great concern on one hand about being too coercive and thus provocative, and, on the other hand, being too accommodative and thus appearing weak. Such situations call for a *mixed* strategy of coercion and accommodation from the start because a strategy predominant in one or the other would not be appropriate where neither party is sure of its own position or strength. Both countries approach each other with substantial caution and a strong desire to avoid setting in motion any process that could lead to an uncontrolled escalation. The result in most cases is a greater willingness to make concessions in those areas that may be vital to the interests of the opponent but only of marginal interest to one's own country. This seems especially true in those situations involving symmetrical bargaining power in the nuclear era. The prospects for an accommodative strategy are substantially brighter when the other party's interests and resolve are perceived as roughly equivalent to one's own and when each perceives some legitimacy in the other's claims.

The answers to a number of questions should help determine the vital interests and the resolve of the parties in a crisis situation:

- What are the interests involved for each party? Vital? Marginal? Is there an asymmetry of motivation favoring one side over the other? Which side has more at stake?
- What are the long-range objectives of each party vis-à-vis the other?

- To what extent are the disputing parties motivated to recognize the vital interests of the opponent?

Personalities of the Key Decision Makers

In chapter 4, we briefly touched on the effect of personality on history, and we concluded that personality factors—personal characteristics of key decision makers—constitute an important variable in determining the success or failure of positive diplomacy and, indeed, whether it is undertaken at all. We agree on this point with historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., that “leadership may alter history for better or worse. . . . For better or worse, [leaders] make a difference.”²² Obviously, personality is not the only important factor, and its importance in crisis situations varies a great deal from crisis to crisis. Nevertheless, personality is a critical determinant in whether positive diplomacy is or is not employed, and it should receive more attention than it does.²³ Gorbachev’s leadership and his skillful use of accommodative measures in reshaping the world’s political map dramatically point this up.

The following considerations have a bearing on the role of personality in international bargaining:

- “Belief systems” and historical influences on decision makers.
 - Current domestic political influences on decision makers.
 - The ability, experience, and sophistication of decision makers in the bargaining process.
 - The extent to which military leaders influence the policy process with their point of view.
 - The ability of key decision makers to discount dissonant information and signals in order to move toward agreement.
 - The willingness to limit demands and use restraint.
 - Decision makers’ ability to put themselves in the opponent’s shoes.

Dynamics of the Bargaining Process

International bargaining obviously does not occur in a vacuum. It is affected by the past, the present, and even the future. As they proceed with bargaining, statesmen worry about how their past record looks to their adversary, how their present actions appear, and how these actions will affect their future relations with friends and foes.

In addition to considerations such as these, bargaining is influenced by a host of other factors, many of which we have already touched on—domestic politics, public opinion, relations with other countries, personality factors, relative military capabilities, and the overall international political environment.

In addition to all these factors, however, the course of the bargaining is affected by the dynamics of the bargaining process itself; that is, the actions taken by the parties as part of the bargaining process produce other actions that may have only a tangential relationship to the merits of the case but that nonetheless affect the outcome significantly. For example, one party may make a conciliatory gesture that does not seriously affect the basic issues in the dispute one way or the other; however, since it is a conciliatory gesture, it may produce a positive response from the opponent, who then reciprocates. Thus, we have a situation where the dynamics of the process—in this case, the fact that the conciliatory gesture was made—may become even more important than the actual substance of the conciliatory step.

As Thomas C. Schelling states in his classic *Strategy of Conflict*, “The convergence that ultimately occurs in a bargaining process may depend on the dynamics of the process itself and not solely on the a priori data of the game.”²⁴ It is our contention that given a rational opponent and a crisis situation in which each party, for whatever reasons, must recognize to some degree the vital interests of the other, the use of conciliatory steps (combined where necessary with adequate but nonobstrusive force) will often set in motion a tension-reducing process. That is, the act of proffering a conciliatory step (assuming the conciliatory action is appropriate and has some relevance to the issue in dispute or at least to the

general state of relations between the disputants) may in itself induce in the opponent a degree of trust and willingness to reciprocate.²⁵ This reciprocation, which begins a process of de-escalation of the crisis, is based on a recognition that it is in the self-interest of both parties to exercise restraint and to respond to the overtures of the other. It is, as Schelling seems to suggest, a somewhat mysterious process with psychic overtones by which two opponents, using both tacit and explicit bargaining techniques, move toward a “convergence of expectations.” In the sense Schelling discusses it, this process may involve something other than a settlement of the dispute—for example, setting the limits to a limited war. Nevertheless, many of the same principles apply. The dynamics of the bargaining process itself help produce the tension-reducing spiral or the focus on some point at which a settlement or compromise can be reached.²⁶

Charles Osgood’s GRIT scheme was mentioned earlier in this chapter as a plan that calls for employing carefully selected unilateral conciliatory initiatives (none of which would jeopardize the proffering country’s security) to set in motion a process of tension reduction. Basically, Osgood’s thesis is that such initiatives, by promoting a sense of trust in the opponent, will produce reciprocation that can lead to de-escalation of the crisis.²⁷

Consequently, the dynamics of the bargaining process are important in determining whether or not an accommodative strategy—positive diplomacy—is followed. We might more accurately describe this variable as an attitude about the bargaining process; in other words, if the opponents (or even one of them) have positive attitudes about what can be accomplished through the judicious use of accommodative bargaining techniques, we are more likely to see positive diplomacy resulting. Thus, if one or both countries recognize that inducements and other forms of conciliation can be effective tools in bargaining and that the bargaining process can have a salutary effect, then the framework is present to make the bargaining process itself an important variable promoting positive diplomacy. Gorbachev has proved to be a master at using this approach.

More precisely, if the contending powers see the dynamics of the bargaining process as a tool that can be effectively used to defuse a crisis—a tool that is most effective when used with restraint and appropriate accommodation of the opponent's legitimate interests—the chances for positive diplomacy are obviously greatly enhanced. On the other hand, if they have little confidence in the effectiveness of the bargaining dynamics associated with the use of an accommodative strategy, the prospects for positive diplomacy are correspondingly decreased. Put even more simply, if the parties really believe competition breeds competition and cooperation breeds cooperation, the prospects for positive diplomacy are much brighter. A number of questions should help focus on the component elements of the dynamics of the bargaining process:

- To what extent are the parties able to limit demands and display restraint as part of the process of moving toward a “convergence of expectations”?
- How are “threats” and “inducements” used? How are their roles perceived?
- Do the parties respond to each other's moves, especially those that are conciliatory or that display restraint?
- Have the parties “learned” from past crises between them? Has this learning encouraged restraint and greater sophistication in crisis management?

Success in Communication

Closely related to the dynamics of the bargaining process—indeed, actually a part of it—is communication. Our interest here, of course, is to determine how the success or failure of communication in a crisis situation influences the extent to which an accommodative strategy is employed.

To adequately consider communication and its significance for positive diplomacy, we must take a closer look at the distinction between what Robert Jervis calls “signals” and “indices.”²⁸ An

understanding of these concepts is essential to an understanding of the process of accommodation.

Signals are statements or actions the meanings of which are established by tacit or explicit understandings among the actors. As all actors know, signals are issued mainly to influence the receiver's image of the sender. Both the sender and the perceiver realize that signals can be as easily issued by a deceiver as by an honest actor. . . . Signals, then, can be thought of as promissory notes. They do not, in the absence of some sort of enforcement system, provide their own evidence that the actor will live up to them.

In contrast to signals, *indices* are statements or actions that carry some inherent evidence that the image projected is correct because they are believed to be inextricably linked to an actor's capabilities or intentions. Behavior that constitutes an index is believed by the perceiver to tap dimensions and characteristics that will influence or predict an actor's later behavior and to be beyond the ability of the actor to control for the purpose of projecting a misleading image.²⁹

As Jervis points out, signals may include sending diplomatic notes, conducting military maneuvers, extending or breaking diplomatic relations, or choosing the shape of a negotiating table. Indices are such things as private messages the perceiver overhears or intercepts; the study of personal characteristics of one who is unaware of being observed (for example, a baseball pitcher's mannerism that may reveal what he will throw next); or domestic political events that have a relation to foreign policy (for example, the US student demonstrations during the Vietnam War). An index can be anything an observer believes reveals something important about an opponent, something the observer believes is not capable of being manipulated by the opponent.

Oran R. Young has hypothesized that "as a crisis becomes more intense, 'effective' communication among the protagonists concerning such matters as attitudes, expectations, intentions, and resolve will be based increasingly on physical actions in contrast to verbalized statements through diplomatic channels."³⁰ The Quemoy crisis of 1958, as well as other crises, seems to bear this out, though obviously this varies a great deal from case to case. In any event, it is clear that the ability to receive and interpret signals

and indices correctly is extremely important in determining whether or not an accommodative strategy is adopted. The normal communication channels—that is, diplomatic communication either directly or through third parties—will often become degraded in a crisis because of problems with communication facilities, rising levels of “noise” and confusion, and serious questions about the credibility of the signals. Actions then became important in conveying signals to the opponent, whether they be intended to convey firmness, flexibility, or a combination of the two.

When nations use physical actions as signals, it is critical that the signals be received and correctly interpreted. The use of actions to convey accommodative signals is common in crises because direct communication often may be undesirable for a variety of reasons. For example, a nation may wish to let its opponent know of its interest in being conciliatory, but for political reasons may not wish to do so publicly, or even through normal diplomatic channels. Or it may feel that whereas its verbal messages indicating a desire for accommodation may be misinterpreted or not believed, actions can credibly convey such a message. In short, the ability to signal skillfully in a crisis situation, and the ability of the opponent to interpret signals correctly (the ability of both parties to set “rules of the game” early on), is a variable that influences the adoption of accommodative strategies.

Clearly the ability to communicate effectively increases the chances that an accommodation will be reached in a crisis. It does not guarantee it, obviously, but it does enhance the possibilities. The Korean War was a prime example of ineffective communication between the United States and the PRC. The Communist Chinese sent signals that were probably not as clear as they might have been, but nonetheless they should have been picked up; the United States demonstrated a remarkable inability to pick up these signals as well as a lack of sensitivity to the need to devise appropriate signals of its own. The result was not only a long-delayed settlement of the conflict but a near military disaster for the United States.³¹

True, the ability to communicate effectively means that threats can be transmitted to good effect. The historical record indicates, however, that on balance the prospects for accommodation are enhanced if the parties to a dispute (or even one of them) are skilled in the signaling process (including interpretation of indices) and have confidence in their ability to use it effectively.

The following considerations have a crucial bearing on whether there will be successful communication:

- The ability of the parties to communicate with one another, both tacitly and explicitly, through actions as well as words.
- The ability to work tacitly with one's opponent to set rules of the game early in the crisis.
- Sophistication in the technical aspects of signaling.
- The ability to interpret indices accurately and to use them to best advantage.

Relative Military Capabilities and Their Use

Having discussed the value of bargaining dynamics utilizing an accommodative strategy, we need to point out once again that positive diplomacy, in the sense we are using it, does not ignore the coercive element entirely. Force is still present as a background factor—that is, the opponent is aware you have the ability to meet any military challenge if it should become necessary. But the emphasis is different. Force is a factor in the situation, to be sure, but one that is employed with caution, restraint, and even reluctance. Rather than being employed primarily as a means to intimidate or militarily defeat the opponent, force is viewed as a means of communicating for the purpose of clarifying each other's vital interests. Prominently highlighted in the foreground of this communication process are the cooperative-accommodative aspects of the situation, those interests the opponents share. Not the least of these interests is the desire to avoid violence, especially when the superpowers are involved. Despite this emphasis on cooperative-accommodative elements, the fact that force—or at

least the potential to employ force effectively—is present guards against having the opponent interpret an accommodative strategy as weakness, which has been a major concern of many who balk at using accommodative strategies.

A number of questions are relevant in determining the relative military capabilities in a crisis and their possible use in accommodative bargaining:

- Does one party have a substantial military advantage over the other? Is it a nuclear advantage, a conventional advantage, or both?
- Is the situation one in which force can be effectively applied? If so, what kinds of force?
- How is the force applied? Is it actually used in forms of violence or only in a persuasive mode?
- Is there a willingness to use force with restraint and only to the extent required to indicate resolve?
- Is there a willingness (and skill) to use force in ways that convey accommodative signals?
- Are military leaders in the involved countries firmly under the control of civilian leaders?

Obviously all these factors affecting the role of accommodation are quite frequently redundant and tend to overlap a great deal. However, we have chosen to present them this way because we think it indicates more clearly and forcefully the close relationships and interactions between these various elements. For example, all other things being equal, a US decision maker who is not heavily influenced by ideological “baggage” and who has an appreciation and understanding of international bargaining is logically more likely to recognize the vital interests of the opponent, to limit demands to reasonable dimensions, and to approach conflict situations with greater sympathy for the accommodative approach. He or she is also likely to possess greater skill in communicating with the opponent and in using the dynamics of the bargaining process itself to move toward a nonviolent resolution of the crisis. We have emphasized the phrase *more likely* because obviously it

may not always be true that this combination of factors in a decision maker produces such results. On balance, however, it is more apt to do so.

Some of these categories might logically be combined in one category. For example, "vital interests and resolve of the parties," or the question of who has the most at stake in the dispute, could sensibly be included under the overall "structure of the situation." Likewise, the categories of "dynamics of the bargaining process" and "success in communication" might reasonably go together. However, because we want to emphasize the critical importance of each of these variables, we have chosen to separate them more than logic might suggest.

These, then, are what we consider the major elements involved in determining whether a policy of positive diplomacy is selected and successfully implemented. To see how these various elements are involved in an actual situation, we will consider developments in case studies of a number of crises.

Notes

1. Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1960), 99.

2. Henry A. Kissinger, "The Problems of Limited War," in *The Use of Force: International Politics and Foreign Policy*, ed. Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), 115.

3. *Ibid.*, 106.

4. For a good discussion of the problems associated with command, control, and communications systems and their vulnerability to EMP, see Bruce G. Blair, *Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985).

5. Martin L. van Creveld, "Turning Points in Twentieth-Century War," in *When Patterns Change: Turning Points in International Politics*, ed. Nissan Oren (New York: Saint Martin's Press, 1985), 136.

6. *Ibid.*, 141-42.

7. *Ibid.*, 141.

8. John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," *International Security* 10, no. 4 (Spring 1986): 132-40.

9. For an interesting look at the "rules of the game" in the third world, see Neil Matheson, *The "Rules of the Game" of Superpower Military Intervention in the Third World: 1975-1980* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982).

10. For example, the concessions the Soviets have been willing to make in the past two years in the area of arms control, including such sensitive areas as verification and testing, are truly remarkable when compared with past Soviet performance.

11. For a number of years, there have been reports that Israel already has a substantial nuclear arsenal. As of this writing, none of these reports have been officially confirmed. For an interesting discussion of Israel's nuclear position, see Lewis B. Ware, *The Nuclearization of the Middle East and the Subcontinent*, Documentary Research Study AU-201-82-AUL (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Documentary Research Division, Air University, 1982).

12. A good discussion of the many incidents in which the United States and the Soviet Union have used force to achieve political objectives since World War II is contained in two books: from the American perspective, see Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978); and from the Soviet perspective, see Stephen S. Kaplan, *Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981). A review of these incidents emphasizes the great caution exercised by the two superpowers in situations holding potential for direct conflict between them.

13. For a discussion of these forces, see Stanley E. Spangler, "The Sino-American Rapprochement: A Study in Signaling" (PhD diss. in the Library of Congress, 1978).

14. Ibid.

15. Charles E. Osgood, *An Alternative to War or Surrender* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1962).

16. See Richard Wendell Fogg, "Dealing with Conflict: A Repertoire of Creative, Peaceful Approaches," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 29, no. 2 (June 1985): 334. According to Fogg, Kennedy's initiatives included a nuclear test ban and trade improvements for the Soviet Union while the Soviet response included a reduction in the production of strategic bombers.

17. Gaddis, 142. John Gaddis points out that in the future the superpowers may find it in their best interests to promote not just their mutual survival but even one another's success and prosperity (his theory being that if they do not, the alternative may be much worse).

18. For a useful discussion of the distinctions between deterrence, coercive diplomacy, and crisis management, see Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Times* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 172-219.

19. Gaddis, 140.
20. Robert Legvold, "Gorbachev's Foreign Policy: How Should the United States Respond?" Headline Series, *Foreign Policy Association* 284 (April 1988): 14.
21. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), 262.
22. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Cycles of American History* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1986), 421–22.
23. Thomas C. Schelling, *Strategy of Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), 111.
24. Ibid.
25. For a good discussion of the relative effects of following a cooperative strategy as opposed to a competitive strategy, see Morton Deutsch, *The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 352–55. For a discussion of the relative effect of positive and negative sanctions on an opponent, see David A. Baldwin, "The Power of Negative Sanctions," *World Politics* 24 (October 1971): 27–36.
26. Schelling, 111.
27. Osgood, 89–108.
28. Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), 18–40.
29. Ibid., 18.
30. Oran R. Young, *The Politics of Force: Bargaining during International Crises* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), 116.
31. Philip M. Williams, *Crisis Management* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1976), 185.



George F. Kennan, the author of the containment policy, was director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff in 1947.




President Dwight D. Eisenhower confers with his chief deputy of foreign affairs, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, 29 August 1956.



President John F. Kennedy successfully used a mixture of force and accommodation in the Berlin crisis of 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.



President Eisenhower addresses the nation via television on the Berlin situation, 16 March 1959.



Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge briefs President Lyndon B. Johnson on the situation in South Vietnam, 23 November 1963. From left to right, Ambassador Lodge, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, President Johnson, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and Under Secretary of State George W. Ball.



President Johnson and his military advisers agonize over the situation in South Vietnam, 27 March 1968.



President Johnson reviews US troops in South Vietnam, 23 July 1966.



President Johnson, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff develop Vietnam war strategy at the LBJ Ranch, 22 December 1964.



Three decision makers ponder a course of action during a time of crisis, 5 May 1966. From left to right, National Security Adviser Walt W. Rostow, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and President Johnson.



The president briefs his successor on US foreign policy, 20 January 1969.

Part 2

Case Studies

Chapter 6

Quemoy Crisis of 1958

The Quemoy crisis of 1958 is unique in many respects and well illustrates certain important aspects of positive diplomacy and the role of accommodation. We can use this case as a framework for comparing the roles of coercion and accommodation in a complicated international crisis involving both the United States and the Soviet Union as well as important client states of each superpower.

The Quemoy crisis illustrates many variables relevant to our study. First of all, it involved a clash between two bitter adversaries—the People's Republic of China (PRC), or Communist Chinese; and the Republic of China, or Nationalist Chinese, on Formosa. It also involved a direct clash between one of the superpowers (the United States) and the Communist Chinese and an indirect clash between the Soviet Union and the United States. Thus, we have a conflict situation featuring both superpowers and their respective clients. It also was a crisis in which each of the superpowers was less than enthusiastic about many aspects of its support for its respective client, thus providing an illustration of friction between not only the main adversaries but between so-called allies as well.


This particular crisis has other valuable features from our standpoint. It was rich in tacit bargaining, the use of actions to convey messages to the opponent. It also featured explicit bargaining and the extensive use of signals, as well as what Robert Jervis has called "indices."¹ Both coercive and accommodative moves were employed by both sides. Public opinion, both domestic and international, played an important role. The personal characteristics of the policymakers involved—Eisenhower, Dulles, Mao Tse-tung, Chiang Kai-shek, and Nikita Khrushchev—

well illustrate the important role of personality and belief systems in the selection of a mixed strategy of coercive and accommodative elements. Finally, the overall international political situation played an important role, as did the fact that the main protagonists had clearly learned from previous crises between them. For all these reasons, we have chosen the Quemoy crisis as the main case with which to illustrate the various aspects of positive diplomacy, even though it is far from a perfect illustration of that concept.

A Brief Review of the Quemoy Crisis

The Quemoy crisis began in August 1958 when Communist Chinese shore batteries began intermittent shelling of the Nationalist-occupied Quemoy and Matsu island groups, both of which are in the Formosa Strait a very short distance from the coast of mainland China (see map). On 23 August the formerly desultory bombardment was intensified. While the apparent purpose of the Chinese attack was to prevent resupply of the islands, the basic underlying objective was most likely an attempt to probe the US commitment to defend the offshore islands and Taiwan and perhaps to pressure the Americans into a less active defense of Chiang Kai-shek's regime. If the probe proved successful, the Communist Chinese might make some very important gains—possibly even the surrender of Chiang's troops and the evacuation of the islands. If that proved impossible, at least some valuable diplomatic victories might be within reach—perhaps a US agreement to reduce support of Chiang, maybe even recognition of the PRC and its admission to the United Nations.²

The Eisenhower administration was slow in introducing both sticks and carrots into the situation, even though it had received intelligence nearly three weeks before the shelling began that indicated the Communist Chinese might be planning a new attack on the offshore islands.³ Chief among the reasons for Eisenhower and Dulles's slowness in establishing a strong deterrent message that might persuade Peking to back off was Eisenhower's



The geographical location of the offshore islands in relation to Taiwan and mainland China.

conservative interpretation of the Formosa Resolution of 1955, which was a highly ambiguous policy statement. In effect, it said the president could determine if an attack on the offshore islands was a preliminary to an attack on Formosa itself, thus leaving a great deal of ambiguity as to what the United States might do in a situation like that of 1958. Eisenhower chose to interpret the resolution conservatively for a number of reasons, not the least of which was his desire to keep Chiang Kai-shek under control. Chiang was eager to see the United States more directly involved in his conflict with the PRC and had accordingly placed 100,000 troops on Quemoy (nearly one-third of his troop strength) in the hope that, with this much of his total force at risk, the United States would be forced to come to his aid.⁴ Thus, one reason Eisenhower delayed in issuing any sort of strong deterrent statement was his concern that the Nationalist Chinese leader was trying to maneuver the United States into a war. A strong statement of support for Chiang might simply embolden the generalissimo further.

Chiang's action in greatly increasing his troop strength on Quemoy was, however, a successful ploy. Because of it, the Eisenhower administration felt it could not abandon the tiny pieces of Asian real estate without seriously compromising its commitment to defend Chiang's government.⁵ Therefore, beginning on 24 August, one day after the bombardment of Quemoy had begun in earnest, the Eisenhower administration initiated a series of gradually escalating steps that sent a definite deterrent message to Peking. These included putting the Seventh Fleet on alert and substantially increasing its strength in the area. An additional Air Force fighter squadron was deployed to the region. Along with these actions, the administration issued a relatively mild deterrent statement in a letter from Dulles to a US congressman on 23 August that contained a veiled threat that the United States would intervene to prevent the PRC from taking the islands.⁶ However, it should be pointed out that this statement was made, and American military actions taken, after the shelling had begun; thus, they were too late to deter the Communist Chinese from beginning hostilities.

Consequently, at least one part of deterrence in the situation failed due to delay in the US response.

By early September it was clear that Communist Chinese artillery might be able to blockade the islands effectively and prevent their resupply. As a result, the Eisenhower administration concluded that a reassessment of the situation was in order. An internal memorandum of 4 September, compiled by Eisenhower and Dulles, summarized the conclusions of the reassessment, the bottom line being that the United States could not allow Quemoy to be either cut off or captured by the PRC. To justify this commitment, the administration paper engaged in flagrantly overblown rhetoric.

According to the memorandum, the loss of the tiny offshore islands would threaten not only the loss of Formosa but also our position in Japan, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaya, the Philippines, Korea, Cambodia, Laos, and Indonesia. Amazingly, the memorandum pushed the "row-of-dominoes" theory to the extreme when it stated that loss of the small islands "would be even more far-reaching and catastrophic than those which followed when the United States allowed the Chinese mainland to be taken over by the Chinese Communists."⁷ The statement was a classic example of Armageddon-like cold war rhetoric. Thus, two small specks of land, a stone's throw from the coast of mainland China suddenly became as vital as Gibraltar or Suez or the Dardanelles, possibly more so. In this case, fortunately, the use of fanciful rhetoric to persuade both policymakers and the public that a marginal interest was in fact a vital interest had a relatively innocuous effect. The same thing could not be said less than a decade later when similar rhetoric was used to justify our presence in Vietnam.

In their statement of 4 September, Eisenhower and Dulles left no doubt in the minds of the Communist Chinese that the United States would respond with force to prevent Quemoy from being invaded or strangled by a blockade. In fact, some Dulles comments on the administration policy paper even indicated that nuclear weapons might be used if necessary.⁸ Though this threat came late,

the Eisenhower administration had plainly brandished the stick and the PRC apparently clearly received the signal.

However, along with the stick came the carrot. In the same statement of 4 September, Dulles called for a resumption of the Geneva ambassadorial talks that had been held in abeyance since December 1957. Two days later, Chou En-lai accepted the invitation to resume the ambassadorial talks (this time in Warsaw) and in essence offered to settle the crisis through peaceful negotiations. However, to avoid the interpretation that his acceptance might be an indication of weakness (a common concern of most powers that offer compromise or inducements), Chou accompanied his acceptance with some tough language.⁹

While Eisenhower and Dulles were alternating threatening and conciliatory statements, the US Navy was busy providing an effective escort for Nationalist Chinese ships up to the three-mile limit, beginning the process that would eventually break the Communist artillery blockade. Within 10 days, it was obvious that effective convoy methods by the United States fleet and improved unloading techniques quickly learned by the Nationalist Chinese had, for all practical purposes, defeated the blockade.¹⁰

Before the blockade was broken, however, Dulles and Eisenhower continued to throw out hints that were conciliatory in nature, indicating that a more flexible American position was possible. Thus, during the first three weeks of September, the administration tried to establish an image in the minds of the PRC leaders that the United States would indeed come to the aid of the Nationalist Chinese if events went too far *but* that it was prepared to concede that the Communist Chinese did have certain legitimate interests in the situation and that the United States was ready to be flexible if the PRC was willing to do the same.

On the day that Eisenhower and Dulles called for resumption of the ambassadorial talks—4 September—the Red Chinese halted the bombardment; two days later Chou En-lai accepted the offer. Immediately before that acceptance, the United States had been building up its strength in the Formosa area, and Eisenhower and Dulles had been issuing statements designed to convince the PRC

that the United States had adequate will to protect the offshore islands.

In their excellent book *Conflict among Nations*, Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, referring to this aspect of the Quemoy crisis, state that “this combination of verbal and active coercion, combined with an accommodative gesture, brought an immediate accommodative response from the Chinese Communists.”¹¹ They say that the parties to the dispute worked out their relative bargaining strength through their early coercive moves. The weaker party (in this case the PRC) was eventually switched onto the “accommodative bargaining track” through the application of verbal and active threats combined with an attractive accommodative gesture (the American suggestion that the ambassadorial talks be renewed).

Despite Communist Chinese acceptance of the offer to negotiate in Warsaw and their temporary halt of the bombardment, the Nationalists continued to bombard the mainland. The fact that the PRC halted its shelling in spite of continued Nationalist shelling was a definite indication that the Communist Chinese wanted to prevent an escalation of the crisis.¹²

That did not mean, however, that the Communist leaders were prepared to end their probe at this stage. In their minds, the blockade effected by the artillery bombardment could still yield some benefits without undue dangers. If the bombardment produced an effective blockade, the Americans would be faced with the prospect of escalating the crisis to break the blockade. Since this likely would have involved air strikes against Communist batteries on the mainland—quite unlikely because of world public opinion that was already negative about the US position—Communist China perceived itself to be in a reasonably good bargaining position.¹³ Though it now respected US strength and had given up any thoughts it might have had of invading Quemoy after the Eisenhower/Dulles statement of 4 September, the PRC still harbored hope that some concessions might be extracted from the situation. Therefore, to exert pressure, the Communist artillery bombardment was resumed within a few days

and the United States was faced with the prospect of having to either escalate the crisis or somehow evade its commitment to the Nationalist Chinese.

The Eisenhower administration was to be spared from making this unpleasant choice by the skill and daring of the US Navy and Nationalist Chinese seamen. By mid-September the two naval forces working together had successfully broken the blockade. Thus, the leverage the Communist Chinese had hoped to enjoy was suddenly taken from their grasp. This marked a major turning point in the crisis.

On 6 October Peking announced it would begin a one-week cease-fire contingent on the United States agreeing to terminate its escort for Nationalist Chinese convoys headed to Quemoy. The United States quickly agreed to the proposal. A week later, on 13 October, the PRC defense minister announced a two-week extension of the cease-fire, emphasizing in the process that this was a "unilateral and informal" gesture and that it should not be confused with the "two-Chinas" concept.¹⁴

After a three-day (20–23 October) Dulles visit with Chiang Kai-shek in Taipei, the United States and the Republic of China issued a communiqué that contained a paragraph renouncing the use of force in the Formosa Strait area. The statement, which was a direct result of pressure on Chiang by Dulles, was taken by the Communist Chinese as evidence of an effort by the United States to restrain Chiang. In effect, it amounted to an inducement, a carrot, and the Communist Chinese responded to it on 25 October by announcing they would bombard Quemoy only on odd-numbered days of the month, a plan that prompted Eisenhower to wonder if we were in a "Gilbert and Sullivan" war.¹⁵ As Eisenhower put it, "The Chinese Communists . . . gradually seemed to lose interest in Quemoy and Matsu and . . . cease[d] firing."¹⁶ The crisis was now clearly over.

Most of the literature of the crisis of 1958 emphasizes that the Communist Chinese "backed down" in the face of strong US resolve backed by superior force. It gives primary credit for the resolution of the crisis to the presence of superior US military force

(primarily the Seventh Fleet) and to the fact that the US and Nationalist Chinese navies were able to break the blockade. A few authors regard the veiled nuclear threats made by Dulles and Eisenhower as having a considerable effect in causing the Chinese Communists to “retreat.”¹⁷ Although some authors do regard the resolution of the crisis as due to the effective use of carrot and stick,¹⁸ the majority seem to believe it was primarily the result of successful US deterrence.

The coercive element in the Quemoy crisis *was* of great importance. The five attack carriers, three heavy cruisers, 40 destroyers, and assorted other ships of the Seventh Fleet constituted a formidable force indeed. But let us briefly look at the Quemoy situation once again to see what role inducements and positive diplomacy played. Was this in fact an instance of positive diplomacy? Is Philip Williams correct in calling the Quemoy crisis of 1958 a classic example of the use of the carrot-and-stick approach to solving a crisis?¹⁹ A somewhat more detailed look at the conciliatory steps taken by Eisenhower and Dulles during the crisis will help answer these questions.

The Mix of Coercion and Accommodation

Between the strong American statement of 4 September and the eventual end of the crisis in mid-October, an interesting mix of conciliation and threats was employed by both the United States and the PRC. It is important to remember that the United States faced a complex situation in considering how much stick and how much carrot to apply. As Jonathan Howe phrased it in describing the American position, “It was not easy to find and maintain the right proportions of firmness and ambiguity which would deter the Communists, not overly encourage or discourage the Nationalists, offer the Chinese an excuse for backing down, and promote domestic support for the policy.”²⁰

Following the offer to renew ambassadorial talks in Warsaw and the positive Communist Chinese response on 6 September,

Eisenhower and Dulles embarked on a policy that from the verbal standpoint seemed to emphasize conciliatory steps over coercive steps, at least during the period from 4 September to mid-October. Although it is true the movement of US forces in the Formosa Strait area provided a visible and authoritative stick, the statements from Eisenhower and Dulles contained very significant conciliatory elements. For example, in a press conference on 9 September, Dulles implied there might be some concessions on previous American positions and indicated a renouncement of force in the area would "probably have consequences."²¹ In a speech two days later, Eisenhower also sounded a conciliatory note when he said, "There are measures that can be taken to assure that these offshore islands will not be a thorn in the side of peace."²² At the negotiations in Warsaw the United States offered a withdrawal in stages and "may also have suggested that future sovereignty over the offshore islands was negotiable."²³

Clearly various factors in the situation were encouraging Dulles and Eisenhower to take a conciliatory approach. On 7 September Eisenhower had received a letter from Chairman Khrushchev warning that "an attack on the Chinese People's Republic is an attack on the Soviet Union."²⁴ Plainly this induced somewhat more caution among the administration staffers about the potential role of the Soviet Union than had been the case.²⁵ Furthermore, public opinion around the world and in the United States was not generally supportive of the American position. This was true of our key allies, including Great Britain.²⁶ In addition, President Eisenhower in particular was concerned about Chiang Kai-shek and his possible motive of embroiling the United States in a conflict to further his own ambitions.²⁷ A strong statement of support for Chiang and equally strong threatening actions to back him might well have encouraged the volatile leader of the Nationalist Chinese to attack the mainland, despite virtually no prospect of success. On the other hand, a policy emphasizing caution and conciliation might cool the Kuomintang leader and convince him that, while we intended to honor our commitment, we had no intention of getting into a major war over it. Finally, it

was evident from the limited nature of the Communist probe (and lack of any evidence of invasion preparations) that the PRC's chief purpose was to test American intentions, not to launch a major war.

The American emphasis on conciliation continued through September. In a speech to the Far East American Council of Commerce on 25 September, Dulles provided more of an inducement to the Communist Chinese by stating the American position was flexible. Elaborating on this flexibility, he said:

We would find acceptable any arrangement which on the one hand did not involve surrender to force or the threat of force; and on the other hand eliminated from the situation features that could reasonably be regarded as provocative or which, to use President Eisenhower's phrase, were a thorn in the side of peace.²⁸

In the same speech, the secretary of state further indicated American willingness to compromise when he described Quemoy as "militarily indefensible."²⁹ The overall thrust of the speech seemed to signal the Chinese that the United States no longer regarded a cease-fire as a prerequisite for negotiations; that we recognized the Communist Chinese had legitimate interests in the situation; that we were prepared to restrain Chiang Kai-shek from conducting activities that genuinely threatened the mainland; that while we had adequate force available, we preferred not to use it; and that we sincerely wanted a mutually satisfactory settlement and would go a considerable distance to get it.

The Dulles Press Conference of 30 September

In a press conference on 30 September, Dulles went even further in providing carrots for the Chinese and in the process managed to infuriate Chiang Kai-shek. The emphasis on increased flexibility and the secretary's disavowal of any US legal commitment to defend the offshore islands did not sit well with the Nationalist Chinese leader. Dulles indicated that if a cease-fire could be effected, even an informal one, the United States would favor reduction of the Nationalist garrisons, and he said, "It would be

foolish to keep these large forces on these islands.” Dulles added to Chiang’s ire when, in commenting on the prospects of a Nationalist return to the mainland, he said he doubted they could make it “just by their own steam.”³⁰

The overall thrust of Secretary Dulles’s comments on 30 September indicated that the United States was pliable and was anxious to defuse the crisis. Almost as important as what Dulles said was what he did not say, including the lack of any strong statement linking the defense of Quemoy to the defense of Formosa. So dramatic was the conciliatory nature of Dulles’s remarks that a number of political writers and newspapers interpreted it as indicating a decisive change in policy from one emphasizing firmness to one emphasizing conciliation.³¹

Thus, with the apparent concessions of 30 September and the conciliatory statements of the preceding weeks, the United States appeared to have moved from a basically coercive and threatening mode to one emphasizing accommodation. There were, as we have already noted, obvious reasons prompting Dulles and Eisenhower to adopt this tack; and a policy emphasizing accommodation and flexibility appeared to be a reasonable way to meet them—particularly the mounting public concern.

Influence of the Variables on the Role of Accommodation

We can apply to this crisis the six factors or variables from chapter 5 to see how they influenced (or failed to influence) the way in which accommodative steps were used as part of the overall strategy. Those factors are (1) the structure of the situation, (2) vital interests and resolve of the parties, (3) the personalities of the key decision makers, (4) the dynamics of the bargaining process, (5) success in communication, and (6) relative military capabilities and their use. We will apply these to other international crises in subsequent chapters, though not to the same extent as we do to Quemoy.

Structure of the Situation

The Quemoy crisis of 1958 vividly illustrates how the structure of a crisis, including the overall context in which it takes place, influences the strategies adopted by the opponents and also the outcome. Certainly the structure surrounding the Quemoy incident played a major role in the development of that crisis and was in no small way responsible for the prominent role played by accommodation and positive diplomacy.

The overall international context or structure in which the Quemoy crisis occurred favored the use of caution and accommodation. First of all, both the United States and the Soviet Union were substantially less than enthusiastic about the fact that their respective clients, Taiwan and the PRC, had involved them in a dangerous situation that could have led to a major war. The United States was plainly unhappy that Chiang Kai-shek had involved American power by placing a major share of his troops on an exposed island only a few miles from the Chinese mainland. The Soviets, likewise unhappy about the PRC's attempts to drag them into the situation, made it clear that they would provide support only under very special circumstances. Therefore, the relationship between the superpowers and their client states was one that tended to favor caution and accommodation. The superpowers were extremely restrained lest the actions of their clients force them into a direct conflict. The client states, not fully supported by their patron states, were unsure of their position (and capabilities) and consequently tended toward greater caution, and, in the case of the PRC, greater accommodation as well. Two important factors—public opinion and geography—generally favored the Communist Chinese in the crisis and also tended to promote an American accommodative strategy.

International public opinion did not generally support the US position on the offshore islands, and opinion in Great Britain, our most important ally, was quite strongly opposed.³² Domestic public opinion in the United States, especially later in the crisis, was also far from enthusiastic about the administration's actions. In Congress and among the general public, there was heavy

criticism of a policy that might involve the United States in a war over some tiny islands off the Chinese coast.³³ Further, the legal and moral position of the United States in supporting Nationalist claims to the offshore islands was questionable.

Geography clearly favored the Chinese. Only a few short miles from the heavily armed Chinese mainland, the islands were first of all extremely difficult to defend in the event of an all-out Chinese assault unless the United States attacked the mainland, something it did not wish to do. Because of their proximity to the mainland, they were perceived by most of the world as clearly an integral part of China (this was the official British position) and thus under international law obviously belonged to the PRC.³⁴

The overall context or structure of the situation consequently put pressure on Eisenhower and Dulles to find a means of settling the dispute that avoided open conflict, that demonstrated restraint, and at the same time that preserved the integrity of our commitment to the Nationalist Chinese. The United States was thus disposed by *the nature of the overall situation* toward a policy of positive diplomacy (or at least a policy that contained a good many of its features).

Vital Interests and Resolve Dominance

There is no question that both the PRC and the United States regarded the crisis as entailing vital interests. The United States had a commitment to defend Taiwan and, though its obligation insofar as the offshore islands were concerned was much less clear, the Eisenhower administration plainly felt the situation demanded American action to prevent a forceful takeover of those islands. Though many observers in hindsight felt this was stretching the containment doctrine to ridiculous lengths,³⁵ Eisenhower and Dulles felt the situation called for firm support of the Nationalists—up to a point.

Communist China also saw the situation as involving vital interests. However, since the tactical approach selected by the bellicose-sounding but essentially cautious Communist leaders

was only a probe to test American intentions, they probably did not regard the probe as a do-or-die proposition.

Because of the nature of the crisis, it is difficult to say which party had the most at stake. Certainly the United States managed to establish what Diesing and Snyder call "resolve dominance" through the accumulation of superior force and strong verbal statements. As they suggest, this probably did give the United States the edge in bargaining power. But the numerous other factors operative in this case, many of them favoring the Chinese side, weakened the US bargaining position.

It therefore appears that in this case the overall structure of the situation had more to do with determining the use of accommodative gestures and adoption of certain aspects of positive diplomacy than did the fact that one country (the United States) managed to establish a dominance of resolve over the other (the People's Republic of China). Thus, the Quemoy crisis does not appear to be a case of clear asymmetrical bargaining power in which the stronger party establishes its dominance and then uses a few accommodative gestures to help the weaker party get "off the hook." True, the United States did bring great strength to bear, and this immense power initially overshadowed conciliatory moves. But in our estimation, American use of accommodative gestures was not simply a bargaining ploy to shift the PRC to "an accommodative track" after the United States had clearly established its superiority in bargaining power (the interpretation favored by Snyder and Diesing).

From the beginning of the crisis on 23 August, American actions (including the deployment of force) carried a strongly conciliatory message along with the obvious implied threat. We cannot agree with Snyder and Diesing that this was a case where concessions were withheld until the weaker party (Communist China) realized the stronger (the United States) had established dominance. While it is true the majority of Dulles's most significant verbal conciliatory statements came late in the crisis on 30 September, there were nonetheless many other indications of American desire to be conciliatory long before that date, some of them verbal

signals, many of them actions (or inactions) that were in effect indices pointing toward an accommodative policy. Therefore, it appears to be oversimplifying matters to interpret the situation as one in which the United States simply gathered together awesome force, established its military superiority and resolve dominance, and only then moved to a more accommodative policy. Likewise, interpreting Chinese conciliatory actions in the latter part of the crisis as simply a result of being forced into an accommodative mode by superior American strength is an overly simplistic interpretation.

It is true that the United States could and did deploy superior force in the Quemoy crisis of 1958. It is also no doubt true that the American stick was an important consideration in the minds of the PRC leaders as they developed strategy for the crisis. However, too many analyses of the crisis tend to overlook the fact that Communist China also had some important cards in its hand, including international public opinion, a statement of Soviet support (though it was not as strong as the PRC desired), and the fact that international law favored the PRC's position. In addition, there was the fact that the United States was forced to impose restraint on Chiang and his Nationalist Chinese, which curtailed their use of the offshore islands. All of these things, as Kenneth Young points out, were to eventually result in significant gains the Communist Chinese would realize from the crisis. In short, they did not come away empty-handed. The People's Republic did not achieve its priority goals, possession of the offshore islands and Taiwan, but it nevertheless achieved some gains that were important in the long run.

As we have previously observed, most American government officials and foreign policy analysts have been heavily influenced for several decades by the policies of "containment" and "negotiating from strength." Since these policies have been characterized by an emphasis on military force, there appears to be a strong tendency among policymakers and many academic analysts to attribute successful outcomes in crises to the effective use of force and to ignore or downplay other factors. It seems to

us that this has too often been the case in many analyses of the 1958 Quemoy crisis.³⁶ For a variety of reasons, not the least being a postwar fascination with displaying resolve through the use of military means, force received more credit than it deserved in the Quemoy case, and the extensive use of conciliatory steps received far less than deserved.

Personalities of Key Decision Makers

In our judgment, personality factors were a major influence on the type of strategy adopted by both sides in the Quemoy crisis. The fact that the United States followed strategy that in many of its essential features was one of positive diplomacy was due in no small part to the personalities and belief systems of the two key decision makers on the American side, President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles. On the Communist Chinese side, the key figure was Premier Chou En-lai, followed closely by Mao Tse-tung. Both leaders were responsible for the cautious, reciprocating policy followed by the PRC, with Chou probably the man most directly in charge of day-to-day decisions.

In recent years there has been substantial controversy about President Eisenhower's role in the cold war and the extent of his commitment to accommodation with the Soviet Union. Some revisionist historians have exalted Eisenhower as the most prudent of the cold war presidents.³⁷ Other historians like John Lewis Gaddis have presented a mixed picture of a president who displayed strong tendencies toward conciliation and accommodation but often failed to follow through on his initially sound instincts.³⁸ Others like Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., have described Eisenhower in more critical terms as a president who was careless in his thinking about the use of nuclear weapons, who fostered the worldwide covert activities of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and who "fully accepted the premises of the Cold War."³⁹

Like most historical questions of this kind, the truth probably lies somewhere in the middle. Even the more critical account by Schlesinger acknowledges that Eisenhower had instincts in the

accommodative direction: "In his late mood, Eisenhower strove, less anxiously than Churchill and later Macmillan but a good deal more anxiously than Dulles, to meet the Russians at the conference table."⁴⁰

Based on available evidence, there is little question that Eisenhower, though in many respects unquestionably influenced by the rhetoric and psychology of the cold war, genuinely hoped to improve relations with the Soviets. As John Gaddis has observed, it was "Eisenhower's personal conviction that sooner or later progress would have to be made toward a resolution of Cold War differences."⁴¹

Thus—though it is true Eisenhower helped promote the growth of some of the more unattractive American activities in the cold war (such as often poorly conceived CIA operations), frequently failed to follow through on his sound instincts toward accommodation, and in too many ways allowed his often rigid and self-righteous secretary of state to dominate policy—he nonetheless genuinely sought avenues of conciliation with the Soviet Union. This became particularly evident following Dulles's death in the spring of 1959.⁴²

One of the most outstanding of Eisenhower's accomplishments was his control of the "hawks" within his own administration, particularly during times of crisis. Since he was a military man himself, his ability to distance himself from the short-sighted, highly aggressive instincts of some of his military leaders was especially impressive. For example, in the 1954–55 crisis over the offshore islands he firmly rejected the military advice of the majority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (led by JCS chairman Adm Arthur W. Radford) that the United States permit Chiang Kai-shek to bomb inland targets in China and that American aircraft be authorized to enter the fray (perhaps with nuclear weapons) if Communist forces tried to invade Quemoy.⁴³ In Townsend Hoopes's words, Eisenhower "seemed swiftly to grasp the imperative need for an American policy of proportion and restraint" despite strong pressure from his military advisers. By rejecting the reckless JCS plan—which could easily have involved

the United States in an all-out war with China and perhaps the Soviet Union as well—Eisenhower, as one high official put it, had likely “personally saved the situation.”⁴⁴ Indeed, it appeared to many observers at the time that Eisenhower was the one major figure in the administration who was determined to avoid war by following a restrained policy in words and deeds.⁴⁵

In the 1958 Quemoy crisis, Eisenhower again displayed an impressive ability to harness both the civilian and military “hawks” in his administration. As in the 1954–55 crisis, he was once again pressured for aggressive action against the PRC, particularly by certain American senior military commanders who were convinced a showdown with the Communist Chinese was the only way to resolve the situation.⁴⁶ As Eisenhower himself said:

Throughout this whole period it seems that I was continually pressured—almost hounded—by Chiang on one side and our own military on the other requesting delegation of authority for immediate action to United States commanders on the spot in the case of attack on Formosa or the offshore islands. . . . I kept to myself the decision to employ U.S. forces.⁴⁷

Writing in his memoirs about his policy during the 1958 Quemoy crisis, Eisenhower said, “I was determined that by every possible means we should avoid expanding hostilities more than absolutely necessary.”⁴⁸ This attitude was reflected at every stage of the crisis. Eisenhower pulled together an awesome concentration of force in the Formosa Strait area, but the pace at which it was gathered and the highly circumspect way it was employed vividly demonstrated Eisenhower’s intention to avoid any provocative actions. He continually rebuffed those American military advisers demanding more aggressive action against the PRC and he adroitly turned aside Nationalist China’s pleas for more American involvement.⁴⁹ And while it can be argued that he made a mistake in permitting the situation to develop in the first place by allowing people in his administration to encourage Chiang to heavily fortify the islands, he nonetheless handled the crisis with skill and good judgment. This was not an easy task because it involved juggling and assuaging not only foreign

adversaries and allies but also powerful domestic political forces ranging from the military, the “China lobby,” and the Republican Right to liberal Democrats and a hostile public. Still, the bulk of the evidence indicates that Eisenhower handled all these forces with considerable skill, never permitting matters to move out of his overall control.

Throughout the crisis Eisenhower displayed an eagerness to find some ground for accommodation. This was evident from the very beginning and became more evident as Communist China showed signs of restraint and readiness to reciprocate. It was apparent in Eisenhower’s quick acceptance of Chou En-lai’s offer on 6 September to reopen the Warsaw ambassadorial talks, despite the fact that Dulles was suspicious of Chou’s motives.⁵⁰ It was evident again in his major television address to the nation on 11 September. Though the speech showed the hand of Dulles and his affinity for cold war rhetoric, the concept of containment, and an inordinate concern with the Munich syndrome, it also demonstrated Eisenhower’s instinctive tendency to look for negotiated diplomatic solutions. It also demonstrated, at least indirectly, the president’s awareness that he had a “loose cannon” in Chiang Kai-shek and that the Communist Chinese had some legitimate grievances on their side. The passage in the speech concerning negotiation and accommodation is deserving of note:

But there is a far better way than resort to force to settle these differences, and there is some hope that such a better way be followed. This is the way of negotiations. . . . We believe that diplomacy can and should find a way out. There are measures that can be taken to assure that these offshore islands will not be a thorn in the side of peace.⁵¹

The last sentence was certainly a signal to mainland China, a signal the United States was eager to negotiate a solution and was prepared to make significant compromises, at least insofar as “releasing” Chiang was concerned. Moreover, it constituted an *index* to the Chinese Communist leaders, one of a number of indices they probably observed with special interest as possible predictors of future US behavior. While not mentioning specifics, this public statement strongly implied that the United States would

be willing to undertake actions to change the status of the offshore islands in ways favorable to the PRC. Clearly such actions would be unpalatable to Chiang Kai-shek. The end result of this, of course, could only be that relations between the United States and Taiwan would be exacerbated and the Eisenhower administration would be forced to exercise greater control over Chiang—not an altogether negative outcome from the standpoint of Peking.

Space will not permit an extensively detailed analysis of Eisenhower's role in the Quemoy dispute. Suffice to say that the president was firmly in control of policy during the critical phases. Further, it seems clear that his personality and "belief system" were critical elements in producing the caution and restraint, coupled with a conciliatory firmness, that characterized American policy. To the degree that the strategy of the United States approximated what we have been calling positive diplomacy, Eisenhower was primarily responsible. Though one can fault his extension of the containment concept to some insignificant islands that were obviously of little intrinsic importance to this country⁵² as well as his too casual consideration at an early stage of employing tactical nuclear weapons,⁵³ Eisenhower's common sense, emotional balance, international experience, ability to apply history with discrimination, and instinct for compromise and accommodation all were instrumental in helping bring the crisis to a peaceful and relatively successful conclusion.

What, then, of the role played by John Foster Dulles? Many analysts (including Dulles himself) have rated the secretary of state highly in his conduct of the Quemoy crisis. Even a writer as generally critical of Dulles as Townsend Hoopes admitted that it was "probably, in purely technical terms, his most brilliant and successful piece of brinkmanship."⁵⁴ However, we are inclined to agree with Hoopes's overall assessment of the Dulles performance in the Quemoy case—that it was a tactical success but a strategic failure and that Dulles was excellent in helping conceive and implement a strategy that resolved the crisis in the short term but failed to address the underlying issues that had caused the crisis in the first place. In the words of Alexander L. George and Richard

Smoke in speaking of the Dulles role in the Quemoy crisis, “Dulles apparently was willing to introduce flexibility into the American position in some respects in order to survive a difficult crisis, but he was unwilling or uninterested in displaying the same flexibility afterward to avoid a new crisis.”⁵⁵

Our primary concern here, of course, is to assess the extent to which Dulles’s personal characteristics and belief system were influential in determining American strategy in the Quemoy crisis. More particularly, we are interested in how these factors impacted on the conciliatory/accommodative aspects of that strategy. To what extent was Dulles responsible for the accommodative elements—the concessions and inducements, actual or merely promised—that were part of the American strategy? How did his personality affect the crisis?

We have already answered these questions to some degree. There is little doubt that Dulles contributed greatly to the tactical success of the Quemoy crisis.⁵⁶ To achieve a short-term tactical objective, Dulles was capable of sublimating temporarily his visceral anticommunism and moralistic Manichaean view of the world, particularly if the realities of the situation dictated it. In the Quemoy case they did. Skeptical public opinion at home and abroad, critical allies, a volatile and not completely reliable client state (Taiwan), an unpredictable adversary (the PRC) backed at least nominally by an increasingly formidable superpower (the Soviet Union)—all these called for a strategy to meet many requirements, a “strategy for all seasons” as it were. Dulles, coached by Eisenhower, eventually recognized these realities and adjusted accordingly. His adjustment was greatly facilitated by having a pragmatic boss in Eisenhower, a man who instinctively grasped the complexity of the situation and realized it demanded a flexible strategy featuring restraint and what might be termed *calculated ambiguity*.

When the crisis broke out in full force on 23 August, Dulles favored an immediate strong statement of support for the Nationalists. Eisenhower opposed this on the reasonable grounds that he wanted to keep the Communists guessing.⁵⁷ Not until nearly

two weeks later did he agree to a stronger statement in the Newport memorandum of 4 September. Throughout the early part of the crisis one can trace a similar pattern: Dulles pushing for a more definitive commitment to take action in support of the Nationalists, Eisenhower cautious and more inclined to follow an ambiguous policy designed to create uncertainty in the minds of Communist leaders.

However, despite Dulles's rigidity in many respects, he was an able diplomatic tactician and was capable of recognizing realities. Such a reality was the adverse public opinion, both domestic and international, that was pressuring Washington in the direction of negotiations.⁵⁸ Dulles was well aware of this early in the crisis, and it was clearly a factor in his decision to combine carrots with sticks from the outset. As we observed earlier, the increased strategic nuclear power of the Soviets and the volatility of a disingenuous Nationalist "ally" were additional factors that made the path of negotiation more palatable to Dulles.

It is interesting to speculate that Dulles may have experienced significant changes in his belief system late in his career. Certainly he proved more flexible in the matter of negotiations in both the Quemoy crisis of 1958 and the Berlin crisis that same year than he had earlier. However, because the structures of these situations were (in our opinion) ones of relative symmetrical bargaining power and hence tended to encourage accommodation, it is difficult to assess how significantly Dulles's personal views on negotiation may have changed.

One is left with the impression after reviewing the available evidence that Hoopes is probably correct in his assessment that Dulles demonstrated in the Quemoy crisis a "brilliant display of tactical skills" but evidenced no real understanding of how to go about finding solutions to the fundamental problems that caused the crisis in the first place.⁵⁹ Faced with a complex situation, Dulles did use force and diplomacy effectively to find a short-term solution to the crisis. With the help of Eisenhower and Chou En-lai and world opinion, Dulles saw the need for flexibility. But there is little evidence to suggest that Dulles really appreciated or even

understood how conciliation might lead to longer-range strategic solutions. Negotiations, like force, were instruments one used if they facilitated one's cause and helped bring about a satisfactory solution to a tactical problem. But in Dulles's thinking, over the longer span of history this did not alter the fact that the world was composed of good guys and bad guys and that one could not negotiate with the devil with any real prospect for success.

Summarizing the American side, it appears that personality factors played a major role in the Quemoy crisis and in the development of positive diplomacy largely because of two factors. First, the structure of the situation was such that it forced even someone like Dulles (who had previously displayed little interest or faith in negotiations) in a conciliatory direction. This became especially evident after the 30 September news conference. By that time, public criticism of administration policy (and possibly pressure from Eisenhower) helped bring on a major acceleration in the conciliatory aspects of Dulles's strategy.⁶⁰ Second, Eisenhower's good sense, formidable background in international bargaining, and instinctive inclination toward caution and compromise provided restraints within which Dulles had to operate.

One can debate the relative contributions of Eisenhower and Dulles to the strategy adopted in the Quemoy crisis. Since much official material on the crisis is still not available, a considerable amount of speculation is necessary. Still, the timing of events seems to indicate that Eisenhower's extreme concern about adverse public criticism may have caused the president to pressure Dulles into a more conciliatory approach.⁶¹ This is the thesis advanced by Hoopes and some other writers, and it seems plausible. It would help explain the dramatic shift in the Dulles approach that began with the 30 September news conference.⁶²

This is not to detract from the contribution made by Dulles. He did conceive and conduct the bulk of the day-to-day strategy and he did it with great skill from the tactical standpoint. Even though the accommodative actions he took consisted largely of conditional promises rather than actual concessions, he used these

conciliatory steps with a deftness and sensibility he had not displayed earlier.

One would like to think Dulles recognized that the Chinese Communists had some legitimate reasons for being upset over the status of the offshore islands (and especially the fact that Chiang had been using them as staging bases for spy forays and commando raids on the mainland).⁶³ It would be pleasant to think that Dulles had begun to recognize that an accommodation with the PRC was a global imperative and he therefore was laying the groundwork for an eventual rapprochement. Unfortunately, the evidence does not bear this out; Dulles remained firmly opposed to any recognition of Communist China and its admission to the United Nations.⁶⁴

It therefore seems likely, as Hoopes maintains, that Dulles used accommodative steps with skill in the Quemoy crisis not because he was interested in reaching a just settlement of the underlying problems but rather as a means of achieving a short-term solution that would mollify domestic and foreign critics. As Hoopes put it, Dulles

resisted any earnest search for accommodation or even for serious negotiation, for his goal was not really coexistence based on a calculated balance of force; it was superiority and mastery based on a vague expectation that the West would maintain a permanent power preponderance.⁶⁵

Thus, one is left with the overall impression that while Dulles must be given substantial credit for tactically handling force and accommodative measures with skill, it was Eisenhower's influence—his restraint, instinct for compromise, and good sense—that provided the all-important boundaries and guidelines for American policy. Had another president with less international experience and less maturity been in office, pressures for more aggressive action from American military leaders and the Republican Right might have led the United States into an all-out clash with the PRC.

As Stephen Ambrose stated in discussing Eisenhower's superb diplomatic bargaining accomplishments during World War II,

Eisenhower was by the end of the war “as adept at politics as any professional diplomat.”⁶⁶ His world outlook was far more sophisticated in many ways than was Dulles’s. He felt strongly that goodwill and common sense could solve most problems, and as John Gunther observed, Eisenhower had an “instinctive ability to understand the other person’s point of view.”⁶⁷ This empathy, coupled with a basically optimistic nature, made it possible for Eisenhower to view the cold war struggle with the Soviets and the PRC in more detached and pragmatic terms than could someone like Dulles or the leaders of the Republican Right.

Equally important as the restraint displayed by the American side was the cautious restraint displayed by the PRC. Though overall policy and guidelines were set by Mao Tse-tung and the Politburo of the Chinese Communist party, the individual most responsible for day-to-day decisions and policy was Premier Chou En-lai. Even though little Chinese documentation is available, the evidence we do have indicates that Chou should receive much of the credit for the restraint and observance of the rules of the game that the PRC demonstrated during the crisis. For example, in his study of Eisenhower, Peter Lyon is quite critical of Eisenhower’s role in the 1954–55 Formosa Strait crisis and at the same time praises Chou En-lai for his “self-possession, maturity, willingness to conciliate, friendliness, and an easy, relaxed self-confidence.”⁶⁸ While we cannot agree with Lyon’s overly critical assessment of Eisenhower and think his evaluation of Chou tends to ignore some negative factors, we nonetheless generally concur with his favorable evaluation of Chou’s role.

In his book *Superpowers and International Conflict*, Carsten Holbraad says the Quemoy crisis of 1958

was settled through what Charles Osgood would call *graduated reciprocation in tension reduction* [emphasis added]. The opening move was Chou En-lai’s statement of 6 September, in which he, though ostensibly taking a strong line, announced that his government was prepared to resume the ambassadorial talks between the two countries.⁶⁹

Though Dulles had indicated in his statement of 4 September that the United States favored approaching the crisis through negotiation, it was Chou who took the first concrete conciliatory step by proposing on 6 September that the ambassadorial talks, abandoned in 1957, be resumed. It was Eisenhower who immediately jumped at this offer and rejected a reply suggested by the suspicious Dulles that contained a high-threat content. Eisenhower told Dulles he wanted the reply to indicate "a concrete and definite acceptance of Chou En-lai's offer to negotiate."⁷⁰

Chou's offer was consistent with the substantially conciliatory line followed by Peking since the Bandung Conference of 1955. At that conference, which marked the end of the 1954–55 Formosa Strait crisis, Chou talked of friendship for the American people and suggested negotiations to discuss "relaxing tension in the Taiwan area."⁷¹ For the next three years, the PRC made it clear it desired improved relations with the United States, proposing an exchange of journalists and other measures to break down the wall between the two countries. But as Gaddis put it, "The administration was . . . adamant in its refusal to enter into substantive negotiations with Communist China, despite the fact that Peking's desire for an opening to the West was becoming obvious."⁷²

In addition to the major conciliatory step Chou took on 6 September to help defuse the situation, his hand was evident in the restraint displayed by the Communist Chinese throughout the crisis. Chiang's use of the offshore islands as staging areas for commando raids on the mainland was roughly similar to having a hostile foreign power use Ellis Island in New York Bay as a staging area for raids on the American mainland.⁷³ In addition, Chou had to be provoked by the nearly three years of Dulles's rebuffs that had greeted the conciliatory overtures the Chinese leader had extended beginning in 1955. Discussing the Dulles attitude toward the Sino-American ambassadorial talks, Kenneth Young has observed that "the United States did not intend to make any concessions by trading away its relations with Taipei, particularly since the United States government did not want diplomatic

relations or continuing negotiations with Peking. Washington wanted to isolate, not enhance, Peking.”⁷⁴

Despite Dulles’s rebuffs and provocations (including his refusal to shake Chou’s hand at the 1954 Geneva Conference),⁷⁵ Chou managed to sublimate his personal feelings and approach the Quemoy crisis with restraint and generally sound judgment.

In his memoirs, Henry Kissinger describes Chou En-lai as “urbane, infinitely patient, extraordinarily intelligent, and subtle . . . one of the two or three most impressive men I have ever met.” Referring to his meetings with Chou in 1971 and 1972 to launch the Sino-American rapprochement, Kissinger continued:

The impact of personalities on events is never easy to define. To be sure, China and the United States were brought together by necessity; it was not abstract goodwill but converging interests that brought me to Peking; it was not personal friendship with Chou but a commonly perceived danger that fostered the elaboration of our relationship. But that these interests were perceived clearly and acted upon decisively was due to leadership that—on both sides—skillfully used the margin of choice available. That China and the United States would seek rapprochement in the early 1970s was inherent in the world environment. That it should occur so rapidly and develop so naturally owed no little to the luminous personality and extraordinary perception of the Chinese Premier.⁷⁶

While Kissinger was speaking of Chou some 13 years after the Quemoy crisis, there can be little doubt that those same qualities he displayed to Nixon’s special envoy in 1971 were also evident in the manner in which the 1958 incident was handled. Caution, restraint, shrewdness, and an ability to communicate with tacit moves and to put himself in the adversary’s shoes—all these were qualities Chou displayed in the summer of 1958. Although some analysts criticize Chou for permitting the Quemoy probe in the first place, for dragging his feet in the Warsaw ambassadorial talks, and then being forced into what they see as a humiliating backdown, the situation might have been far worse for mainland China had someone else been the main figure directing that country’s foreign relations. And in fact, as we noted earlier, Peking did realize some important gains from the crisis, including increased American pressure on Chiang Kai-shek to restrain his use of the offshore

islands for provocative activities against the mainland. The PRC also made other significant gains, especially in the public relations area.⁷⁷

Thus, the personalities of key decision makers, particularly Eisenhower and Chou En-lai, appear to have been extremely important in the way the Quemoy crisis of 1958 was conducted and concluded. The restrained use of force, willingness to find areas of accommodation, and the remarkable display of tacit communication between the United States and Communist China owed much to the American president and the Chinese premier. Dulles contributed an impressive technical display of tactical diplomacy on the US side while Mao undoubtedly was the ultimate source of decisions on the Chinese side. But Eisenhower and Chou En-lai were the main personalities that shaped the strategies followed by their respective countries, and they were responsible for the fact that in many respects those strategies reflected strong elements of what we have been calling positive diplomacy.

As Kissinger noted, the impact of personalities on events is difficult to define.⁷⁸ Nonetheless, it is a critical variable in foreign policy decision making. In his much-quoted work, *The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy*, Joseph de Rivera states that “we must insist that the personality of official decision-makers is always an important determinant of their decisions, and hence, of the nation’s policy.”⁷⁹

We have neither the space nor the expertise in psychology to conduct a personality analysis of the decision makers we discuss in this study. Excellent studies of such leaders as Eisenhower, Dulles, Kennedy, Chou, and others are readily available, many of them containing impressive psychological assessments. What we are interested in are those factors of personality that seem to make leaders more likely to follow policies of positive diplomacy, more sympathetic with techniques of negotiation and accommodation, and more cautious and restrained in their use of force. At the same time, however, the leadership qualities we have in mind, those that illustrate positive diplomacy at its best, do not reject the use of force when necessary. Weakness, timidity, and vacillation—

qualities that in too many historical instances have produced “appeasement” in the most pejorative sense of that much-maligned word—have no place in positive diplomacy.

We make no pretense in this study of attempting in-depth personality analyses, nor do we consider our conclusions about personality factors new or profound. They are quite familiar assessments, generally accepted, and on the whole primarily products of historical observation and common sense. Nevertheless, because they are frequently overlooked or at least shortchanged in many crisis studies, they deserve mention. Here we can only note what appear to be those traits of personality and character that lead decision makers to follow policies of positive diplomacy.

Based on the Quemoy case (we will consider other cases later), the key overall personality trait—from which many other good traits flow—appears to be a worldview that is flexible, pragmatic, relatively nonideological, and nonemotional, and one that recognizes bargaining and compromise as the warp and woof of international or domestic politics. For want of a better term to describe this broad personality characteristic, let us call it “international sophistication.”

Despite the difficulty in defining what international sophistication is, it seems obvious some decision makers have it, others do not. Dwight Eisenhower and Chou En-lai had it; John Foster Dulles and Lyndon Johnson did not. John Kennedy did not have it when he entered office but rapidly acquired it; Jimmy Carter did not have it when he entered office, never really acquired it, but was moving in that direction in some respects before being hit by the Iran hostage debacle. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger had it until their programs were swept under by Watergate and the subsequent collapse of *détente*. Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev did not have it; Mikhail Gorbachev so far appears to have it in abundance.

Clearly these are highly subjective and not very scientific assessments, and many people would disagree with them. Nonetheless, having plainly labeled them as one man’s opinion,

let us attempt to refine the definition of international sophistication a bit more in the hope it will help us in our consideration of positive diplomacy.

Generally speaking, international sophistication is probably the result of certain positive personality traits (acquired early) plus subsequent experience, particularly experience in international diplomacy and especially in the bargaining and negotiating areas. It is in essence, an attitude of mind born largely of experience but fostered by certain pragmatic and empathetic character traits developed somewhere during the growth process. It is a quality that permits the individual to perceive that the world and its problems consist of more "grays" than "blacks" and "whites," that "truth" is generally not all on one side and depends a great deal on where one sits, that the other fellow probably has legitimate interests also, that flexibility and compromise are required to solve "real world" problems in international politics, and that a rigid adherence to ideological doctrines cannot be allowed to interfere with a realistic approach to such problems.

It is essentially a quality reflecting a maturity and inner security that permits one to be flexible, interested in finding grounds for accommodation, and cautious and restrained in the use of force without being overly concerned that these traits are evidences of weakness or that they may be interpreted as such. As Henry Kissinger said, "There was about Chou an inner serenity that enabled him . . . to eschew the petty maneuvers that characterized our negotiations with other Communists."⁸⁰

In the Quemoy case, both Eisenhower and Chou En-lai possessed this quality of international sophistication, a result in large part because of the long experience both men had in working at the highest level of international affairs. Each had learned the art of bargaining and compromise in years of international diplomacy, and those lessons had been supplemented by the hard compromises required in the rough and tumble of domestic politics. Their awareness of the complexities of the issues and their ability to view the problems from an emotionally detached, longer-range strategic perspective made it possible for them to

tacitly coordinate and move toward a “convergence point” in the crisis.

Dulles, on the other hand, had a tremendously impressive technical background in international diplomacy, but in many respects he was not in the same league of international sophistication as Eisenhower and Chou, largely because his ideological blinders would not permit him to be. Perhaps this was due to the fact that while he had many years of training in international affairs, he did not have Eisenhower’s or Chou’s experience in hard international bargaining at the highest levels, nor did he have their experience in the demanding world of domestic politics. More important, however, was the fact that Dulles’s belief system would not permit him more than intermittent displays of flexibility that were manifested in temporary tactical moves. Thus, while he did display flexibility on occasion and an ability to use carrots tactically in the Quemoy crisis, there is little evidence to suggest he did it as a means of moving toward a long-range, strategic solution of the problem. The explanation advanced by Hoopes is more likely the case—that he did it as a tactical ploy to find a solution to an *immediate* problem and to relieve the onerous burden of critical domestic and international public opinion.⁸¹

Dynamics of the Bargaining Process

Earlier we observed that Carsten Holbraad had referred to the Quemoy crisis of 1958 as an example of graduated reciprocation in tension-reduction (GRIT) in action.⁸² While the crisis was obviously not a pure example of GRIT as described by Charles Osgood, we essentially agree with Holbraad. It was an example that illustrated the principles of GRIT in many respects and also what we have been calling positive diplomacy.

The interaction in the Quemoy crisis—the dynamics of the bargaining process—constituted a prime example of effective tacit communication. Moves by one side produced responsive moves by the other side—all of them (between the United States and the PRC at least) being characterized by restraint. As many writers

have observed, it was a remarkable example of tacit coordination between two opponents to defuse a serious situation while preserving relatively intact the balances that existed before the crisis.⁸³

We think the way in which the bargaining in the Quemoy case was conducted—that is, the *dynamics* of the interactions that were engendered by the US approach—was instrumental in bringing about a resolution of the crisis. In his classic book *Strategy of Conflict*, Thomas C. Schelling points out that the parties in a bargaining process often are able to settle intuitively on what appears to be a “focal point,” a logical place for agreement that becomes obvious to both parties during the bargaining process. Schelling observes that this process involves the “convergence of expectations”; that is, “intuitively perceived mutual expectations” by both parties are coordinated, usually in a tacit bargaining process (though as he notes, it is likely an element in explicit bargaining as well). In any event, in the process of bargaining, both parties “must bargain their way to an outcome, either vocally or by the successive moves they make, or both. They must find ways of regulating their behavior, communicating their intentions, letting themselves be led to some meeting of minds, tacit or explicit, to avoid mutual destruction of potential gains.”⁸⁴

It seems clear, as Schelling notes, that the intellectual process of “choosing a strategy of pure conflict and choosing a strategy of coordination are of wholly different sorts.” While Schelling was referring specifically to game theory, the principle applies to bargaining in general. If the parties to a dispute enter the conflict with what amounts to an accommodative strategy, a genuine desire to find a mutually satisfactory solution, they approach the situation with a much “different attitude,” as Schelling says, “through some imaginative process of introspection, of searching for shared clues.”⁸⁵ In short, there is a mind-set in the accommodative approach (or strategy of coordination of expectations) that encourages reception of signals that guide the way to some form of mutual accommodation. As Schelling points out, the adversaries are mentally attuned and psychologically prepared to seek out,

through the psychic phenomenon of “mutual perception,” the “unique signal that coordinates their expectations of each other.”⁸⁶

If, on the other hand, the dispute between the parties is approached with a strategy of pure conflict, the mind-set is quite different. The players are not psychologically predisposed to intuitively “sniff out” those prominent signals or landmarks on which a compromise can be based. The focus is instead on conflict.

Our major point here, of course, is that the use of conciliatory measures by the United States in the Quemoy crisis induced reciprocation by Communist China. The considerable body of psychological/sociological literature that holds that carrots produce more positive reactions than sticks would appear to have been vindicated in the Quemoy case.⁸⁷ The United States, on the whole, responded positively to conciliatory Chinese moves and, for the most part, the Chinese responded positively to the American moves.

David Baldwin has well described the different reaction to carrots and sticks in his work on positive and negative sanctions. If one considers B in the following passage to be the PRC, we have a plausible description of how the PRC may well have reacted to American moves in the Quemoy crisis.

B's immediate reaction to sticks usually differs from his immediate reaction to carrots. Whereas fear, anxiety, and resistance are typical responses to threats, the typical responses to promises are hope, reassurance, and attraction. Three important examples of the difference this can make are as follows: (1) Threats cause B to feel stress, which is likely to affect (that is, enhance or impair) B's problem-solving capacity, i.e., his rationality. (2) Threats tend to generate resistance by B. (3) Whereas positive sanctions tend to convey an impression of sympathy and concern for B's needs, negative ones tend to convey an impression of indifference or actual hostility to B.⁸⁸

Thus, the dynamics of the bargaining process—the positive interactions that are produced by the conciliatory steps—often help bring about a de-escalation spiral that defuses the conflict. This clearly happened in the Quemoy crisis.

Success in Communication

The tacit communication and coordination between the PRC and the United States in the Quemoy crisis was extraordinary. Communication through actions was carried out with great effectiveness, and, in effect, the two nations settled the crisis through a process of tacit coordination, even though the underlying issues were left largely unsettled. Formal verbal communication between the two countries—for example, during the Warsaw negotiations—proved largely ineffective.⁸⁹

From the beginning of the Quemoy crisis in early August, Peking was receiving a variety of messages from Washington, some of them signals, some indices. Because of the greater reliability of indices as indicators of future behavior, Peking was probably paying more attention to the latter than the former. Let us examine these further to see how they relate to our main interest—the use of accommodation and inducements.

In his fine study of the Quemoy crisis, Jonathan Howe points out that when indications of a Communist buildup on the mainland opposite the offshore islands became evident in early August, the Eisenhower administration began signaling its intention to support the Nationalists. The signaling, however, was definitely circuitous. For example, there was no direct presidential statement asserting we would definitely defend Quemoy. Instead, during the period from 6 August until the full-scale bombardment began, the administration issued several mild and *indirect* signals that were apparently intended to discourage the People's Republic of China from any aggressive action in the Formosa Strait.

Among these was an “emphatic statement” from the State Department on 9 August to all its embassies indicating we had no intention of recognizing the People's Republic of China.⁹⁰ A speech by John Foster Dulles on 19 August made reference to our collective security agreements with “nearly fifty nations” under which “an attack upon one is an attack upon all”—an intimation that we might go to the aid of Quemoy, though our defense treaty with the government of Chiang Kai-shek contained no provision of this kind. But these were only indirect indications of concern;

no direct statements of support for Quemoy and Taiwan were forthcoming from Washington, even though the Communists were rapidly building up military forces in the area and had already begun sporadic shelling as early as 4 August.⁹¹

It seems probable, then, that the leaders of the People's Republic of China were not paying a great deal of attention to the American signals in what Howe calls the "buildup phase," the period from 4 August until 23 August (the date the heavy bombardment began). What they seemed to be paying most attention to were indices. Following are some examples of these indices: (1) there was no presidential statement asserting we would defend the offshore islands; (2) there was during this period no increase in the size of the Seventh Fleet in the Formosa Strait area or any attempt at an American "show of force";⁹² (3) there seemed to be an attempt to downgrade the crisis by officials of the Department of State;⁹³ and (4) the secretary of state left for a week's vacation on the day the shelling began, and the president went on vacation a week later, an indication they were not overly concerned about the crisis.

These facts were most likely interpreted by the Chinese as indices, or reliable indications, that the US government was confused and hesitant about the situation, at cross-purposes as to how to proceed, not overly enthusiastic about supporting Chiang Kai-shek's questionable motives, and not happy about the fact that US allies and the world at large were taking a rather dim view of our moral and legal position in the dispute. If, as seems probable, this was the assessment made by the Communist Chinese, it was essentially correct. They could well afford to say to themselves after observing the indices that this was obviously an awkward situation for the United States and one in which Americans were unlikely to risk precipitating direct hostilities with the PRC except in the improbable event the Communist Chinese attempted an invasion of the offshore islands.

Even though communicated by inaction and indecision (as opposed to overt acts), the message to the PRC was clear. Part of that message, even early in the crisis, was one of accommodation—that we recognized Peking also had certain legitimate interests and

we would make every effort to avoid infringing on those interests. The stage was thus set for the success of specific conciliatory steps that were taken later in the crisis.

The reciprocal actions taken by the parties permitted the two powers to tacitly defuse the crisis. These actions included US observance of strict offshore limits for their escort vessels, Communist China's abstinence from employing its bomber fleet against the islands or US vessels, American refusal to allow the Nationalists to conduct air strikes against the mainland, and so on.

Military Capabilities and Their Use

During the Quemoy crisis, the assembled US military might in the Formosa Strait area could leave no doubt in the minds of the Chinese Communist leaders that the United States had the wherewithal to make any attempt to take the offshore islands very costly. Still, the restraint with which the American force was deployed—including the careful observance of normal territorial coastal limits and the stationing of combat ships at a very substantial distance from the disputed islands⁹⁴—gave evidence of US recognition of certain legitimate PRC rights and interests; sent a message that the United States desired to find common ground of accommodation; and signaled that the United States did not intend to escalate the conflict. Assuredly, US force was present and was formidable indeed. But as Philip Williams observed, America's commitment was limited and "was solely a defensive commitment: there would be no American help or encouragement for any attempt by Chiang to return to the mainland."⁹⁵

One of the major characteristics of the nuclear age has been the significant development in the use of force for demonstrative purposes—that is, the use of force to *communicate* with one's opponent. As the advent of nuclear weapons placed severe restraints on the resort to full-scale violence and war, some new means for effecting changes in the international system had to be found. To a large extent, crises such as the Quemoy conflict, with

their accompanying demonstrations of force, have served as a substitute for war. As Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing put it:

In any system, there must be some mechanism for change and for resisting change. Historically the ultimate mechanism has been war, but since war is no longer a plausible option between the nuclear powers, they have turned to threats of force and the demonstrative use of force short of war as a means of getting their way. Between these powers, the only truly usable force is "psychological force." It is generated by creating some prospect, some risk, that one *might* use force. The pressure of risk substitutes for the pressure of force itself. The winner of the encounter is the one who can appear the most resolved to take risks and stand up to risks. But this competitive risk-running must be carefully "managed" lest it escalate to disaster.⁹⁶

In the prenuclear era, diplomacy and military activities were relatively separate and distinct; a nation tried diplomacy first and if that failed it turned the matter over to its soldiers. Today, however, with dire penalties probable for both sides in any full-scale war, diplomatic and demonstrative military activity merge together in a communication "network" designed to demonstrate the extent of one's vital interests to an adversary, as well as one's superior resolve. The use of military force, then, becomes a means of "talking" to an opponent, communicating messages to him with greater effectiveness and credibility than can be done through the usual verbal channels. This was done to a remarkable degree in the Quemoy crisis as both the United States and the PRC manipulated force to indicate determination but practiced at the same time a skillful restraint designed to communicate a desire for a peaceful settlement. Military moves (and the restraint of such moves) became a virtual language in the Quemoy crisis. As Thomas C. Schelling has observed:

This is one of the reasons why talk is not a substitute for moves. Moves can in some way alter the game, by incurring manifest costs, risks, or as a reduced range of subsequent choice; they have an information content, or evidence content, of a different character from that of speech.⁹⁷

In short, moves carry more credibility in many instances than do words. As Schelling correctly points out, moves are valuable as signals or indices that convey to the opponent one's value system and interests and what one is prepared to bargain or not bargain over. If the opponent is also able to convey through nonviolent moves his interests and value system, the framework for some form of mutual accommodation has been put in place.⁹⁸ In the Quemoy situation the United States, through its circumspect management of the Seventh Fleet and its restrictions on the combat activities of the Nationalist Chinese forces, clearly signaled it would go out of its way to prevent the confrontation from escalating to violence. The People's Republic of China, through the nonuse of its sizable bomber force and other measures, signaled the same thing. Through these military moves, coupled with some verbal signals, the two nations communicated what they were prepared to bargain about and what they were not prepared to bargain about.

From the perspective of this book, one of our primary interests is how force can contribute to accommodation between opponents. What kinds of force can be used in what ways to help bring about a mutually satisfactory nonviolent settlement of the dispute? When it is necessary to employ force, how can it most effectively be employed to promote accommodation?

Clearly attitudes about how military force should be used is an important variable in determining whether an accommodative approach is adopted and whether or not it is successful. If used properly, it will communicate certain kinds of signals and indices; that is, it will indicate a determination to defend essential vital interests but at the same time a willingness, indeed a strong desire, to be conciliatory, as was done in the case of Quemoy. It will convey messages that make clear to the opponent that we desire accommodation not because of any weakness on our part but because it makes good sense for both parties. It will also make clear to the opponent what it is we wish him to do.⁹⁹ All of these, except perhaps the last, were skillfully accomplished by Eisenhower and Dulles in the 1958 Quemoy crisis.

Although the nuclear and conventional military power of the superpowers is obviously still an important factor in crisis situations such as Quemoy, its importance in relation to other factors is highly uncertain. As stated by Robert E. Osgood and Robert W. Tucker,

The relative military power of the superpowers affects the outcome of their crisis even though it is not tested. But there is a greater disproportion than before the nuclear age between objective disparities of military capabilities and the political leverage or bargaining power of antagonists. In crisis the impression of relative military strength in the minds of the adversaries is surely a factor in the outcome; but the relation of these impressions to actual military ratios is not precise, and their correlation with relative bargaining power is obscure. The Soviet Union has been as cautious in avoiding war and as willing to retreat from an offensive in Berlin, where it had great local conventional superiority and held Western Europe a nuclear hostage, as in Cuban waters. The U.S. was neither more nor less inclined to take risks of war in opposing Soviet moves in Cuba, where it had great local conventional superiority in addition to over-all strategic nuclear superiority, than in Berlin.¹⁰⁰

Put somewhat more simply, in the nuclear era relative military power does not have as decisive an influence in determining risk-taking propensity and resorting to war as it did in the pre-nuclear age. For example, in the Quemoy confrontation the United States could muster far greater military power, including tactical nuclear weapons, than could the Chinese Communists but in most respects this was irrelevant. As Eisenhower recognized, use of this power, especially nuclear weapons, would have infuriated a good part of the civilized world, not to mention the tremendously greater risks involved should a crisis like Quemoy have gotten out of hand.

In today's world, such factors as international public opinion, political will and determination, risk-taking propensity and skill, and estimates of the opponent's intentions play a much larger role than they did before 1945. Real differences in military power are still important but are no longer a reliable predictor of what actions either superpower will take in a crisis. This was certainly true in the Quemoy case.

A Policy of “Conciliatory Firmness”

We have analyzed the Quemoy crisis of 1958 from the perspective of six variables or factors for determining whether positive diplomacy was followed. This analysis reveals that the United States, for a variety of reasons, approached the Quemoy crisis with a strategy of what Philip Williams calls “conciliatory firmness.”¹⁰¹ Unmistakably, powerful force was deployed by the United States; it conveyed to the People’s Republic of China a deterrent message that could hardly be misinterpreted. But the force was deployed and used in such a circumspect manner that it also conveyed a second and equally important message—one of conciliation. As we noted earlier, this message (received by the People’s Republic of China as both a signal and an index), combined with the verbal conciliatory signals sent by the Eisenhower administration (some of which were also seen by the PRC leaders as indices), constituted basically a strategy of conciliation and accommodation. It is our opinion that adoption of such a strategy, which in many respects follows what we have been calling a strategy of positive diplomacy, set in motion a dynamic process of mutual accommodation between the United States and the People’s Republic of China that went beyond the facts of the case and the conflict environment and produced Schelling’s “convergence.”¹⁰²

Quemoy is interesting because the circumstances were unique in many respects. Communist China, with international law and public opinion on its side to a substantial degree, attempted a probe of US intentions. The probe was limited, designed to clarify the extent of America’s commitment to the offshore islands and to Taiwan. Behind mainland China was a reluctant and somewhat anxious Soviet Union, not by any means the fully supportive partner the PRC would have liked.¹⁰³ In front of China was a formidably armed Nationalist Chinese force and the awesome might of the Seventh Fleet. Clearly, the instrument chosen for the probe needed to be one that was flexible and easily controlled. Most important, it had to be something that could be quickly

de-escalated. This the artillery bombardment proved to be, but it could not by itself create an effective blockade against a skilled and determined opponent. Thus, China labored under a number of serious handicaps in the crisis; to minimize these she adopted a low-risk, supremely cautious strategy.

The Eisenhower administration also faced some complex problems. Of prime importance was the requirement to keep the wily and irascible Chiang Kai-shek from engineering a major war. Second, the administration had an obligation to honor the commitment to Taiwan but under the vague terms of the Formosa Resolution of 1955. Third, it had to find some means of mollifying an increasingly disapproving public opinion both at home and abroad. And last but far from least, the Soviet Union, led by the unpredictable Khrushchev, constituted a potentially dangerous threat in an already complicated situation. Confronted by these complexities, the administration also deemed it wise to follow a cautious, low-risk strategy.

Thus, both major players in the Quemoy drama had sound reasons for adopting low-risk strategies that studiously avoided escalating the crisis. Each attempted to place the other in a position of being responsible for initiating any escalation. Each went out of the way to avoid actions that might result in a head-on clash between the forces of the PRC and the United States. It was clear to each power relatively early in the crisis that its opponent was not eager for a clash and would, on the contrary, go to substantial lengths to avoid one. For example, the Chinese Communists carefully avoided firing at American ships, and the US Navy was equally religious about staying at least three miles from the offshore islands. Many other examples of mutual restraint were evident throughout the crisis.¹⁰⁴

Before leaving Quemoy, we need to evaluate how important coercive and accommodative elements were in resolving the crisis. Such an evaluation requires a more detailed look at the dynamics of the bargaining process in this case.

Choosing between Coercion and Accommodation in Crises

Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing point out that parties in a crisis normally begin the encounter with coercive moves (verbal, physical, or both) and through this early phase clarify one another's relative bargaining power by coercive tactics. According to Snyder and Diesing, only *after* this relative bargaining strength has been clarified can accommodative efforts succeed.¹⁰⁵ As they put it, "A phase of mutual coercion and countercoercion that clarifies relative bargaining power must precede accommodative bargaining; otherwise accommodative attempts fail."¹⁰⁶

Once the power relations between the parties have been clarified and it becomes clear that one side has "resolve dominance" (meaning superior motivation) and is also plainly the stronger party, accommodative bargaining can begin. In this type of situation, the stronger power is usually recognized by both parties as having superior resolve. It can then, without fear of appearing weak, offer concessions that will hopefully jolt the weaker power onto the accommodative track.¹⁰⁷

Although this may quite often be true in what Snyder and Diesing refer to as cases of "asymmetrical bargaining power" (clearly unequal bargaining power between the parties), it is not necessarily true in cases where the parties see their resolve as roughly equal or symmetrical. In cases of symmetrical bargaining power, the parties may both be uncertain that coercion can force the other to back down. For this reason, they may consider it too risky to attempt a purely coercive strategy in the beginning. Therefore, some mixture of coercion and accommodation may be necessary from the outset of the crisis.¹⁰⁸ This certainly was true in the case of Quemoy.

Determining the appropriate mixture of coercion and accommodation to apply in a crisis situation is a difficult task indeed. Snyder and Diesing describe the dilemma well:

Whether to be firm and tough toward an adversary, in order to deter him, but at the risk of provoking his anger or fear and heightened conflict, or to conciliate him in the hope of reducing sources of conflict, but at the risk of strengthening him and causing him to miscalculate one's own resolve, is a perennial and central dilemma of international relations. A rational resolution of this dilemma depends most of all on an accurate assessment of the long run interests and intentions of the opponent. If his aims are limited, conciliation of his specific grievances may be cheaper than engaging in a power struggle with him. If they are possibly unlimited, the rational choice is to deter him with countervailing power and a resolve to use it.¹⁰⁹

As Snyder and Diesing observe, the choice between coercion and accommodation "is a micro-version of a macro-choice that states often face when dealing with each other over the long term."¹¹⁰ In short, the crisis between two states is often a compressed and highly intensified representation of the problems and differences that face these nations in the long term; the policies they adopt in the crisis often follow the choices they have made over the long run.

Snyder and Diesing appear to be on sound ground in suggesting that in making decisions about what mix of coercion and accommodation to follow in a crisis situation, a nation is well advised to carefully assess the long-run interests and intentions of its opponent. Far too often, as we noted in an earlier chapter, judgments about policy tend to be made on the basis of capabilities rather than on intentions, what we referred to earlier as the "Colonel's fallacy."¹¹¹ While it may be appropriate for military officers at the tactical level to make assessments of their opponent on the basis of what he is capable of doing, people at higher levels (both military and civilian) need to take a more statesmanlike approach and attempt to assess intentions. Unfortunately, too often this is not done or is done inadequately.

In our judgment, then, the Quemoy crisis of 1958 is an important illustration of positive diplomacy, a case in which conciliation and accommodation played a prominent role. Impressive force was an important element in the drama, but it was employed in a fashion that conveyed not only "threat" messages but also messages of

conciliation and “coordination of expectations.” Use of the Seventh Fleet as an instrument of coercion in a manner that conveyed firm but nonprovocative intent was impressive indeed. The conciliatory statements flowing from the Eisenhower administration complemented the messages conveyed by the circumspect deployment of military force. Operating in a highly complex situation involving not only the United States and China but also the Soviet Union, the Nationalist Chinese, skeptical US allies, and an almost equally skeptical domestic audience, Eisenhower and Dulles skillfully tailored their strategy to meet the requirements of the situation.

Notes

1. Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), 18–40.
2. Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 375.
3. *Ibid.*, 376.
4. *New York Times*, 22 August 1958.
5. George and Smoke, 377.
6. Roderick MacFarquhar, *Sino-American Relations, 1949–71* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), 159.
7. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace, 1956–1961* (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1965), 691–93.
8. George and Smoke, 364.
9. “Text of Premier Chou’s Statement on Taiwan Strait,” *New York Times*, 7 September 1958, 2.
10. Jonathan T. Howe, *Multicrisis: Sea Power and Global Politics in the Missile Age* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1971), 239.
11. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), 259–60.
12. *Washington Post*, 7 September 1958, 10.
13. George and Smoke, 365–66.
14. Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973), 453.
15. Eisenhower, 304.

16. Ibid.
17. See, for example, McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years* (New York: Random House, 1988), 279–87.
18. On this point, see Philip M. Williams, *Crisis Management* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1976), 170; and Snyder and Diesing, 260.
19. Williams, 170.
20. Howe, 208.
21. Ibid., 231.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. George and Smoke, 366.
25. A second letter from Khrushchev to Eisenhower on 19 September indicated the USSR might support China with nuclear weapons if necessary. However, this came late in the crisis and was probably more of a propaganda ploy than a serious warning.
26. Ibid., 225–26.
27. Eisenhower, 296.
28. *New York Times*, 26 September 1958, 3.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., 1 October 1958, 3.
31. Howe, 235–36. Howe indicates that in his opinion there really was not such a drastic change in policy beginning on 30 September—that this change had been foreshadowed by statements going back as far as the 1954–55 crisis in the Formosa Strait.
32. Ibid., 224–35.
33. Kenneth T. Young, *Negotiating with the Chinese Communists* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1968), 153.
34. Howe, 225.
35. George and Smoke, 384.
36. A typical example of this is in McGeorge Bundy's new and generally excellent book on choices American leaders have made regarding nuclear weapons in the past 50 years. In discussing the Quemoy crisis, he attributes the great bulk of Eisenhower and Dulles's success in resolving the crisis to their effective use of force, with no small amount of the credit going to the implied and direct threats made by the administration. Virtually no mention is made of the important conciliatory gestures. For example, in discussing Eisenhower's famous speech of 11 September 1958, he mentions the "emphatic warning" content but fails to mention that a significant portion of the speech was devoted to conciliatory gestures and a call for negotiations. Bundy, 279–87.
37. Robert A. Divine, *Eisenhower and the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 155.

38. John L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 160, 196–97.
39. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Cycles of American History* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1986), 392–405.
40. Ibid., 403.
41. Gaddis, 159.
42. Hoopes, 492.
43. In the 1954–55 Formosa Strait crisis, Adm Arthur W. Radford, chairman of the JCS, voted for this strong action, along with Chief of Naval Operations Adm Robert B. Carney and Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Nathan F. Twining. Only Army Chief of Staff Gen Matthew B. Ridgway voted against it. Fortunately, his view was supported by President Eisenhower. Ibid., 265–66, 280.
44. Ibid., 280.
45. Ibid., 279.
46. Ibid., 445.
47. Eisenhower, 299.
48. Ibid., 295.
49. Divine, 67.
50. Ike accepted Chou's offer based on an unofficial broadcast of Chou's proposal over Radio Peking without even waiting for the official version to be released by the PRC government. Young, 153. John Foster Dulles was suspicious of this negotiating move by Chou and offered Ike a reply that was full of threats. Ike rejected it and asked Dulles to prepare a reply that indicated quick acceptance of Chou's suggestion. Stephen A. Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 483.
51. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Dynamics of World Power: A Documentary History of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1945–1973*, vol. 4 (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1973), 249.
52. On this point, see George and Smoke, 384.
53. Schlesinger, *Cycles of American History*, 400.
54. Hoopes, 442.
55. George and Smoke, 384.
56. Williams, 170.
57. Eisenhower, 295.
58. Kenneth Young, 153.
59. Hoopes, 459.
60. *Time* magazine reported in its lead story that Eisenhower was very concerned about adverse public opinion on the Quemoy situation, not only at home but abroad as well. "Policy under Pressure," *Time*, 13 October 1958, 15.
61. Hoopes, 452.
62. We cannot agree with Jonathan Howe that Dulles's 30 September news conference did not represent a substantial change in United States policy.

Although it is true many of the things Dulles mentioned had been mentioned at one time or another over the years, in the context of the 1958 crisis the conciliatory statements by Dulles in the 30 September conference represented a very distinct change in the proportion of "carrot" as opposed to "stick." See Howe, 234–37.

63. Stewart Alsop, "The Story Behind Quemoy: How We Drifted Close to War," *Saturday Evening Post* 231, no. 24 (13 December 1958): 87.

64. Dulles made two speeches not long after the 1958 crisis, one in Cleveland and the other in San Francisco, in which he continued to firmly oppose recognition of Red China or its admission to the United Nations. Hoopes, 458–59.

65. *Ibid.*, 488–89.

66. Stephen A. Ambrose, *The Supreme Commander: The War of General Dwight D. Eisenhower* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1970), 97.

67. John Gunther, *Eisenhower: The Man and the Symbol* (New York: Harper and Row, 1952), 87.

68. Peter Lyon, *Eisenhower: Portrait of the Hero* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1974), 643.

69. Carsten Holbraad, *Superpowers and International Conflict* (New York: Saint Martin's Press, 1979), 46.

70. Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President*, 483.

71. Divine, 64.

72. Gaddis, 193–94.

73. According to Stewart Alsop, the CIA had helped the Nationalist Chinese in their training of spies and planning of spy operations dating back to the early 1950s. The CIA cover organization in Taiwan was called "Western Enterprises." Alsop, 87.

74. Kenneth Young, 113.

75. Chou En-lai apparently remembered this incident with considerable bitterness for many years. Edgar Snow, *The Other Side of the River* (New York: Random House, 1961), 94–95.

76. Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1979), 745–46.

77. For other important gains the PRC probably made as a result of the crisis, see Kenneth Young, 205–6.

78. Kissinger, 746.

79. Joseph H. de Rivera, *The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1968), 165.

80. Kissinger, 744.

81. Hoopes, 457–59.

82. Holbraad, 46.

83. See, for example, the comments on this point by Oran R. Young, *Politics of Force* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), 294.

84. Thomas C. Schelling, *Strategy of Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), 106.
85. *Ibid.*, 196.
86. *Ibid.*, 54, 101.
87. For a discussion on this point and some of the relevant literature citations, see Morton Deutsch, *The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973).
88. David A. Baldwin, "The Power of Negative Sanctions," *World Politics* 24 (October 1971): 32.
89. Oran Young, 123–30.
90. Howe, 185.
91. *Ibid.*, 186.
92. *Ibid.*, 192.
93. *Ibid.*, 186.
94. The US carriers and supporting warships stayed a substantial distance from the offshore islands, usually between 150 and 200 miles away. While this was partly because of concern over possible bombing attacks on American ships by land-based Communist Chinese aircraft, it was also because the United States was conveying a message of restraint. Howe, 168.
95. Williams, 132.
96. Snyder and Diesing, 456.
97. Schelling, 117.
98. *Ibid.*
99. For a good discussion of the desirability of making it very clear to the opponent what it is we wish him to do (and our failure to do so in Vietnam), see Roger Fisher, *International Conflict for Beginners* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 15–56.
100. Robert E. Osgood and Robert W. Tucker, *Force, Order and Justice* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), 151–52.
101. Williams, 171.
102. Schelling, 111.
103. The Soviet position vis-à-vis the PRC was in many respects a "mirror image" of the United States' position vis-à-vis the Nationalist Chinese.
104. Howe, 247.
105. Snyder and Diesing, 249.
106. *Ibid.*, 256–57.
107. *Ibid.*, 262.
108. *Ibid.*, 254.
109. *Ibid.*
110. *Ibid.*
111. Michael MccGwire, "Deterrence: The Problem—Not the Solution," *SAIS Review* 5, no. 2 (Summer–Fall 1985): 110.

Chapter 7

Berlin Crisis of 1958–59

In this chapter we will look at a second crisis that occurred during the Eisenhower administration, the Berlin crisis of 1958–59. In our opinion, it represents an excellent example of the effective use of the carrot and the stick, with the emphasis on the carrot. We will consider the case in considerable detail because, like the Quemoy crisis, it exhibits many characteristics of positive diplomacy.

It is true that the Eisenhower/Dulles policy followed during the 1958–59 Berlin crisis has been subjected to substantial criticism from academics and others. The chief criticism revolved around the perceived failure of the Eisenhower administration to set firm deterrent lines early in the crisis, thereby encouraging misperceptions on both sides. In essence, the criticism boils down to the fact that some critics feel the Eisenhower administration opted too early for an accommodation strategy and then allowed accommodation to become too prominent in the coercion/accommodative mix.

Although such criticism is understandable, especially in light of the fact that the crisis was not permanently settled, we think it fails to take note of a number of short-term and long-term benefits that flowed from the Eisenhower/Dulles policy. Chief among the short-term benefits was the avoidance of what might easily have become a rapidly escalating conflict. In the long term, a valuable precedent was set that helped legitimize, in both American and Soviets eyes, the value of negotiations in settling their disputes.

Before we discuss the Berlin crisis, remember our basic objectives:

1. To illustrate how coercion and accommodation, with emphasis on the latter, have been effectively combined in policies that at least represent significant features of positive diplomacy.

2. To demonstrate how the key variables we have been using for an analytical framework either promoted or hindered the development of positive diplomacy in these situations.

Once again we remind the reader that we fully recognize that none of the actual historical crises we discuss in this book are pure examples of our idealized model of positive diplomacy. But these imperfect examples from the real world are likely of greater value than perfect “models” because they permit us to look not only at the roses but also at the weeds.

The Berlin “Deadline Crisis” of 1958–59

John Lewis Gaddis has described Dulles’s handling of the 1958 Soviet challenge in Berlin as “a textbook demonstration of how combinations of threats and inducements could defuse a crisis.”¹ Faced in November 1958 with Khrushchev’s demand that the Western allies leave Berlin and turn over access control to the East Germans, the United States and its allies responded with a mixture of force and inducements. Although the final result was inconclusive, with neither side emerging the winner and the underlying issues still unresolved, the strategy followed by Eisenhower and Dulles did prevent the outbreak of violence in an extraordinarily sensitive situation.

It is our opinion that the 1958–59 crisis displayed many of the characteristics of positive diplomacy and was particularly noteworthy in one element that contributes to this strategy—the ability to consider the opponent’s *intentions* (as opposed to *capabilities*) and to empathize with him, at least up to a point. This amounts to putting oneself in the other’s shoes, being able to consider the opponent’s vital interests as well as one’s own. Dulles was able to do this to a remarkable degree in the 1958–59 crisis despite his image as a “cold warrior.” As Gaddis put it:

Convinced that the Russians acted out of a sincere if misplaced fear of the West Germans, the secretary of state sought to extend reassurances and even minor concessions through diplomatic channels while at the same time acting to strengthen the Western alliance and reaffirm fundamental Western rights in the divided city.²

Let us now look at the 1958–59 crisis from the perspective of our six selected variables.

Structure of the Situation

The ingredients for a severe crisis over Berlin were present long before the Soviet Union sent the “deadline notes” of 27 November 1958 proposing that negotiations to make Berlin a free city be undertaken. Moscow’s insistence that an “adequate agreement” had to be reached within six months or it would turn control of access to the city over to the East Germans was, in effect, an ultimatum, a demand that Berlin’s “abnormal condition” be corrected.³ In the view of many observers, including Dulles, the Soviets were right—the situation was in fact abnormal. Some 13 years after World War II, four foreign powers occupied a divided city 100 miles deep within the territory of one part of a divided country.

The peculiar political geography, which in most respects favored the Soviet Union, was therefore one important aspect of the situation. After all, Berlin was located deep within the Soviet sphere of influence, and the peculiarities of the situation made it seem reasonable for the Soviets to seek changes in the Berlin status quo.⁴

A second important aspect of the overall situation was Soviet concern over West Germany’s rearmament. Since the first Berlin crisis of 1948–49, the Federal Republic of Germany had been increasingly rearmed and incorporated into NATO, a worrisome development for the Soviets. This, coupled with the fact that by 1958 some 10,000 refugees were fleeing East Germany—the German Democratic Republic (GDR)—each month and arriving

in West Berlin, gave the Soviets good reason for wanting to alter the situation.⁵

The overall picture was further complicated from the Soviet standpoint because of a power struggle within the Kremlin. Khrushchev by 1958 had been fighting internal dissidents within the top echelons of the Soviet government (the so-called antiparty group) for some time. Though scoring some successes against Georgy Malenkov and Nikolay Bulganin, Khrushchev still faced serious opposition from such powerful Soviet leaders as Frol Kozlov and Mikhail Suslov.⁶

One of the major issues dividing the Khrushchev and anti-Khrushchev groups was the question of relations with Communist China. Enmity between the two countries had been growing steadily since 1957 over a variety of issues. While Khrushchev was becoming increasingly disenchanted with the Chinese and was looking for some means to enhance his internal image in the foreign policy area, his opposition favored a "hard line" against the United States and an improvement of relations with China. One result of the Sino-Soviet friction was a somewhat schizophrenic approach by Khrushchev to policy toward the West. On one hand, Khrushchev was interested in what Robert Slusser calls a "resounding symbolic victory over the United States" to enhance his standing internally. On the other hand, he was attracted to possible "deals" with the Americans that might reduce tensions between the two countries. The result in either case, he hoped, would be the ability to reduce armaments and defense expenditures and to devote more resources to the problem-ridden Soviet economy.⁷ Interestingly, Mikhail Gorbachev appears to be following a similar pattern today.

Other important elements of the overall situation were related to strategic nuclear postures in Europe and the United States. In the early part of 1958, the West German government urged the United States to deploy intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the Federal Republic of Germany, a development that understandably alarmed the Soviet Union. However, the US suggestion that these weapons be deployed and NATO's acceptance of this plan had

come about largely because of the Soviet's spectacular success with Sputnik the year before. The Western powers began to fear the Soviets were surpassing them in developing intercontinental missiles. The Soviets, led by Khrushchev himself, played on this fear by encouraging the perception that they were indeed far ahead in the field of strategic arms.⁸

In Washington the Eisenhower administration, led by the fiscally conservative chief executive and his treasury secretary, was making every effort to keep the defense budget at the lowest possible level. Because of budgetary concerns, the administration refused to meet the 1958–59 crisis with significant increases in American conventional capability. Despite the fact that the situation in Berlin did not readily lend itself to the Dullesian concept of "massive retaliation," the Eisenhower administration continued to rely on that increasingly anachronistic doctrine.⁹

The overall situation, then, was characterized by fear and misperceptions on both sides—on the Soviet side by worries over a rearmed West Germany that might threaten the Soviet security buffer in Eastern Europe, and on the American side by a misplaced concern about possible Soviet superiority in strategic nuclear weapons. In effect, then, the 1958–59 Berlin crisis involved far more than the immediate geopolitical problems of the city; it represented a crisis over much broader security interests of both the Soviet Union and the United States. Like the Quemoy crisis earlier that year, it represented a highly volatile situation, with the potential to explode into war. But also like that situation, it contained elements in its overall structure that favored accommodation instead of the use of force.

Both sides had internal domestic reasons for wishing to avoid a contest of force that could conceivably leave them looking less than competent. On the Soviet side, the friction with China tended to argue against overdoing the contest of wills with the Western allies.¹⁰ The fact that the situation in Berlin and Germany was abnormal and was recognized as such by many people in the West was another pressure tending to favor accommodation. As Glenn H. Snyder put it:

In the Cuban [missile] case, the Russian challenge was seen as completely illegitimate by the United States; thus any substantial move toward accommodation would have violated our clear conception of what was "right" and, therefore, was "unthinkable." In the Berlin crisis, on the other hand, the Soviet position and interests were seen to have some degree of legitimacy: the status of West Berlin was abnormal, the whole German situation was awkward, ambiguous, and autonomously productive of conflict, and so on, so that there did appear to be a good deal of shared interest between us and the Communist side in tidying it up by negotiation. Hence an accommodative strategy appeared more appropriate. In this case the president faced a much more difficult choice between his hard- and soft-liners than he did later in Cuba and the actual behavior of the United States in Berlin was an interesting and somewhat uneasy mix between coercive and accommodating tactics, as was the behavior of the Soviet Union as well.¹¹

These factors, coupled with the attitude of such important American allies as Britain who favored negotiation and avoidance of confrontation, tended to favor accommodative approaches. Despite these generally favorable elements in the overall situational structure, however, other important variables had to do their work to bring about a peaceful resolution of the crisis.

Vital Interests and Resolve of the Parties

Both the Soviet Union and the United States were highly motivated during the 1958–59 Berlin crisis, but the Soviets were probably more motivated because of geographical factors and the stakes involved. As Philip Williams has pointed out, the crisis of 1958–59 and the one in 1961 represented in some respects a reaffirmation of the spheres of influence principle.¹² Certainly in 1958 the United States, through Dulles, tacitly and explicitly recognized that the Soviets had legitimate security concerns in Eastern Europe and that the situation in Berlin and Germany was hardly conducive to stability. Thus, there was agreement that at least some change was required; the differences came over the means for effecting change.¹³

The Soviet Union hoped to convince the United States and its allies that it had superior motivation on its side and that

military-geographical factors heavily favored it. As Alexander George and Richard Smoke point out, the Soviets largely failed in this objective because they did not succeed in convincing the Western allies that they were strategically inferior to the Soviets in nuclear response capabilities and that any violence in or around Berlin would only result in a major embarrassment for the United States and its allies. Their failure to convince opponents of their superiority and greater motivation destined the Soviets to come out of the 1958–59 crisis with less than they originally hoped to gain.¹⁴

Although Khrushchev was never able to convince the United States and its allies that the Soviet Union had an asymmetry of motivation in its favor sufficient to force the West to accept Soviet objectives, Dulles and Eisenhower nonetheless recognized that Soviets and East Germans had some legitimate worries. Therefore, the two American leaders demonstrated substantial flexibility in the situation, pressing for negotiations, holding off the “hard-liners” and even proposing some concessions.¹⁵ In this case, Dulles recognized the Soviets had a number of vital and legitimate interests at stake. As we have noted, where both sides have strong interests at stake (symmetrical motivation) and where one or both recognize that the other has legitimate interests and motivation, there is often a strong tendency toward accommodative bargaining. This was the case in both Berlin crises. But whether the situation actually produces accommodative approaches—positive diplomacy—depends to a very substantial degree on other factors as well, including the personalities of key decision makers.

Personalities of Key Decision Makers

One of the more interesting features of the 1958–59 Berlin crisis was the flexibility and conciliatory attitude displayed by that cold warrior among cold warriors, John Foster Dulles. Throughout most of his tenure as secretary of state, Dulles had displayed little inclination to negotiate with the Soviets. Instead he had relied heavily on the policy of containment, preferring to meet the Soviet Union’s expansive pressures with a ring of defensive alliances

around that country. But late in the Eisenhower administration (and as it turned out late in his own life), he suddenly began to display more flexibility in his dealings with the Soviets. This had been evident in the Quemoy crisis of 1958 and was also evident in the Berlin crisis later that same year. However, it is hazardous to read much into this by way of proving that Dulles's views had suddenly become more liberal. Too many other factors were involved in both the Quemoy and Berlin crises, and it is entirely possible that the new Dulles flexibility was simply a reflection of these factors. After all, as Townsend Hoopes has pointed out, Dulles was a masterful and pragmatic tactician and he was perfectly capable of subordinating his strongly held views to the demands of the immediate tactical situation.¹⁶

There is also substantial evidence that, contrary to the popular belief that prevailed for many years, it was Eisenhower and not Dulles who was in control of the overall direction of US foreign policy during the 1950s. Eisenhower kept a relatively low profile and gave Dulles extensive responsibility, but he nevertheless maintained a firm control over major policy decisions.¹⁷ And since a key objective of the president was to reduce tension with the Soviets and go down in history as a "peacemaker," it seems probable that Eisenhower's predisposition toward compromise and negotiation had come more and more to influence Dulles. There were, of course, other factors that influenced Dulles in both crises to pursue a more conciliatory course than his past record would have indicated. Among these, as we have noted, was a very important one—the peculiar structure of the situations. Still, there is little question, in the mind of the author at least, that Eisenhower's flexibility and talent for negotiation and compromise had come to have an increasing influence on Dulles's thinking by 1958.

Regardless of the reasons for the new Dulles flexibility, in the Berlin crisis he did from the start demonstrate the qualities that contribute to positive diplomacy. First of all, Dulles analyzed Soviet intentions (as opposed to capabilities), and he made a sincere effort to understand the motives and interests of the Soviet

Union. As pointed out by numerous analysts, Dulles felt that the Soviets were acting defensively and that their primary concern was the security of their buffer zone in Eastern Europe.¹⁸ The potential transfer of nuclear weapons to West Germany, announced by NATO in late 1957, brought to Soviet minds a frightful picture of a powerful and revanchist German state again poised to strike the motherland. Dulles recognized this and apparently understood that the chief Soviet goal, as pointed out by Adam Ulam, was the neutralization of Germany.¹⁹

Thus, Dulles analyzed the crisis as primarily a political problem rather than a military one and, as Jack Schick has observed, he perceived the crisis “as an excellent opportunity to negotiate improved security for the Soviet Union in exchange for new safeguards guaranteeing the security of the Federal Republic and Berlin.”²⁰ Having reached this estimate of Soviet intentions, Dulles further concluded that a war could best be avoided by signaling a willingness to negotiate. He felt that any major moves in the way of strengthening America’s military forces in Western Europe would simply increase the risk of conflict.²¹ And as subsequent events were to prove, he was prepared to make some concessions. He conveyed this to the Soviets in his “agent theory” (the idea that we might be able to deal with East Germans as agents of the Soviet Union in control of Berlin access points), in his remarks on free elections (in which he indicated some flexibility), and in his willingness to discuss the Soviet proposal of a confederation of the two Germanies (as opposed to reunification).²²

From the beginning of the crisis to the time he was forced to drop out due to illness in the spring of 1959, Dulles was consistent in his approach to the Berlin problem. His statements of determination to defend basic American and allied rights in the city were coupled with a strong and unmistakable emphasis on negotiations. His signals to the Soviets, both tacit and explicit, were intended to convey a message: we will defend our basic rights, but we recognize you also have rights and security problems

and we will work with you to find a political solution to the situation.²³

In their excellent book on deterrence in American foreign policy, Alexander George and Richard Smoke indicate that the failure of Eisenhower and Dulles to respond more rapidly and forcefully to the Berlin challenge issued by Khrushchev in his speech of 10 November may very well have encouraged the Soviets to push the challenge even further, as represented by the ultimatum in the 27 November notes.²⁴ Why the administration did not respond sooner is not entirely clear, although Eisenhower indicates in his memoirs that he did not want to give the Soviets the impression we were "edgy" over Berlin. Moreover, since nothing had yet happened in the way of Soviet infringement of allied rights, Eisenhower saw no reason to act.²⁵

While George and Smoke may be right in their contention that the Soviets would not have pushed their challenge so far if the Eisenhower administration had responded immediately to the warning in Khrushchev's speech of 10 November, the point is clearly unprovable. Possibly they are correct in speculating that "a vigorous declaratory reaffirmation of the very serious American commitment to the city" by the administration would have had a positive effect "at virtually no cost whatsoever."²⁶ However, both Eisenhower and Dulles were sensitive to the Soviet security problem and both viewed Khrushchev as more volatile and therefore more dangerous than Stalin. They were probably also aware of the internal pressures Khrushchev was under. Hence, they wished to avoid any moves that might unnecessarily provoke the Soviet leader. This wish undoubtedly contributed to the administration's decision to ignore Khrushchev's challenge for roughly two weeks and then to adopt a strategy that contained a high conciliatory content.

While Eisenhower and Dulles were basically in favor of an accommodative strategy featuring negotiations, others associated with the administration were taking a different and substantially more hard-line view. Dean Acheson, who at that time headed up the Democratic Advisory Council, viewed Khrushchev's

challenge with great alarm and pushed hard for a rapid buildup of American and allied conventional forces in Europe and a crash program for the production of intercontinental ballistic missiles.²⁷ Support for Acheson's tougher approach came from Gen Lauris Norstad, commander of NATO forces in Europe, and Gen Maxwell Taylor, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Both men supported Acheson's view that conventional forces should be substantially increased.²⁸

Throughout the crisis Eisenhower, intent on holding the line on defense spending, had resisted the call for an increase in US armed forces. Despite intense pressure from such prestigious leaders as Acheson, members of Congress, and a number of his own senior military people, the president steadfastly refused to budge on the issue. This was mainly because of his unwavering desire to economize but also because he was firmly convinced that such an increase would be of little use from the military standpoint. As Eisenhower put it:

Many people seemed to assume that, because Mr Khrushchev had made an announcement, I should abandon my determination to enforce strict economy on defense expenditures. This showed a total lack of understanding of our military problem. If resort to arms should become necessary, our troops in Berlin would be quickly overrun, and the conflict would almost inevitably be global war. For this type of war our nuclear forces were more than adequate. Why so much of our populace has always seemed to feel that our defense would be immediately improved by an increase of a billion dollars or so, or by the quick call-up of a hundred thousand ground troops, has always been beyond my ken. I determined that this crisis should not affect our long-range plans for assuring the defense of America without waste. Indeed, it was always my conviction that one purpose of Khrushchev's manufactured crisis was to frighten free populations and governments into unnecessary and debilitating spending sprees.²⁹

In January 1959 Eisenhower and Dulles disagreed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the military strategy to be followed should the Soviets begin stopping truck convoys after the Soviet "ultimatum" deadline passed on 27 May. The Joint Chiefs favored the use of at least a full division to escort any detained convoys to Berlin, but

Dulles objected on the grounds that the use of such a large force would likely alienate world public opinion. Eisenhower supported Dulles's position, arguing that a force of division size might push the Soviets into an awkward put-up-or-shut-up position, something the president wished to avoid. A much smaller force was designated to perform any probe along the autobahn to Berlin, should that become necessary.³⁰

Throughout the crisis Eisenhower and Dulles continued to keep the force element in a low-profile position, both for economic reasons and because they felt that too much emphasis on military preparations might unnecessarily provoke the Soviet leader. The president did take some relatively minor military measures that he hoped would signal the Soviets in a nonprovocative manner that "we meant business" (for example, sending adequate replacements to bring our units in Europe up to strength).³¹ But the major emphasis of the president and the secretary of state continued to be on negotiations.

In their book *Conflict among Nations*, Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing express the opinion that one result of the Dulles flexibility and conciliatory gestures mentioned earlier was "misperception and mistaken optimism on both sides." According to Snyder and Diesing, the United States misinterpreted Soviet conciliatory gestures as meaning they were "relenting on their Berlin demands and were willing to negotiate about the whole German question." The Soviets "interpreted the acceptance of negotiations and Dulles's apparent flexibility as signs they were making progress toward their own aims." Thus, the result of using a mixed strategy (a mixture of accommodation and coercion) in this case was that both sides interpreted accommodative moves as actual shifts in the opponent's substantive position when in fact this was not the case.³²

Although there were misperceptions on both sides, many of which were clarified at the foreign ministers' conference in the spring and summer of 1959, there is not a strong case for criticizing the accommodative steps taken by both countries. On the contrary, there seems to be good grounds for crediting Dulles and

Eisenhower for helping to defuse the crisis, at least to the extent of avoiding violence. True, the Berlin situation was left unresolved and was to flare again less than two years later. Still, the fact remains that the immediate crisis was met and handled without a war or even an armed skirmish, not an inconsequential result in such a dangerous situation. It is not at all obvious that a less-mixed or less-accommodative strategy would have produced such a nonviolent outcome or would have resulted in fewer misperceptions. Certainly it is questionable, given Khrushchev's volatile personality, that a more coercive strategy would have done as well.

We are more inclined to agree with George and Smoke's assessment of Dulles's strategy:

We see, therefore, that Dulles' response to warning that deterrence might be about to fail was not an attempt to reinforce deterrence by threats or military deployments or alerts, but rather an indication of limited, defined flexibility on the matter at issue. Dulles evidently had concluded that in any case the United States could not prevent the Soviets from transferring traffic management to the East Germans, and hence a signal of flexibility on this issue would, if this were all the Soviets intended, forestall any crisis, and if it were not, at least clarify and emphasize the essential issue in the Western viewpoint, namely, the rights of access to Berlin. He perceived that many possible techniques for reinforcing deterrence on receipt of warning would be at best irrelevant to a low-level politico-diplomatic challenge, and at worst provocative to the opponent, possibly obliging him to take similar measures and thus escalating the crisis. Dulles should therefore be credited with a real sophistication in grasping the limits of deterrence policies and looking for alternatives to threats in trying to ward off a crisis. He also avoided the ever-present temptation to signal one's commitment to oppose *any* change in the status quo; and he substituted instead a differentiated analysis of the national interest, distinguishing which interests could not be compromised in any way and which could be accommodated to the opponent's objectives when his motivation was high, in the interests of peace.³³

George and Smoke criticize Dulles for not clearly and effectively indicating at an early date in the crisis what the vital American interests were, "thus nonprovocatively but credibly reinforcing deterrence."³⁴ Nonetheless, as indicated by the paragraph above, they clearly feel that the basically accommodative

stance adopted by Dulles (with force present but only in low profile) was in most respects the wisest policy under the circumstances. In many ways it represented a policy of positive diplomacy.

The Eisenhower/Dulles policy followed the tenets of positive diplomacy in three fundamental respects: (1) there was a deliberate effort to understand the interests and intentions of the adversary, to put oneself in the opponent's shoes; (2) the use of force was minimal and for the most part was kept at a very low profile, signaling only that there were certain vital interests that the United States would defend if pushed too far; and (3) there was a substantial and continuing emphasis on negotiations.

One must remember also that the Soviets, led by Khrushchev, also displayed the ability to be conciliatory and accommodative during the crisis. Their challenge to American deterrence, as pointed out by George and Smoke, was cleverly constructed and contained sufficient ambiguities to enable them to closely control risks.³⁵ As the crisis developed, they used these ambiguities to be flexible when necessary, as for example when they backed away from the six-month ultimatum. Throughout the crisis Khrushchev used calculated ambiguity and tactical flexibility to keep the West guessing about the relative hardness of the Soviet position. Although the Soviets did not achieve their major objectives in the crisis, they too displayed an impressive ability to employ carrots and sticks in pursuit of political objectives.

Thus, personality factors played a major role in the 1958–59 Berlin crisis and were to a significant extent responsible for the accommodative bargaining that took place. Dulles, for whatever reasons, managed to at least overcome his visceral anti-Soviet feelings temporarily and to conduct a policy that featured conciliation to a significant degree. Eisenhower—with his sound strategic sense, his talent for compromise, and his desire to keep the defense budget down—was also inclined toward caution and conciliation, albeit combined with some firm rhetoric. Khrushchev, though often conveying the image of a reckless gambler, had carefully mounted the kind of challenge that

contained numerous ambiguities and convenient avenues for compromise and outright retreat. Together the personal characteristics of the major players added up to a significant force moving the crisis in the direction of accommodation and compromise. While they did not permanently resolve the crisis or eliminate the underlying problems, they did manage to reach a temporary denouement that averted war and in some respects laid groundwork for a more stable solution in the future.

The Dynamics of the Bargaining Process

The 1958–59 Berlin crisis demonstrated that accommodative steps, combined with firmness on certain key issues, could produce a dynamic process of mutual bargaining that would avoid war. Dulles, convinced from the outset of the crisis that the problem was basically political rather than military, opted for negotiations from the beginning.³⁶ His earliest offering of a concession came in a press conference on 26 November when he hinted that the Western allies might agree to deal with East German guards at the access points to Berlin as agents of the Soviet Union. Although this came too late to affect the tone of the Soviet notes of 27 November (and while the idea was never accepted by President Eisenhower and eventually was dropped),³⁷ there is reason to believe that this early indication of American flexibility was helpful in inducing Soviet flexibility as the crisis moved along. By setting a tone early in the crisis that emphasized flexibility and a desire to negotiate, Dulles had psychologically begun to undermine Soviet and East German truculence and to encourage greater responsiveness from that side.

Although the strong Soviet notes of 27 November and its six-month deadline ultimatum prompted Dulles to reevaluate the situation, he did not change his opinion of Soviet intentions nor his emphasis on conciliation. On 30 November he proposed to the president that any Western reply should emphasize a readiness to negotiate.³⁸ At the NATO Ministerial Council meeting on 15 December, he convinced many of his NATO colleagues that

negotiations should be stressed in replying to the Soviet demands. His success was evident in the replies sent from Washington and the other NATO-member capitals on 31 December, all of them emphasizing negotiations and for the most part ignoring the ultimatum contained in the 27 November Soviet notes.³⁹

The Western replies not only ignored the ultimatum provision in the Soviet deadline note but also many other provisions of the long document, including the Soviet demand that Berlin be made a "free city." The replies were structured in such a way as to make it relatively easy for the Soviets to back away from some of the demands made in the 27 November notes. The heavy emphasis on the Western interest in "broad negotiations" provided a means for the Soviets to be flexible in their reply.⁴⁰

In early January Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan visited the United States. Dulles interpreted this as a signal that the Soviets were sincerely interested in negotiations. Accordingly, in his 13 January press conference, Dulles took another conciliatory step when he indicated that free elections might not be "the only method by which reunification could be accomplished," a definite signal of flexibility from the Western side.⁴¹ On his return to Moscow a short time later, Mikoyan responded to this flexibility with a Soviet concession, announcing that the six-month deadline was really not all that important in the overall situation. The Eisenhower administration, interpreting this as a Soviet conciliatory signal, responded in a news conference on 27 January during which Dulles indicated that the West might consider some form of German confederation. Since this was a position heretofore always opposed by the United States and its allies, this was a dramatic signal to the Soviets that the West was prepared to go a substantial distance to reach a compromise solution.⁴²

During this period, November through February, Eisenhower and Dulles's stress on negotiations and their refusal to emphasize military threats produced a series of reciprocating responses that helped move the adversaries toward a compromise. Clearly, a bargaining process stimulated by accommodative rather than

threatening gestures was helping the two sides find a means to resolve the situation short of war.

We do not need to consider in detail all the reciprocal conciliatory moves that took place during the remainder of the crisis. The Eisenhower administration continued to emphasize negotiations and at the same time tried to build a consensus among the Western allies favoring the conciliatory approach. During the early months of 1959, Dulles managed to convince the key Western nations to follow a conciliatory path, though Charles de Gaulle of France and Konrad Adenauer of West Germany were not enthusiastic about this approach.⁴³ The labors of Dulles and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan of Great Britain finally resulted in a four-power foreign ministers meeting in May. This proved inconclusive since the Soviets were really more interested in a summit meeting between Eisenhower and Khrushchev, a goal they had been working toward in secret high-level contacts with the Eisenhower administration since at least December 1958.⁴⁴

Several authors claim that the Soviets and Americans both chose to perceive their adversary's concessions as confirming what they themselves *wished* to believe (in several instances leading to incorrect interpretations).⁴⁵ Although this may be true, the fact remains that the dynamics of the bargaining process—with concessions stimulating counterconcessions—were nonetheless moving the confrontation away from a violent resolution. A final solution to the Berlin problem was not attained, but there is little evidence to suggest the hard-line approach advocated by Acheson and de Gaulle would have produced a better result. On the contrary, there is considerable reason to believe the reverse may have been true.⁴⁶ Thus, we think the 1958–59 crisis represents a case in which the Eisenhower administration properly applied many of the principles of positive diplomacy. The adroit utilization of concessions and flexibility to promote a tension de-escalating spiral was a prominent and salutary feature of this diplomacy.

Success in Communication

Judgments as to the effectiveness of communication between the superpowers in the 1958–59 Berlin crisis depend on the perspective from which one views the crisis. George and Smoke, viewing it from the perspective of the United States deterring the Soviets, judge communication as not very effective. They believe the failure of the Eisenhower administration to signal the Soviets immediately after the Khrushchev speech of 10 November that the United States regarded their threats with extreme concern may have encouraged the Soviets and East Germans to proceed more boldly. Even after mid-November, and in spite of Soviet obstruction of US Army convoys to Berlin, the administration had made no strong statements on the crisis.⁴⁷

When the administration did reply in a news conference on 26 November, it was with a policy of flexibility emphasizing the West's willingness to negotiate. Dulles, convinced Khrushchev was acting defensively and well aware of Western conventional weakness, signaled the Soviet Union that the United States was sensitive to legitimate Soviet security needs.⁴⁸ Dulles and Eisenhower clearly reacted slowly to the Soviet challenge and with great caution because they recognized that attempting to upgrade deterrence through military threats might well escalate the crisis by provoking Khrushchev. They therefore chose to communicate with the Soviets utilizing a policy of accommodation and negotiation and stressing the fact that the United States was aware of their concerns.

Later in the crisis the administration, with minimal but clear use of military force, signaled to the Soviets that the United States did not intend to be intimidated in the situation. It is important to remember, however, that the military steps taken by the Eisenhower administration, such as bringing units up to strength in West Germany and conducting carrier exercises in the Mediterranean, were relatively low-key measures.⁴⁹ Combined with the emphasis on negotiations, two messages were signaled to the Soviets: the United States was capable of a strong military response if provoked too far, and the United States regarded the

situation as primarily a political problem and not a military one. Thus, US military force was used effectively for signaling purposes—enough to signal determination but not enough to be provocative.

Moreover, the military signals were almost always accompanied by conciliatory signals. For example, Eisenhower's television address to the nation on 16 March 1959 contained firm signals regarding America's ability to bring strategic power to bear on the crisis, but it placed an even greater emphasis on our desire for negotiations.⁵⁰

In general, then, the communication in the 1958–59 crisis was quite good on both sides. The Soviets, through careful control of each successive stage of the crisis, effectively signaled their basically defensive and limited aims. By drawing back at key junctures (for example, dropping the six-month ultimatum), they effectively signaled flexibility and a desire for accommodation. There were, of course, some communication "glitches" in the crisis, an example being Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy's failure to accurately transmit to Khrushchev the preconditions Eisenhower had set for a visit to the United States by the Soviet premier.⁵¹ In general, however, the two adversaries communicated well enough to keep the crisis from ever reaching the violence level. Thus, as in the 1958 Quemoy crisis, effective communication at both the explicit and tacit levels was an essential factor in making positive crisis diplomacy work.

Relative Military Capabilities and Their Use

The Soviets clearly had conventional military superiority on their side in the 1958–59 Berlin crisis. Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Western allies were painfully conscious of this fact. Furthermore, Khrushchev made every effort to convince his opponents that he also possessed strategic superiority as a result of Soviet technological advances following the Sputnik success of the previous year. George and Smoke observe that his failure in this latter effort made the attainment of the Soviet key objectives impossible.⁵²

For a variety of reasons, Eisenhower rejected vigorous use of even limited force. Like his secretary of state, the president saw the Soviet challenge as primarily a political rather than a military challenge. He firmly rejected the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the United States be prepared to send a full division up the autobahn to Berlin if the East Germans attempted to stop allied convoys after the deadline date of 27 May. Eisenhower believed that such a large force would be provocative yet ineffective militarily against the much larger Soviet forces. Instead, he opted for a much smaller probe, probably an armed convoy, to be used only as a last resort if all other measures failed.⁵³

The record indicates that Eisenhower was probably prepared to risk nuclear war to defend Berlin if necessary. However, he was acutely conscious that, for geographical reasons as well as relative military capabilities, the West was in a weak position. Moreover, like Dulles he had a certain amount of empathy for the Soviet assertion that the Berlin situation was "abnormal." (He himself had opposed the postwar arrangement splitting Berlin into four occupation zones deep within East Germany.)⁵⁴ With his ability to look objectively at his opponent's goals, his long experience in military matters, and his innate caution, Eisenhower saw every reason to proceed slowly. And he was convinced that diplomacy and negotiations offered the most promising course of action. As Eisenhower put it:

Our approach was cautious, controlled, and I was confident it was correct. We were trying to give the Soviets every opportunity to be reasonable without humiliation but we were keeping our powder dry.⁵⁵

Insofar as the use of military force was concerned in the 1958–59 crisis, Eisenhower's basic strategy was to recognize geographical and political realities and avoid any moves that would challenge local Soviet superiority on the ground, to emphasize Western strategic nuclear capabilities but with an ambiguity that would leave the Soviets guessing as to his ultimate intentions, to use modest conventional military preparations sufficient to indicate a quiet determination to defend Berlin but not on a scale that might

be provocative (he employed such modest military steps in May 1959 on the eve of the foreign ministers conference),⁵⁶ and to continue to emphasize through various signals a reluctance to use either nuclear or conventional force but a willingness to use it if pushed too far. Eisenhower skillfully signaled this through both actions and verbal statements such as his refusal in March to abandon a planned 30,000-man reduction in American armed forces while at the same time quietly bringing US ground units in Europe up to full strength.⁵⁷

While the nuclear and conventional military strength of the two parties in the crisis was certainly a factor, it was considerably less important than it might have been had the adversaries interpreted the situation differently than they did. Eisenhower and Dulles, seeing the probe as basically a political problem, weighted their response in the direction of diplomacy and negotiation with force playing a secondary role. The Soviets followed suit.

Throughout the crisis, of course, both parties tried from time to time to impress their opponent with their military capabilities. This was particularly true of the Soviets, who attempted very hard to get across the idea that their newly acquired strategic nuclear forces made them equal or even superior to the West. In this they largely failed, a factor that was in no small part responsible for preventing them from achieving major gains from the crisis.

Despite the fact that relative military strength did play a role in the crisis, it seems to have been more important as a negative element than as a positive force. As George and Smoke point out, the Soviets probably saw the value of their challenge as a “political threat” that remained a threat—useful as long as it provided a threatening presence but counterproductive if it was forced to become a military actuality.⁵⁸ From the Soviet perspective, the West hopefully would recognize Soviet conventional superiority in and around Berlin, would judge the Soviets to be at least equal in strategic nuclear power, and would conclude that a compromise solution was in order. This is what happened to some extent, but not to the extent the Soviets had planned and not as a result of Soviet military power only.

The Eisenhower administration, and especially Dulles and Eisenhower himself, recognized early in the crisis that military force could not be advantageously used by either party. True, the Soviets had overwhelming local conventional superiority, but to have used it coercively would have immediately cost them the support of many in Europe and the West who viewed their complaints about Berlin with some sympathy. (We have already noted this included even Dulles and Eisenhower to some degree.) The Soviets recognized this fact and acted with great circumspection, as did the United States and its Western allies. In fact, there seems to have been an early tacit understanding between the parties that while each might occasionally proclaim its firm determination and even move troops and ships about, the hard truth was that the situation was political and required diplomatic solutions, not military action.

Thus, neither party in the crisis could be sure of its overall military superiority, a fact that undoubtedly encouraged the adversaries to seek solutions via the politico-diplomatic route. In that sense, relative military capabilities were important but probably not as critical as other factors.

Evaluating the 1958–59 Berlin Crisis

As we have observed throughout this chapter, the policy followed by Eisenhower and Dulles during the 1958–59 Berlin crisis has been criticized by numerous observers. Primarily it has been criticized on the grounds that by choosing to emphasize negotiations and a desire for accommodation early in the crisis and by failing to take a strong deterrent posture, the United States led the Soviets to believe it would compromise on things it had no intention of compromising on. This, in the opinion of some critics, led to a prolongation of the crisis and a new crisis two years later.⁵⁹

We do not see it this way. On the contrary, we agree with John Gaddis that the Eisenhower/Dulles handling of the 1958–59 Berlin problem was “a textbook demonstration of how combinations of

threats and inducements could defuse a crisis.” Gaddis observes that one of the underlying motivations in the strategy was, as Eisenhower put it, “to try to get Khrushchev committed to negotiations as a principle in the conduct of our relations.”⁶⁰ Through its actions in the crisis and such subsequent diplomatic contacts as the 1959 Camp David talks, the Eisenhower administration made substantial progress in doing just that. Gaddis states that these talks

served to legitimize the idea that negotiations could be undertaken without risking the unraveling of alliances or the appearance of appeasement . . . no inconsiderable legacy for Eisenhower’s successor, whose opportunities for negotiations with the Russians were greater, but whose base of support, both at home and overseas, was considerably more precarious than the universally popular “Ike’s” had been.⁶¹

As we have repeatedly noted, Dulles and Eisenhower displayed many of those attitudes and actions that we have identified as important in promoting diplomacy. First, from the early stages of the crisis they were able to empathize with their opponent and to take note of their problems and interests. Second, they were able to accurately discern that the challenge was basically political, not military, and that a vigorous military response would likely lead only to an escalation of the crisis. Third, having accurately ascertained the basic nature of the crisis, they moved to emphasize the *common interests* of the adversaries—the key one, of course, being the avoidance of nuclear war. Fourth, realizing that deterrence based on threats and military force alone was an inadequate response in a complicated political situation, they searched for ways to convince the Soviets that negotiations and diplomacy offered the most promising prospects for *both* parties. In short, while protecting American and Western interests, they looked for inducements that would keep the Soviets moving on a negotiating track. Finally, recognizing their own weak geographical and military positions (as well as the political nature of the crisis), they refused to use military force in a provocative way. Instead, military force was used with restraint, communicating that the United States was very reluctant to use force and

regarded it as less important than political measures, but if pushed too far, the United States was prepared to defend its vital interests.

Of the six variables we have been using as a framework from which to view positive diplomacy, it would appear once again (as was true in the Quemoy crisis) that the structure of the situation and the personalities of the decision makers were the key elements moving the adversaries toward a policy of positive diplomacy. The Berlin situation was abnormal, the geography unfavorable (from the Western point of view), and the military prospects for both parties unappealing. All these factors tended to push the parties toward negotiations and some sort of compromise.

The vital interests and relative resolve of the parties also played an important role. Although the Soviets tried hard to establish superior motivation, they never really succeeded in convincing the United States and the West. Thus, the situation developed into one of symmetrical bargaining power; that is, one where the adversaries *perceive* their resolve as roughly equal. In such situations, as pointed out by Snyder and Diesing, both parties are reluctant to use pure coercion because such a strategy is too risky.⁶² Some combination of accommodation and coercion is usually therefore required, and if the peculiar structure of the situation is volatile because of certain factors such as geography and domestic political problems, the forces pushing the parties toward accommodation may be very strong.

But here enters the very important factor of personality. While the forces pushing in the direction of accommodation are strong in symmetrical bargaining situations, the potential for miscalculation and the outbreak of violence is great. In such cases, the personalities of the decision makers become increasingly critical because their maturity, judgment, and "world view" become key factors in determining whether their nations will use coercion or accommodation. In actual practice, of course, there is normally a mix of the two but with one or the other somewhat dominant.

Fortunately, in the Berlin crisis of 1958–59 Dwight Eisenhower was firmly in control, ably assisted by the pragmatic Dulles. Eisenhower's international sophistication, his caution, his talent

for compromise, and his desire to reduce the tension of the cold war⁶³ were blended with Dulles's pragmatic diplomatic skills and newfound ability to empathize with Soviet security concerns in Europe. This combination produced a policy that wisely met the pressured and anxious Khrushchev with what he clearly wanted most—negotiations to increase his prestige at home and vis-à-vis the increasingly troublesome Chinese.

As a result of the personality factor, success in communication was achieved, though perhaps not to the extent one might have desired. And because Eisenhower, Dulles, and Khrushchev all displayed flexibility and restraint, the dynamics of the bargaining process exerted a salutary influence on the crisis. Military capabilities played a less important role, partly because of the structure of the situation but also in no small part because the key personalities chose to exercise firm restraint in that area.

Later events would, of course, tarnish what had been achieved in the 1958–59 crisis. The U-2 incident destroyed any further progress that might have been made by Eisenhower and Khrushchev at their Paris summit meeting in May 1960. Thereafter Soviet policy became increasingly bellicose, and the world was faced in the following two years with another nerve-wracking crisis in Berlin and an even more wrenching episode in Cuba. Still, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the world weathered both these acute crises, and by 1963 a new *détente* had begun to emerge. True, it would not last and would be besieged by new crises, but these too would be safely resolved. As John Gaddis has aptly pointed out, a substantial share of credit for the fact that these later crises were successfully met must go to Eisenhower and Dulles. Their policies and actions in the 1958–59 crisis did indeed serve “to legitimize the idea that negotiations were an appropriate means of dealing with Moscow, and that they could be undertaken without risking the unraveling of alliances or appearance of appeasement.”⁶⁴

Notes

1. John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 196.

2. Ibid.

3. The Soviet notes of 27 November 1958 specifically portrayed the Berlin situation as "abnormal." See Jack M. Schick, *The Berlin Crisis, 1958–1962* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963), 15.

4. It was clear to the Western powers that large segments of world opinion would sympathize with the Soviet view that the Berlin situation was abnormal and needed to be changed. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), 269.

5. Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 394–95.

6. Robert M. Slusser, "The Berlin Crises of 1958–59 and 1961," in Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force without War: U. S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978), 366.

7. Ibid.

8. Schick, 8–10.

9. Slusser, 362–63.

10. As Adam Ulam points out, the Soviets were undoubtedly concerned that their conflict with China would become public knowledge relatively soon. They very likely felt that when it did become public they would lose some of their bargaining leverage against the United States. Ulam notes that this was very likely one important reason why the Soviets imposed the six-month deadline in the 27 November note. Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917 to 1973* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publisher, 1968), 620–21.

11. Glenn H. Snyder, "Crisis Bargaining," in *International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research*, ed. George F. Hermann (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1972), 254.

12. Philip M. Williams, *Crisis Management* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1976), 162.

13. Schick, 30–40.

14. Despite the fact the Soviets did not achieve all they had hoped for in the way of major gains, they did achieve some important objectives, including pressuring the West into negotiations over Berlin, a Khrushchev trip to the United States, and a summit meeting with Eisenhower. George and Smoke, 402, 411.

15. Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973), 466–69.
16. *Ibid.*, 459.
17. Robert A. Divine, *Eisenhower and the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 19–23.
18. See, for example, George and Smoke, 408; and Schick, 30.
19. Ulam speculates that the Soviets would likely have been ready to settle for a firm pledge that West Germany would not receive nuclear weapons. Ulam, 620.
20. Schick, 30.
21. George and Smoke, 408.
22. Schick, 40.
23. George and Smoke, 408.
24. *Ibid.*, 405–6.
25. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1965).
26. George and Smoke, 405–6.
27. Slusser, 374.
28. *Ibid.*, 375.
29. Eisenhower, 336.
30. *Ibid.*, 340–41.
31. *Ibid.*, 340.
32. Snyder and Diesing, 269–70.
33. George and Smoke, 409.
34. *Ibid.*
35. *Ibid.*, 402–3.
36. Schick, 33.
37. Eisenhower, 337.
38. *New York Times*, 1 December 1958, 1.
39. Schick, 34–36.
40. *Ibid.*, 36.
41. *Ibid.*, 37.
42. *Ibid.*, 38–39.
43. *Ibid.*, 55.
44. Slusser, 371.
45. See, for example, Snyder and Diesing, 270.
46. There is considerable evidence Khrushchev had locked himself into a difficult position on Berlin and was being heavily criticized by both the Chinese and his adversaries at home. A confrontational policy by the West would very likely have increased his anxiety and increased the risk the Soviet leader might act rashly. See Schick, 238–39.
47. George and Smoke, 406–7.
48. *Ibid.*, 408.

49. Slusser, 377.
50. Ibid., 375.
51. Divine, 137.
52. George and Smoke, 395–96, 402.
53. Eisenhower, 340–41.
54. Ibid., 335.
55. Ibid., 342.
56. Slusser, 377.
57. Ibid., 374, 377.
58. George and Smoke, 400.
59. See, for example, *ibid.*, 406–9; Schick, 236–37; and Snyder and Diesing, 270.
60. Gaddis, 196.
61. Ibid.
62. Snyder and Diesing, 262.
63. An interesting analysis of the effects of personality traits on Eisenhower's presidency (as well as those on other presidents) is contained in James David Barber, *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977).
64. Gaddis, 196.

Chapter 8

Berlin Crisis of 1961

The two cases we have examined thus far—the Quemoy crisis and the Berlin crisis of 1958–59—represent situations where sticks and carrots were used quite successfully. In many respects, the handling of these situations approaches our ideal model of positive diplomacy. Now we will examine another case—the Berlin crisis of 1961, where positive diplomacy was employed to some extent (particularly in the latter stages of the confrontation) but where an overemphasis on the coercive aspects caused the case to deviate substantially from our model.

The Continuing Crisis

The Berlin crises of 1958–59 and 1961 can be viewed as one continuing crisis, a crisis marked by two phases, one under the Republican administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower, the other under the Democratic administration of John F. Kennedy. Because it was a continuing crisis basically over the same issues, the two phases had numerous similarities. At the same time, however, there were significant differences and these are important as we analyze the situations from the standpoint of positive diplomacy.

The similarities are quite evident. Basically the fundamental issues in dispute were the same, the military and geographical constraints were much the same, and the cast of characters in Europe and the Soviet Union was largely unchanged.¹

There were, however, significant differences. First of all, the problem of refugees fleeing from the German Democratic Republic (GDR) to West Berlin, a major concern to the East Germans and Soviets in 1958, had become a virtual crisis by 1961.²

Second, the international environment had grown more complex. For example, the Sino-Soviet conflict, which was beginning to smolder in 1958, had broken into a full-blown flame by 1961. This may well have increased East Germany's bargaining leverage with Khrushchev, since the Soviet leader was apparently sensitive about the GDR's relatively friendly relations with the Communist Chinese.³ Third, most of the cast of characters on the American governmental side had changed in 1961; a young Democratic president with new ideas about national strategy and the economy succeeded an aging Republican president with essentially cautious and conservative views. A fourth difference was the fact that the strategic nuclear balance, which had been *perceived* as increasingly favoring the Soviets in the years from 1958 to 1961 (the so-called missile gap), was gradually recognized to be an incorrect perception. While the Soviet-sponsored fiction that the USSR had strategic nuclear superiority persisted during the first stages of the 1961 crisis, by the early fall American intelligence reports demonstrated that this was indeed a misperception and that in actual fact the United States was strategically superior.⁴ Finally, while the overall international environment surrounding the two Berlin crises was quite unstable in both cases, it was very likely more unstable during the 1961 crisis, a point we will consider in greater detail later.⁵

From our standpoint, the most significant difference between the 1958–59 and 1961 phases of the Berlin crisis was the fact that military force was a far more active “player” in the latter phase. When faced at the Vienna meeting of 3–4 June 1961 with Khrushchev's renewed threat on Berlin (essentially raising the same issues as in the 1958–59 crisis), Kennedy was caught off guard. He had anticipated a renewed crisis on Berlin during 1961 but did not expect Khrushchev to spring it so soon. Given the new Soviet ultimatum (threatening to sign a separate peace treaty with the East Germans if the Berlin problem was not satisfactorily resolved in six months), Kennedy faced the difficult questions that usually confront a statesman in a crisis situation: Should I emphasize firmness and coercion or flexibility and accommo-

dation? Or should I use a mixture of the two? And if I choose the latter option, what should the mixture be?

In the final analysis, Kennedy chose to follow a two-track path that emphasized both military force and negotiations but with the coercive aspects considerably stronger than they had been during the 1958 phase of the crisis. Thus, force was employed in a substantially higher profile than it had been under Eisenhower (and as called for by our model of positive diplomacy). There were reasons for the mixture of force and accommodation chosen by the young president, and it is useful to consider these in light of our six variables.

Structure of the 1961 Situation

As we have noted, the overall structure of the situation was similar in many respects to 1958–59. However, there were important differences. The increased flow of refugees from East Germany had made the situation even more serious from the Soviet and East German standpoint. A new and untried American president, one suffering the ignominy of the botched Bay of Pigs operation, was in the White House. And from the standpoint of the Soviet premier, the pressure from the increasingly troublesome Chinese had grown even more intense.⁶ The net effect of the overall situation was to increase the White House's sense of urgency to find a solution to the Berlin problem.

Vital Interests and Resolve

In the matter of vital interests and resolve, we agree with Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke's contention that the Soviets were undoubtedly at least initially more motivated than the United States and the Western allies.⁷ This was partly due to the intensity of the refugee flow, partly to Soviet recognition that their supposed strategic superiority would soon be exposed, and partly to genuine Soviet fears about China and about West German rearmament. The United States and the West were also highly

motivated, in no small part because they had made the Berlin issue a major matter by virtue of their stand in the 1958–59 crisis. In addition, the new administration of President Kennedy felt a strong need to show the world it was not weak and vacillating in the face of Soviet power. Still, on balance the Soviets and East Germans appear to have been initially more motivated than their adversaries, and the course of events in the crisis indicates both parties recognized this fact. (Certainly the building of the Berlin Wall on 13 August and the Western acceptance of this reality would indicate this was the case.)

We are thus inclined to agree with the analysis made by George and Smoke that the Berlin crisis of 1961 was, in the earlier stages, one of asymmetrical motivation and resolve and that both parties recognized Soviet–East German motivation was greater (though the West probably still underestimated Soviet resolve). However, as the crisis deepened during August and September of 1961, Kennedy’s strong coercive moves (including a conventional military buildup) apparently made the Soviets think they had underestimated the young president’s resolve.⁸ Thus, as the crisis moved along, the Soviets likely increasingly perceived the American resolve as much stronger than they had originally anticipated. This fact, coupled with the American perception that the Soviet–East German motivation was even stronger than it had been in 1958–59, made for a situation in which each side perceived the resolve and motivation of the other as nearly equal to its own—a situation of symmetrical bargaining power.

Here it is important to recall that bargaining power between two adversaries depends not just on the actual assets available to each but on the estimate each makes of the other’s resolve. For example, once “A” makes an estimate of the resolve of its opponent “B,” it can compare that estimate with what it perceives as its own level of resolve. “A” then has a perception of its *relative* bargaining power. Meanwhile, “B” has gone through the same process and developed a perception of its own relative bargaining power. In cases where both adversaries estimate the other party’s resolve as close to or equal to its own, there is a strong potential for

accommodation and resolution of the crisis, although this may not always be the result. In cases where one party badly underestimates the interests and resolve of its opponent, there is, of course, a strong potential for conflict.⁹

Thus, the 1961 crisis seems to have been a situation characterized by perceptions of asymmetrical resolve (and consequently asymmetrical bargaining power) in the early stages, developing later into a situation more symmetrical in terms of resolve and bargaining power. The fact that the perceptions of both parties regarding the relative resolve of the other were changeable during the earlier phases made the situation more tense and dangerous than the earlier phase of the crisis had been. This was reflected, of course, in the many military moves by both parties.¹⁰

The Personality Factor

As in the other cases we have examined, the personalities of the decision makers were a critical and pivotal factor in the 1961 phase of the Berlin crisis. Khrushchev behaved much the same as he had in the earlier phase—alternating bluster, threats, and bullying with periodic efforts to reach a negotiated settlement. All the while, the Soviet leader maintained a tight control over the risks involved and exercised extreme caution.¹¹ It was the Kennedy role that, in our opinion, was the most interesting from the standpoint of personality.

Several “drives” or factors influenced John F. Kennedy in the 1961 crisis: a strong drive to avoid any appearance of weakness; a strong commitment to negotiated solutions; a well-developed ability to empathize with an opponent, to put himself in the adversary’s shoes; and a conviction that this is a diverse, imperfect world and that perfect solutions to problems can rarely be found.

Of these, probably the key element that influenced the Kennedy administration was the desire to avoid any appearance of weakness. As John Gaddis has observed:

What the Kennedy and Johnson administrations came to fear most, one gathers, was not communism, which was too fragmented, or the Soviet

Union, which was too committed to détente, or even China, which was too impotent, but rather the threat of embarrassment, of humiliation, of *appearing to be weak* [emphasis added].¹²

As a result of this great concern about appearing weak, it became doubly important to demonstrate resolve and determination. As Gaddis puts it, "This showed in a tendency to turn crises first into public tests of strength, and only then to pursue negotiations: the pattern was the same on Laos, Berlin, nuclear testing, and Soviet missiles in Cuba."¹³

Kennedy hoped to follow this two-phase strategy of first demonstrating resolve and determination, convincing Khrushchev he would not back down in defending Western rights in Berlin and then moving on to negotiations. Unfortunately, from Kennedy's perspective, he was not able to follow the schedule he had in mind for each phase, partly because of Soviet actions, partly because of domestic pressures.

Kennedy received conflicting advice within the administration from a hard-line group of advisers (led by Dean Acheson, Paul Nitze, Gen Maxwell Taylor, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and a soft-line group (led by Adlai Stevenson, Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, Averell Harriman, and Charles ("Chip") Bohlen, plus Senators William J. Fulbright and Mike Mansfield).

The hard-liners insisted that the Soviets were engaged in offensive actions and that only strong deterrent actions (including a military buildup) would prevent them from humiliating the Western powers. Negotiations and other signs of flexibility would only encourage the Soviets to make greater demands. The so-called soft-liners, on the other hand, saw the Soviet actions as primarily defensive in nature and considered military preparations as counterproductive if undertaken before diplomatic efforts were exhausted.¹⁴

Following the two-track approach of trying to first appear strong and at a later point flexible, Kennedy accepted advice from both the hard-liners and the soft-liners. From the Acheson group he accepted the idea that a military buildup should take place—in fact, one had been going on since the spring—and from the Stevenson

“conciliators” he accepted the idea that negotiations should be undertaken.¹⁵

In his very useful history of the 1961 Berlin crisis, Jack Schick is critical of Kennedy for his use of the two-track approach. In Schick’s view, Kennedy’s emphasis on both a military buildup and negotiations was a mistake; he simply “risked garbling the message he wanted Moscow to hear.”¹⁶ In essence, Schick favored Acheson’s hard-line approach—“leading with a quarantine on Khrushchev’s ambitions and reserving negotiations as a way out.”¹⁷ As Schick put it, “The political costs of negotiating and the benefits of not negotiating were inadequately considered.”¹⁸

Despite our admiration for Schick’s book, we cannot agree with his conclusion that Kennedy emphasized negotiations too much and too soon. After careful study, our conclusion is that, if anything, Kennedy, anxious to prove his resolve, overemphasized military preparations and underemphasized the negotiating track too long. For example, in his pivotal television address to the nation on 25 July, the president talked about negotiations, but the part of the speech receiving the most attention was a call for extensive military preparations, including substantial increases in the defense budget and manpower, accelerated draft calls, the call-up of reserve units, and even new civil defense measures. He rejected Acheson’s call for proclamation of a national emergency, but otherwise the speech was a sobering message with a strong and, to the Soviets at least, very threatening content.¹⁹

The speech infuriated Khrushchev, who apparently regarded it as an attempt to intimidate him. John McCloy, Kennedy’s special representative for US-Soviet disarmament talks, happened to be with Khrushchev at the time he received word of the president’s speech. According to McCloy, Khrushchev considered the US partial mobilization and the speech “a virtual declaration of war.”²⁰

There can be no doubt that Kennedy’s fear of appearing weak was a driving force behind the militant-sounding speech. In his mind, it was essential that the Soviets be convinced that he could not be pushed around anymore than could Eisenhower. This point

had to be gotten across to Khrushchev *before* Kennedy felt he could pursue open negotiations.

Still, it is clear that Kennedy favored negotiations from the early stages of the crisis.²¹ He faced serious difficulties in moving rapidly in this area, not only because of domestic hard-liners but also because of resistance on the part of some allies opposed to negotiations, particularly France and West Germany (Britain was in favor of negotiations).²² Despite these obstacles, however, Kennedy was determined to move ahead on the diplomatic front as soon as he had satisfactorily demonstrated his resolution.

An important Kennedy personality trait was evident in his desire to "lean forward" on negotiations.²³ According to numerous observers, including Llewellyn Thompson (US ambassador to the Soviet Union), the president had a well-developed ability to put himself in his adversary's shoes, to empathize with his legitimate problems.²⁴ As Walter W. Rostow (a Kennedy administration assistant secretary of state) put it, "He had an enormous sense of the position of other human beings and a gift for projecting himself into their circumstances."²⁵ Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing point out that Kennedy was "somewhat empathetic" with the Soviet position during the Berlin crisis, not wishing to "seem intransigent about negotiations" and being "willing to accommodate on less essential matters."²⁶

Another important factor motivating Kennedy in the direction of negotiations was the opinions offered by respected Sovietologists like ambassadors Thompson and Harriman. They believed Khrushchev's aims were limited and primarily defensive, centering around a desire to improve the Communist security position in Eastern Europe. They did not believe the Soviet leader's objectives included a desire to humiliate the United States.²⁷ Throughout the crisis Kennedy was receptive to their views because he respected these men who knew the Soviet Union intimately.

Despite Kennedy's natural inclination toward negotiation and accommodation, the president continued to be driven by what he perceived as a need to prove himself strong and resolute in the face

of the Soviet challenge. This need, coupled with his sincere belief that the nation's defense structure had atrophied under Eisenhower, led Kennedy to call for substantial increases in the defense budget in the winter and spring of 1961 before the new phases of crisis actually began. The Soviets, of course, responded to the American buildup with increases in their own defense establishment. Thus was set in motion an action-reaction-counterreaction military cycle that was to confront Kennedy throughout the crisis. He would later speculate that his efforts to reinforce deterrence by the military buildup in early 1961 might have been counterproductive in that it may have encouraged the Soviets to take a harder position. There is evidence that this may indeed have been the case.²⁸

Whatever the truth of this latter point, the influence of personality factors in the 1961 phase of the Berlin crisis is clear. Kennedy was plainly affected by a host of factors, but his strong desire to demonstrate strength in adverse circumstances was doubtless due in no small part to psychological factors stemming from his childhood and early adult development and more immediate experiences associated with his presidency.

In the first category was the fact that he was the product of a highly competitive family, a family in which the drive to achieve and to win was developed to a fine art. Especially intense was the competition with his older brother, Joe (Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr.). His father emphasized competition, toughness, and the need to strive mightily for excellence. From this background the young Kennedy developed highly competitive instincts, a drive to excel, and an admiration for courage and toughness. His book *Profiles in Courage* was an indication of the value the 35th president placed on the mental toughness that produced courageous acts.²⁹

Kennedy, like his contemporaries who had grown to manhood during the 1930s, was influenced substantially by World War II. He had watched Hitler's steady march to power while traveling in Europe. At Harvard his senior thesis dealt with the Western nations' failure to stop the Nazi dictator in time. The thesis, later published under the title *Why England Slept*, was very successful.³⁰

Its central theme, the failure of the British people to recognize early enough the need to challenge the brutal neighborhood bully, was a lesson that stayed with Kennedy. The fact that World War II had been a clear contest of wills between evil and good, between the “black hats” and the “white hats,” would imprint itself strongly on Kennedy’s mind. This would later be an influence that on occasion made it difficult for Kennedy to see that the postwar world was not always so neatly divided between the good and the bad.³¹

In addition to these psychological factors from childhood and his young adult years, certain immediate realities associated with Kennedy’s presidency made him wary of indicating any weakness. He was the second youngest president in the nation’s history and the first Catholic chief executive. His electoral victory against Richard Nixon had been paper thin, and he could claim no substantial mandate from the voters. Moreover, in the first months of his term, he presided over a major foreign policy fiasco—the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. All these were factors that made Kennedy feel less than secure and made him feel the need to demonstrate strength, firmness, resolution, and decisiveness.³²

The combined result of these various factors, of course, was formidable pressure on Kennedy pushing him in the direction of a strong military response to Khrushchev’s Berlin challenge. And the military steps taken by the Kennedy administration were indeed substantially stronger and potentially more provocative than those taken by the Eisenhower administration in the earlier phase of the Berlin crisis.

Despite the pressures that made Kennedy feel it necessary to make a strong military response, there was another side of his personality that pushed him probably even more forcefully in the opposite direction, toward negotiation and accommodation. As he had put it in his inaugural speech, “Let us never negotiate out of fear, but let us never fear to negotiate.”³³ That sentence in many ways spelled out Kennedy’s basic philosophy of international relations—one cannot afford to be perceived as weak, but when concern about appearing weak begins to interfere with the ability

to negotiate peaceful settlements, it has become a counter-productive concern.

Whether from heredity, family environment, early adult experiences, or all of these, Kennedy had acquired certain personality traits that made him receptive to the idea of reaching accommodation with an adversary. These are characteristics mentioned again and again by Kennedy observers over the years. We have already noted his unusual ability to empathize, to put himself in the position of his opponent. In addition, there was the cool analytical mind that could look at problems with objectivity and remarkable detachment. There was a pragmatism, an ability to look at the world realistically, to recognize that there are many more shades of gray than there are blacks and whites.³⁴ Above all, he was receptive to new experiences, able to learn and grow. James David Barber has described him as an active-positive president, the central characteristic of that classification being "the sense of the self as developing," demonstrated externally by evidence of openness, willingness to experiment, flexibility, and growth.³⁵

An associated Kennedy characteristic was his belief that the world, being an imperfect place, does not readily lend itself to rapid, sweeping, all-encompassing solutions. Instead, he saw the reversal of the cold war as a long-term process, made up of many small steps.³⁶ He did not believe that in the nuclear world one could rely any longer on military "victories" in the traditional sense, that indeed the American people would have to learn to live with a competition that no longer produced clear "winners" and "losers."³⁷

Thus, personality factors played a major role in the 1961 Berlin crisis as Kennedy struggled to find an appropriate mix between firmness and conciliation, between sticks and carrots. Khrushchev's personality characteristics were also a major player, but here we are interested primarily in American policymakers and their influence on crisis situations. It is our contention that the role played by Kennedy in the 1961 Berlin crisis, although a mixture of coercion and accommodation, was most important from the accommodative standpoint. Through signals and indices, supple-

mented by a significant private correspondence with Khrushchev, Kennedy's use of negotiation and conciliation, some of it direct and some tacit, was a key factor in bringing the crisis to a peaceful if temporary conclusion.

Communication and Bargaining Dynamics

Some interesting insights into the 1961 Berlin crisis can be obtained by looking at the nature and effectiveness of communications between the adversaries and the dynamics of the bargaining process. They indicate Kennedy recognized that because of the necessity of demonstrating resolve, he would be unable to communicate effectively through normal diplomatic channels and would therefore have to use less public means of communication, including signals, private correspondence, and other means. These signals would have to indicate that the United States would be prepared to yield on certain points critical to the Soviets and East Germans as long as *basic* American and allied rights were preserved. This basically conciliatory American position would have to be camouflaged by signals of readiness to use force to avoid the appearance of weakness.

It seems clear from the available material that Kennedy was able to empathize with the Soviet–East German concern about the staggering flow of refugees to West Berlin. In early August he predicted to Walt Rostow that Khrushchev would have to do something to stop the drain on East German resources.³⁸ Earlier, on 30 July, Senator William Fulbright stated in a television interview, “I don’t see why the East Germans don’t close their border because I think they have a right to close it.”³⁹ The administration made no move to repudiate Fulbright’s comment, an omission that was no doubt taken as a signal by the East Germans and Soviets that we would not interfere with their efforts to seal off the refugee flow.⁴⁰ Two weeks later the border was closed and the Berlin Wall went up.

As Oran Young has pointed out, direct formal diplomatic contacts were relatively ineffective in the 1961 crisis. This applied

to diplomatic correspondence and face-to-face diplomatic contacts. (The latter did not even consistently occur till the late stages of the crisis.) There was a goodly amount of indirect communication, a substantial amount of which consisted of military signaling, obviously intended to convince the opponent of the signaler's resolve.⁴¹

It was, however, the indirect signals and secret correspondence between Kennedy and Khrushchev that was most significant in bringing the crisis to at least a temporary peaceful settlement. For example, Kennedy's speech of 25 July, which as already noted was militant sounding in many respects, contained some key accommodative signals by virtue of omitting certain things. Thus, while Kennedy mentioned the continued presence of American forces, the continued access to West Berlin, and the security and economic viability of that city as "vital interests of the United States," he omitted certain other important items. He said nothing about Western rights in East Berlin, for example, nor did he mention anything about "free access between East and West Berlin."⁴² The Soviets and East Germans could thus fairly safely assume these were signals indicating the United States had limited objectives in Berlin and would not interfere with their attempts to stem the refugee flow. As already noted, the Fulbright speech on 30 July, unrepudiated by the administration, was another signal. Then when the wall was erected on the night of 12–13 August, the slow US response (no significant response at all for four days) was undoubtedly also regarded as a signal that the United States would not interfere.⁴³ The message in all these signals was one of accommodation, albeit only up to a point.

As part of the dynamics of bargaining, the Soviets responded to these conciliatory signals with accommodative signals of their own during the first half of August. A diplomatic note in early August modified the original Soviet demand substantially and omitted any mention of the previous threat to turn over control of the access routes to the East Germans. There was no mention of any deadline. During the actual building of the wall, a number of Soviet conciliatory statements were issued indicating that Soviet

objectives were limited.⁴⁴ Thus, through various signals, the Soviets responded to the American acknowledgment that the Soviets and East Germans did, in fact, have a serious problem and that we would not interfere if they tried to correct it. In short, the dynamics of the bargaining process seemed to be working; accommodative signals from the United States were reciprocated by the Soviets.

Erection of the Berlin Wall solved Khrushchev's most immediate problem. It recognized the reality of the awkward Berlin situation—the fact that the Soviets and East Germans had lopsided geographical and military advantages that the United States and its allies could do little about. In retrospect, one can see that the building of the wall, distasteful as it was to the West, marked the beginning of the end of the 1961 phase of the crisis.⁴⁵

In addition to the signals already mentioned, an important means of communication in the latter stages of the crisis was the secret correspondence between Khrushchev and Kennedy. Initiated by the Soviet leader through a secret message to Kennedy that was to have been delivered by C. L. Sulzberger of the *New York Times*, the correspondence was apparently of substantial significance in cooling off the crisis.⁴⁶

It should be noted here that the crisis had flared again after the erection of the wall when the Soviets, surprised by the slow Western reaction, decided to see what other gains might be realized. Following up on their advantage in conformance with Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the Soviets began harassing Western air traffic in the air corridors leading to Berlin about 10 days after the wall was put up. In addition, the Soviets resumed nuclear testing on 30 August in direct violation of Khrushchev's pledge in Vienna in June.⁴⁷

There is little agreement among students of the 1961 Berlin crisis regarding the Soviet motivation for renewing the crisis in the period from 22 August to 1 September. Jack Schick, for example, sees the new Soviet harassment as an attempt to put new pressure on the West and as a response to Kennedy's military buildup.⁴⁸ Robert Slusser says the belligerent Soviet behavior during this

period was due to the fact that Khrushchev's hard-line opponents in the Kremlin gained control of policy-making while Khrushchev was on vacation.⁴⁹ Alexander George and Richard Smoke interpret it as due to a Soviet perception of weakness on the part of Kennedy and his Western allies.⁵⁰ Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing attribute the renewed Soviet belligerence as simply "a series of coercive measures designed to camouflage the fact that the Soviets had decided to give up their demand for a free city." In other words, this was not really a renewal of the crisis but simply a means of protecting against "image loss."⁵¹

There are probably elements of truth in each of these explanations. However, our analysis leads us to favor the idea that renewed Soviet belligerence was, in order of priority, (1) a response to US postwall military moves, including Kennedy's dramatic reinforcement of the Berlin garrison on 16 August with a 1,500-man battle group sent to the capital over the autobahn; (2) a means, directly related to the above, of protecting against image loss; and (3) a means of probing to see if any further concessions might be possible.

In any event, by late August both Kennedy and Khrushchev, apparently alarmed by the renewed tension, decided to seek more effective means of communicating as a first step toward negotiations.⁵² As already noted, Khrushchev initiated a secret correspondence with Kennedy in a note he gave to Sulzberger during a television interview on 5 September.⁵³ For reasons that are unclear, Kennedy still had not received the Khrushchev message more than two weeks later. Finally, on 22 September two Soviet newspaper editors approached Kennedy's press secretary, Pierre Salinger, in New York and asked if the president had received the message. When Salinger indicated he was unaware of it, the Soviet diplomats gave him the essence of Khrushchev's message and asked him to transmit it to the president.⁵⁴

The Khrushchev message was conciliatory. The Soviet leader indicated a willingness to listen to Kennedy's views on Berlin and Germany and expressed a desire for an early summit meeting. The president received the message on the eve of his address to the

United Nations in New York. After reviewing Khrushchev's letter with Salinger and Dean Rusk, Kennedy delivered a moderate and conciliatory address before the international organization.⁵⁵

This was the beginning of a secret and continuing correspondence between Kennedy and Khrushchev. On 29 September, one of the Soviet editors, Georgi Borshakov, delivered to Salinger a 26-page Khrushchev letter addressed to the president. Although part of the letter was devoted to Laos, a considerable portion dealt with Berlin. Again, Khrushchev was conciliatory and hopeful, and he indicated a willingness to back away from a number of the hard-line positions he had taken at Vienna.⁵⁶

The Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence continued for two years, until the president's death. Although many of the details of this correspondence are still unavailable, we do know from reliable sources that the exchanges were usually initiated by Khrushchev and were often helpful in defusing crisis situations. There can be little doubt they were instrumental in bringing about a relaxation of tension and at least a temporary settlement of the 1961 crisis.⁵⁷ On 17 October, less than three weeks after the Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence was initiated, the Soviet leader announced he was withdrawing the deadline he had earlier imposed for reaching a settlement of the Berlin issue. For all intents and purposes, the 1961 crisis was over. The direct communication between Kennedy and Khrushchev deserves much of the credit.⁵⁸

Relative Military Capabilities

As we have indicated throughout this chapter, there is no doubt Kennedy wielded the stick quite openly in the 1961 crisis. Convinced that American military capabilities had deteriorated under Eisenhower, he began a major buildup soon after he entered office. There is evidence that this buildup may have been at least partly responsible for Khrushchev's decision to launch the Berlin crisis. Furthermore, there is evidence Kennedy himself had misgivings about the necessity for so much military posturing.⁵⁹ Nonetheless, the desire to demonstrate firmness proved so strong

that the administration's military response was far more extensive than dictated by the concept of positive diplomacy. In our opinion, it was also considerably stronger than called for by the facts of the situation. Two paragraphs from Theodore Sorensen's biography of Kennedy capture the seriousness and extent of the buildup:

To provide the manpower needed for the Berlin crisis, draft calls were doubled and tripled, enlistments were extended and the Congress promptly and unanimously authorized the mobilization of up to 250,000 men in the ready Reserves and National Guard, including the activation of two full divisions and fifty-four Air Force and Naval air squadrons. Some 158,000 men, Reservists and Guardsmen, mostly for the Army, were actually called up; and altogether the strength of our armed forces was increased by 300,000 men before winter. Some 40,000 were sent to Europe, and others were prepared for swift deployment. Six "priority divisions" in the Reserves were made ready for quick mobilization, and three Regular Army divisions engaged in training were converted to full combat readiness.

Along with the manpower, the Berlin build-up provided enough equipment and ammunition to supply the new troops, enough sealift and airlift to transport them and enough airpower to cover ground combat. Some three hundred tactical fighter aircraft, more than 100,000 tons of equipment and several thousand tanks, jeeps, armored personnel carriers and other vehicles were placed in position on the European continent, and still more on "floating depot" ships.⁶⁰

These measures along with additional military moves, congressional appropriations to increase the defense budget, and extensive civil defense measures, made the coercive response of the United States quite strong indeed.⁶¹

Despite the formidable US buildup (which began even before the outbreak of the crisis), the confrontation over Berlin was not avoided. As George and Smoke observe, deterrence partially failed in 1961 despite Kennedy's best efforts to reinforce the deterrent. The Soviets were able to "design around" the American deterrent and develop a "low-level, politico-diplomatic option." Thus, the buildup of American conventional forces may well have been irrelevant insofar as Soviet intentions were concerned. As George and Smoke note, it may even have been counterproductive in that

it stimulated Soviet military countermoves and in a sense confirmed the Soviet perception that the United States no longer had confidence in its strategic nuclear power.⁶²

It is extremely difficult in this case to judge the importance of relative military capabilities and the use of the stick. On one hand, the American conventional buildup appears to have made little difference in that it did not stop the Soviets from initiating and continuing the crisis. In fact, it seems to have had the effect of stimulating the Soviets to take additional military steps (for example, canceling their previously announced plans to reduce their conventional forces).⁶³ On the other hand, one can also make a case that the American conventional buildup prompted Khrushchev to seek a negotiated solution in September because he was worried that the Americans were overreacting and consequently might precipitate a fatally serious incident.

What seems more likely, however, is that Khrushchev was willing to begin serious negotiations in September because he had solved his most immediate and pressing problem with the erection of the Berlin Wall, and he recognized that the United States and the Western allies were rapidly becoming aware that the so-called missile gap was a fiction. Continuing the crisis under this latter handicap hardly seemed worth the risks involved.

Relative military capabilities did seem to play something of a role in the crisis because of the perceptions of strategic nuclear capabilities. The crisis had begun with the Soviets believing they could take advantage of the fictional missile gap and ended with their awareness that the United States was no longer buying that story. This would, of course, strengthen Western resolve, in Soviet eyes at least, and make continued probing by the Soviets even more risky.⁶⁴

In general, however, we tend to agree with Philip M. Williams that "purely military considerations are far from being dominant in superpower confrontations." The fact of American nuclear supremacy did not stop the Soviets from walling off East Berlin, and Soviet local conventional superiority did not prevent the United States from protecting its most vital interests in the city.⁶⁵

Thus, in the Berlin crisis of 1961, actual military power did not confer any enormous bargaining advantages on either side. As Williams points out, the structure of the situation and the vital interests involved were more important considerations. However, as we have already observed, the American military buildup, the Soviet response, and the extensive military posturing by both sides aggravated the danger of the situation.

Evaluating the 1961 Berlin Crisis

It is extremely difficult to evaluate the 1961 Berlin crisis from the standpoint of coercion and accommodation, in no small part because there is confusing and conflicting evidence regarding the extent to which each of these was responsible for defusing the situation. However, we can make some judgments based at least partly on reasonably solid empirical evidence. For the most part, though, our conclusions must be highly speculative.

Judging the overall performance from the standpoint of positive diplomacy, we would give the Kennedy administration rather mixed "grades." Although Kennedy moved forward on the politico-diplomatic front with considerable effectiveness in the latter stages of the crisis, this movement came late and was in some respects negated by the heavy emphasis on military preparations. As even Theodore Sorensen put it, "Our diplomatic posture improved far more slowly than our military posture."⁶⁶

Our main criticism of Kennedy's handling of the 1961 crisis is this: in attempting to prove that the administration was not weak, the military response was overemphasized and had the unfortunate result of stimulating Soviet military countermoves. Rather than being the relatively quiet, low-profile military moves that indicate firmness but also communicate a desire to reach accommodation, the buildup by the Kennedy administration reflected an anxiety that tended to be provocative. True, the president wisely resisted the demands of such people as Acheson to proclaim a "national emergency," which would have been very provocative and would

have doubtless greatly exacerbated the situation. Still, the administration's military buildup had far too high a profile and overemphasized the military aspects of what was essentially a political problem.

Kennedy's emphasis on military preparations must be placed in context, however. We have already observed that such earlier administration problems as the Bay of Pigs fiasco created great sensitivity about appearing weak. The pressure on Kennedy from such hard-liners as Acheson, Nitze, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff was substantial. This, coupled with French and West German negative feelings about negotiations, tended to push the young president further in the direction of a coercive strategy than he probably would have chosen had the pressures been less.⁶⁷

Having said that, however, we must concede that the administration buildup that began soon after the new president took office was prompted in no small part by the fact that Kennedy sincerely believed Eisenhower had allowed the nation's military posture to deteriorate to the point of danger. Moreover, he felt the Eisenhower administration's strategy of massive retaliation was an inflexible and unrealistic approach that tied the nation's hands in a crisis and increased the danger of nuclear war. Therefore, the defense increases that Kennedy called for in the spring of 1961 were motivated not just by outside pressures but by a sincere conviction that the country needed a wider variety of military options.⁶⁸

Whatever Kennedy's motivation or the logic of it, the fact is that Khrushchev clearly was enraged by Kennedy's military buildup. As Jack Schick points out, Khrushchev interpreted these measures to improve our conventional forces not as a warning (as Kennedy intended) but rather as blackmail.⁶⁹ He responded with various coercive measures, including cancellation of planned Soviet defense cuts, increases in military spending, harassing tactics in the Berlin air corridors, and finally a resumption of nuclear testing.

There is substantial evidence that Khrushchev's primary objective in the 1961 Berlin crisis, as in the 1958–59 crisis, was to force the United States and its allies into negotiations over the Berlin issue, not to humiliate the Western powers militarily.⁷⁰ A

vital and immediate Soviet objective was to somehow stop the flow of refugees from East Germany. Other important Soviet goals included the desire to achieve increased recognition as a great power and to avoid any appearance of being intimidated by the United States and its allies. With these goals, and considering the volatile nature of Khrushchev's personality, the military buildup by the United States beginning in the spring of 1961 and continuing into the high-profile preparations of the summer, was a strategy that could hardly have done anything other than exacerbate the situation. We therefore conclude, as we have already noted, that the high-profile military preparations undertaken by the Kennedy administration were a mistake. They served little purpose except to engage Khrushchev's pride and convince him the United States was trying to humiliate the Soviet Union, not to solve what he perceived as a political problem. The eventual result was simply to convince the Soviet leader he needed to find new ways (for example, missiles in Cuba) to overcome the overall American military superiority.⁷¹

But what was Kennedy to do in the difficult 1961 situation? Faced with the perennial problem of looking for ways to reach a settlement without seeming overly anxious to negotiate (and thus risking the appearance of weakness), he felt he must first demonstrate firmness. This was a legitimate consideration. There was reason to think that Marxist-Leninist tactics and Khrushchev's belligerent personality might combine to produce a situation where early Western concessions, unbacked by force, might simply cause the Soviets to believe they could obtain additional benefits by pressing even more aggressively. Our point is that we think this line of reasoning was carried too far. Military preparations that should have been a low-profile indication of quiet firmness became high profile and tended to be intimidating and hence provocative.

Although, we believe the Kennedy administration erred by relying too heavily on military power to reinforce deterrence during the early stages of the crisis, we must give the president great credit for continuing to pursue the elusive goal of negotiations. Kennedy continued to search for ways to start an

effective negotiation process despite the fact he continually had to battle obstacles ranging from Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and Gen Charles de Gaulle to his own State Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff. Quoting Winston Churchill, Kennedy observed that "it is better to jaw, jaw than war, war, and we shall continue to jaw, jaw and see if we can produce a useful result."⁷²

We observed earlier that Kennedy signaled the Soviets in a variety of ways that he wished to find a political solution to the crisis. All these signals, including the slow US response to the erection of the wall, were messages to the Soviets that while the United States did not like the situation or think highly of the solution (the wall), Kennedy did recognize that the Soviets and East Germans faced a serious political problem. To avoid a military solution, some flexibility on the part of the West—distasteful though it might be—would be necessary. The Kennedy signals clearly indicated these realities to the Soviets. The erection of the wall, regardless of its hideous aspects, constituted the fundamental means of settling the most pressing aspect of the 1961 crisis.

Kennedy launched more formal negotiations in late August, apparently having decided by then that his resolve had been adequately demonstrated. He instructed Ambassador Thompson to invite the Soviets to open negotiations and suggested that Soviet foreign minister Andrey Gromyko and Secretary of State Dean Rusk meet at the opening session of the United Nations in New York to discuss the Berlin problem.⁷³ Meanwhile, as we observed earlier, Kennedy and Khrushchev had begun a secret correspondence in September that helped defuse the crisis. George and Smoke indicate that Kennedy may have offered Khrushchev some concessions in that correspondence, possibly including restraints on allied use of West Berlin for political and psychological warfare purposes.⁷⁴

In any event, at the 17 October meeting of the 22d Party Congress, Khrushchev withdrew the December deadline for a peace treaty, indicating that the various negotiations in progress "left us with the impression the Western powers were showing a certain understanding of the situation, and that they were disposed

to seek a settlement of the German problem and the issue of West Berlin on a mutually acceptable basis.”⁷⁵

As Schick observes, Khrushchev's decision to withdraw the deadline and conclude the crisis appears to have been due far more to Kennedy's willingness to negotiate than to his military preparations. As Schick put it:

Judging by his outburst to McCloy, his success with the Berlin Wall, and his own counterdemonstration, Kennedy's bid to negotiate rather than his plans for mobilization persuaded Khrushchev to withdraw the deadline.⁷⁶

The available evidence indicates that both Khrushchev and Kennedy felt a strong psychological need to demonstrate firmness. However, both men also recognized that negotiations offered the only sensible way out of the dilemma. Both leaders must be given credit for moving forward on negotiations, but Kennedy must be given a larger share in view of the obstacles he faced within his own country and with his allies. In the final analysis, the reduction of tension came about not so much because of what was accomplished in the negotiations but because of the fact they were undertaken. As Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., put it, “There were many ways to initiate a dialogue, and in the end the substance of negotiations turned out to matter a good deal less than the willingness to negotiate.”⁷⁷

As we noted at the beginning of this chapter, the Berlin crisis of 1961 is a very interesting case insofar as positive diplomacy is concerned. It illustrates some things that should be done in practicing positive diplomacy as well as some things that should be avoided.

From the standpoint of our six variables, the structure of the situation had remained much the same as it had been in 1958–59, with the important differences that the East German refugee problem had increased in seriousness and a new American president occupied the White House. The overall structure did not contain major elements that automatically encouraged accommodation; however, as we noted in the case of the 1958–59 Berlin crisis, the peculiar geographical features and the nature of the

military balance (and the lack of realistic military options for both sides) did favor movement toward negotiation.

Complementing this feature of the overall situational structure were the vital interests and motivation of the adversaries. Generally asymmetrical in the earlier stages of the crisis and favoring the Soviets, the situation became more symmetrical as the crisis progressed. In the sense that a symmetrical bargaining situation tends to encourage caution and a resulting mixed strategy of coercion and accommodation, vital interests and motivation can be said to have encouraged accommodation in the latter stages of the 1961 crisis.⁷⁸

Again, however, it should be pointed out that while symmetrical bargaining situations tend to promote caution and flexibility (because a more aggressive course is perceived as too risky), such situations also are inherently dangerous to a high degree. If each party perceives the other's interests and motivation as roughly equal to its own, it has an extremely difficult task in choosing the appropriate mixture of accommodation and coercion. The potential for miscalculation is tremendous. This being the case, mismanagement of the situation by selecting an inappropriate strategy can result in a hostility spiral almost as easily as a tendency toward mutual accommodation.

It is here that the personality factor becomes highly significant. The 1961 Berlin crisis is immensely instructive from this standpoint. Faced with a difficult situation, Kennedy struggled between two conflicting tendencies: on one hand, to appear strong and decisive and avoid humiliation; on the other, to do what his instincts suggested was the only way to effectively settle the crisis—negotiate. Fortunately, Kennedy clearly preferred negotiations and accommodation and this eventually became apparent to Khrushchev. But as Schick points out, by following a high-risk strategy involving extensive military preparations mixed with attempts to negotiate, he ran the risk of “garbling the message.”⁷⁹ In our judgment, the situation became more dangerous than it had to be because Kennedy's military preparations were of a higher profile than the circumstances really

required. Moreover, the movement toward negotiations came later than it should have.

Still, the crisis was finally settled peacefully, at least temporarily, and here personality factors played a major role. Kennedy was influenced by a substantial amount of "cold war baggage"—a strong tendency to admire "toughness," a somewhat overly romanticized conception of "courage," an excessive concern about weakness, and (like most statesmen of his generation) a tendency to be influenced by the Munich syndrome.⁸⁰ Although in the abstract these are not necessarily condemnable qualities, they tended to push Kennedy too strongly toward the use of force in cold war strategy. Gaddis observes that this showed in a tendency to turn crises first into tests of strength, and only then to pursue negotiations.⁸¹

Fortunately, there were other Kennedy personality traits that counterbalanced these counterproductive tendencies. Among these were two important traits that the young president seemed to possess in abundance—the ability to learn and to grow from experience and the ability to empathize, to put himself in his opponent's shoes.

In his book *Fearful Warriors*, Ralph K. White calls realistic empathy "the great corrective for all forms of warpromoting misperception."⁸² It is White's judgment, and one with which we wholeheartedly agree, that the ability to empathize with the opponent—to understand his position and his motivations—is one of the primary requirements for a capable statesman, perhaps even the most important. Eisenhower had that ability and so did Kennedy. In Kennedy's case, he possessed an ability to look at situations with a detachment and objectivity that allowed him to see his adversary's problems from the adversary's perspective. This permitted him to see the difficult refugee situation from the standpoint of the Soviets and East Germans, and while not necessarily sympathizing with the eventual solution, he could understand the problem. This understanding was conveyed to the Soviets in the various signals we have already discussed, thereby helping to put the crisis on a firm negotiating track.

It should be noted here once again that Khrushchev's personality traits were also instrumental in helping to move the controversy to a negotiating track. While this is a study of American policy-making and our concentration is therefore on American statesmen, it is sometimes overlooked that Khrushchev, despite an often impetuous belligerence, also possessed a flexibility and an ability to empathize with the opponent. This often showed only in the latter stages of a crisis and was far too often obscured by his crusty truculence. Still, these traits were evident in Khrushchev's actions in both Berlin crises and the Cuban missile crisis, as well as in others.

In essence, then, we agree with Schick that the fact the Kennedy administration survived the 1961 Berlin crisis without violence was due more to Kennedy's "bid to negotiate" than it was to his vigorous military preparations.⁸³ In this respect, Kennedy can be said to have followed the tenets of positive diplomacy. Unfortunately, the strong desire to demonstrate firmness led to military moves that tended to provoke rather than to communicate firmness as well as a desire for accommodation. Had the administration followed a lower-profile military strategy (emphasizing low-key moves such as bringing units up to strength, as Eisenhower had done in 1958–59) and had it initiated negotiations earlier, Khrushchev's pride and prestige probably would not have been so heavily engaged. The fact that the Soviet leader felt intimidated by the US military buildup virtually ensured that he would seek some new means of overcoming the overall American military superiority. This he attempted, of course, in Cuba in late 1962.

The 1961 crisis finally ended for a number of reasons. Perhaps most important was the fact that Khrushchev's most immediate problem had been solved by the wall. In addition, the Soviet leader probably felt he had gotten about all he could reasonably expect to obtain for the moment, particularly in view of the fact the West was rapidly becoming aware that the missile gap was a fiction. In addition, Kennedy felt he had demonstrated adequate firmness and could afford to pursue negotiations without appearing weak.

Therefore, a combination of structural features and personality characteristics, assisted to a lesser degree by the relative military balance at the strategic nuclear level, helped bring about an accommodation.

However, we must conclude that positive diplomacy was only partially applied in the 1961 Berlin crisis. Had it been more closely followed, we think the results of the 1961 crisis might have been even better and more permanent. But this conclusion, of course, is made with the benefit of hindsight. Despite what we regard as a misjudgment in overemphasizing the military features of the situation, John Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev both deserve credit for recognizing the real limitations of military power under the circumstances and for continuing to press for a negotiated solution.

Notes

1. For a good discussion of the political environment in which the 1961 Berlin crisis occurred, see Oran R. Young, *The Politics of Force: Bargaining during International Crises* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), 79–82.

2. Jean Edward Smith, *The Defense of Berlin* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963), 256.

3. Jack M. Schick, *The Berlin Crisis, 1958–1962* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), 26–27.

4. A more detailed discussion of the influence of this factor on Soviet policy can be found in Hans Spier, *Divided Berlin* (New York: Praeger, 1961), 140–41.

5. Young, 79–83.

6. Robert M. Slusser, "The Berlin Crises of 1958–59 and 1961," in Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force without War: U. S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978), 386.

7. Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 418–21.

8. *Ibid.*, 421.

9. For a good discussion of the importance of comparative resolve in determining relative bargaining power, see Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), 191–95.

10. For a detailed discussion of Kennedy's military preparations, see Slusser, 420–22, 430–31.
11. George and Smoke, 418.
12. John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 212.
13. *Ibid.*, 233.
14. For a detailed account of the debate between the “hard-line” school and the “soft-line” school, see Smith, 293–97.
15. George and Smoke, 436.
16. Schick, 148.
17. *Ibid.*, 237.
18. *Ibid.*, 236.
19. Slusser, 421–22.
20. Quoted in Schick, 185.
21. Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1965), 590.
22. *Ibid.*, 591.
23. *Ibid.*, 590.
24. Ambassador Llewellyn L. Thompson (former US ambassador to the Soviet Union), interview by Elizabeth Donahue, 25 March 1964, 5, Oral History project, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston.
25. Walter W. Rostow, assistant secretary of state, interview by Richard Neustadt, 2d transcript, 11 April 1964, 60–63, Oral History project, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston.
26. Snyder and Diesing, 270.
27. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), 356.
28. George and Smoke, 429–30.
29. For an interesting study of the factors that appear to have shaped Kennedy's personality and their influence on him in the presidency, see James David Barber, *The Presidential Character* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977), 293–343.
30. *Ibid.*, 304–6.
31. *Ibid.*, 317.
32. Schlesinger, 363–64.
33. Gaddis, 228.
34. These qualities are mentioned repeatedly in a host of studies of the Kennedy years and biographies of President Kennedy. For example, see the biographies written by Arthur Schlesinger, Theodore Sorensen, and Pierre Salinger, and the psychological study by James David Barker.
35. Barber, 180.

36. See Richard W. Fogg, "Dealing with Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 29, no. 2 (June 1985): 334.
37. Sorensen, 512–17.
38. Rostow interview, 60–63.
39. Quoted in Schlesinger, 366–67.
40. George and Smoke conjecture that the Fulbright speech was a deliberate signal to the East Germans and Soviets. See George and Smoke, 436–37.
41. Young, 130–37.
42. On this point, see Snyder and Diesing, 274; and George and Smoke, 436.
43. George and Smoke, 438.
44. Snyder and Diesing, 275.
45. Ibid.
46. Sorensen, 599.
47. Slusser, 427–28.
48. Schick, 175.
49. Slusser, 428–29.
50. George and Smoke, 441.
51. Snyder and Diesing, 275.
52. Schick, 175–76.
53. Slusser, 428.
54. Pierre Salinger, *With Kennedy* (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1966), 191–92.
55. Ibid., 194–95.
56. Ibid., 198–99.
57. Sorensen, 599–600.
58. George and Smoke speculate that Kennedy may have offered Khrushchev concessions in the correspondence, some of them relating to "the use of West Berlin as a center of political and psychological warfare against the Eastern bloc, which led to Khrushchev's October decision to defuse the crisis." George and Smoke, 443.
59. Ibid., 429.
60. Sorensen, 627.
61. For a more detailed account of American military preparations, see Slusser, 421–31.
62. George and Smoke, 429.
63. Snyder and Diesing, 274.
64. George and Smoke, 444.
65. Philip M. Williams, *Crisis Management* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976), 163–64.
66. Sorensen, 596.
67. See Schick, 137–58.
68. For a good discussion on this subject, see Gaddis, 213–20.
69. Schick, 184.

70. Ibid., 185.
71. Schlesinger, 376.
72. Quoted in Sorensen, 596.
73. "De Gaulle Calls for Force in Berlin Crisis if Needed," *New York Times*, 6 September 1961, 8.
74. George and Smoke, 443.
75. Schick, 185.
76. Ibid., 186.
77. Schlesinger, 372.
78. For a good discussion of this symmetrical bargaining situation, see Snyder and Diesing, 262.
79. Schick, 148.
80. See Barber, 293–343, for a discussion of these and other Kennedy personality traits.
81. Gaddis, 233.
82. Ralph K. White, *Fearful Warriors: A Psychological Profile of U. S.-Soviet Relations* (New York: Free Press, 1984), 160.
83. Schick, 186.

Chapter 9

Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam War

In this chapter we will look at two other cases from the standpoint of positive diplomacy, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the Vietnam War. The first, of course, was a short-term crisis lasting less than two weeks. The second was a long war; in fact, it was America's longest, lasting a decade. In neither case was positive diplomacy fully employed as we have described it in this book (though aspects of it were prominent in the latter stages of the Cuban missile crisis). Nonetheless, we may gain some valuable insights about positive diplomacy by attempting to do two things: (1) analyze why positive diplomacy (or a very similar accommodative policy) was not used in these situations, and (2) speculate a bit about how history might have been altered if positive diplomacy had been used.

Two of the cases we have examined thus far—the Quemoy crisis of 1958 and the Berlin crisis of that same year—represent situations in which carrots and sticks were used quite successfully. The third case that we reviewed, the Berlin crisis of 1961, is a mixed bag; in some respects, one can say that carrots were used quite effectively, but in our judgment the stick was over-emphasized to the detriment of overall American policy. None of the three cases, represents a “pure” application of positive diplomacy, of course, but all three demonstrated, in substantial ways, the benefits that can flow from a basically accommodative policy that features low-profile force to protect truly vital interests.

The Cuban missile crisis and the Vietnam War are cases that tell us other things about positive diplomacy, not because they represent the most effective use of an accommodative policy but rather because they represent important situations where positive diplomacy was either inappropriate or was ignored because of

circumstances and inhibiting factors. Cuba represents the first, Vietnam the second.

The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962

This is clearly the most famous and dramatic of the postwar crises and one that has generated an enormous amount of literature. President Kennedy's skillful handling of Nikita Khrushchev in this tense encounter has become the model of excellence for coercive diplomacy—the controlled, demonstrative use of limited force to achieve political objectives without war. During the famous “thirteen days of October,” the young president—utilizing psychology, intuition, his native Boston political “savvy,” steel nerves, and a carefully orchestrated mixture of threats and promises—forced the Soviet leader to back down and withdraw his missiles from Cuba. Aided by his brother and the other members of his hardworking special task force (ExComm), Kennedy won a major cold war victory that ensured his place in history—or so goes the conventional wisdom about the Cuban missile crisis.¹

Our primary concern in dealing with the Cuban missile crisis here is to attempt to determine whether an approach closer to our model of positive diplomacy would have produced better long-run results than did Kennedy's use of coercive diplomacy. The former president has been criticized by some observers for following a policy that was an apparent success in the short term but a Pyrrhic victory in the long run. According to these critics, Kennedy succeeded in making Khrushchev remove the missiles from Cuba, but the results in the long run (1) prompted the Soviets to launch a massive military buildup and (2) helped solidify Fidel Castro's position.

Would another and perhaps more accommodative policy have produced better long-term results? Would a policy of positive diplomacy have been likely to produce an outcome that was superior to what in fact occurred?

We believe that the critics of Kennedy are wrong, for the most part, considering the special circumstances of this case. These special circumstances—the peculiar structure of the situation and the personalities involved—made a policy of positive diplomacy inappropriate, especially in the earlier stages of the crisis.

Certain features of positive diplomacy were evident in the Cuban situation, especially in the latter stages. We can learn some important things about positive diplomacy from this crisis by studying the reasons Kennedy followed a strategy of coercive diplomacy rather than follow our ideal model of positive diplomacy.

It seems appropriate and useful at this point to review briefly some of the similarities and differences between coercive diplomacy and positive diplomacy. The two strategies are similar in that they both employ force with restraint; both seek to *persuade* an opponent to follow certain actions rather than bludgeoning him into doing so; both rely heavily on effective communication for success; both rely on threats and inducements (sticks and carrots) to achieve their objectives; and both are highly context dependent.

The differences, however, are substantial. The chief difference is that whereas coercive diplomacy is basically a coercive strategy with an element of accommodation, positive diplomacy is basically an accommodative strategy with an element of coercion. This is an oversimplification, of course, but it is true that coercive diplomacy depends far more on threats and coercion than does positive diplomacy. Conversely, positive diplomacy depends more on inducements and conciliation than does coercive diplomacy.²

Both strategies use limited, restrained force but positive diplomacy uses force in a far more restrained manner than does coercive diplomacy. The message conveyed by the force element in coercive diplomacy is a threat: "This force will be used unless you do as we ask." There is also a threat in positive diplomacy, but it is a "soft" threat that is conveyed by the fact that force is present in the background. However, since the force is used in a very low-profile, restrained fashion, the threat does not stand out as the most prominent feature in the situation. The utilization of force

will be so circumspect and so secondary to the main conciliatory thrust that the force itself becomes a means of communicating a desire for accommodation. Such positive diplomacy conveys the message that there are many common interests in the situation which are negotiable; that we do not want to provoke the other party with threats but that we have certain vital interests on which we will not yield; and that we have force available but will use it only as a last resort to protect those interests from unreasonable demands by the other party.

In the final chapter we will examine the similarities and differences in greater detail. Suffice for now to say that the strategies have some common elements but are essentially quite different in their overall thrust.

There is, however, one similarity between the two that is extremely important: both are very context dependent—that is, their suitability as a strategy and their success or failure depends very much on the particular structure of the situation. This brings us to perhaps the most important thing we can learn about the Cuban missile crisis and positive diplomacy: the strategy of positive diplomacy, like that of coercive diplomacy, cannot be applied in the same form in all situations. Certain conditions appear to be required to make coercive diplomacy work effectively; this seems to be true for positive diplomacy as well.³

In the final chapter we will discuss in greater detail what *appear to be* the conditions required to make positive diplomacy successful. For now, let us simply say that, while we firmly believe the general conceptual approach we have described in the preceding chapters is potentially the most productive means of achieving a mutually satisfactory settlement of disputes in the *majority* of cases, there will nonetheless be cases that are exceptions. In general, these exceptional cases, where the positive diplomacy approach is not applicable or must be radically modified, will be situations where one or more of the following conditions apply: the intentions of the adversary are clearly aggressive; his interests lack any real legitimacy or are legitimate to only a minimal extent; his basic objectives are held with such

tenacity that in his mind no compromise of those objectives is possible; he desires superiority over his adversary, not relative equality; he desires friction or violence as an end in itself; and he does not fear war.

Obviously the presence of any of these conditions would make the use of positive diplomacy, which is heavily dependent on conditions conducive to compromise, very difficult. If other compensating conditions are present, it may still be a viable option, perhaps in a somewhat modified form. Quite clearly, however, situations that exhibit many of these conditions are not likely candidates for a strategy of positive diplomacy.

Equally evident is the fact that in talking about these conditions, we are talking about the intentions of the adversary, not his capabilities. Thus, we need to say a few words about intentions as they apply to positive diplomacy.

In *Conflict among Nations*, Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing state,

Whether to be firm and tough toward an adversary, in order to deter him, but at the risk of provoking his anger or fear and heightened conflict, or to conciliate him in the hope of reducing sources of conflict, but at the risk of strengthening him and causing him to miscalculate one's own resolve, is a perennial and central dilemma of international relations. A rational resolution of this dilemma depends most of all on an accurate assessment of the long run interests and intentions of the opponent. If his aims are limited, conciliation of his specific grievances may be cheaper than engaging in a power struggle with him. If they are possibly unlimited, the rational choice is to deter him with countervailing power and a resolve to use it.⁴

The *intentions* of the Soviet Union in the Cuban missile crisis, *as perceived by the Kennedy administration*, were of central importance in determining how the crisis was handled. While the factors motivating the USSR to place offensive missiles in Cuba are still the subject of some disagreement, there can be little doubt that Khrushchev hoped at one stroke to redress the strategic balance between the superpowers and generally improve Soviet leverage in all its international political relationships, especially in Berlin and vis-à-vis the Communist Chinese.⁵ There also is little

doubt that Khrushchev still held the opinion that Kennedy could be pressured and would not hold firm in a crisis, despite the president's extensive military moves in the 1961 Berlin episode. Thus, Kennedy was faced with a situation in which he *perceived* the opponent's intentions as aggressive, very likely not limited to the immediate problem, and fueled in no small measure by his adversary's image of him as weak. In Kennedy's mind, then, it became imperative to demonstrate firmness before conciliation could be considered.

This particular point deserves some elaboration since it involves a key premise of this book. We have noted repeatedly that positive diplomacy as an approach to crisis situations, while not ignoring the element of firmness and military force, places greater emphasis on cooperative/conciliatory approaches. Firmness and an unwillingness to abandon one's most important vital interests is demonstrated to the opponent but normally in a low-key, low-profile, nonprovocative manner. There is, in short, an early recognition of the opponent's legitimate interests, as well as the interests both parties have in common. This is combined with a message that while some form of accommodation is desirable, there are limits beyond which we will not go.

For positive diplomacy to be an effective approach, a number of things are necessary: the opponent must be rational, *his objectives must be limited and must possess a reasonable degree of legitimacy*, and he must be able to empathize sufficiently to recognize the legitimate interests of the other party. Other conditions favor positive diplomacy, but these basic requirements are necessary if the strategy is to stand a reasonable chance of succeeding. It is our contention that when *most* contests between the superpowers are pared down to their essentials, these necessary elements are present. We therefore think that positive diplomacy is the type of approach that *is likely to be least dangerous and most effective in the majority of cases*.

Obviously, however, there are instances where an opponent's intentions are aggressive, his aims unlimited, his rationality questionable, and his ability to empathize with his opponent's

interests nonexistent. Hitler represents such a case. When dealing with such situations, one clearly cannot profitably employ conciliatory measures, at least not before exhibiting the ability and willingness to take strong coercive action. In such cases, conciliatory steps will probably be interpreted as simply weakness, and the opponent will more than likely attempt to exploit them.⁶

Despite his often-flamboyant rhetoric and colorful style, Nikita Khrushchev generally moved with caution in a world of nuclear danger. For the most part, he carefully guarded his options and generally made certain that lines of retreat were available to him. He was a leader acutely conscious of the dangers associated with allowing superpower confrontations to go beyond a certain point. Thus, the Cuban missile crisis was an aberration, a major miscalculation by the Soviet premier, brought about by a combination of events that pressured him into forsaking his usual rational judgment in favor of a "quick fix."

It is unnecessary to analyze Khrushchev's motivations for installing offensive missiles in Cuba. This is a subject that has received much attention elsewhere, and we need not discuss it further here except to note that by mid-1962 a combination of circumstances had converged to make Khrushchev anxious for a major foreign policy success. Under intense criticism from the Chinese Communists, saddled with economic problems at home, stymied in Berlin, smarting from other foreign policy setbacks, and aware that the "missile gap" would soon be revealed as Soviet-inspired fiction, Khrushchev looked about anxiously for some master stroke to reverse his declining fortunes.⁷ Cuba seemed to be it. Tossing his usual caution to the wind, the Soviet leader rolled the dice for all the chips.

In short, Khrushchev was temporarily deserted by his usual reasonably sound judgment. To achieve a quick, short-term gain, he ignored the fact that placing offensive missiles in Cuba would put the young American president in an impossible position just before the 1962 congressional elections. He ignored the American attachment to the Monroe Doctrine and the "spheres of influence" principle tacitly observed by the superpowers. He totally mis-

judged Kennedy's will and determination and completely misread the way the American people (and most of the world) would interpret his audacious move. Finally, he blatantly lied by repeatedly denying the Soviet Union was putting offensive missiles in Cuba.

This, then, was an instance in which the Soviet Union's normally cautious behavior was temporarily replaced by an ill-considered, aggressive action that clearly went beyond the tacit guidelines that up to that point had governed the cold war. Though Kennedy has been criticized by some for "overreacting" in the Cuban crisis, we cannot agree with this view. Khrushchev had been repeatedly warned that the United States would react strongly to the emplacement of offensive missiles on the Caribbean island. He was fully aware that the American president was facing his first midterm elections, was under intense pressure from conservative Republicans on the Cuban issue, and would almost certainly be forced to react strongly to the Soviet challenge. Khrushchev, apparently laboring under a false impression of Kennedy's courage and resolve, nonetheless made his move.⁸

Khrushchev was taking an action that would very likely result in Kennedy's humiliation, taking it in an area that had long been regarded as an American "sphere of influence," and taking it covertly while simultaneously denying it. These facts all added up to an aggressive move that lacked the kind of legitimacy that attached itself to the Soviet motives in Berlin or Chinese Communist motives in the Quemoy crisis. There can be little doubt that the Soviet intentions in this case were aggressive and little doubt that the move was designed to secure a quick strategic advantage. Had Kennedy's initial response been weak or even too conciliatory, bearing in mind Khrushchev's less than favorable opinion of the president's "backbone," it seems highly probable that Khrushchev would have attempted to exploit the situation even more.⁹

The key question from the standpoint of this book is, In the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, would a more conciliatory initial response have been more effective than the response actually

taken? We are not talking about a policy of appeasement in the pejorative sense of that term but rather an initial response that was more conciliatory, one emphasizing diplomatic negotiations rather than military preparations. Kennedy has been criticized in some quarters for overdramatizing the situation and for failing to utilize diplomatic tools from the earliest indications that a crisis was in the making. By failing to use diplomacy and conciliation from the outset, so goes the criticism, he plunged the world into a far more dangerous situation than needed to be the case. In spite of our attachment to positive diplomacy, however, we do not think this criticism is justified considering the circumstances.

The Cuban missile crisis represents a case where positive diplomacy could not realistically be followed as a strategy until Kennedy had established in Khrushchev's mind an image of himself as a firm and decisive leader. While we do not agree with Snyder and Diesing that it is *always* necessary to establish a strong image of firmness and resolve *before* taking accommodative steps (they often can profitably be taken concurrently), we do agree that there are obviously situations where this is necessary. As they discuss this point on the basis of their findings from 14 case studies, Snyder and Diesing make the following conclusion:

The cases show overwhelmingly that the only good way to meet the loss-avoidance constraint on accommodation is *first* to establish a convincing image of firmness. That is, a state that desires to settle with the opponent at minimum cost to itself must first demonstrate that it is resolved to hold firm on issues it considers vital, though it will concede on others. If concessions are offered before this resolve image is established in the opponent's mind, he will not accept them or offer counterconcessions, since he still believes himself the more resolved and therefore capable of winning the whole prize. The concessions will be considered signs of general weakness, to be exploited.¹⁰

Given the circumstances and Khrushchev's personality and past record, the Cuban missile crisis does seem to be a case where it was essential to apply the stick first to create a credible image before moving on to bargaining. It seems highly improbable that accommodative moves by Kennedy early in the crisis would have

done anything other than convince Khrushchev that his initial appraisal of the American president as weak was indeed correct.¹¹ After all, Kennedy had made it clear in statements on 4 September and 13 September that his administration would not tolerate the introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba, yet Khrushchev ignored these warnings and proceeded to do precisely what the American president had publicly staked his prestige on preventing.¹² Little wonder that Kennedy had some months earlier formed an opinion of Khrushchev that was succinctly expressed by the president in an informal remark to some White House staffers. Referring to the Soviet leader, Kennedy said, "That son of a bitch won't pay attention to words. . . . He has to see you move."¹³

Another important reason Kennedy felt he had to demonstrate firmness before making concessions was the nature of the situation. In the two Berlin crises, the Soviets had *threatened* to take action but in fact did not, except for the building of the wall. They did not attempt to forcibly cut off Berlin or interfere with basic Western rights in the city. The primary Soviet aim in Berlin was to present a threat while carefully avoiding turning that threat into a reality. Reality—actual armed confrontation with the United States—could prove disadvantageous to the Soviets. In the Cuban missile crisis, on the other hand, the action was not just threatened; the Soviets had already taken it. Offensive nuclear missiles had been installed in Cuba and were rapidly being brought to combat readiness. Thus, in addition to the sensitivity engendered by the proximity of the threat was the difference in the nature of the threat. In the Berlin situation an action was threatened but not actually taken, while in Cuba the action was in fact carried out.

In addition to confronting a situation where a hostile and aggressive action had already been accomplished, Kennedy was well aware that communication between him and the Soviet leader was dangerously inadequate, at least in the early stages of the crisis. Clearly Khrushchev had misread him and in turn he had misread the Soviet leader. Khrushchev obviously felt Kennedy could be intimidated; and with this image, Kennedy thought it highly

unlikely that early conciliatory gestures would be useful. On the contrary, they would likely be counterproductive. It was therefore necessary to correct Khrushchev's distorted view by projecting an image of firmness and resolve. Until this was accomplished, effective communication could not be established.¹⁴

Thus, the missile crisis is an interesting case from the standpoint of positive diplomacy. It represents a situation in which the aggressive intent of the crisis initiator, coupled with his negative image of the defender, ruled out the use of positive diplomacy in the early stages. Strong elements of positive diplomacy would appear in later stages of the crisis, but the structure of the Soviet challenge was such that the coercive elements in the American strategy properly held front and center position in the early going. Hence, whereas the abnormal nature of the Berlin situation produced a common interest in finding a solution (and thus favored an accommodative strategy), the Cuban crisis did not, at least not initially.

Overall the Cuban missile crisis is a classic example of successful coercive diplomacy. Both the stick and the carrot were used effectively. Despite the fact that most of the literature tends to give the stick considerably more credit than the carrot, the important role of concessions is generally acknowledged. For the most part, however, this acknowledgment is the variety accorded by Snyder and Diesing. The use of force to establish credibility and resolve dominance was the key to success in the Cuban crisis; the carrot was valuable as a face-saver for Khrushchev, but essentially it was coercive power that won the day.¹⁵

Although we do not deny the important role of force in this case, it is our judgment that the missile crisis represents a situation where the carrot has been shortchanged in favor of the stick. Force was clearly necessary to change Khrushchev's image of Kennedy's resolve, but the concessions made by the Kennedy administration were real and important. They were not mere window dressing or face-savers. True, they did make it easier for Khrushchev to "retreat," but they also represented real and important gains, not simply meaningless concessions, for the Soviets.

This point deserves additional comment. Our pledge not to invade Cuba was a substantial concession, even though it perhaps did not appear to be so important at the time. Made before the entire world as part of the settlement “package,” it committed the United States to observe a policy that over the long run permitted Castro to pursue adventuristic foreign policy goals with a freedom of action he would not otherwise have had. Over the years this has proven to be of considerable importance to the Cuban government, making it possible to dispatch troops to various corners of the globe without fear of leaving the home front too vulnerable.

Likewise, the removal of our Jupiter missiles from Turkey was not an unimportant concession.¹⁶ Although the concession was not technically part of the “deal” between Kennedy and Khrushchev, Robert F. Kennedy’s statement to the Soviet ambassador that the missiles would be removed after the crisis was settled was not an insignificant action.¹⁷ True, the missiles were obsolete and President Kennedy had ordered them removed before the crisis developed. Nonetheless, the Soviets were acutely conscious of the missiles on their border and were well aware of the political symbolism that could accompany their removal shortly after the crisis was terminated.¹⁸

As George, Hall, and Simon point out, “From an early stage the president believed he would probably have to pay a price to get the missiles out (of Cuba). . . . Accordingly Kennedy relied on coercion to reduce substantially his part of the quid pro quo . . . but . . . he did not rely on coercion exclusively to secure removal of the missiles.”¹⁹

This is important from the standpoint of this book. The point George makes, and one with which we agree fully, is that Kennedy recognized that the United States would have to make concessions and pay a price. This was true because behind the hypocrisy, dishonesty, secrecy, and poor judgment that characterized Khrushchev’s Cuban gambit was the incontrovertible fact that the placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba was no worse on the face of it than the placement of American missiles in Turkey. Thus,

Kennedy knew the carrot would have to be proffered and would have to be a real carrot, not a pale imitation.²⁰

But Kennedy was also aware that the price Khrushchev would demand would likely be too great if he employed the carrot too early. It was first necessary to impress the Soviet leader with his resolve and determination, thereby reducing the quid pro quo he would eventually have to come up with. This, of course, is where the blockade appealed to him for it offered a means of demonstrating firmness but also a device flexible enough to avoid the most serious hazards of a Soviet-American confrontation.²¹

The major point here is simply this: the genius of Kennedy's approach in the Cuban crisis was an early recognition that negotiations and concessions would be basic to a settlement of the crisis and that force alone would not make the Soviets back down. Therefore, conciliation would have to play a major role but only at the appropriate time, and that time would not come till Khrushchev was convinced of Kennedy's resolve. Coercion of a special type would be used (1) to demonstrate firmness and (2) to reduce the eventual cost of the quid pro quo Kennedy knew he must eventually pay.

Our object here is not to counter the well-known argument that American nuclear power and local conventional superiority played a vital role in the Cuban crisis. Clearly they did. What we have tried to demonstrate is that given the nature of the situation and the somewhat desperate plight of Khrushchev, Kennedy knew that accommodative measures would be essential to a peaceful settlement of the crisis.²² But first he had to jolt Khrushchev away from the ill-considered and aggressive track he was on, back to the blustering but nonetheless basically sensible Khrushchev of the past. A firm but low-profile type of coercion—the blockade—was selected for this purpose. Once this had been accomplished, Kennedy felt he could move on to the accommodative track.

Our point here is that although a basically accommodative strategy like positive diplomacy was not suitable for the overall Cuban crisis, accommodation as a tactic played an even more important role in the Cuban missile crisis than it is usually given

credit for. It is necessary to remember that an accommodative strategy consists of more than specific concessions, such as the pledge not to invade Cuba and to eventually remove the American missiles from Turkey. It also involves other things, such as the limitation of the demands made and the use of force in a manner that indicates a desire for accommodation and a solution to the problem.

In the Cuban crisis, Kennedy was careful to limit his demands on Khrushchev to the immediate problem—removal of the missiles from Cuba and cessation of any further introduction of such weapons. Thus, the president carefully avoided making much larger demands that would engage the prestige and integrity of the Soviet Union more directly—for example, demanding that all Soviet weapons and advisers be withdrawn from Cuba. Reducing his demands to only the most immediate and vital US concerns followed sound principles of crisis management. It made it easier for Khrushchev to yield than would have been the case had he been faced with much broader demands.²³

Thus, limitation of demands to only the most vital concerns was one way a desire for accommodation was signaled even in the early stages of the crisis. Another method of signaling a desire for accommodation was the cautious use of force. The blockade represented a device that preserved options for the president, provided flexibility, and signaled the Soviets that while we would be firm in protecting our vital interests (i.e., preventing offensive missiles from reaching and remaining in Cuba), we nonetheless desired to avoid a direct military confrontation. Actions that we took after the blockade had been established—for example, moving the line of blockading ships closer to Cuba to give the Soviets more time to consider their position—further emphasized our desire to avoid a confrontation and reach an accommodation.

We should note here that a hard-line faction in the ExComm favored strong military action, especially an air strike to take out the missiles.²⁴ The crisis thus followed the same general pattern of earlier crises—Quemoy and the two Berlin crises—where a small group of civilian hard-liners (in all three cases Dean Acheson was

a leader of this group), supported by key military leaders including most of the Joint Chiefs, advocated strong military action. In each of these four crises the more aggressive military options were vetoed by the president—twice by Eisenhower (the Quemoy and the 1958–59 Berlin crises) and twice by Kennedy (the 1961 Berlin crisis and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962).

The options proposed by the hard-liners in these four crises included such approaches as using nuclear weapons against the Chinese mainland (Quemoy, 1958), using a division-size “task force” to push through to Berlin if the East Germans held up access (Berlin, 1958–59 and 1961), and a quick, “surgical” air strike (Cuba, 1962). Had these actions been carried out, the results in all likelihood would have been disastrous because they would have left the Soviets and Chinese with little choice except escalation. In all these crises, the voices of the hawkish civilians and military leaders were influential, but fortunately the judgment and personality of the president proved adequate to the challenge. Both Eisenhower and Kennedy possessed the self-confidence, international political sophistication, and common sense to resist these calls for ill-considered actions.²⁵ Unfortunately for the country, another president, Lyndon B. Johnson, did not possess these qualities, and the result was an inexorable descent into the morass of Vietnam.²⁶

Had the advice of the hard-line group been accepted by Kennedy, an air strike on the missile sites and other targets would have taken place.²⁷ Such a strike would almost certainly have resulted in the deaths of a considerable number of Soviet personnel, leaving Khrushchev with the unpalatable choices of escalation on the one hand or humiliation on the other. Though Kennedy considered the air strike option carefully, he gradually came to realize, by mentally placing himself in Khrushchev’s shoes, that the air strike would put the Soviet leader in a position from which it would be difficult to retreat.²⁸

The problem therefore became one of finding the means to demonstrate firmness on the vital issue of removing the missiles but a means that did not run an inordinate risk of precipitating

hostilities. Combined with this would have to be accommodative steps that left Khrushchev a graceful way to retreat. The result, of course, was selection of the blockade as the method of demonstrating firmness and later the selection of carrots as a means of permitting the Soviets to back down without total humiliation. It is interesting, of course, that the carrots—the pledge not to invade Cuba and the removal of the American missiles from Turkey—were suggested by Khrushchev as the *quid pro quo*, and these were in fact adopted by the Kennedy administration.²⁹

The Cuban missile crisis was thus an excellent example of coercive diplomacy but approximated positive diplomacy only in certain aspects. Force was used in a demonstrative limited fashion, along with certain inducements, to persuade the opponent to adopt a certain course of action. In the final analysis, Kennedy had to employ an ultimatum to bring Khrushchev to the point where he agreed to withdraw the missiles from Cuba. Fortunately, the result was successful.

In his restrained use of force, the careful timing of his moves, the avoidance of actions that might cause the adversary to escalate, and his coordination of politico-diplomatic and military activity, Kennedy effectively followed sound crisis-management principles. In many respects, these principles follow our model of positive diplomacy.³⁰ However, as we noted earlier, the peculiar nature of the Cuban situation—Khrushchev's deception and aggressiveness and Kennedy's requirement to demonstrate firmness before using accommodative tactics—made it difficult if not impossible to initially employ our model.

As we have observed, many of the features we have singled out as being necessary for successful positive diplomacy were present. Communication in the latter stages of the crisis was good, proceeding through several different channels. The dynamics of the bargaining process were excellent in the late stages, with a high degree of tacit bargaining developing between Khrushchev and Kennedy. The personalities of the two key decision makers lent emphasis to this process, with both Kennedy and Khrushchev demonstrating impressive ability to empathize with their

adversary.³¹ Important concessions were proposed and accepted. Conditions favorable to positive diplomacy were present in all these respects.

But conditions unfavorable to positive diplomacy were more prominent. We have mentioned Khrushchev's aggressive intentions and Kennedy's psychological need to demonstrate resolve. In addition, the structure of the situation, including geographical factors, heavily favored the United States. The result was an asymmetry of motivation that gave the United States a decided psychological advantage. Clearly it considered the interests involved more important than did the Soviet Union.³² Relative military capabilities, both local conventional capabilities and strategic nuclear capabilities, also heavily favored the United States. The end result was an overall situation in which the defender considered its own vital interests threatened by clear aggression and saw little or no legitimacy in the objectives of the initiator of the crisis. Further, the defender possessed obvious advantages in the means necessary to "persuade" the adversary to rethink his course of action. The result, of course, was a US victory, at least in the short run.

Unfortunately, the "victory" was not so beneficial to the United States in the long run. Though the Soviet Union was not totally humiliated, its perception of humiliation because of military inferiority was strong enough to make it determined to avoid a repetition. The result was the beginning of a massive buildup of the Soviet military, particularly in naval forces and strategic nuclear capability. In the long run this was clearly to the disadvantage of the United States.³³

What, then, can we learn from the Cuban missile crisis about positive diplomacy? First, its use as a strategy is impractical in many crisis situations, especially those where it is clear that the initiator's intentions are aggressive and lack legitimacy, that common interests are minimal or totally lacking, and that there are substantial disparities between the adversaries in relative strength and motivation. In such situations, positive diplomacy is not likely

to be effective, at least not until the initiator has been jolted off the aggressive track by firmness.

Despite the fact that the Cuban crisis was resolved with a strategy that was essentially one of coercive diplomacy (as opposed to positive diplomacy), many aspects of the crisis reflected principles of positive diplomacy at its best. For example, military force was used very cautiously, there was a commendable effort on both sides to empathize with the adversary, and inducements (in our judgment at least) played an even more significant role than most people think.

We have attempted here to address the question of positive diplomacy's potential effectiveness in the Cuban missile crisis. Would positive diplomacy, utilizing conciliatory steps at an earlier stage and with greater emphasis, have been likely to produce more satisfactory results than in fact occurred? We think not, for the simple reason that the situation was one that in critical essentials, especially in the early stages, did not lend itself to a strategy of positive diplomacy. Perhaps the greatest lesson we can learn about positive diplomacy from this crisis is that positive diplomacy, like coercive diplomacy, is highly context dependent and certain conditions must be present for it to be successful. If these conditions are not present, or are present but at inadequate levels, then some other strategy must be adopted.

Vietnam

Let us briefly address the same basic questions in the case of Vietnam. Would a more accommodative strategy, perhaps one closely resembling positive diplomacy, have been appropriate in the case of Vietnam? Were the necessary conditions present in Vietnam to make such a policy workable? Or was a policy of coercive diplomacy (which was in fact the strategy attempted by the Johnson administration in the early phases of the war) an appropriate strategy that was simply poorly executed?

Our comments on Vietnam will be relatively brief and in no way be intended as a systematic analysis of that war. We will not attempt to apply all the criteria we have used in examining the other cases we have surveyed. This is due in part to space limitations and partly to the fact that the Vietnam situation was not a temporary crisis (as were our other cases) but rather a long, drawn-out war. Nonetheless, a few comments may provide added perspective to our study on the role of coercion and inducements in international bargaining. After all, Vietnam was an event of monumental importance to the foreign policy of the United States and certainly a major failure in the use of both sticks and carrots.

As numerous observers have noted, the very success of American coercive diplomacy in the Cuban missile crisis may have been a reason for the failure of this same strategy in Vietnam. So successful was Kennedy in using the techniques of coercive diplomacy to manage conflict in the Cuban situation that an unbridled omniscience surged through his administration, the feeling that international crises could be managed and conflict molded to one's will by selectively and skillfully using techniques of bargaining with force to face down adversaries. Following the president's death, many former staffers took this brash confidence with them into the new Johnson administration.³⁴

The plain fact was, however, that the situation in Vietnam was not analogous to the Cuban crisis. As George, Hall, and Simon have pointed out, Vietnam was much more closely analogous to the crisis in Laos during the early 1960s: both were cases of internal wars between rival groups with each side receiving support from outside powers.³⁵ In both the Laos and Vietnam cases, the United States became involved in supporting the side that appeared to be having extreme difficulty. In each case, multiple actors were present—the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, as well as Laos, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam. By contrast, the Cuban missile crisis was essentially a direct United States-Soviet Union confrontation. In short, there were major differences between Vietnam and the Cuban missile crisis, but in many respects both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations proceeded

as though the success in Cuba could be transferred to the predicament in Southeast Asia.

Alexander George has specified eight conditions that he feels must be substantially present in order for the strong form of coercive diplomacy to be successful.³⁶ These include (1) strength of US motivation, (2) asymmetry of motivation favoring the United States, (3) clarity of American objectives, (4) sense of urgency to achieve American objectives, (5) adequate domestic political support, (6) usable military options, (7) the opponent's fear of unacceptable escalation, and (8) clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement. In George's opinion, all eight of these conditions were present in the Laos and Cuban crises but at least six of them were absent in the Vietnam situation.³⁷ According to George and his fellow authors, it was therefore not surprising that Johnson's attempt to use the strong variant of coercive diplomacy failed. Forced by that failure to use the weaker version of coercive diplomacy (the try-and-see variant), the Johnson administration found it also unsuitable and a strategy that soon had American forces bogged down in a war of attrition.

As we have already seen, coercive diplomacy and positive diplomacy employ both sticks and carrots. In the former, the stick tends to be the dominant element in the strategy while the carrot is a necessary ingredient but less important than the coercive element. In positive diplomacy, the two aspects—coercion and accommodation—are much more equal, with the accommodative element generally more important than the coercive.

Our chief concern here is to determine (1) whether coercive diplomacy was inappropriate for Vietnam and (2) whether positive diplomacy, employing a more accommodative approach, would have been more successful. In our judgment, George and his colleagues are precisely on target in their belief that coercive diplomacy was an inappropriate strategy for Vietnam. The conditions for successful coercive diplomacy were not present to begin with, and the ineptness of the techniques used by the Johnson administration doubtless would have ensured failure even had some of them been present. The plain fact was that the opponent

was the party with the most vital interests at stake and hence the superior motivation. Moreover, it was North Vietnam and the Vietcong that had strong domestic support and feared escalation the least. It was North Vietnam and its confederates in South Vietnam that possessed the resolve to reach a clear objective they never lost sight of—the independence and reunification of their country under the banner of North Vietnam.

There were other factors that militated against American and South Vietnamese use of coercive diplomacy toward North Vietnam. First of all was American reluctance to use strong coercive tactics because of fear of possible reactions from the Soviet Union and especially China. The lessons of Korea were strongly imbedded in the thinking of American policymakers, including Johnson.³⁸ This dictated a gradual, incremental, strategy characterized by a constant and more than slightly apprehensive over-the-shoulder look at China. With this fear motivating the president's thinking (and even his target selection), any strong version of coercive diplomacy was clearly out of the question.³⁹

The weaker version of coercive diplomacy also proved inappropriate. The threat that was intended to be conveyed by Johnson's bombing campaign that began in the spring of 1965 was never judged a fully credible threat by the North Vietnamese. To be effective, the threat would have conveyed a message that promised greater punishment in the future if the North Vietnamese failed to comply. Such a message was never clearly and explicitly transmitted to Hanoi.

Not only was the threat of future punishment never made clear, the actions we required the North Vietnamese to take in order for us to halt the bombing were never made explicit. As Roger Fisher has pointed out, our demand in March 1965 that the North Vietnamese "stop aggression" was so vague and ill defined as to be virtually meaningless.⁴⁰

Clearly the use of force in Vietnam was badly handled. One can argue, as many have, that we might have been successful had force been applied massively and consistently and at an earlier date. This argument contends that the incremental approach killed us. Others

have argued that our failure was due to our inability to understand guerrilla warfare and that an earlier and stronger emphasis on effective counterinsurgency operations might have saved us and the South Vietnamese from defeat. Our own judgment is that both these views are wrong, though the latter seems more plausible than the former. It is our view, one now widely shared, that given the nature of the conflict—a civil war that had been going on for nearly a quarter of a century—the war was simply unwinnable.

It is commonly argued that a full-fledged, unrestricted bombing campaign could have won the war. Considering the results of strategic bombing in World War II and also the fact that Vietnam was a preindustrial society, there is considerable reason to doubt this assertion.⁴¹ Available evidence indicates the North Vietnamese were prepared to fight on regardless of how much the American bombing campaign accelerated. The only solution, therefore, was to turn North Vietnam into a desert, to “bomb them back to the Stone Age” as Gen Curtis E. LeMay supposedly put it.⁴² Clearly such a “victory,” even if obtainable, would have been a hollow one and would doubtless have reaped a massive amount of negative world opinion for the United States.⁴³

Many military men and some civilians still insist that an invasion of North Vietnam by American forces could have produced victory. There is no assurance that this would have been the case; indeed, it might well have degenerated into a prolonged guerrilla war or escalated into a struggle with Chinese army units poised on the border between North Vietnam and China. And as George Herring points out, even had an American/South Vietnamese invasion been successful, we would then have had the unenviable, expensive task of policing a hostile, desolated country on the doorstep of an alarmed and angry China.⁴⁴ Prospects for the rapprochement with China, which was later carried out under Nixon and which was so politically important for our global foreign policy, might well have vanished entirely.

Thus, in hindsight it seems highly improbable that the use of any type of military power could have brought a lasting victory in Vietnam. Even as early as late 1963, informed observers such as

Roger Hilsman (at that time director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the State Department) were convinced that any type of meaningful success in Vietnam would have to be accomplished through political and social programs, not through military actions. Said Hilsman, "In the State Department, we were convinced that the only way the Vietcong could be defeated in a permanent, political sense was through a political and social program to which military measures were subordinated."⁴⁵

Assuming, then, that the stick was not appropriate for the Vietnam situation (or at least was inappropriately used), would greater accommodation have provided a more effective means of reaching a better outcome? Our short answer to that question is a qualified yes, provided it had been applied relatively early and provided also that force had been used in a low-profile mode. What we are saying is that an approach utilizing positive diplomacy, while it would not have prevented North Vietnam from dominating South Vietnam, would have doubtlessly reduced American and Vietnamese losses greatly—with a final result no worse, and possibly better, than what in fact occurred.

Utilizing those factors we have discussed throughout this study, let us now consider in greater detail why force failed in Vietnam, why accommodation was inadequately and inappropriately used, and why a more judicious employment of accommodation might have produced not "victory" but rather a less undesirable outcome. Because of their importance in the case of Vietnam, we will pay particular attention to the structure of the situation and personality factors.

Structure of the Situation

As already observed several times, this was essentially an indigenous struggle, a civil war. Far more than an example of Communist expansion, as many leading American policymakers (including the president) perceived it, the conflict represented the continuing explosion of a powerful Vietnamese nationalism. Outside powers—the United States, China, and the Soviet

Union—could lend assistance to their client-states, but none of these could exercise control over the revolution. Obsessed by their long and costly struggle for independence from one colonial power (France), the followers of Ho Chi Minh had no intention of surrendering to what they considered another colonial power (the United States). Because of this fact, plus realities of geography (difficult terrain and location on China's doorstep), the United States and its allies in South Vietnam stood little chance of being successful. The lack of a viable political structure in South Vietnam and the resulting lack of popular support among the Vietnamese population for the American-backed government of South Vietnam made failure a virtual certainty.

Thus, coercion by the United States would be no more likely to turn back the revolutionary tide in Vietnam than force had been successful in stemming the French Revolution of 1789, or the Russian Revolution of 1917, or the Chinese Revolution that swept the Middle Kingdom and brought victory to Mao Tse-tung's forces in 1949. As Ernest R. May has said, a better understanding by American policymakers of Vietnam's history and culture "might also have led to recognition that the conflict in Vietnam was in many if not most respects a civil war, the determining forces of which were outgrowths of the Vietnamese past and likely to be affected only marginally by foreigners."⁴⁶

But if coercion was unlikely to be successful in a situation featuring civil war and a long-continuing revolutionary struggle by a determined foe, was the structure of the Vietnam conflict susceptible to solution by a more accommodative approach—by an earlier and more effective use of the carrot? Our answer, as we noted earlier, is yes, but only if certain qualifications are made. Accommodation could have reduced America's losses and brought a much earlier settlement of the war. But this would have happened only if we had recognized and accepted the following realities: (1) that the conflict was a civil war resulting from a long revolutionary struggle; (2) that it involved at its core far more fundamental elements than simply a struggle between democratic and Communist forces, being essentially a social modernization

process in which new groups were entering the political life of Vietnam; (3) that because of this fact, the struggle was not winnable by the United States any more than it was winnable by the French; (4) that because of the strength and determination of the North Vietnamese, the equal determination of the Vietcong, and the lack of a viable political structure in the South, it was highly probable or inevitable that the forces of Ho Chi Minh would eventually dominate the country; and (5) that the struggle did not directly affect vital American interests.

Vietnam, then, from the standpoint of situational context, was basically a no-win situation for the United States. Insisting on applying our containment policy to an internal struggle thousands of miles from our shores was one major error. Interpreting the struggle as a military threat rather than the political threat it was, was a second major error. Allowing our initial commitments and rhetoric to become the rationale for additional commitments was a third tragic miscalculation.⁴⁷ And perhaps the greatest error of all was our failure to admit that there are certain conflicts in the world that, regardless of our feelings about them, are simply not deterrable by military force. Indeed, some of them are simply not deterrable by any means. As Alexander George and Richard Smoke put it:

In retrospect there seem to be good reasons for believing the threat posed by Hanoi to South Vietnam, at least (and perhaps to Laos as well), was simply not deterrable by deterrence policy the United States could have been willing to attempt. If at that time the U.S. had possessed a deterrence theory with a better-defined scope which was capable of differentiating deterrable from nondeterrable threats, the U.S. might not have made the deterrence commitments it later felt it had to fulfill in order to maintain its general credibility.⁴⁸

Thus, the overall situation was not one that was susceptible to solution by military means. True, the United States had military options in Vietnam, but none of them were really viable options because of the political context of the situation. As George and Smoke point out, "The United States must possess practical, usable, and specific military options, and applying these options

must be politically feasible.”⁴⁹ Applying this maxim to Vietnam, they concluded:

Hanoi never doubted overall American military power, nor the intent of American decision-makers to protect South Vietnam and Laos. What Hanoi doubted—essentially rightly—was first, America’s capacity to find specific military options that would be effective against guerrilla attack; and second, the domestic political feasibility for the U.S. of applying effective military options over an extended period of time.⁵⁰

Vital interests and resolve certainly did not favor the United States. The asymmetry of motivation clearly was on the side of North Vietnam and the Vietcong. We continually failed to recognize this fact because of our insistence on interpreting the struggle as one featuring external aggression rather than what it actually was—a civil war.

Communication between the parties in the Vietnam War was poor throughout. The United States and North Vietnam talked past each other during almost the entire struggle. Again this was in no small part due to our failure to see the conflict for what it was. Had we recognized that the fundamental values at stake for the North Vietnamese and their allies in South Vietnam were fueled essentially by an intense nationalism (not a messianic drive for Communist worldwide expansion), we would doubtless have reached the conclusion much earlier that a military solution was not possible and that some form of negotiated compromise was essential.

In summary, the structure of the situation, a civil war featuring a struggle for independence from colonial rule, was one that was not likely to be solved by outside coercion. The nature of the conflict—a dedicated and unified North Vietnam, committed deeply to a cause, against a divided, shakily committed South Vietnam—meant that the asymmetry of motivation favored North Vietnam. Because the meaning of the struggle was misperceived and the determination of the opponent underestimated, adequate communication failed to develop. With poor communication, the healthy dynamics of a reciprocal bargaining process failed to take hold. As we have seen, certain military options were available to

the United States, but none of them were really viable considering the nature of the situation.

Thus, the use of coercion—coercive diplomacy—was not favored. The use of positive diplomacy was not favored either, if one's goal was to achieve a victory in Vietnam. However, if one accepted the premise that the only thing possible in that Southeast Asian country was some form of compromise, then the intelligent use of positive diplomacy could have brought that about. But this could have occurred only if certain personality types, receptive to the tenets of positive diplomacy, had been guiding American policy. This was not the case, and especially not where the president, Lyndon Johnson, was concerned.

The Role of Personality

Vietnam is a classic case illustrating the powerful effect personality can have on foreign policy. One has only to read Doris Kearns's biography of Lyndon Johnson to see, stunningly revealed in his own words, the belief system and personality traits that were to be instrumental in impaling the United States on the horns of the Vietnam dilemma for over five critical years. True, one cannot fault Johnson alone or lay at the door of his personality total responsibility for the debacle in that distant Asian land. Both circumstances and many other individuals and nations must share the blame. Still, even a cursory review of the president's words and actions provides a depressing look at a man whose overall background and personality left him tragically ill equipped to deal with a complicated foreign policy issue like Vietnam. Had he been in a less exalted position, the effects might have been less serious. His actions as president, however, resulted in a foreign policy disaster.

Probably better than any single case, Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam illustrate the key lessons we have attempted to present in this book. No case represents so dramatically and tragically how those things that have acted as inhibiting factors on the use of accommodation have adversely affected our politico-military

policy. Those factors include the obsessive fear of anything labeled Communist; the fascination with slogans like *containment* and their application to inappropriate circumstances; the confusion of “means” with “ends”; the unwarranted use of inapplicable historical analogies like “Munich”; the inability or unwillingness to resist domestic political pressures that produced poor decisions in foreign policy; the apparent inability to see that rhetoric (as opposed to facts) was increasingly shaping Vietnam policy; the failure to see that no vital American interests were involved except those created by the words of American policymakers; and, probably worst of all, the near total inability to see that the human and materiel costs involved were far greater than any gain that was even remotely achievable. As Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., has said:

Prudence implies the old theological principle of proportionality—the principle that means must bear a rational relationship to ends. American intervention in Vietnam lost its last claim to legitimacy when the means employed and the destruction wrought grew out of any rational relationship to the interests threatened and the objectives sought.⁵¹

To Lyndon Johnson, Vietnam was a test—a test of his courage, his political ability, his determination, and even his manliness. After lamenting at one point about how the war in Southeast Asia was interfering with his “Great Society” programs, Johnson warned:

But if I left that war and let the Communists take over South Vietnam, then I would be seen as a coward and my nation would be seen as an appeaser and we would both find it impossible to accomplish anything for anybody anywhere on the entire globe.⁵²

Heavily influenced like most men of his generation by the events of the 1930s and 1940s, Johnson was drawn to historical examples like the appeasement of Hitler at Munich and the “loss” of China in 1949. With little if any careful analysis of their applicability to Vietnam, the president (as well as his secretary of state and others) chose to apply them to the war in that country. Said Johnson:

Yet everything I knew about history told me that if I got out of Vietnam and let Ho Chi Minh run through the streets of Saigon, then I'd be doing exactly what Chamberlain did in World War II. I'd be giving a big fat reward to aggression. And I knew that if we let Communist aggression succeed in taking over South Vietnam, there would follow in this country an endless national debate—a mean and disruptive debate—that would shatter my Presidency, kill my administration and damage our democracy. I knew that Harry Truman and Dean Acheson had lost their effectiveness from the day that the Communists took over in China. I believed that the loss of China had played a role in the rise of Joe McCarthy. And I knew that all these things taken together, were chickenshit compared with what might happen if we lost Vietnam.⁵³

But in addition to laboring under these beliefs, inappropriate to the Vietnam situation, Johnson was afflicted with a complicated, contradictory personality—aggressive and dominating on the surface but riddled underneath by deep and destructive insecurities. Speculating on what would happen if he failed to persevere in Vietnam, he painted a vivid picture of what might be said of his manliness:

For this time there would be Robert Kennedy out in front leading the fight against me, telling everyone that I had betrayed John Kennedy's commitment to South Vietnam. That I had let a democracy fall into the hands of the Communists. That I was a coward. An unmanly man. A man without a spine. Oh, I could see it coming all right. Every night when I fell asleep I would see myself tied to the ground in the middle of a long, open space. In the distance, I could hear the voices of thousands of people. They were all shouting at me and running toward me: "Coward! Traitor! Weakling!" They kept coming closer. They began throwing stones. At exactly that moment I would generally wake up . . . terribly shaken.⁵⁴

Again it must be said that the president was far from the only important player whose personality and belief system had been shaped by the events of the 1930s, World War II, and the years of cold war with the Soviets. Key individuals like Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, and National Security Adviser Walter W. Rostow held much the same views, though McNamara's would later dramatically change. Nor were others free of personality traits that impacted negatively on Vietnam policy—Rostow being a case in point. Still it was the

president who made the final decisions, the man whose beliefs and personality traits made the greatest impact. Unfortunately, at least in the case of Vietnam, the impact was a negative one. As Doris Kearns put it:

In bequeathing him the problem of Vietnam, history presented Lyndon Johnson with issues alien to his experience, resistant to his method of leadership, yet decisive for his Presidency.

That was a historic misfortune, for Johnson and for America. But Johnson was not simply a victim of circumstance. Destiny and victimization are not the same. The latter assumes neither an act of will nor even a motivating passion; the circumstances appear as exclusively external, arbitrary, and exorbitant. But Lyndon Johnson's decision to escalate the war in Vietnam was his own, the product of his beliefs, inward needs, and the public experience of decades.⁵⁵

Outlook for Accommodation

Thus, personality and domestic political factors were not such as to encourage the use of genuine, realistic accommodation in the case of Vietnam. The personality of the key player in the drama, Lyndon Johnson, was driven by the need to prove himself strong to the influential foreign policy establishment, to the country's powerful right wing (which Johnson feared), to the Kennedys and their supporters, and to himself.

It is true that he looked on Vietnam as basically a situation calling for astute bargaining involving ultimately negotiable issues. Utilizing force in a controlled and careful fashion, he was convinced he could ultimately force the North Vietnamese to the bargaining table and achieve a negotiated end to the struggle. Confident of his unquestioned ability as a negotiator in American politics, he hoped to cover his inexperience and insecurity in foreign affairs by forcing situations like Vietnam into the more familiar operating framework of domestic affairs. Like Procrustes, however, he found the fit a difficult one. He simply failed to understand that what he considered negotiable, the North Vietnamese did not. Totally misperceiving the nature of the

Vietnam conflict, largely unfamiliar with the history and culture of that small nation, grossly underestimating the difficulties in successfully applying coercive diplomacy, Johnson stood little chance from the beginning of achieving a happy outcome.

True, Johnson wanted negotiations but *on his schedule* and *on his terms*. Following the precepts of NSC-68, the president and his advisers did not want serious negotiations until a "situation of strength" had been built up; the long-held belief in "negotiation from strength" was alive and well in Johnson's administration. There was a serious problem, however; building strength required getting involved in an ever-deeper military commitment in a situation that basically called for political rather than military solutions.

There were numerous opportunities during the Vietnam War for the United States to pursue serious negotiations with the North Vietnamese. Intermediaries like Charles de Gaulle, Secretary U Thant of the United Nations, British prime minister Harold Wilson, and even Pope Paul made repeated efforts to get negotiations started. These efforts failed during Johnson's tenure in office for several reasons: (1) the North Vietnamese, aware of the unrest over the war in the United States, felt they could outlast America and were frequently intransigent; (2) the Johnson administration, though it made numerous proposals for negotiations, never made it clear in political terms what the North Vietnamese would have to do to get the United States to halt the bombing;⁵⁶ (3) both sides attempted to hold back in order to negotiate from a position of strength; (4) the Johnson administration, through its rhetoric about our commitment to a "free South Vietnam," had virtually ruled out a political compromise settlement, leaving military victory about the only way to avoid what would appear to be an American defeat;⁵⁷ and (5) because of our overblown and unrealistic rhetoric, we refused to acknowledge the real nature of the struggle and hence could not see what *realistic* options were actually available.

As we have indicated, a realistic policy of positive diplomacy could have brought a compromised political settlement much earlier than in fact occurred. This would have required that we (1)

carefully assess the legitimate interests of the opponent; (2) objectively assess our own national interests, placing ideological considerations in their proper perspective; and (3) recognize the struggle as a civil war and further acknowledge that in such a setting a political compromise was essential. Had these things been done, policymakers could have seen, much earlier, that a victory by South Vietnam was not possible. Had that been done, policy would have much earlier developed along the lines finally proposed by a discouraged Robert McNamara on 19 May 1968—essentially a plan calling for a coalition government of North and South Vietnamese (and Vietcong) and abandonment of the idea that we could guarantee a non-Communist South Vietnam.⁵⁸ True, this meant abandoning the idea of victory, but this is what the situation demanded.

Based on hindsight as to what in fact happened during the Vietnam War, it now seems that the best possible solution, soon after the United States became militarily involved and it became increasingly clear that a satisfactory military solution was unlikely, would have been a proposal to accept a total cease-fire and a coalition government pending nationwide elections under UN supervision. This would have undoubtedly meant a Communist victory in the elections and a takeover of the country by Ho Chi Minh and his forces. But this was clearly preferable to losing thousands of American and Vietnamese lives and billions of dollars, and still winding up with the same result.

But, protests the reader, that is hindsight after more than two decades, an easy but not a very fair assessment. Granted. To be fair, we must put ourselves in the atmosphere of the 1960s when Lyndon Johnson, Dean Rusk, and Robert McNamara had to make their decisions. It is far easier to look logically at Vietnam from the perspective of the 1980s than it was during those days when containment was virtually an untouchable doctrine and many intelligent people still perceived communism as a monolithic force bent on world domination, despite much evidence to the contrary.

We do not quarrel with the hindsight-is-unfair argument. What we contend here is that a standard policy featuring accommo-

dation—positive diplomacy—as a strong element could have prevented Vietnam from developing into the tragedy it did. Had the tenets of positive diplomacy been followed early, had we been able to employ such a policy to explore the situation in its early stages, perhaps we could have saved much of what we lost in Vietnam, most importantly American and Vietnamese lives.

For example, if the president, the National Security Council, and the State Department—facing a complicated political situation in Vietnam—had attempted a policy of positive diplomacy early in the crisis, the approach would have been far different. Possible common interests would have been carefully analyzed, every effort would have been made to “put oneself in the shoes of the adversary,” and legitimate vital interests of both parties would have been carefully assessed. A careful study of what might appeal to the opponent would have been made. As Roger Fisher has said:

In this era of nuclear weapons and deterrence the Department of Defense has become quite sophisticated about making threats. We have no comparable sophistication regarding the making of offers. This is true despite the fact that the process of exerting influence through offers is far more conducive to international peace than the process of exerting influence through threats.⁵⁹

Early in the crisis threats would have been limited to a low-profile display of force, communicating to the opponent an ability to use armed might if necessary but tacitly indicating a desire to avoid it if at all possible. If, however, the opponent had initiated violent action—as for example the Vietcong attacks on American forces at Bien Hoa and Pleiku—these would have been answered on a tit-for-tat basis, a strategy that considerable research indicates produces the most positive cooperative responses. (In the tit-for-tat strategy, a negative act is answered by a negative act, a positive act by a positive act.)⁶⁰ At the same time, as early as possible in the crisis, all available political approaches and solutions would have been under exploration. Possible negotiations would have been explored consistently and in a sincere fashion, not in the desultory and frequently skeptical manner that too often characterized the Johnson administration.⁶¹

In addition to these steps, possible carrots would have been carefully studied for their applicability to the situation. As Fisher points out, President Johnson's famous Johns Hopkins University speech on 7 April 1965, in which he proposed a billion-dollar Mekong River development project to aid Vietnam, simply had no appeal to the opponent. Not only did it smack of bribing the Vietnamese to give up their revolution and struggle for national independence, the nature of the project would have meant Vietnam would be invaded by an army of "capitalist" businessmen under control of the United States, hardly an attractive prospect to a Leninist-Marxist regime.⁶² The point is that if threats must possess credibility, certainly promises must also be credible. And one can hardly make a credible proposal for accommodation if there is no understanding of what motivates the opponent.

Clearly there is no way to prove positive diplomacy would have been successful in Vietnam. We think, however, that a very good case can be made that such a policy would have been far more successful than the policy we actually employed. Through the lower-force profile and a greater emphasis on accommodation, positive diplomacy at the very least would have produced more explicit bargaining and hence improved communication. Better communication would doubtless have clarified the extent of each party's interests and relative commitment and certainly should have made clearer to American policymakers the real nature of the struggle. Above all, by restricting the use of force to the very minimal levels of positive diplomacy, we could have bought time, avoiding the incremental military actions that increasingly turned the situation into a military problem rather than the political problem it actually was.

But all of these positive outcomes could not occur unless we had a commitment to a policy of positive diplomacy, or at least a very similar policy. This was not the case. Instead, our commitment was to a very different policy—containment, and to its instrument, deterrence. And the instrument, unfortunately, was conceived of primarily as a military tool. Without another more positive policy

in our tool kit, we lacked the instruments to avoid the tragedy of Vietnam.

In the final chapter, as we try to summarize our findings about positive diplomacy, we will again touch on its applicability to Vietnam. Clearly conditions in the Vietnam case were not conducive to its use. Virtually all the inhibiting factors that limit policies of conciliation were present, including personality types ill suited to accommodative strategies. Thus, in a real sense our discussion of what might have been is academic and irrelevant. In another sense it is not, because Vietnam is such a classic case of faulty policy, blindly followed, that it obviously offers many lessons about policies that clearly did not work. Thus, we can legitimately speculate that developing other policies such as positive diplomacy to meet similar future crises may make it possible to avoid the kind of military and political disaster that occurred in that little Southeast Asian country. However, for that to happen, such policies, as we have just indicated, must be accepted and available to policymakers. The *fact* of their lack of availability, their lack of prominence, and their lack of acceptability are the greatest inhibiting factors to their productive use.

Notes

1. There are, of course, a host of books and articles that deal with the missile crisis. Among the most interesting accounts are Elie Abel, *The Missile Crisis* (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1966); Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971); Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967); Robert F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days* (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Crest Publications, 1967); and Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1965).

2. For probably the best single analysis of coercive diplomacy, see Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William R. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), 211–45.

3. For a succinct discussion of the conditions Alexander L. George considers necessary for coercive diplomacy to work properly, see *ibid.*, 215–28.

4. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), 254.

5. For a good discussion of Soviet motives in the Cuban missile crisis and especially Khrushchev's desire to even up the strategic nuclear balance, see Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 126–56; see also Allison, 40–55. For an interesting account of Soviet views of the crisis, see Ronald R. Pope, *Soviet Views on the Cuban Missile Crisis: Myth and Reality in Foreign Policy Analysis* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982).

6. This point is emphasized repeatedly in Snyder and Diesing. There is considerable evidence in laboratory experiments with games that a strategy of unconditional cooperation will often result in the exploitation of the cooperating party by his opponent. See Martin Patchen, "Strategies for Eliciting Cooperation from an Adversary," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31, no. 1 (March 1987): 164–65. See also James Tedeschi et al., "Social Power and the Credibility of Promises," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 13 (1969): 253–61.

7. For a good discussion of the background factors that influenced Khrushchev in the Cuban missile crisis, see William Hyland and Richard W. Shryock, *The Fall of Khrushchev* (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1968), 3–18.

8. The Soviets had repeatedly assured the United States prior to the October crisis that they would refrain from causing international problems for the administration before the 1962 elections. On this point, see Abel, 19.

9. R. J. Leng and H. G. Wheeler found in their six case studies of international crises that a weak policy; that is, one of consistent appeasement, resulted in a diplomatic defeat for the appeaser in five cases and war in the sixth case. See R. J. Leng and H. G. Wheeler, "Influence Strategies, Success, and War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 23, no. 4 (1979): 655–84.

10. Snyder and Diesing, 248.

11. George, Hall, and Simons, 98–100. For additional evidence from the laboratory that strong players in games tend to exploit players perceived as weak, see studies by Leng and Wheeler and Tedeschi et al.

12. George, Hall, and Simons, 91.

13. *Ibid.*, 98.

14. Aside from his need to convince Khrushchev of his firmness, Kennedy felt vulnerable on the issue of Cuba from the standpoint of domestic politics. He therefore felt the need to act firmly and decisively on the missiles because of domestic political pressures, though clearly this was far from the only reason. Hilsman, 196–98.

15. Snyder and Diesing, 258.

16. On this point, see George, Hall, and Simons, 101.

17. For Robert Kennedy's account of his conversation with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, see Robert F. Kennedy, 106–9.

18. Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, trans. and ed. Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970), 493.

19. George, Hall, and Simons, 102.

20. Recently released tape recordings of the White House ExComm meeting of October 27, 1962, transcribed by McGeorge Bundy (who was a member of the ExComm group), indicate President Kennedy was apparently resigned to the fact that he would probably have to wind up trading removal of the missiles in Cuba for removal of the American missiles in Turkey. In Kennedy's view, world public opinion would probably regard the Soviet offer to remove their missiles in Cuba for ours in Turkey as "a pretty good proposition." McGeorge Bundy, transcriber, and James Blight, ed., "October 27, 1962: Transcripts of the Meetings of the ExComm," *International Security* 12, no. 3 (Winter 1987-1988): 13-14, 57-59.

21. For an interesting description of Kennedy's reasoning in favor of the blockade option, see Sorensen, 694.

22. George, Hall, and Simons, 102.

23. *Ibid.*, 26.

24. For a good discussion of the reasoning of the civilian and military "hawks," see Allison, 197-99.

25. Kennedy, whose confidence in military advice had been badly shaken by the Bay of Pigs fiasco, came out of the Cuban missile crisis with little improvement in his feelings about such advice. This feeling was no doubt accentuated by statements such as the one made by Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay *after* the Soviets had agreed on 27 October to remove their missiles from Cuba. Suggested LeMay on 28 October after learning of the Soviet backdown, "We (should) attack Monday in any case." Allison, 206.

26. For an interesting account of Kennedy's role in Vietnam and some informed speculation about what he might have done about Vietnam had he lived, see William J. Rust, *Kennedy in Vietnam: American Vietnam Policy, 1960-1963* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1985).

27. In addition to Acheson and the Joint Chiefs, there were some other prominent civilians strongly in favor of strong military action like an air strike. These included Paul Nitze, Douglas Dillon, and John McCone, none of whom were Kennedy's natural political allies. Allison, 198.

28. Robert Kennedy stresses the amount of time the president spent trying to place himself in Khrushchev's shoes. Kennedy, 124-26. Llewellyn Thompson, American ambassador to the Soviet Union and one of the most influential advisers to the president during the crisis, was very impressed with Kennedy's ability to empathize with his adversary. Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson, interview by Elizabeth Donahue, 25 March 1964, 5, Oral History project, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston.

29. Letter, Nikita Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy, 26 October 1962, Box 84-190, NSF Countries File, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston.

30. For a discussion of crisis management principles, see George, Hall, and Simons, 8–11.

31. In his memoir on the Cuban missile crisis, Robert F. Kennedy said President Kennedy “spent more time trying to determine the effect of a particular course of action on Khrushchev or the Russians than on any other phase of what he was doing.” Kennedy, 124.

32. *Ibid.*, 131. President Kennedy’s speech to the nation on 22 October 1962 includes a vivid description of US interests.

33. Robert A. Divine, ed., *The Cuban Missile Crisis* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), 155.

34. John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 231–32.

35. George, Hall, and Simons, 212.

36. George identifies two variants of coercive diplomacy: the strong, or tacit ultimatum type, and the try-and-see approach. The first, as the name implies, features time limits in which the threats will be implemented if the demands are not met. The try-and-see approach is a weaker form, featuring attempts to persuade an opponent to do something but usually proceeding only one step at a time and with usually no time limits or sense of urgency. *Ibid.*, 27–28.

37. Those conditions *absent* in Vietnam, according to Alexander George, were (2) asymmetry of motivation favoring the United States; (3) clarity of American objectives; (4) sense of urgency to achieve American objectives; (5) adequate domestic political support; (7) the opponent’s fear of unacceptable escalation; and (8) clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement. *Ibid.*, 227.

38. Ernest R. May, *Lessons of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 105.

39. Lyndon B. Johnson, *The Vantage Point* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971), 370.

40. Roger Fisher, *International Conflict for Beginners* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 81–82.

41. George C. Herring, “Why the United States Failed in Vietnam,” in *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy*, ed. Thomas G. Paterson, vol. 2, *Since 1914* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Co., 1984), 631.

42. Quoted in David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (New York: Random House, 1969), 462.

43. Like the war in Vietnam, the Korean War also failed to demonstrate that air power could be decisive against a relatively primitive society. Max Hastings, *The Korean War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 266–69.

44. Herring, 632.

45. Hilsman, 524.

46. May, 120.

47. Barbara W. Tuchman, *The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1984), 374–75.
48. Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 79–80.
49. *Ibid.*, 81–82.
50. *Ibid.*, 82.
51. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Cycles of American History* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1986), 83.
52. Doris Kearns, *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1976), 252.
53. *Ibid.*, 252–53.
54. *Ibid.*, 253.
55. *Ibid.*, 284.
56. Fisher, 81–84.
57. Townsend Hoopes, *The Limits of Intervention* (New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1969), 125.
58. *The Pentagon Papers*, as published by the *New York Times* (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), 535–37, 577–85.
59. Fisher, 106.
60. Patchen, 171.
61. Hoopes, 119–25.
62. Fisher, 109.

Part 3

Summary

Chapter 10

Sticks, Carrots, and Positive Diplomacy: A Review

In this chapter we summarize what we think we have learned about positive diplomacy in the preceding chapters. First, however, we should review the purpose of the book and the scope of the subject.

Since the end of World War II the United States has relied very heavily on the use of military force to influence the decisions of other states. As Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan have documented, there were 215 instances between 1946 and 1975 in which the United States used force, directly or indirectly, to persuade other states not to do something or to do something they would not have done otherwise.¹ Philip D. Zelikow has identified an additional 44 instances between 1975 and 1982.² And since 1982 there have been a considerable number of other instances, including our invasion of Grenada in 1983, our raid on Libya in 1986, the invasion of Panama in 1989, and Operation Desert Storm in 1991.

In a number of these cases, force was used in an exemplary fashion, even from the demanding perspective of positive diplomacy. In a number of critical situations, the United States was able to combine restrained force (the stick) with some combination of accommodation (the carrot) to effectively achieve political objectives. The 1958 Quemoy crisis, as we have seen, was one of these, as was the Berlin crisis that same year. John F. Kennedy's handling of the 1961 Laos crisis was another example. The 1961 Berlin crisis, as we have noted, was in many respects an important example of the effective use of carrots and sticks, but, in our judgment, the stick was overemphasized. The 1962 Cuban missile

crisis represented the skillful use of coercion and accommodation, while Vietnam represented just the opposite.

It must be remembered, of course, that the vast majority of the nearly 300 instances in which force has been used by the United States since World War II were less serious than these cases. Probably not more than 40 (or only about 13 percent) could be classified as dramatic confrontations or—as Blechman and Kaplan put it—“points at which world tensions, which usually rise or fall only in small increments, increased sharply.”³ These more serious crises have been the focus of our attention.

We have attempted to do a number of things in this book, probably too many, but the major objectives can be summarized fairly briefly. We have tried (1) to demonstrate that the United States has too frequently relied on military force to secure political objectives without fully understanding the relationship between force and diplomacy, between sticks and carrots; (2) to show that military force, in the majority of situations (though not all), can be most effective when combined with various kinds of inducements; (3) to demonstrate that we have neglected conciliation and accommodation (carrots) in many situations; (4) to indicate why this has been true; (5) to show through case studies that the skillful blending of force with more accommodative steps (what we have called positive diplomacy) can often produce better results than a too-heavy reliance on force; (6) to point out that the effective use of accommodation is often discredited, or—perhaps more accurately—that the use of force, being more dramatic, often receives more credit than it deserves; and (7) perhaps most importantly, to show that—at least in the majority of international crises—the United States will achieve more desirable results by following from the outset a policy of positive diplomacy rather than an inflexible policy based largely on military coercion, or even deterrence.

The Role of Force

None of what we have said in this book is intended to relegate the use of military force to the dustbin of history. Force will continue to be an important means of achieving political objectives. As Blechman and Kaplan point out, the United States has frequently used force to good advantage, and it will continue to find the armed services an important instrument for achieving foreign policy objectives well into the next century. As of this writing, the war in the Persian Gulf seems to illustrate the fact that occasions will arise when only the strong application of force can achieve necessary objectives. Only time and future studies will determine whether an earlier application of effective deterrence and coercive diplomacy might have achieved better results.

Having said that, however, we must also point out that the major weakness in using force is that it rarely results in long-term solutions to complex international problems and often exacerbates them. In summarizing the results of their study of more than 200 situations involving the use of US armed forces, Blechman and Kaplan observe that the “success rate eroded sharply over time.”⁴ In short, their extensive study found that while the use of armed force to achieve political objectives was often successful in the near term, it generally failed to produce solutions that lasted very long (by their method of measurement anything over six months). Thus, the chief advantage of using armed force, at least according to the Blechman-Kaplan study, is that it often “delays unwanted developments” and therefore buys time to find other more permanent solutions. But the authors point out that

though there is some value in “buying time”—that is, keeping a situation open and flexible enough to prevent an adverse fait accompli—it should be recognized that these military operations cannot substitute for more fundamental policies and actions—diplomacy, close economic and cultural relations, an affinity of mutual interests and perceptions—which can form the basis of sound and successful alliances or for stable adversary relations. What political-military operations perhaps can do is provide a respite, a means of postponing adverse developments long enough to

formulate and implement new policies that may be sustainable over the longer term.⁵

It must be remembered, however, that force used aggressively and without obvious restraints will very often increase the opponent's will to resist. Rather than encouraging him to seek accommodation, unrestrained force will frequently encourage him to fight harder. The people of England under the German "blitz" of 1940 and the North Vietnamese facing the American bombing campaigns of the Vietnam War are prime examples.

The historical record therefore seems to indicate that while force can be useful for certain purposes and is a necessity in some circumstances, it has real limitations as an instrument to find long-lasting solutions to difficult problems. It can buy time to find diplomatic solutions. Clearly it is needed to oppose aggressors where the aggressing party has no interest in reasonable compromise and must be opposed by force, as in the case of Hitler and probably Saddam Hussein. It can provide the added leverage that, when introduced into a conflict equation between the powers, may in certain circumstances push the parties toward a settlement. But far too often it has negative effects, pushing the conflicting parties toward escalating the crisis, obscuring common interests, and stifling the communication process. To be effective as an instrument that encourages resolution of crises in which there is conflict but where neither party is bent on aggression and where each has some legitimate interests, force must be used in a careful, restrained, low-profile manner that communicates to the opponent a desire for compromise and a nonviolent settlement. Above all, it must be used in conjunction with diplomatic steps. Ideally it will be subordinate to those approaches.

The Role of Accommodation

Like the use of force, accommodative steps also present certain problems. The most serious, of course, is the obvious one: accommodation, especially if attempted too soon in a crisis, may

be interpreted by the opponent as weakness. If this occurs, the accommodating state may find its adversary applying more pressure under the illusion that his earlier aggressive moves had prompted the conciliatory steps. Following this theory, the aggressor state may conclude that a little more pressure will perhaps yield even greater dividends.⁶

This is a very real and serious problem for those favoring accommodative strategies. History provides many examples in which attempts at conciliation were greeted by even harsher pressure from the enemy. Again, Hitler serves as a prime example. Laboratory studies of conflict situations also confirm that the adversary may interpret accommodative strategies as weakness and try to take advantage of them.⁷

Hence, we arrive at the key problem addressed by this book: how can a nation, in this case the United States, formulate a strategy for handling foreign policy problems that does not suffer from excessive belligerence and inflexibility, while at the same time avoiding the appearance of weakness and overly accommodative behavior that may threaten real vital interests? As noted by Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing:

The problem of finding the appropriate mix between coercive and accommodative tactics is the central dilemma of international conflict, but finding the recipe and implementing it is beset by many uncertainties and pitfalls. Both coercion and accommodation rest on virtually self-contained but somewhat contradictory logics. Each logic has its weaknesses, which tend to be the obverse of the other's strengths. Thus, a blending of coercion and accommodation offsets the vulnerabilities of each of the pure strategies with countervailing elements of the other but without weakening too much the strengths of either. Any particular blend may be considered appropriate if the gain from offsetting the vulnerabilities is greater than the costs and risks introduced by the countervailing strategy.⁸

Snyder and Diesing are obviously correct. In the real world, strategies of pure coercion or pure accommodation are rarely followed. In virtually all cases, the strategy adopted is a mixture of coercion and accommodation. The question, of course, is how to determine the appropriate mix.

From the Snyder-Diesing perspective, the mix is appropriate “if the gain from offsetting the vulnerabilities is greater than the costs and risks introduced by the countervailing strategy.” Thus, as they point out, utilizing some accommodative measures in a basically coercive strategy may be desirable if it “reduces the risk of ‘provoking’ the opponent more than it increases the risk of being thought weak.” Likewise, an element of coercion in a basically accommodative strategy may be useful if it reduces the losses one has to accept in a compromise settlement more than it increases the risk of a dangerous escalation of the crisis.⁹

While this sounds logical in theory, in practice it is often exceedingly difficult to measure the relative risks involved. In the 1961 Berlin crisis, as we have already seen, the hard-liners in the Kennedy administration—primarily Dean Acheson and several key military leaders—were strongly in favor of a predominantly confrontational approach. Essentially their strategy was heavily weighted on the coercive side—increase military preparations, refuse to negotiate, demonstrate readiness for a showdown. The so-called soft-liners—led by Adlai Stevenson and two former ambassadors to the Soviet Union, Llewellyn Thompson and Averell Harriman—were opposed to this idea, believing it mistakenly slighted diplomacy and accommodation. Said Stevenson, “Maybe Dean is right, but his position should be the conclusion of a process of investigation, not the beginning.”¹⁰

Here, then, was a classic conflict over the classic dilemma of international politics. Do we begin with coercion or with accommodation? Or do we begin with a mixture of the two? And if we begin with one strategy, when do we introduce elements of the other?

As we have already seen, Kennedy used an uneasy mix of coercion and accommodation throughout the 1961 Berlin crisis. In our judgment, he overemphasized the coercive aspects of the strategy at certain times, and this would have negative effects later.¹¹ Still, in the latter part of the crisis he skillfully blended accommodative moves into his overall strategy and emerged from the immediate confrontation in a reasonably successful fashion.

The dispute between hard-liners and soft-liners in the 1961 Berlin crisis was characteristic of virtually every major postwar crisis involving the United States and the Soviet Union. Similar disputes had occurred at the highest policy levels during the 1948 Berlin blockade, the Korean War, the 1954 and 1958 crises over Taiwan and the offshore islands, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, and the Vietnam War. This is not surprising since in nearly every international conflict situation there are those who favor the accommodative approach of diplomacy and negotiations over the coercive approach of delaying negotiations until one has established resolve, usually through manipulation of military force.

On the surface, of course, this difference between hard-liners and soft-liners appears as simply a disagreement over preferred tactics and strategy. The former believe negotiations are useless, except from a position of strength. They see early accommodative moves as steps that can only encourage the opponent to become more aggressive. They worry endlessly that accommodation will make them appear weak, an image that must be avoided at all costs.¹² The soft-liners, on the other hand, see accommodative steps as a means of identifying common interests in the situation, as a means of establishing communication with the adversary, and as a way to prevent hardening of positions and dangerous escalation of the crisis.

Beneath these superficialities, however, lie some very fundamental differences in attitudes about international relations. As Snyder and Diesing point out, it is not simply disagreement over whether to "coerce first or accommodate first"; rather, it involves "a profound divergence in philosophies of international politics, comprising, among other things, divergent images of the opponent, different estimates of the proportion of common and conflicting interests in the situation, and different conceptions of the role of power in bargaining."¹³

Coercive Diplomacy or Positive Diplomacy?

Thus, in virtually all international conflict situations we will normally find at least three distinct groups at the highest policy level. The first group will favor a basically coercive policy with emphasis on military force. The second will favor a basically accommodative policy emphasizing negotiations and conciliation. In addition, there is normally a third group that coalesces in between and attempts to reconcile the hard-line and soft-line views by adopting elements from each position.

In the peak cold war period of the 1950s and 1960s, when more international incidents involving the use of force occurred than at any other time,¹⁴ these three groups were usually in evidence at the highest policy-making levels. The key crises during those two decades involving the United States and the Soviet Union either directly or indirectly included the 1954 and 1958 crises over Quemoy and Matsu; the 1958–59 and 1961 crises over Berlin; the Cuban missile crisis of 1962; and, finally, the very long crisis that was Vietnam. In each of these situations the hard-line group, not surprisingly, usually included the top military leaders, frequently most of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (though there were some notable exceptions to this pattern, especially Gen Matthew B. Ridgway).¹⁵ The hard-line military people (or “hawks” as they would later be known) normally pushed hard in each crisis for early and strong military action.¹⁶ They were joined by high-level conservative civilians, often prestigious men like Dean Acheson and Paul Nitze, individuals who frequently had occupied high-level policy positions in the difficult opening years of the cold war.

Their opponents in the soft-line group tended to be nonmilitary, more often Democratic than Republican in political orientation, and frequently more familiar with the adversary country (Soviet Union or China) than their opposites in the hard-line group. Notable examples included individuals like UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, Senators Mike Mansfield and William J. Fulbright,¹⁷ former ambassadors to the Soviet Union like Averell Harriman and

Llewellyn Thompson, and occasionally a general (usually from the Army) such as Matthew B. Ridgway and James M. Gavin.

The third group is more difficult to define, primarily because their positions tended to be a compromise between the extremes of the other two and also because members of this third, or middle-of-the-road grouping sometimes shifted back and forth between groups. Particularly in the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, however, these individuals tended to favor the diplomatic, soft-line approach initially but demonstrated a willingness to use force if necessary. Individuals like Llewellyn Thompson and Averell Harriman probably would be more accurately located in this group most of the time, along with certain close advisers to the president such as Andrew Goodpastor in the Eisenhower administration and Robert Kennedy and Ted Sorensen in the Kennedy administration.

In the Johnson administration the more conciliatory advisers were generally ignored (George Ball) or resigned out of frustration (William Moyers and eventually a chastened and disillusioned Robert McNamara). The more hard-line advisers like Walt Rostow, Dean Rusk, and Gen Earle Wheeler continued to hold the president's ear until too late to change the disastrous course of events in Vietnam.

We bring these groups to the reader's attention because they represent the continual struggle between coercion and accommodation taking place behind the front presented to the public. The struggle between the opposing viewpoints eventually results in a synthesis or some sort of mix between coercion and accommodation. The third group centers around this new synthesis or mix. This mix may be more coercive than accommodative, more accommodative than coercive, or, in some cases, fairly evenly balanced.

The first group, as we have noted, will worry about appearing weak if the emergent policy is too accommodative. The second group will worry about being provocative and thereby possibly escalating the conflict if the policy is too heavily coercive. The third group will produce the synthesis and then worry about both

possibilities—possibly appearing too weak or possibly too coercive.¹⁸

An interesting discussion of the dynamics of the decision-making process as these groups interact to reach decisions in crisis situations is contained in Snyder and Diesing's *Conflict among Nations*. As those authors point out, compromises and the strategy eventually adopted usually depend heavily on the individual biases of the members of each of these groups and their strength relative to each other, modified, of course, by the personality of the leader (president). Thus, in the Cuban missile crisis, for example, the hard-liners possessed moderate strength, the soft-liners were quite weak, and those in the middle were quite strong.¹⁹

Almost without exception, crises are characterized by a continuing and frequently acrimonious struggle between these groups, with policy outcomes riding in the balance. We contend, however, that in crisis situations the personality of the leader exerts tremendous influence on the selection of the strategy adopted, including the nature of the mix between coercion and accommodation. This is not a new finding, of course, since numerous studies have stressed the importance of the leader's personality in such situations.²⁰ It is our judgment, however, that the makeup of the leader—his personality and values—plays an even more decisive role than he is usually credited with. This is especially true in the case of the American presidency. Snyder and Diesing, in examining the decision-making role of the groups we have just discussed as well as the role of the president, make the following statement:

The Cuban result, however, was not just due to bias distribution, but also the unusual sophistication of Kennedy and certain advisers—empathy with the opponent, knowledge of Soviet governmental style and structure, understanding of international diplomatic history, and enough self-doubt to build in maximum opportunity for feedback of information and correction of strategy.²¹

Thus, we see that three elements in the internal bargaining process are very important in determining what mixture of accommodation and coercion are adopted in a crisis: (a) the biases

of the members of the various groups within the body charged with developing strategy (hard-line, soft-line, and middle-line); (b) the strength of these groups relative to each other; and (c) the personality of the leader. We will return for further discussion of the personality factor when we consider the conditions that seem to favor an accommodative strategy, or positive diplomacy. Before turning to that, however, let us review those factors (discussed in earlier chapters) that *inhibit* the adoption of accommodative strategies.

Factors Inhibiting Accommodation

Those favoring an accommodative policy will find their proposals blocked by a host of factors. Since we discussed most of these in detail in part 1, we can give them brief treatment here.

The Containment Paradigm

Springing from the chaos of the postwar world and the emerging cold war, containment seemed an appropriate way to meet the uncertainties facing the United States. It provided, first of all, a convenient and comfortable model for thinking about foreign policy problems. Conveniently, one could measure almost everything against the model, whether appropriate or not. Unfortunately, since its core premise was that we must contain an expansive world communism primarily by military means, very little room was left for pursuing any form of accommodation with the adversary. The result, of course, was that we adopted a way of thinking about virtually all foreign policy problems using the premises of containment. While the model was probably useful in the early phases of cold war, it could only lead to serious errors if *all* international problems were seen through the containment “prism.” It did so, of course, in Vietnam.

It is unfortunate but true that many of our policymakers, despite the end of the cold war, still insist on clinging to old containment

guidelines, hardly a prescription for improving relations in a world that has experienced enormous changes since George Kennan first enunciated his plan in 1947.²²

Historical Analogies

The extent to which key policymakers draw on inappropriate historical analogies as a guide to policy formulation is truly astounding. The most common analogies are lessons drawn from the history of the 1930s, especially the so-called Munich syndrome. Too often policymakers use inapplicable (or only partly applicable) analogies because they offer an easier and more convenient guide to action than the task of undertaking a rigorous analysis of the current problem. As Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May point out, Lyndon Johnson and his advisers used the “lessons of the 1930s” and the Korean War as analogies (neither of them really applicable to Vietnam) and rejected careful consideration of the most appropriate analogy, the French experience in Vietnam. By failing to carefully examine likenesses and differences in these analogies, the Johnson administration drew many inapplicable conclusions.²³

Because there is a definite inclination among policymakers to pick out those historical analogies that are most dramatic,²⁴ there is a decided tendency to pick incidents or events that have featured actual violence—wars, revolutions, insurrections, and so on. For example, World War I, World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War are popular analogies to illustrate a point. So, of course, are analogies of nonviolence, such as the appeasement of Hitler at Munich. Much less dramatic and hence less attractive as analogies are negotiations that resulted in a peaceful settlement of some sort. For example, standing firm in the 1961 Berlin crisis and in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis are far more frequently employed analogies than John Kennedy’s successful 1963 tension-reducing moves that resulted in the Partial Test Ban Treaty. Thus, for probably many of the same reasons we savor books and movies featuring the hero “standing tall” at high noon against the villain,

we are drawn to analogies that feature strength and virtue confronting evil. The unhappy fact is that, in our society at least, someone defending himself with a stick against a determined foe has more dramatic appeal than someone cleverly and successfully proffering a carrot to an uncertain enemy.

The overall result of all of this, of course, is that analogies featuring confrontation, being more dramatic, are more often selected as guides to action than are the more prosaic efforts at accommodation.

Rhetoric and Slogans

We have already noted how containment, which Stanley Hoffman of Harvard says should have been a political guideline, was instead turned into “a formula mechanically applied with the help of analogy.”²⁵ This has been an unfortunate American tendency—to conduct foreign policy by slogans and formulas and then reinforce our commitment to these formulas through endless and often ill-considered rhetoric.

Vietnam, of course, is unfortunately a classic case of slogans and formulas and rhetoric dragging the nation into a disastrous war we should have been able to avoid. First of all, the containment formula was applied, even though in a civil war situation it was inapplicable. Steady rhetoric by key policymakers—utilizing all the standard phrases like “Communist aggression,” “defense of the free world,” “right to self-determination,” and so on—increasingly locked us into an ever-tighter commitment to the South Vietnamese government. Gradually, through daily rhetoric about “falling dominoes,” “key strategic position,” and “American vital interests,” we convinced ourselves that this was indeed a vital interest. Day after day, week after week, month after month, the policymakers’ incessant rhetoric steadily built a commitment from which the United States would find it increasingly difficult to escape. Said Barbara W. Tuchman in *The March of Folly*:

Like fibers of a cloth absorbing a dye, policymakers in Washington were by now so thoroughly imbued, through repeated assertions, with the vital

necessity of saving Indochina from Communism that they believed in it, did not question it and were ready to act on it. From rhetoric it had become doctrine.²⁶

Clearly formula-type thinking, the slogans, and especially the emotional rhetoric were hardly the things to nourish any kind of accommodation. Like most slogans and much political rhetoric, they were intended to produce an emotional, confrontational response among the American public. This they did—for a while, at least. And while they did, the mix in American policy between coercion and accommodation was heavily weighted toward the former.

Domestic Politics

Domestic politics obviously has been a major player in inhibiting the role of accommodation. In a pluralistic and democratic society, one heavily influenced by various strong ethnic groups and religious faiths, accommodation has suffered as a tactic. While the Bible (and especially the New Testament) preaches peace and the brotherhood of mankind, it also teaches that one does not compromise with the devil. If your opponent is viewed as the devil incarnate—as communistic, atheistic Russia was for so many years—the result is strong pressure in the direction of confrontation as opposed to cooperation.

Politicians, of course, sense this. Senator Joseph McCarthy is the classic case. Confrontation obviously makes much better theater than accommodation, and McCarthy exploited this fact for all it was worth. The “loss of China” under Truman was so heavily capitalized on by Republicans that a long string of Democratic politicians, including presidents Kennedy and Johnson, felt a compelling need to appear strong in any situation involving possible loss of an Asian country to communism. Unfortunately, Vietnam was such a case.

It is also true, as Stanley Hoffman has pointed out, that the very conservative Far Right in the United States appeals “to a powerful latent strain of America’s emotional makeup.”²⁷ Whereas the Far

Left can be dismissed as naive, stupid, and possibly even treasonous, the right wing's "boisterousness is easily presented as the logical and courageous pursuit of American government policy taken to the final consequences, which the government fails to reach due to its half-heartedness, lack of stamina, and wishy-washiness."²⁸ Thus, the Far Right exerts considerably more influence on the American political process than does the Far Left and an influence substantially out of proportion to their numbers. Since the Far Right based its *raison d'être* on unalterable opposition to compromise with the "enemy" (for many years the Soviet Union), there was a strong, well-financed movement away from accommodation. (This opposition by the Far Right has softened somewhat in the Gorbachev era but there is still substantial reluctance to reach a deeper accommodation with the Soviets among members of the Far Right.) There is not a comparably strong influence by the Far Left, partly because their positions on foreign policy issues are often too extreme in the other direction. But whereas the Far Left has trouble selling their extreme views, the Far Right has historically been more successful.

Military and Civilian "Hawks"

We have already discussed the role of both military and civilian hard-liners at some length. We need not repeat it here except to note that their influence, when in high-level policy positions, can be disastrous as far as the accommodative part of the accommodative-coercive mix is concerned. The pattern during the peak cold war years has generally been one of the key military leaders allying themselves with a few civilian hard-liners to influence policy in the coercive direction. There have been notable exceptions to this rule, however. Especially notable were generals like Matthew B. Ridgway and James M. Gavin, as well as Dwight D. Eisenhower.

In recent years there seems to be a movement in the opposite direction among military men, which we consider an encouraging development. After Vietnam, and since the Soviet Union has

acquired essential overall military parity with the United States, American military leaders often appear to be less aggressive and more of a moderating influence. This appears to be true on arms control matters, in crisis situations, and generally across the board, especially at the very senior level.²⁹ There are obvious exceptions to this trend and it clearly does not mean the American military leaders have become passionate advocates of the virtues of accommodation. For example, it is still too early to make a judgment about the role of military leaders as the situation in the Persian Gulf deteriorated in late 1990 and progressed toward war. It does mean, however, that many top American military leaders have recognized that the security interests of the United States can best be served by trying to reach mutually beneficial compromises with an opponent who can deal out as much punishment as we can. Hopefully, it also means that they are becoming more sophisticated about world affairs. In my judgment, this is probably the case. It is rewarding and encouraging to see senior military men nudging "hawkish" civilian leaders toward more moderate positions, something that seems to be happening with increasing frequency. Let us hope this trend continues. Again, having said this, we must repeat that we have not had the time or information to make judgments about the role of military leaders in the conflict with Iraq.

Clearly those factors we have just discussed have been instrumental in discouraging a greater emphasis on accommodation. They have, along with other factors, helped reduce the amount of accommodation in the coercive-accommodative mix. A factor already discussed that may also inhibit movement toward more accommodative policies is personality characteristics of key decision makers. Important examples here were Dean Acheson during much of his later career, John Foster Dulles for all but the last part of his, and, of course, Lyndon Johnson and many of his key advisers during the Vietnam period. But personality factors can also be a variable that works in the other direction—that is, they can encourage movement toward accommodation. There are a number of examples of this, but prominent ones would include

President Eisenhower (especially in the last part of his second term), President Kennedy (particularly in the last year of his life), and President Nixon (especially with respect to both China and the Soviet Union). What are the things that encourage accommodative policies? What are the conditions that seem conducive to their effective use? We now return to our case studies for answers.

Factors Encouraging Accommodation: A Review of the Case Studies

We have attempted to assess the roles played by coercion and accommodation in a number of case studies. In each we have applied our ideal model of positive diplomacy in an attempt to determine to what extent the policy actually followed approximated this model. The object was to use the model to illustrate a number of things: (1) to show that policies featuring a heavy element of accommodation can be quite effective; (2) to point out that the accommodative element in a policy, being less dramatic than the coercive aspect, often receives less credit than it deserves; (3) to indicate those factors that seem to encourage accommodation and those things that discourage it; (4) to determine what kinds of situations are appropriate for positive diplomacy and what kinds are not; and (5) to argue—there is no way to prove it—that a policy of positive diplomacy (or a policy approximating this model) is, *in most cases*, a far more sound way to approach international crisis situations than is a basically coercive policy emphasizing military force.

What, then, have we learned from the cases we have reviewed? It is not possible to cover in detail all the factors that impact on the mix of coercion and accommodation selected for various crisis situations. Likewise, it is impractical to attempt to determine all the conditions in any particular situation that will make a policy of positive diplomacy either successful or unsuccessful. Nonetheless, based on our cases, we believe we can make certain generalizations

that if factored into the policy formulation process would make for a more sound policy.

We employed several variables that we consider important to form a framework of analysis for the problem. These were (1) structure of the situation, (2) vital interests and resolve of the parties, (3) personalities of the key decision makers, (4) dynamics of the bargaining process, (5) success in communication, and (6) relative military capabilities and their use. These are broad and overlapping categories to be sure, but it has been our judgment that looking at our cases from the standpoint of these variables would provide valuable insights on the coercive/accommodative dilemma and the role of positive diplomacy. Even though many of these "insights" are not new and have been noted by many other writers, we think they bear repeating in the context of our subject focus. Utilizing our framework of analysis, we will make some general observations.

Like coercive diplomacy, positive diplomacy is highly context-dependent—that is, the *overall structure of the situation* will have a very great bearing on whether or not positive diplomacy is a suitable policy and whether or not it will be successful. This is not surprising and on the face seems almost absurdly self-evident. And virtually anything can be placed in this category, including all the other variables we are discussing here. However, for purposes of our analysis, we are limiting this category to some specific things we consider important causal factors. Several stand out.

Domestic politics in the contesting countries is certainly a major player. For example, Republican presidents with strong anti-Communist credentials—Nixon and Reagan are examples—seem to have greater freedom to follow accommodative policies with Communist countries than do Democratic presidents. This is especially true if they keep up some fairly strong anti-Communist rhetoric at the same time they are pursuing accommodation. In general, Democratic presidents seem to have felt a greater need to avoid appearing "weak," especially where communism is concerned.

Geographical factors play a role. In general, as Oran R. Young has pointed out, a crisis occurring a long distance from one's own country—and particularly if it is in the opponent's "backyard"—will be "disadvantageous for bargaining purposes,"³⁰ Thus, the Soviets had certain advantages over the United States during the two Berlin crises while the reverse was true in the Cuban missile case. Still, the fact that a geographical advantage may create an asymmetry favoring one party may be a factor encouraging the other party toward accommodation. The geographical disadvantage therefore seems to have been a factor influencing the Soviets toward accommodation in the Cuban case, and the same can be said of the United States in the Berlin crises and the Quemoy-Matsu case.

This is not always true, however, as illustrated by Vietnam. Geographical factors were certainly not favorable from our standpoint, yet we were not influenced in the direction of accommodation by that factor. Other variables such as personality factors and ideological considerations overrode whatever disposition toward accommodation might have come about because of geographical disadvantages.

The status of international and domestic public opinion clearly plays an important role in some situations—for example, in the Quemoy crisis of 1958. Public opinion, particularly if key allies are critical of one's policy, can be instrumental in pushing a country toward a more accommodative policy.³¹ On the other hand, there are situations in which an adverse international public opinion seems to exercise little or no influence this way because other variables exert a stronger influence. South Africa has been a classic case in point, though this now seems to be changing, partly as a result of sanctions and partly due to public opinion. Domestic public opinion can obviously play a major role in encouraging accommodation, as well illustrated by Vietnam.

The influence of a third country, often one not even directly involved in the crisis, can frequently be an important factor pushing a country toward a more accommodative policy vis-à-vis its opponent. For example, in the two Berlin crises and the Cuban

missile crisis, the Soviet Union's concern about growing friction with China undoubtedly helped fuel its desire for some sort of settlement with the United States. In the Quemoy-Matsu crisis, American concern about possible Soviet actions helped produce a greater receptivity to a more accommodative policy. American concern about China during the Vietnam War did not help bring about an accommodation but it did restrain American military efforts and thus reduce the amount of coercion from what it might otherwise have been. And although not a crisis situation, China's rapprochement with the United States in the 1970s was largely due to China's concern about the Soviet Union.³²

In general, the fear shared by the United States and the Soviet Union of a nuclear superpower confrontation has been a strong influence promoting accommodative behavior by both powers.

The *vital interests and relative resolve* of the contesting parties are important elements in determining the mix of coercion and accommodation in a crisis situation. As we shall see, this is largely because the relative balance of interests and resolve will produce situations that are either asymmetrical (where one party appears to have a distinct advantage over the other), or symmetrical bargaining situations (where the balance of interests and resolve are perceived by both parties as roughly equal). Let us briefly review how this symmetry or asymmetry in interests and resolve affects the role of sticks and carrots.

Most writers agree that the party which perceives its interests as most vital in a particular situation, and successfully communicates that perception to its adversary, has established an "asymmetry of motivation." Commitments enter in here, whether formal commitments through treaties and alliances or informal commitments that can be held up as vital and virtually inescapable. Through a well-publicized devotion to such commitments or other vital interests, one party may be able to establish in the other party's mind the idea that it is more strongly motivated. Based on historical evidence, it appears the party establishing this superiority of interests and motivation will most often emerge the victor in the crisis. As Philip M. Williams has put it:

Thus, purely military considerations are far from being dominant in superpower confrontations. The basic structure of the situation, and particularly which participant has most at stake, is generally a far better guide to the outcome. It would hardly be exaggerating to suggest that, although its importance is not always acknowledged—at least by commentators on international politics and foreign policy as opposed to practitioners of the art—this is likely to be the decisive factor in determining the balance of gains and losses among the participants in almost any superpower crisis.³³

We agree with Snyder and Diesing that the two Berlin crises were probably instances of symmetrical bargaining power and that the Cuban crisis was essentially one of asymmetrical bargaining power,³⁴ but we think the Quemoy crisis of 1958 had many characteristics of a symmetrical bargaining situation. While it is true the United States had military superiority, this was offset to a considerable extent by other factors favoring the Chinese. One such factor was that world public opinion and even American public opinion was strongly negative about the United States' actions, which appeared to risk war over a few small specks of land that likely belonged to the mainland in any case under international law.³⁵

Even the Cuban missile crisis seems in retrospect to have involved more bargaining equality than most observers have accorded it. Evidence from the recently released ExComm transcripts clearly indicates that President Kennedy was far readier to accommodate the Soviets over the issue of American missiles in Turkey than was earlier thought to be the case. Kennedy was obviously convinced the Soviets had some strong cards in their hands and was aware that he might have to pay a considerable price to make Khrushchev remove the missiles from Cuba.³⁶

Our point here is simply that while there does appear to be a definite relationship between short-term success in a crisis and the vital interests and resolve of the parties, there does not seem to be any direct relationship insofar as the way accommodation is used. The nation with the most at stake in the crisis will emerge the short-term "winner" in most cases, providing it has convinced its opponent of this fact. On the other hand, the fact that one party has

a definite bargaining edge over the other does not by itself mean that the weaker party (once it realizes it is the weaker party) will necessarily start accommodating the stronger party. There are cases like this, of course, but there are not many clear-cut situations of this type in the nuclear age involving the superpowers. The Cuban missile crisis was perhaps the case that most closely approximated this type, but, as we have already observed, even it had aspects that made it somewhat more symmetrical than earlier believed.

In crisis situations involving the United States and the Soviet Union in the nuclear age, disputes tend more often to be symmetrical than asymmetrical simply because both nations possess such globe-girdling power and so many widespread interests. Thus, one party can enjoy a local military advantage, hold a geographical advantage, have greater vital interests at stake (as the United States did in the Cuban missile crisis), and still not hold an absolutely clear bargaining advantage. True, the Cuban situation was at least a short-run victory for the United States, because Khrushchev failed to follow up on certain advantages he possessed. Had he insisted we take our missiles out of Turkey as a price for taking his out of Cuba, much of the world (including President Kennedy) would not have regarded this as an unreasonable proposal.³⁷ Because of internal pressures and fear that the crisis was getting out of hand, Khrushchev did not pursue that course of action, fortunately for Kennedy. Had he pursued it, the record indicates the president, if pushed, would probably have gone along with a swap. The American "victory" would then have been far less clear-cut.³⁸

Personality characteristics of key decision makers is a subject discussed throughout this book. The reader is already aware that this writer regards it as extraordinarily important in determining the extent to which accommodation is used and the manner in which it is employed. The personality characteristics of the principal decision makers seem to be critical in determining the relative role of coercion and accommodation.

We have not attempted to do an in-depth psychological analysis of key leaders in crisis situations to determine how their particular personality traits affected their use of coercion and accommodation. We have not undertaken this task because space will not allow it, and, more importantly, this author does not possess the qualifications for such an effort. Moreover, there are a number of good studies of this type available.³⁹ What we have attempted to do in this book is simply to highlight the role personality characteristics have played in specific postwar crises and illustrate the vital part that this factor has played in determining the mix between coercion and accommodation.

There is, of course, no way to prove how important personality factors were in determining how accommodation and coercion were used in a particular crisis. It is not possible to prove it was the first, the second, or the third most important variable. It simply is not a subject that lends itself easily to empirical substantiation. Nonetheless, enough work has been done on the subject to indicate strongly that the variable is a critical one and a topic that deserves much more intensive attention. As Joseph de Rivera has said:

The objective situation will influence the decision of any man, but his personal view of the national interest and his own personal interest will also shape the decision. Knowledge must be available for it to be taken into account, but *how* a person goes about making the decision (his personal style) also influences what is taken into account. Therefore, we must insist that the personality of official decisionmakers is always an important determinant of their decisions, and hence, of the nation's policy.⁴⁰

A careful analysis of nearly any of the major postwar crises will indicate how important the role of personality is. One cannot be immersed for long in the details of the 1958–59 and 1961 Berlin crises, the 1954 and 1958 offshore islands (Quemoy) crises, or the Cuban missile crisis without being struck by how important the personalities of Eisenhower, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Chou En-lai were to the final outcomes. Lyndon Johnson's personal qualities and world view were tragically tied to our entrapment in Vietnam. On the more positive side, one can trace the relationship

between personality and Richard Nixon's success in bringing about the rapprochement with China.⁴¹ Likewise, one can trace the effect of personality in his downfall in the Watergate crisis.

We must guard against reductionism as we discuss the role of personality factors in the international crises discussed in this book. Nonetheless, after a careful analysis of these crises, one cannot help but be deeply impressed with the importance of this factor. Remember that we define personality factors broadly to include anything that has influenced the development of the individual from birth to the time he is faced with making decisions in a particular crisis. This, of course, includes what Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May call "placement," essentially an assessment of the historical events the individual has lived through and a consideration of other factors in his personal history—family, education, career pattern, and so on.⁴² All of these will significantly affect the policymaker's world view.

What are the personality characteristics that seem to favor accommodative behavior as opposed to a tendency toward coercive solutions to international problems? Is there any definable relationship between personal characteristics and the policymaker's receptivity to accommodation? To coercion?

There are many instances in which personality appears to have substantially influenced policy.⁴³ Robert G. Kaiser's colorful description of the effect of Khrushchev's personality on Soviet diplomacy is illustrative. Kaiser wrote that the Soviet leader's diplomacy "reflected the personality he revealed in his recollections: proud yet fearful, boastful but timid, desperate for respect and admiration."⁴⁴ Doris Kearns's description of Lyndon Johnson's tragically mistaken notion that he could assimilate the Vietnamese experience into his own framework tellingly reveals the influence of personality factors:

He wanted to believe this about the Vietnamese because he needed to believe it about everyone. This master practitioner of bargaining and negotiation was also a man who perceived the fragility of that process. He preached rationality and compromise, but continually feared and imagined the emergence of unreasoning passions and unyielding ideologies. His conduct and words expressed a will to believe, a fear of

his own doubts. Johnson was always afraid that he himself might give way to irrational emotions; control came to appear a requirement of survival of the self. By treating the struggle in Vietnam as an exercise in bargaining, he sought to deny that it might exist somewhere beyond the healthy bounds of reasonable negotiations. Thus the purpose of the bombs was not to hurt or destroy; that was a by-product. They were a means of bargaining without words. Since Johnson, if not an expert on warfare, was a master bargainer, he would retain final control over when and where to bomb, so that his knowledge of detail could be both used and increased. The same attention to the minutiae of power that had characterized his relations with the Congress would now characterize his conduct of war.⁴⁵

Our concern here, of course, is to determine what personality factors influence attitudes about accommodative behavior. What qualities seem most likely to produce attitudes that are positive toward policies that approximate positive diplomacy? What kinds of personal traits and experiences seem to make a policymaker receptive to policies that emphasize conciliation rather than confrontation?

A complete psychological study of various policymakers would be necessary to answer this question with hard empirical evidence. For our purposes here we will necessarily limit our comments to brief observations arising from the cases we have analyzed in this book.

In his excellent study *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House*, James David Barber of Duke University defines four general character types into which he believes all presidents can be placed. The four types are based essentially on two baselines: (1) activity-passivity, or how much energy the individual invests in his presidency; and (2) positive-negative attitude toward his activity—how he feels about what he does. These four categories are (a) active-positive presidents; (b) active-negative presidents; (c) passive-positive presidents; and (d) passive-negative presidents. Each type of category is characterized by specific personality traits, such as high or low self-esteem, optimism or pessimism, flexibility or inflexibility, and so on.⁴⁶

Barber's analysis is both interesting and impressive. He places Thomas Jefferson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, John

F. Kennedy, and Jimmy Carter all in the active-positive category, clearly the best of the four groupings. Here the presidents tend to be self-confident, to be flexible, to enjoy power, to have a great capacity to learn from experience, and to be "results oriented." The less fortunate active-negative presidents—and here Barber includes John Adams, Woodrow Wilson, Herbert Hoover, Lyndon Johnson, and Richard Nixon—tend to have low self-esteem, are driven by strong compulsions, possess rigid characters, are conscience stricken and suffer from much self-doubt. The passive-positive types—including William Howard Taft, Warren G. Harding, and Ronald W. Reagan—are seekers of love and affection and tend to be open, compliant, vulnerable, and not too energetic. The passive-negative types—represented by Washington, Coolidge, and Eisenhower—really do not care for politics, tend to protect the existing "system," and are driven primarily by a strong sense of civic duty.

Barber's framework of analysis is an interesting and in many ways a valuable tool for looking at our chief executives, and he has recorded some impressively accurate predictions—for example, in the case of Richard Nixon. However, it has limited usefulness for predicting how a president may relate to coercion and accommodation, or to put it another way, how effective he will be in employing the principle of positive diplomacy.

The postwar presidents who have been most successful in utilizing force and accommodation in various kinds of international crisis and noncrisis situations have been Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Nixon.* Eisenhower and Kennedy were effective in crisis situations in Berlin, the Formosa Strait, and Cuba. Nixon effectively used accommodative steps to bring about a rapprochement with China and a limited *détente* with the Soviets, and he used various combinations of coercion and accommodation to handle crises in the Middle East and Asia.

*Some would argue that President Reagan, a passive-positive president, was one of the more successful chief executives in using force and accommodation. However, his tenure is too recent for us to make informed judgments. So, for the most part, we will not evaluate him from this standpoint. This is also true of President George Bush.

On the other hand, Harry Truman, Lyndon Johnson, and Jimmy Carter demonstrated limited ability to utilize coercion and accommodation effectively in crisis situations or to skillfully utilize those tools to improve relations with the Soviets. In the case of Johnson, we experienced a major foreign policy disaster in Vietnam. Thus, even allowing for the fact that the circumstances and the times played important parts in each of these cases, the personality factor also appears to have played an extraordinarily important role. The obvious question is—how?

In the above-mentioned cases in which chief executives skillfully used coercion and accommodation (at least to a degree effectively followed policies of positive diplomacy), we had what Barber calls an active-positive president (Kennedy), an active-negative president (Nixon), and a passive-negative president (Eisenhower). In the unsuccessful cases, Barber's classification includes two active-positive presidents (Truman and Carter) and an active-negative president (Johnson).

It is thus apparent that Barber's overall conceptual categories do not tell us much about how effective a president will be in utilizing positive diplomacy effectively, or even how effective they will be in using coercion and accommodation in any kind of "mix." Nixon's rapprochement with China was an extraordinarily skillful foreign policy achievement, even though his personality characteristics led him into a domestic political disaster. Johnson, like Nixon an active-negative president, achieved some very impressive domestic political successes but stumbled into disaster in the foreign policy field. Kennedy, an active-positive president, used accommodation (and coercion) effectively and appeared to be getting more proficient with what we call positive diplomacy as his term progressed. At the same time, however, he was no more effective than Eisenhower in utilizing sticks and carrots and many would argue he was not as effective as Eisenhower, typed by Barber as a passive-negative president. We must therefore look beyond Barber's categories for those character traits that seem to be most conducive to the effective use of positive diplomacy.

All the presidents we have just mentioned lived through the 1930s and World War II and all were affected in various ways by those critical years of history. To some degree, each was influenced by the Munich syndrome, by the apparent negative effects of appeasement, by the need to be strong, and by the clearly disastrous results of being weak. The cold war, the Communist threat, and the growing and apparently malevolent power of the Soviet Union impressed each of them at some level. Despite this common historical framework, despite having been mutually exposed to these traumatizing events, these presidents reacted differently in their approaches to foreign policy situations.

In part, of course, this was due to different circumstances and different timing. After all, Nixon found circumstances that were far more conducive to some sort of rapprochement with China in the early 1970s than was true during Harry Truman's days in the White House. John F. Kennedy was faced with a far different kind of crisis (and in some ways a more easily resolvable one) than Jimmy Carter faced in the Iranian hostage situation. Still, even allowing for differences in circumstances and timing, anyone analyzing the major events handled by these and other presidents is struck by the effect that personality factors seem to have played.

In our surveys of the cases we have discussed in this book, can we isolate those personality/character traits that seem to make individuals more effective in employing an effective mix of coercion and accommodation, that make them more receptive to using accommodation as a major tool, that in short bring them closer to utilizing positive diplomacy? Although we have discovered no scientific way to do this, there is enough strong circumstantial evidence for us to make an attempt at identifying what we think are some of the principal personality factors that are likely to make one more predisposed toward positive diplomacy.

To do this, let us look at three things that seem to have a particularly strong relationship to predicting a receptivity to cooperation and accommodation. These are (1) ability to empathize with adversaries, (2) image of one's self and world view, and (3) international expertise. While these represent only a

partial list of personal characteristics that influence attitudes about accommodation and coercion, these three seem to be especially important. Hence, a brief look at each of them as they relate to the overall concept of personality may be useful.

1. Ability to empathize with adversaries. In his book *Fearful Warriors*, Ralph K. White—after analyzing the many factors that create misperceptions between long-time adversaries—states, “Empathy is the *great* corrective for all the forms of war-promoting misperception that have just been discussed” (emphasis added). White then proceeds to define empathy not as sympathy but rather as “simply understanding the thoughts and feelings of others.”⁴⁷

There is substantial evidence that the ability to understand the adversary’s position and point of view is, not surprisingly, a major factor contributing to the effective use of accommodation and positive diplomacy. President Eisenhower had this ability and demonstrated it during the Quemoy crisis in 1958 and the Berlin crisis that same year. His actions in the Quemoy crisis indicated a facility for understanding Chinese motivations on both sides of the Formosa Strait.⁴⁸ His attitude about the “abnormal state” of Berlin and Germany demonstrated an empathy with Soviet motivations.⁴⁹ Also, John F. Kennedy apparently empathized with the East Germans and Soviets over their Berlin problem during the 1961 crisis in that city.⁵⁰

On the other hand, Lyndon Johnson demonstrated a marked inability to empathize with the North Vietnamese. (Again, it needs to be noted that this means objectively trying to understand your enemy, not sympathize with him.) Likewise, Jimmy Carter demonstrated little ability to put himself in Soviet shoes on human rights issues and other questions. Richard Nixon showed virtually no ability to empathize with his domestic adversaries but considerable talent in doing this very thing in the foreign policy field. Early evidence in the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990–91 seems to indicate that both Bush and Saddam Hussein had little success in putting themselves in their opponent’s shoes.

What are the personality traits that appear to make a person better able to empathize with adversaries? Clearly such traits as confidence, inner security, pragmatism, flexibility, and ability to learn from experience are important traits that promote greater receptivity to cooperative behavior. Both Eisenhower and Kennedy possessed these characteristics, though Kennedy early in his term experienced some concern about proving himself. Johnson suffered from an extraordinarily insecure personality and constantly felt the need to prove himself, to demonstrate his toughness and "manliness."⁵¹ Nixon was a classic case of an insecure personality, but interestingly this did not normally have a negative influence on his foreign policy performance, probably because his ideological flexibility and long experience in this area gave him greater confidence in his ability.⁵² Moreover, in Nixon's mind domestic opponents such as the press and the "establishment" were more threatening to him personally than were foreign adversaries.

Thus, the confident, secure, pragmatic, flexible-personality type of individuals—those open and able to learn from experience, untroubled by the need to prove themselves—are most likely to have the ability to empathize. They are most likely to objectively analyze the problem from their opponent's perspective as well as their own. Because of this they will usually tend to be more receptive to cooperative policies, emphasizing accommodation such as positive diplomacy. In Barber's typology this would probably most often be the active-positive type, though certainly not in all cases.⁵³

2. Image of oneself and one's world view. Closely related to the ability of individuals to empathize with their adversaries is their image of themselves and their view of the world. Thus, as Morton Deutsch points out, soldiers and diplomats have different images of themselves. Soldiers see themselves as tough, invincible, courageous, and tenacious, not the best prescription for cooperative behavior. Diplomats see themselves as patient and flexible, persons able to produce effective compromises, clearly a much better self-image for promoting cooperative behavior.⁵⁴

American presidents have different conceptions of the role of that office, which, depending on the individual, incorporate varying mixes of toughness and accommodation. Eisenhower, secure in himself and his country's power, felt no need to demonstrate "toughness," though he was able to convey the impression he could not be pushed around. Kennedy—young, relatively inexperienced, and deeply influenced by a competitive childhood—felt the need to demonstrate "toughness" in the presidency early in his term.⁵⁵ However, his innate inner confidence and ability to learn from experience enabled him to move away from the "tough-president" image to one emphasizing more cooperative behavior. Lyndon Johnson's image of himself was conflicting in many respects—on the one hand the "great compromiser" and wheeler-dealer, on the other hand the tough, decisive, antiappeasement, anti-Communist leader of the free world. Unfortunately, Johnson's diplomatic instincts and undeniable political skills were overridden by his need to prove himself strong and manly.⁵⁶ Reagan clearly had an image of himself as tough and decisive in relations with the Soviets but fortunately limited his military moves to actions against less formidable foes such as Grenada, Libya, and Nicaragua. Beneath his ideological surface toughness was a strong element of political realism and an inner security that disposed him toward more accommodative policies later in his two-term presidency. This tendency was enhanced by obtaining key advisers in his second term who also enjoyed greater inner security. Again we must point out that it is too early to make judgments about President Bush, although there is some evidence that he has felt the need to overcome the "wimp" image created by his opponents.

In general, one can say with some confidence that the more secure individuals are in themselves (and especially if they are an "open" personality type and learn from experience), the more likely they are to visualize their role as one emphasizing accommodation over coercion. Feeling themselves secure, they are more likely to conceive of their role as one that promotes compromise and cooperation over confrontation and conflict. Confident of their

own self-worth, they see the world as a less threatening place than the personally insecure leader. With this ability, they are able to discern that relations between nations are made up of more grays than blacks and whites, a fact that leads them to accept the idea of compromise and accommodation more readily than their less-secure counterpart.

3. Experience. Experience in the international field appears to be an important factor in determining a leader's attitudes about compromise and accommodation. In general, we can say that the more one has been exposed to international affairs, especially a wide range of high-level international dealings, the more likely an individual is to be receptive to policies similar to positive diplomacy. Experience in the field (international sophistication) also leads a reasonably open-minded individual to the conclusion that there are, in fact, far more grays in the relations between nations than there are blacks and whites. This is not surprising since experience in most fields should bring an awareness that there are few absolute certainties or truths in the majority of human relationships, especially those between states.

Thus, the two presidents in the cold war period, who in my judgment have been most successful overall in the foreign policy field were the two who brought the most experience in international affairs to the presidency—Eisenhower and Nixon. John Kennedy was relatively inexperienced when he came to the presidency and his early foreign policy errors reflected this inexperience. However, he was a fast learner, and by the last year before his death he was giving strong indications that he was rapidly acquiring a much greater proficiency in foreign affairs.⁵⁷

Lyndon Johnson, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan all came to the presidency with little or no experience in international affairs, and their foreign policy difficulties, especially in the earlier portions of their tenure, gave strong evidence of this fact. In each of these cases, however, there was some evidence in the latter part of their time in office that they were acquiring more competence with greater experience. This was especially true in the case of Ronald Reagan. In the case of Johnson, later improvement in some

areas was overshadowed by his entrapment in the Vietnam morass. In addition, his other personality characteristics made it less likely that increased experience would compensate for his many psychological hang-ups. Jimmy Carter showed evidence of increasing competence in foreign policy (as evidenced by the Camp David Accords), but again this was overshadowed by the debacle of the Iran hostage crisis. Ronald Reagan came to the presidency with no experience in foreign affairs, and his first years in office reflected it, as relations with the Soviets plummeted to a new low point. Yet despite disasters like the Iran/Contra affair and a muddled Middle East policy, there was substantial evidence by the latter part of his second term that his competence in the international field (ably seconded by Secretary of State George Shultz) was improving dramatically (even though a good portion of the credit in Reagan's case must go to world developments and Mikhail Gorbachev). Though much remains to be seen, it already seems clear that President Bush's long experience in international affairs has been a major plus in the conduct of our foreign policy and has helped contribute to the growing accommodation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The clash with Saddam Hussein seems to be a very unique exception. Even here, however, Bush will likely be given great credit if the war is relatively short and Hussein is defeated.

Not surprisingly, then, sound high-level experience in the international field, including a wide-ranging exposure to the customs and cultures of other societies, seems to be a major plus in fostering a receptivity to compromise and accommodation. It should be pointed out, of course, that there are exceptions to this rule. History records cases of leaders who were quite superficially experienced in international affairs but could hardly be classified as fans of accommodation (Hitler and Mussolini come to mind as do Stalin and Saddam Hussein). However, none of these were really sophisticated in international affairs; they had not traveled widely and they suffered from substantial ignorance about other peoples and cultures. Thus, the general principle seems to apply—the more a leader has been exposed to in-depth international

intercourse, the more likely he is to see the value of accommodative policies. All of this can be summarized by the following, which admittedly is an oversimplification but nonetheless makes our major points.

Personality factors are a major determinant of whether or not a cooperative or competitive course of action is adopted. While the structure of the situation has a critical impact on the strategy selected, personality attributes of key leaders are pivotal factors and in many situations may be decisive. While there are many aspects of personality development that enter into this equation, we have singled out one personality characteristic that seems to be most important in disposing policymakers toward cooperative policies—the ability to empathize with adversaries, to objectively consider their position and interests as well as their own, to put themselves in the opponents' shoes. This ability seems to be most pronounced in those policymakers who have developed a positive image of themselves and a generally positive image of the world. Specific personality traits conducive to such an outlook include confidence and inner security, a generally trusting and optimistic nature, open-mindedness, tolerance of ambiguity, ability to learn from experience, and generally a high need for achievement.⁵⁸ Experience in the international field seems to help promote the ability to empathize with the adversary and hence a tendency toward more cooperative/accommodative policies.

We have also discussed the effect of *communication* and the *dynamics of the bargaining process*. As Morton Deutsch and many other writers have pointed out, adoption of a competitive/coercive approach to international problems usually produces poor communication between the parties. As a result, the possibility of error and misperception is greatly increased. On the other hand, the adoption of a cooperative/accommodative approach will normally produce better communication between the parties, thus enhancing the possibilities for agreement.⁵⁹

Adopting an essentially accommodative policy such as positive diplomacy will, in itself, often create a dynamic process that encourages further cooperative steps. As Deutsch observes, "All

this may be summarized by saying, cooperation breeds cooperation, while competition breeds competition.”⁶⁰ Encouraging improved communication of relevant information between adversaries helps clarify the issues and promotes better understanding of the position and interests of each party. By reducing defensiveness, it permits each party to see the other in a more objective light, promotes an increasingly friendly and trusting atmosphere, and fosters an enhanced ability to concentrate on common interests rather than differences.⁶¹

A classic case of this dynamic process, as we have mentioned repeatedly, was the rapprochement with China carried out by President Nixon and Henry Kissinger during the period 1969–72. Essentially utilizing a modified version of Charles Osgood’s GRIT strategy, the gradually accelerating policy of accommodation, promoted by both sides, stimulated additional steps toward cooperation as communication and trust improved.⁶²

We saw in the Quemoy crisis of 1958 how the restrained use of force, combined with the use of accommodative steps, produced a dynamic process of tacit communication that enabled the United States and China to defuse the situation and avoid a direct conflict. Similar (though far from identical) processes were evident in the Berlin crises of 1958–59 and 1961 and to some extent in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

In more recent times, the increasingly accommodative policies of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev seem to have been effective in promoting a dynamic process of greater cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Though such policies are doubtless inspired in no small degree by Gorbachev’s need to improve economic conditions at home, his accommodative diplomacy has proved highly effective and seems to have been primarily responsible for a reduction of tension between the superpowers. Whether this will continue over the long run remains to be seen.

On the other hand, the adoption of a highly coercive policy in Vietnam resulted in a breakdown in communication. The dynamics of the interaction became one of escalating conflict,

rather than an escalation of cooperative steps. As the increasing coercive steps escalated the level of conflict and effective communication disappeared, the ability to accurately discern each other's vital interests (and more importantly common interests) also became severely impaired. The very fact that a coercive policy was *initially* adopted in a situation where it was essentially inappropriate generated a dynamic process that called for increasing coercive actions. Clearly the dynamics of this process was not the only factor—for example, different personalities in key roles might have arrested it—but it was an immensely important reason why we were unable to extricate ourselves from Vietnam.⁶³

Hopefully the reader is now aware that we are dealing with perhaps the most fundamental point of this book: an essentially accommodative policy such as positive diplomacy—where the emphasis on accommodation is high as opposed to the emphasis on coercion—is far more likely to produce a dynamic process that will lead to a nonviolent and productive solution to the problem than is a basically coercive policy. We can state it as our firm (if oversimplified) conviction that cooperation *does* tend to breed cooperation, while competition breeds competition.

Relative military capabilities are important in determining the outcome of crises but, as we observed in chapter 7, not nearly as important as they once were. On this point we tend to agree with Philip Williams, who we quoted earlier in this chapter:

Thus, purely military considerations are far from being dominant in superpower confrontations. The basic structure of the situation, and particularly which participant has most at stake, is generally a far better guide to the outcome.⁶⁴

Having said this, however, there is no doubt that military power, in the sense of the overall nuclear potential of both superpowers, has engendered a fear of global nuclear war that has constrained both powers in crisis situations. This has set limits on conflict escalation beyond which neither the United States nor the Soviets have been willing to venture. But outside of this limiting effect, critically important though it is, relative military capabilities do

not appear to be the most vital determinants of success or failure in crisis situations. As Williams points out, for example, Soviet local conventional military superiority around Berlin did not make it possible for Khrushchev to secure all his key objectives in the Berlin crises in 1958–59 and 1961. Likewise, American strategic superiority did not prevent the Soviets from carrying out the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961, a measure that solved their most critical problem.⁶⁵

In summarizing the key points about relative military capabilities, let us refer again to the main points made in chapter 7. It appears we can reasonably make several statements about military power in the nuclear age:

- Because of the great fear of nuclear war it is used primarily in demonstrative shows of force for psychological purposes, the intent being to deter an opponent or compel him to do something, preferably without employing force in actual violence.
- Military force in crisis situations has increasingly been used to send signals, to communicate with the opponent in ways that are often more effective than the usual verbal methods.
- There is much less of a direct relationship between absolute military power and relative bargaining advantage than there was in prenuclear times.
- While military power, both conventional and nuclear, still plays an important role in many crisis situations, it is often very difficult (if not impossible) to gauge its relative importance in comparison with other variables.
- The way in which military force is used (and the attitudes about its use) is an important factor in determining whether an accommodative strategy of positive diplomacy is selected and whether it is successful.

The key point here from the perspective of accommodation is the fact that military force increasingly has become a means of communicating between the superpowers. Used as a means of signaling opponents, for clarifying vital interests, and for ascertaining relative motivation and bargaining power, military

power for the superpowers has increasingly become a tool for effecting change and adjusting interests *without violence*.

There is still considerable disagreement among analysts about the relative effectiveness of military power in crisis situations. This is true of both conventional and nuclear military force. As we have previously noted, most observers agree to the general proposition that the relationship between overall military strength and bargaining strength or political leverage is much less a direct, predictable relationship in the nuclear age than it was in the prenuclear era. Beyond this general point of agreement, however, there is considerable difference of opinion as to the extent to which applications of different kinds of force in specific situations have been effective. For example, there is substantial disagreement among American scholars and military personnel as to whether it was US nuclear superiority or local conventional superiority that made it possible for Kennedy to prevail in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.⁶⁶ There is significant disagreement over the relative effectiveness of nuclear and conventional forces in the Berlin crises of 1958–59 and 1961 as well as in the Quemoy crises of 1958.

Some scholars disagree sharply over the extent to which nuclear superiority by one side over the other confers any bargaining advantage at all. For example, Snyder and Diesing disagree emphatically on this point in their jointly authored book on bargaining in crises. Snyder claims there is some empirical evidence to support the idea that “absolute quantitative superiority in nuclear power can be a bargaining asset in crisis,” while Diesing maintains that the evidence is too weak to draw conclusions.⁶⁷

A review of the literature on the major post-World War II crises reveals considerable evidence that local conventional military superiority in a crisis does confer some bargaining advantages.⁶⁸ It is less clear that quantitative nuclear superiority confers such advantages. In a well-known study of some 215 crises and “shows of force” that the Brookings Institution did in 1978, the data does not support the conclusion that the strategic weapons balance between the superpowers was a conclusive factor in the outcome

of these incidents.⁶⁹ Even in the case of local conventional superiority, the evidence regarding the *extent* of any bargaining advantage conferred is unclear.⁷⁰

The most important point, from the perspective of this book, is the fact that force has increasingly been used as a means of communicating with opponents in crisis situations. Faced with the prospect of a nuclear holocaust should events get out of hand, the superpowers have sought ways to continue their competition within reasonably safe bounds. This has meant military power has had to be adapted to the new and highly dangerous nuclear environment. In such a volatile environment, it is essential, at least insofar as the superpowers are concerned, that force become primarily an instrument of communication, a means of clarifying and adjusting competing interests.⁷¹

While this is hardly a new finding, we think it has been insufficiently stressed. Too often when force has been used demonstratively by the superpowers in the postwar period, the accommodation eventually reached in crises has been too often credited to force used coercively in an intimidating role. To put it another way, when an accommodation has been reached between the United States and the Soviet Union in a crisis situation involving force (or between rival clients of the superpowers), the successful outcome has been too often attributed to the successful operation of deterrence theory. One side supposedly skillfully employed intimidating military power and forced the other side to back down. This has been a natural result of American fascination with the concept of containment and later deterrence theory, a phenomenon that emerged in the 1950s and early 1960s to dominate the newly prominent field of strategic studies.

In a number of postwar crises (including the Quemoy crisis of 1958), the deterrent role of the military force has been over-emphasized, while the communication role has been under-emphasized. Thus, it is easier and probably psychologically more satisfying to attribute the accommodations (as opposed to violence) reached in the Quemoy crisis and the Berlin crisis of 1961 to the skillful flexing of military muscle. This is much less

taxing than attempting to analyze how force itself was used as a means of talking to the opponent, for determining the extent of his interests, for ascertaining the points of compromise and accommodation, or—as Schelling puts it—for reaching a “convergence of expectations.”⁷²

To sum up, military power essentially performs two important functions insofar as the use of accommodation is concerned: (1) it provides a means of informing the opponent he cannot take advantage of an accommodative stance to extort unreasonable concessions (that there is a point beyond which the accommodating power will not be pushed); and (2) when used with restraint, as in positive diplomacy, it provides a very effective means of signaling a desire for accommodation.

There appears to be no clear pattern as to how a relative military advantage (conventional or nuclear) will affect a nation's disposition to adopt an accommodative policy (other variables appear to be more critical). What does seem evident from an analysis of the cases we have studied is that the way military power is *used* can be an important factor encouraging accommodation. When employed with restraint and in a manner that clearly signals a desire to be conciliatory, military force can act as a powerful message that helps generate a process of mutual accommodation.

Notes

1. Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978).

2. Philip D. Zelikow, “Force without War, 1975–82,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 7, no. 1 (March 1984): 29–54.

3. Blechman and Kaplan, 515.

4. *Ibid.*, 517.

5. *Ibid.*, 517–18.

6. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing stress this point repeatedly in their study of international bargaining. See, for example, their *Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), 206, 256–57.

7. R. J. Leng and H. G. Wheeler, "Influence Strategies, Success, and War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 23, no. 4 (1979): 655–84.

8. Snyder and Diesing, 279.

9. Ibid.

10. Quoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days* (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Crest Publications, 1967), 355.

11. This was especially the case in the Cuban missile crisis. There is considerable evidence that Kennedy's military buildup during the 1961 Berlin crisis was partially responsible for convincing Khrushchev he needed to do something drastic to redress the military balance. See, for example, Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, trans. and ed. Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970), 494.

12. Concern about appearing weak was a major concern of American presidents, especially Democratic presidents after Truman, in no small part because of the so-called loss of China and the subsequent witch-hunt by Senator Joseph McCarthy. See, for example, Doris Kearns, *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1976), 252–53. See also John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 212, 242.

13. Snyder and Diesing, 271.

14. Blechman and Kaplan, 26.

15. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change* (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1963), 463. In addition to individual exceptions like Matthew B. Ridgway, Irving L. Janis raises the interesting hypothesis that some groups become very cohesive and are affected by what he calls "groupthink," which essentially is development of certain group norms that prevent the members from judging a situation with objectivity. As examples he lists the Truman administration's Korean decision and the Bay of Pigs fiasco in the Kennedy administration. Irving L. Janis, *Groupthink* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1983).

16. See Robert F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969), 36; Jean Edward Smith, *The Defense of Berlin* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963), 296; Gaddis, 244; George and Smoke, 284, 291.

17. It should be noted that Senator William J. Fulbright was initially a supporter of the American effort in Vietnam but later turned against the Johnson administration's policies. John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy since World War II* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1983), 158.

18. A firsthand look at the struggle between these groups in the Cuban missile crisis is contained in Robert F. Kennedy's *Thirteen Days*. However, in some cases, and Vietnam may be one of these, the policy-making group may lapse into "groupthink." Janis, 97–130.

19. Snyder and Diesing, 382–85.
20. See, for example, Thomas M. Mongar, "Personality and Decisionmaking: John F. Kennedy in Four Crisis Decisions," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 2, no. 2 (June 1969): 200–25.
21. Snyder and Diesing, 384.
22. Probably the best and most comprehensive treatment of containment policy as practiced by various administrations is Gaddis's *Strategies of Containment*.
23. Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers* (New York: Free Press, 1986), 75–90.
24. Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 239–71.
25. Stanley Hoffman, *Gulliver's Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1968), 136.
26. Barbara W. Tuchman, *The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), 264–65.
27. Hoffman, 337.
28. Ibid.
29. Notable examples of this moderating influence by top military leaders have included support by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for continued observance of the provisions of the ABM Treaty and the unratified SALT II Treaty, despite opposition by key Reagan administration civilians.
30. Oran R. Young, *The Politics of Force: Bargaining during International Crises* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), 363.
31. This clearly played a major role in the Quemoy crisis of 1958, during which many of America's allies, especially Britain, were highly critical of US policy. See Jonathan T. Howe, *Multicrisis* (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1971), 257–59.
32. Stanley E. Spangler, "The Sino-Soviet Rapprochement: A Study in Signaling" (unpublished PhD diss., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1978).
33. Philip M. Williams, *Crisis Management* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1976), 164.
34. Snyder and Diesing, 255–56.
35. Howe, 241; see also Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, vol. 2, *The President* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 484.
36. McGeorge Bundy, transcriber, and James Blight, ed., "October 27, 1962: Transcripts of the Meetings of the ExComm," *International Security* 12, no. 3 (Winter 1987–1988): 30–92.
37. Ibid., 45.
38. Ibid.
39. Among the more useful books that deal with the subject of personality factors in decision making are James David Barber, *The Presidential Character*:

Predicting Performance in the White House (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1985); Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*; and Joseph H. de Rivera, *The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1968).

40. de Rivera, 165.

41. See Spangler's dissertation.

42. Neustadt and May, 157–80.

43. For an interesting discussion of the effect of personality on threat perception, see Raymond Cohen, *Threat Perception in International Crisis* (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979), 116–36.

44. Robert G. Kaiser, *Russia: The People and the Power* (New York: Pocket Books, 1976), 503.

45. Kearns, 269.

46. Barber, 8.

47. Ralph K. White, *Fearful Warriors: A Psychological Profile of U. S.-Soviet Relations* (New York: Free Press, 1984), 160.

48. Ambrose, 483–85.

49. Secretary of State Dulles also empathized with the Soviets and East Germans on the Berlin problem and felt the Soviets were acting primarily from defensive considerations. Based on his actions and approval of Dulles's actions (including his press conference of 26 November 1958), it is clear Eisenhower also understood Soviet motivations. Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 408.

50. Jack M. Schick, *The Berlin Crisis, 1958–1962* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), 143–45.

51. Barber, 80–81.

52. *Ibid.*, 362–63.

53. *Ibid.*, 277, 287.

54. Morton Deutsch, *The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973), 373.

55. Gaddis, 233.

56. Kearns, 253.

57. His famous American University speech of 10 June 1963, in which he proposed new approaches to the cold war friction between the United States and the Soviet Union, is an important indication of his growing sophistication in international affairs. Schlesinger, 821–24.

58. Deutsch, 375.

59. *Ibid.*, 353.

60. *Ibid.*, 367.

61. *Ibid.*, 363.

62. See Spangler's dissertation. For a discussion of Osgood's GRIT scheme, see Charles E. Osgood, *An Alternative to War or Surrender* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1962).

63. Deutsch, 358.

64. Williams, 164.

65. Ibid., 162–63.

66. Robert E. Osgood and Robert W. Tucker, *Force, Order and Justice* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), 155–56.

67. Snyder and Diesing, 462.

68. Ibid., 458–59.

69. Blechman and Kaplan, 128–29.

70. For example, Soviet local conventional superiority in the Berlin crises of 1958–59 and 1961 did not enable the Soviets to win any clear-cut victories, although it undoubtedly did strengthen their bargaining position.

71. For a discussion of communicative moves, see Williams, 171–81.

72. Thomas C. Schelling, *Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), 111.

Chapter 11

Some Final Thoughts on Force and Accommodation

It is not an uncommon thing for writers, on reviewing their work, to notice that their desire to prove a point has led to an imbalance and a lack of objectivity. To a certain extent, this author pleads guilty to that charge. In attempting to demonstrate that conciliation and the carrots of international life have too often been neglected and have frequently failed to get the credit they deserve, it is quite possible we have committed the reverse sin—that is, at times undervaluing the effectiveness of force and overvaluing the effectiveness of conciliatory measures in achieving political objectives. We have tried to avoid doing this and have attempted to emphasize that force will be a continuing and important element in international life, an element that when properly employed with diplomacy and conciliatory measures can be instrumental in achieving nonviolent resolutions of international confrontations. As long as the international system is basically anarchic in nature with no central enforcement authority, force will remain an important means of effecting change.

However, important new elements that affect the use of force and accommodation in international affairs are increasingly evident and give promise of becoming even more significant as time passes.

First, with respect to military force, it seems clear it will be used in new ways (though obviously many of its old functions will continue); it will be employed for a wider range of purposes (an increasing number of them will be domestic in nature); and it will be far more integrated with politics, diplomacy, and economics than has been true in the past. As Robert Hunter has pointed out, the world is rapidly changing and military instruments will have

to be tailored to the new demands of the 1990s and beyond. These demands are likely to be considerably different than they have been in the decades since World War II.¹

The romanticizing of war that characterized international life up until the bloody disaster that was World War I has been replaced over the years by several significant developments that have occurred more or less sequentially. These include (1) an aversion to war that began with World War I and was accelerated by World War II and the potential horrors of the nuclear age; (2) a fascination with deterrence and the management of force at conflicts below full-scale war, which in some respects is a contradiction of the aversion to war; (3) the relatively recent recognition of the severe limitations on the utility of force and a growing awareness of the value of conciliation in securing political objectives and a more stable international society; and (4), most recently, a mounting perception that in a world dominated by the superpowers' enormous nuclear arsenals there can be no *real* security for either nation unless it is *common* security.²

A fundamental fact, one clearly recognized by Mikhail Gorbachev, is that in today's nuclear world it is simply an illusion to think that one superpower can gain a meaningful military advantage over the other. One power may gain a temporary marginal advantage in certain fields but in the critical areas—for example, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and space warfare—neither power will permit the other to achieve a long-term decisive advantage. For example, despite the warming relations, it is unlikely that the Soviet Union will ever allow the United States to gain a meaningful military superiority in space, through the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program, no matter what national sacrifices the USSR has to make. This will undoubtedly remain true in spite of the Soviet Union's current serious internal problems. Only if conditions in the USSR become so bad as to prohibit research in this area would such a thing occur. Similarly, the United States will never permit the Soviets to achieve military superiority in areas that could be decisive in a full-scale conflict.

The result of this, of course, is that the superpowers have long been stalemated in the upper reaches of the conflict spectrum. Gross military capabilities, no matter how impressive, do not translate into usable military power, as both the United States and the Soviet Union found out in Vietnam and Afghanistan, respectively. If a nation must continue to build extraordinarily expensive forces in order to prevent the opponent from gaining a decisive advantage (even though both parties agree the forces are largely unusable because of the danger of destroying the planet), it is clear that there must come a point when each party recognizes this fact and says "enough." It is at that point that the long years of cold war conflict and rhetoric suddenly stand out in stark relief for what they are—a chimera, a fatuous hope that somehow one superpower can achieve security by attaining a decisive military edge over the other. Gorbachev has recognized this fact, as reflected in his statement delivered to the 27th Party Congress in February 1986:

The character of contemporary weapons leaves no country with any hope of safeguarding itself solely with military and technical means, for example by building up a defense system, even the most powerful one. The task of ensuring security is increasingly a political problem to be resolved by political means.³

On the subject of common security, Gorbachev had the following to say to the Soviet people in a television address in August 1986.

Today one's own security cannot be ensured without taking into account the security of other states and peoples. There can be no genuine security unless it is equal all around and all-encompassing. To think otherwise means to live in a world of illusion, in a world of self-deception.⁴

There is, of course, a continuing and lively debate in this country between conservatives and more liberal types on the question of whether or not Gorbachev is for real. His rhetoric to the outside world is peaceful and attractive, but some of his actions internally raise questions about his real nature and intentions. Or, as many conservatives view him, is he simply a wily and dangerous master

of public relations techniques who has managed to hoodwink the West into granting him a breathing spell in the cold war (*peredyshka*)—a respite to permit the Soviets to solve some pressing internal problems before turning again to an expansionist policy worldwide? Or, is he sincere in his stated purposes and merely struggling to bring order to a nation experiencing a profound social revolution?

Clearly, no one can answer that question with absolute certainty except perhaps Gorbachev himself. However, this author would agree with Robert Legvold of Columbia University's Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union, who believes that Gorbachev is indeed leading a real revolution in Soviet foreign policy. As Legvold puts it in stressing the importance of Gorbachev's statements:

Words, it will become apparent, are important. Words that carry with them new and different assumptions about modern international relations and the contest between East and West will become the precursors of altered deeds, indeed their source, rather than their counterpoint. . . . The Gorbachev era will turn out to be one of the great turning points in the history of Soviet foreign policy.⁵

We will leave it for others to debate whether Gorbachev is for real and whether or not he will be able to remain in power. We have our opinion, but clearly there are no guaranteed answers to either question. What is clear and of critical significance from the standpoint of this book is the fact that Gorbachev has plainly discovered four very important and fundamental things about the use of force in the nuclear age:

- Maintaining a mammoth arsenal in a long-standing super-power confrontation is immensely expensive and exacerbates serious internal economic and social problems.
- Since a very high percentage of this military power is not usable anyhow, the investment required is incommensurate with the results obtained.
- At some point even the fact that great military strength has brought the Soviets superpower status pales before the equally true

fact that continued inordinately high investment in armaments will hold back the overall economic development of the USSR to such an extent that it might well enter the twenty-first century as little better than a second- or even third-rate power. The Soviet Union is already recognized as a superpower only in the military sphere.

- Because force is so expensive and in so many respects unusable, more rewarding returns can be found by using other means of influencing international affairs—particularly conciliatory-accommodative approaches offered through a vigorous and imaginative diplomacy that in many ways is similar to what we have been calling positive diplomacy.

Gorbachev has learned these things well as reflected in his enormously successful global diplomatic offensive. As Barry F. Lowenkron put it, “Gorbachev has realized that the perception of intimidating military force can erode political acceptance and legitimacy.”⁶ In a skillful and remarkably well-orchestrated campaign, the Soviet leader has pursued a conciliatory diplomacy that has dramatically improved the image of the Soviet Union around the world. In Western Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and even Latin America, Gorbachev’s dynamic diplomacy—applied with remarkable deftness—has made the Soviet Union appear to be a progressive and reasonable power, anxious to maintain peace and to rid the world of war, especially the fear of a nuclear holocaust. Recently this image has been tarnished to some extent by internal problems, especially the crackdown in the Baltic states, but the USSR has still managed to appear as a nation promoting world harmony. The United States, on the other hand, has appeared too often as a conservative status quo power, reacting slowly and often negatively to Soviet initiatives. For many months, especially during 1988–89, the image too frequently was one of the Soviet Union moving forward with bold initiatives, eager to enter a new era of peaceful cooperation with the United States holding back, hesitant, uncertain, and suspicious, reluctant to leave the cold war behind. Though this image was not altogether correct, and the United States would later become more responsive in meeting Soviet

initiatives, it is nonetheless a perception that has received widespread acceptance around the world.

The primary point, insofar as this book is concerned, is simply this: the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev has recognized that the world is entering a new era and that various forces, most of them beyond the control of any single nation, are relentlessly dictating that new approaches must be developed in the relations between nations. Gorbachev is a remarkable personality and his talents have been instrumental in helping bring about a lessening of tension between the Soviet Union and the United States. Nevertheless, it is true that new forces and ideas have been developing in the USSR for a number of years before the current Soviet leader ascended to power, and these forces were of sufficient importance and intensity that it seemed inevitable that they would one day thrust forward a leader like Gorbachev.⁷ Mounting problems in the economy, foreign policy failures, ethnic group conflicts, and many other social and political difficulties have combined to bring about a comprehensive review of the Communist model and its apparent inability to cope with many of these challenges. Thus, Gorbachev seems a product of his times, a talented leader that these new needs and new forces have brought to the fore. Had Gorbachev not emerged, it seems highly probable that someone very much like him would have assumed the leadership role in the Soviet Union.

The point here is that Gorbachev and the Soviet Union have recognized that these new forces exist and that they must be coped with if their nation is to survive. Perhaps even more important is the fact that Gorbachev seems to have genuinely reached the conclusion that many of these new forces affect the world as a whole and can be managed only through joint efforts. Thus, his conclusion that in a world overflowing with enormous nuclear and nonnuclear arsenals and an unbelievable array of sophisticated weapons, there can be no real security unless it is common security. Until all nations, and especially the superpowers, take a genuine and realistic interest in the security concerns and needs of their neighbors and their rivals, there can be no real safety for anyone.

Gorbachev may not survive the social and economic revolution he has done so much to bring about. It is conceivable that he might be replaced by a far more conservative and militaristic regime similar to the Stalinist models of the past. Still, we think that the internal and external forces that helped bring Gorbachev to power and that brought about a warming of relations with the United States will prevent a return to the cold war of past years. US-Soviet relations will have their ups and downs, but the world forces we have discussed in previous chapters should move both nations more toward a cooperative than a conflictual relationship.

Deterrence, based on the threat of military force, is likely to play a less important role in both Soviet and American foreign policy than it has in the past. This is true for the reasons we have just discussed—the declining utility of gross military capabilities and the fact that a variety of world economic, political, and social forces are pushing the big powers in new directions, causing them to concentrate more on internal problems. After all, if one's own house is on fire, there is not as much time to worry about the neighbor who has previously been considered troublesome and dangerous.

But deterrence will clearly remain one instrument of policy for both superpowers, even though less dominant than it has been. Increasingly it will come to be based on the idea of "reasonable military sufficiency." In practice, this will probably mean that both powers will agree on means to ensure that each has an invulnerable second-strike capability but not a force structure that would encourage a first strike by either side. This will likely mean that each nation will develop mobile single-warhead missiles capable of a powerful retaliatory second strike but incapable of a decisive first strike. In the conventional area it will probably mean that Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces will agree to asymmetrical cuts that will draw down their forces to levels acceptable to the United States and its NATO allies, in return for which the United States will bring home a substantial share of its forward-based forces. Because of economic imperatives on both sides, this seems the

most likely scenario; and assuming verification measures are stringent enough, this should not result in danger to either country.

Thus, deterrence will continue to be a player in the superpower relationship but its character will be different. In effect, the idea of "reasonable military sufficiency" will become a reality, a reality created in no small measure by powerful and inexorable domestic and international economic forces.

But perhaps most important from the standpoint of this book is the fact that deterrence based on military threats will become only one of many instruments governing the relationship between the superpowers, and indeed between the superpowers and other nations. We are already witnessing the beginning of a new era in which the major world powers, frustrated by the economic and political realities that have in many respects devalued the military instrument, have begun searching for more suitable ways to exercise what Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke call "inter-nation influence."⁸ As George and Smoke point out, it is necessary to develop an array of tools for dealing with other nations in this highly complicated and interdependent world environment. As we noted earlier, deterrence will remain as one tool, but it needs to be complemented by a variety of other means for influencing the relations between nations. We particularly need to develop a better appreciation of the value of conciliatory-accommodative policies that take into account the legitimate security interests of potential adversaries. Combined with a better appreciation of the reasonableness and desirability of tailoring force structures in a "reasonable sufficiency" mode, and with a better understanding of how to integrate force with diplomacy as a means of communicating a desire for mutually agreeable settlements, we will, in effect, have adopted a new and more effective means of conducting our foreign policy.

Mikhail Gorbachev, regardless of his ultimate intentions, has clearly recognized both the value and the necessity of a foreign policy that features accommodative-cooperative measures. As Barry Lowenkron observes, "Gorbachev is developing alternatives to military force as the preponderant instrument of Soviet foreign

policy.”⁹ He has recognized that there is indeed a dynamic and salutary process that takes place when a nation skillfully and persistently begins to follow policies that feature more carrots than sticks, a process that is summarized in Morton Deutsch’s words as “cooperation breeds cooperation, while competition breeds competition.”¹⁰ Gorbachev has reaped enormous public-relations benefits by understanding this fact and by replacing Moscow’s former sterile and heavy-handed diplomacy with imaginative policies that feature accommodative measures.

If there is one major thought this author would like to leave with the reader, it is this: it is imperative for the United States to recognize, as Gorbachev clearly has, that we are entering a new era in international relations and leaving the old cold war era behind.¹¹ In doing so, we must also leave behind some of our old ways of thinking and many of our old slogans and much of our former rhetoric. Especially vital is the need to change our view of conciliatory-accommodative bargaining, to leave behind once and for all the deeply ingrained view that accommodative approaches indicate weakness and appeasement (in the post-Munich definition of that word). Munich and World War II are a half century behind us, and as Gen Douglas MacArthur put it in his farewell speech to Congress, “The world has turned over many times.”¹²

We must recognize that while our fears about weakness and appeasement that grew out of the catastrophe of World War II—which in prevailing thought was a direct result of the interwar appeasement policies of the Western Allies—are understandable fears, they have no real relation to the world as it is today. Yes, competition between the superpowers will continue, but it will be conducted on a different playing field. Yes, there will always be the danger of an aggressor appearing, as in the case of Saddam Hussein, but there is no reason the United States need ever be in a position of military weakness should this happen. We can and should maintain an adequate deterrent force, but this does not mean following policies that are designed to ensure that we have a *decisive* military advantage over our rival. In the nuclear age this simply leads to increased tension and instability. All we really

require is adequate force available to make it obvious to potential enemies that a conflict would result in unacceptable costs to them. This we can do.

Clearly there will be conflicts in the future and obviously the United States is likely to be involved directly or indirectly in some of them. We must be able to cope with these regardless of their nature. The conflict with Iraq typifies the kind of problem we may experience with increasingly strong regional military powers. It also points up the difficulty of dealing with an individual as unpredictable and unprincipled as Saddam Hussein. But in a nuclear world of intercontinental missiles, frightening chemical warfare capabilities, and sophisticated, mind-boggling conventional weapons, many of which are in evidence in the war with Iraq, the world seems to be increasingly aware that limits must be placed on the use of force if mankind is to survive. Perhaps this will be one benefit of the war—an increasing awareness that new tools and new techniques are urgently required. One of these tools will be the use of accommodation and conciliation, combined with low-profile but effective force, to influence international interactions. As evidenced in the diplomacy of Mikhail Gorbachev, accommodation is featured over force, with great public-relations benefits for the Soviets.

It is true that on occasion we will run into an individual like Saddam Hussein, a Hitler-like figure who apparently only understands force and seems to seek conflict. In such cases, the positive diplomacy we have described in this study may not prove applicable, although all the facts are not yet in even in the case of Saddam Hussein. But even granting that there are cases in which positive diplomacy may not be effective, there are many more cases of conflict in which it can be a valuable tool, one that may make the difference between a minor conflict and a major war.

The United States must also understand the benefits of such policies, put aside its former fears about accommodation, and recognize that such approaches, far from being evidence of weakness are signs of strength. They are indeed an increasingly valuable and legitimate tool of diplomacy. When we accept this

reality, not just intellectually but emotionally as well, we will have begun to follow those kinds of policies that are very similar to what we have called positive diplomacy throughout this book. It is our judgment that as we move with other countries in that direction, in both crisis and noncrisis periods, the world will become a safer and happier home for all of mankind.

Notes

1. Robert Hunter, "Next President Faces Task of Integrating Military Power, Politics," *Defense News*, 14 September 1987, 33.

2. For an interesting look at the concept of common security as seen by a group of Soviet and Western scientists and scholars, see Anatoly Gromyko and Martin Hellman, eds., *Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking* (New York: Walker and Co., 1988).

3. Quoted in Robert Legvold, *Gorbachev's Foreign Policy: How Should the United States Respond?* (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1988), Headline Series no. 284, 14.

4. Quoted in Mikhail S. Gorbachev, *Toward a Better World* (New York: Richardson & Steirman, 1987), 364.

5. Legvold, 12.

6. Barry F. Lowenkron, "The New Political Thinking: Pax Sovietica with a Human Face?" *SAIS Review* 8, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 1988): 91.

7. Legvold, 13.

8. Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 606.

9. Lowenkron, 93.

10. Morton Deutsch, *The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973), 367.

11. For Gorbachev's own views on this subject, see Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1987), 139-49.

12. Quoted from "MacArthur's 'No Substitute for Victory' Speech, 1951," in *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy*, ed. Thomas G. Paterson, vol. 2, *Since 1914* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Co., 1984), 440.

Index

- Acheson, Dean: 34–36, 38, 50, 52–53, 79, 82–84, 93, 202–3, 209, 226–27, 240, 264, 279, 298–300, 308
- Accommodation: 20, 43, 67, 76–77, 80, 87, 95, 101–2, 122–25, 127–28, 130–32, 143–44, 149, 151, 154–55, 157–59, 162–67, 171, 173, 175, 177–79, 181, 183, 185–86, 193, 198–99, 206–8, 210–11, 216, 223, 225, 228, 230–31, 233, 239, 244, 246–47, 251–53, 256, 259, 261, 263–65, 266, 268, 270, 273–74, 277, 280, 282–85, 293–94, 296–99, 303, 305–29, 331–32, 337–47
 diplomatic accommodation: 78
- Adams, John: 318
- Adenauer, Konrad: 209, 242
- Afghanistan: 81, 112, 115, 339
- Africa: 341
- American-Soviet relationship. *See* US-Soviet relations
- Appeasement: 53
- Arms control: 112
- Asia: 318, 341
- Asymmetrical bargaining: 30, 123, 157, 185, 224–25, 244, 270, 312
- Asymmetrical power: 225, 267, 276, 313–14
- Ball, George: 138, 301
- Baltic states: 341
- Bandung Conference (1955): 169
- Bay of Pigs operation: 223, 230, 240
- Berlin: 42, 48, 194–95, 197–99, 201–5, 208–10, 212–13, 216–17, 222–23, 226, 230, 233–37, 240, 242, 255, 257–58, 318, 321, 329
- Berlin crises
 1948–49: 195, 299
 1958–59: 5, 165, 193–94, 197–98, 200, 205–7, 211–12, 214, 216–17, 221–22, 224, 243, 246, 251, 260, 264–65, 293, 300, 311, 313, 315, 327–28, 330
 1961: 137, 198, 221–22, 224–25, 229, 231–32, 234, 236, 239–44, 246–47, 251, 256, 260, 264–66, 298, 300, 304, 311, 313, 315, 327–28, 330–31
- Berlin Wall: 224, 232–34, 238, 242–43, 246
- Bien Hoa: 283
- Big Four Geneva Conference (1955): 94

Bismarck, Otto von: 3
 Bohlen, Charles: 34, 36–37, 226
 Borshakov, Georgi: 236
 Brazil: 8, 110, 112
 Brezhnev, Leonid: 172
 Brezhnev Doctrine: 75
 Bulganin, Nikolay: 196
 Bulgaria: 53
 Bush, George: 13, 53, 90, 321, 323, 325

 Callieres, Francois de: 19
 Cambodia: 147
 Camp David Accords: 325
 Carter, Jimmy: 172, 318–21, 324
 Castro, Fidel: 252, 262
 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): 159–60
 Chamberlain, Neville: 64, 279
 Charlemagne: 3
 Chiang Kai-shek: 143–44, 146, 150, 152–55, 160–63, 169–70, 177–79, 184
 China/Chinese: 35, 38, 58, 60, 63, 72–73, 83, 112, 117, 144, 153, 156,
 160–61, 168–69, 178, 183–84, 187, 196–97, 223, 269, 272–73, 278, 300,
 309, 312, 316, 318–20, 327
 Communists: 59, 73, 85, 130, 143–44, 146–53, 155–62, 164, 167–69,
 171, 176, 178–79, 182–84, 196, 222, 255, 257–58
 mainland: 147, 155–56, 162, 170, 183
 Nationalists: 143, 146, 148, 150, 152–54, 156, 158, 161, 164–65, 179,
 181, 183, 187
 Nationalist Chinese navies: 150–51
 two-Chinas concept: 150
 Chou En-lai: 82, 116, 148, 159, 162, 165, 168, 170–74, 315
 Churchill, Winston: 82, 160, 242
 Classical diplomacy: 12
 Clausewitz, Carl von: 107
 Clifford, Clark: 37
 Coercive diplomacy: 4, 10, 15–17, 19, 23–24, 40, 43, 50–51, 63, 76, 107,
 118–19, 123–24, 143–44, 151, 185–86, 193, 205, 216, 231, 239–40, 244,
 252–54, 261, 263, 266, 268–71, 274, 277, 294–95, 297–302, 306–10, 312,
 314–16, 318–20, 323, 327–29
 Cognitive dissonance: 75, 85
 Colonel's fallacy: 186

Communication process in international relations
 cooperative-accommodative aspects: 326–27
 indices: 128–29, 131, 143, 162, 177–78, 181, 231
 rhetoric: 70–71, 74, 305–6, 339
 signaling (direct and indirect): 128–30, 143, 177, 181, 183, 210–11, 231–33, 245, 332
 slogans: 305–6
 Compromise: 20, 64, 67, 72, 82, 91, 93–96, 118, 126, 128, 157, 159, 166, 176, 179, 181, 183, 186–87, 207, 211, 232, 253, 257, 259, 263, 268, 294, 296, 317, 323–25, 337, 341, 344
 Conciliatory behavior. *See* accommodation, compromise, inducements, and negotiation
 Containment doctrine: 14, 23–35, 39, 40–42, 49–50, 52, 56, 60, 63–65, 67, 70–71, 74–78, 136, 158, 162–63, 278, 284, 305, 331
 Containment paradigm: 25, 50–52, 55, 64, 73, 93, 303
 Convergence of expectations: 128, 175, 183, 332
 Coolidge, Calvin: 318
 Counterinsurgency: 63
 Crisis management: 107
 Cuba: 81, 112, 115, 230, 246, 252, 255, 257, 260, 262, 264, 266, 270, 313, 318
 Cuban missile crisis (1962): 3, 5, 30, 48, 52, 104, 117, 137, 198, 226, 246, 251–55, 257–61, 263–70, 293–94, 299–300, 304, 311, 313–15, 327, 330
 Czechoslovakia: 42, 54, 81

 Dardanelles: 54
 de Gaulle, Charles. *See* Gaulle, Charles de
 Democratic Advisory Council: 202
 Desert Storm. *See* operations
 Deterrence: 4, 10, 15–17, 23–27, 40, 49–52, 60, 63–65, 77–78, 101, 107, 119, 206, 229, 284, 295, 331, 343
 Domino theory: 58, 70
 Dulles, John Foster: 14, 50, 52–53, 60, 82–91, 93, 95, 136, 143–44, 146–54, 156, 159–60, 162–72, 174, 177, 181, 187, 193–95, 197–210, 212–17, 308

 East Berlin: 233, 238
 Eastern Europe: 103, 197
 East Germans/Germany: 194–95, 199, 205, 207, 210, 212, 222–24, 232–34, 241, 243, 245, 265, 321
 Egypt: 9

Eisenhower, Dwight D.: 6, 14, 41, 50, 53, 60, 82–86, 88–89, 91, 136–37,
 143–44, 146–47, 149–54, 156, 159–69, 171–74, 181, 183–84, 187,
 193–94, 197, 199–200, 202–4, 206–17, 221, 223, 229–30, 236, 240,
 245–46, 265, 301, 307–9, 315, 318–19, 321, 323–24
 Eisenhower-Dulles “New Look.” *See* New Look
 Ellis Island: 169
 England: 59, 110, 296
 Ethiopia: 61
 ExComm: 252, 264, 313

 Far East American Council of Commerce: 153
 Federal Republic of Germany: 195–96, 201
 Finland: 54
 Force, use of military: 132, 215, 223, 229, 261, 293–96, 299–300, 309, 318,
 329, 331, 337–47
 Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow: 83
 Formosa: 143, 146–48, 154, 161
 Formosa Resolution (1955): 144, 184
 Formosa Strait: 145, 150, 152, 161, 168–69, 177–79, 318, 321
 Formulism/formula thinking: 63, 65, 305
 France: 47, 53, 59, 110, 228, 240, 274–75
 Fulbright, William J.: 226, 232–33, 300

 Gaulle, Charles de: 209, 242, 281
 Gavin, James M.: 301, 307
 Geneva: 148
 Geneva Conference (1954): 170
 Geographical factors: 311, 314
 German blitz: 296
 German Democratic Republic (GDR): 195, 221–22
 Germany: 47, 64, 110, 197–98, 202, 204, 235, 321
 Gibraltar: 147
 Goodpaster, Andrew: 301
 Gorbachev, Mikhail: 4, 8–9, 13, 23, 40, 50–52, 78, 82, 90, 101, 109, 116–17,
 119–20, 125, 127, 172, 196, 307, 325, 327, 338–46
 Great Britain: 47, 53, 152, 155–56, 198, 228
 Greece: 54
 Grenada: 293, 323

GRIT (graduated reciprocation in tension-reduction): 117, 119, 127, 168, 174, 327

Gromyko, Andrey: 242

Hanoi: 271, 275–76

Harding, Warren G.: 318

Harriman, Averell: 28, 226, 228, 298, 300–301

Hitler, Adolf: 3, 25, 53, 61, 64, 77, 82, 106, 121, 229, 257, 278, 296–97, 304, 325

Ho Chi Minh: 82, 274–75, 279, 282

Hoffman, Stanley: 47–48, 62–63

Hoover, Herbert: 318

Hopkins, Harry: 82

House, Edward M.: 82

Hungary: 54, 81

Hussein, Saddam: 82, 121, 296, 321, 325, 345–46

Inchon: 103

India: 8, 110, 112

Indices. *See* communication process

Indochina: 306

Indonesia: 147

Inducements: 13–14, 20, 48–49, 51, 60, 63–65, 67, 72, 76, 80, 82, 86, 93–95, 101, 128, 150–51, 164, 177, 215, 253, 269, 294

Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: 117

Iran: 9, 54, 110, 112–13, 320, 325

Iraq: 7–10, 102, 106, 110, 112–13, 346

Islam: 110

Israel: 8, 110, 112–13

Japan: 33, 36, 58, 103, 110, 147

Jefferson, Thomas: 317

Johnson, Lyndon B.: 3, 53, 60–61, 68, 95, 138–40, 172, 225, 265, 268–71, 277–84, 301, 304, 306, 308, 315–19, 321–24

Joint Chiefs of Staff: 160, 203, 212, 226, 240, 242, 265, 300

Jordan: 9

Kennan, George F.: 21, 25, 27–37, 39–42, 49, 54, 56, 76, 136, 304

 Long telegram: 28, 54

 “Mr. X” article: 29–30

Kennedy, John F.: 3, 14, 51, 53, 60, 117, 137, 171, 221–37, 239–47, 252–53, 256–67, 269, 279–80, 293, 298, 301, 306, 309, 313–15, 317–24, 330
 Kennedy, Joseph P., Jr.: 229
 Kennedy, Robert: 279, 301
 Khan, Genghis: 3
 Khrushchev, Nikita: 3, 143, 152, 172, 184, 194, 196–97, 199, 202–3, 205–6, 209–11, 217, 222, 226–28, 230–36, 238, 240–44, 246–47, 252, 255–67, 313–16, 329
 Kissinger, Henry: 103–4, 116, 170–73, 327
 Korea: 42, 58–59, 69, 112, 147
 Korean War/crises: 34, 36–37, 39, 48, 58, 60, 75, 83, 130, 299, 304
 Kremlin: 196
 Kuomintang: 152

 Laos: 147, 226, 269–70, 275–76, 293
 Latin America: 341
 LeMay, Curtis E.: 272
 Lenin: 82, 85
 Libya/Libyan: 11–12, 293, 323
 Low-intensity conflict: 12, 114

 MacArthur, Douglas: 59, 95, 345
 Macmillan, Harold: 160, 209
 Malaya: 147
 Malenkov: 196
 Manchuria: 61
 Mao Tse-tung: 82, 116, 143, 159, 168, 274
 Mansfield, Mike: 226, 300
 Marshall, George C.: 82–83
 Massive retaliation: 197–240
 McCarthy, Joseph: 279, 306
 McCloy, John: 227, 243
 McKinley, William: 3
 McNamara, Robert S.: 68–69, 72–73, 75, 82, 138–39, 279, 282, 301
 Mekong River: 284
 Metternich: 3
 Middle East: 113, 318, 325, 341
 Mikoyan, Anastas: 208
 Military diplomacy: 4, 10, 15. *See also* deterrence and coercive diplomacy

Missiles

American: 262, 264, 266, 313

Jupiter: 262

offensive: 264

Soviet: 252, 255, 262, 264

Missile gap: 222, 238, 257

Missile sites: 265

Monopoly capitalism: 90

Moscow: 195, 217, 227

Moyers, William: 301

Munich/Munich syndrome: 52, 61, 74, 76, 162, 245, 278, 304, 320

Murphy, Robert: 211

Mussolini: 325

Mutual security: 120

Napoléon: 110

National Security Council (NSC): 283

document 20/1: 32

NATO: 195–96, 200, 203, 207–8, 343

NATO Ministerial Council: 207

Negotiating from strength: 20, 78–80, 83, 158

Negotiation: 63–64, 67, 72, 78, 80, 83–84, 87, 93, 101, 171, 210, 213, 228, 230, 232

New Look: 14

Newport memorandum (4 September): 165

New York Times: 234

Nicaragua: 112, 115, 323

Nitze, Paul: 34, 226, 240, 300

Nixon, Richard: 116, 170, 172, 230, 272, 309–10, 316, 318–22, 324, 327

Nixon/Kissinger team: 32, 52, 93

Norstad, Lauris: 203

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): 33

North Korea/Koreans: 57–58, 64

attack on South Korea: 35–36

North Vietnam/Vietnamese: 64, 71–72, 269, 271–73, 275–76, 280–82, 296, 321

NSC-68: 34–40, 49, 56, 281

Nuclear risk-reduction centers: 105

Nuclear war/confrontation: 114

Operation Desert Storm: 293
 Osgood, Charles E.: 117, 119, 127, 174, 327

 Pakistan: 8, 110, 112
 Palmerston: 3
 Panama: 293
 Paris summit meeting: 217
 Partial Test Ban Treaty: 304
 Peking: 146, 163, 169–70, 177

 People's Republic of China (PRC): 8, 72, 110, 116, 130, 143–44, 146–51, 153, 155–59, 161, 163–64, 167–69, 171, 174, 176–81, 183–84
Peredyshka (cold war): 340
 Perimeter-defense: 30
 Persian Gulf: 102, 112, 119, 295, 308, 321
 Personality factors in foreign policy: 81–83, 93
 Philippines: 147
 Pleiku: 283
 Poland: 42, 53, 81
 Politburo: 168
 Positive diplomacy: 7, 10, 13–15, 17–20, 24–25, 27–28, 33, 43, 64, 67, 96, 118–19, 121–22, 125, 127–28, 131, 133, 144, 151, 155–57, 159, 163, 166, 171–74, 183, 186, 193–94, 199, 206, 209, 211, 213, 216, 221, 223, 237, 246–47, 251–56, 259, 261, 263, 266–68, 270, 273, 277, 281, 283–85, 293–94, 298–302, 309–10, 317–22, 324, 326, 329, 332, 341, 346–47
 bargaining process: 60, 67, 87, 94–95, 101, 122, 124, 126–27, 143, 149, 154, 157, 167, 174–76, 184–85, 199, 207, 209, 224, 232
 communication: 128–31, 133, 154, 177, 209–11, 217, 232, 235, 283–84, 296
 personalities: 81, 125, 154, 159, 163, 166, 171–73, 199, 206, 225, 229–31, 245–47, 259, 273, 277, 279–80, 311, 314–17, 319–23, 326, 342
 structure of the situation: 122, 154–55, 157, 166, 195–98, 239, 276
 vital interests and resolve: 156, 198
Profiles in Courage: 229
 Prussia: 110
 Public opinion: 311
 Pusan: 103

Qadhafi, Muammar: 11–12
 Quemoy-Matsu crisis (1958): 5, 143–44, 146–47, 149–51, 153–55, 157–61,
 163–68, 170–86, 193, 197, 200, 211, 216, 221, 251, 264–65, 293, 300,
 311, 313, 315, 321, 327, 330–31

 Radford, Arthur W.: 160
 Reagan, Ronald: 3, 13, 53, 310, 318, 323–25
 Republican Right: 162, 167–68
 Resolve dominance: 123, 156–58, 185
 Rhetoric. *See* communication process
 Ridgway, Matthew B.: 6, 301, 307
 Rolling Thunder: 3
 Romania: 53
 Roosevelt, Franklin D.: 42, 53, 82, 317
 Roosevelt, Theodore: 3
 Rostow, Walter W.: 140, 228, 232, 279, 301
 Rusk, Dean: 53, 60–61, 73, 138, 140, 236, 242, 279, 282, 301

 Salinger, Pierre: 235–36
 Saudi Arabia: 9, 113
 Seventh Fleet: 146, 151–52, 178, 181, 183, 186
 Shultz, George: 325
 Signaling. *See* communication process
 Sino-American relations: 73, 116, 169–70
 Sino-Soviet conflict: 222
 Sorensen, Ted: 301
 South Africa: 311
 Southeast Asia: 61, 70, 277–78
 South Korea: 35–37, 57–59
 South Vietnam: 68–69, 269, 271–76, 278–79, 281–82
 Soviet-American crises: 95
 Soviet Union/Soviets: 3–4, 8–9, 23–25, 27–35, 37, 39–42, 47, 50, 53–54, 56,
 58–59, 62–63, 73, 77–78, 80–90, 92–96, 101, 103, 105, 108–10, 112–14,
 118, 121, 143, 155, 158–61, 164–65, 168, 183–84, 187, 195–200, 202–10,
 212–14, 216–17, 221–24, 226, 228–29, 232–38, 240–42, 245–46, 255,
 257–58, 260–62, 264, 266–67, 269, 273–74, 279, 298, 300, 309, 311–12,
 321, 338–42
 Sputnik: 197, 211
 Stalin, Joseph: 3, 13, 25, 37, 82, 85, 90, 202, 325
 State Department (US): 34, 37, 177, 273, 283

Statement of 4 September: 147–49, 151, 169, 260
 Stevenson, Adlai: 226, 298, 300
 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) II: 6
 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI): 338
 Strong-point defense: 30–31, 35
 Suez: 147
 Sulzberger, C. L.: 234–35
 Symmetrical bargaining: 165, 185, 199, 216, 224–25, 244, 312–14
 Syria: 9, 110, 113

 Tacit bargaining techniques: 143, 171, 174, 177
 Taft, William Howard: 318
 Taipei: 150, 169
 Taiwan: 144, 155–56, 158, 163–64, 169, 178, 183–84, 299
 Taylor, Maxwell: 203, 226
 Tension reduction: 125
 Terrorism/terrorist: 11–12, 109, 114
 Tet offensive: 71
 Thailand: 147
 Thant, U: 281
 Thompson, Llewellyn: 37, 226, 228, 242, 298, 301
 Threats: 128, 253
 Tienanmen Square: 73
 Tocqueville, Alexis de: 25
 Truman, Harry S.: 13, 32–38, 41–42, 50, 52–54, 57–59, 83, 85, 91, 95, 279, 306, 319–20
 Turkey: 54, 262, 264, 266, 313–14
 Turkish incident: 55
 22d Party Congress: 242

 United Nations: 167
 United States: 3–4, 8–9, 23–25, 27–28, 30–31, 40, 47–48, 52, 56, 59, 72–73, 77, 80–81, 84, 86–87, 89, 93–96, 105, 107–10, 112–15, 117, 130, 143, 146–48, 150–59, 161–63, 167, 169, 171, 174, 176–79, 183–84, 197–99, 281
 United States Navy: 151, 184
 US-Soviet arms control agreements: 106
 US-Soviet relations: 23, 28, 40, 49, 52, 62, 91, 93, 105, 108, 114–17, 119, 122, 307–8, 314, 325, 327, 331, 343
 USSR: 108, 255, 338, 341–42

U-2 incident: 217

Vienna: 222

Vietcong: 3, 271, 273, 276, 282–83

Vietnam/Vietnamese: 3, 40, 61, 68–69, 71–73, 75, 116, 147, 252, 265,
268–69, 271–85, 301, 303–5, 307–8, 311, 315–17, 319, 325, 327–28, 339

Vietnam War: 48, 50, 60, 276, 281, 296, 299–300, 304, 312

Vo Nguyen Giap: 82

Warsaw: 148–49, 152, 162, 170, 177, 343

Wars of national liberation: 70

Washington: 170, 177–78

Washington, George: 23, 318

Watergate: 316

West Berlin: 196, 198, 232–33, 242–43

West Germans/Germany: 33, 195, 197, 200, 223, 228, 240

Western Europe: 201

Wheeler, Earle: 301

White House: 106

Why England Slept: 229

Wilson, Harold: 281

Wilson, Woodrow: 318

World War I: 77, 106, 304, 338

World War II: 23, 25, 43, 47, 53, 61, 74, 76–77, 101–2, 105, 167, 304, 320,
338

“Mr. X.” *See* George F. Kennan

Yugoslavia: 54

